IN RE NICHOLAS ALLEN ACKLIN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NICHOLAS ALLEN ACKLIN,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 270570
Midland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-002420-NA
JENNIFER DAVENPORT,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
her minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (h), and (j). We affirm. This appeal is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court
determines that petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must terminate respondent’s
parental rights unless it determines that to do so is clearly not in the child’s best interests. In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. In re
Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
The trial court did not clearly err when it found the evidence clear and convincing to
terminate respondent’s parental rights to the minor child. Respondent had a history of engaging
in activities that resulted in her incarceration. She gave birth to the minor child while
incarcerated and, when she was released, engaged in further criminal activity causing her to be
incarcerated again. When the minor child was brought into care, respondent was incarcerated
and was incarcerated again at the time of the termination trial. The conditions that resulted in the
trial court taking jurisdiction over the minor child continued to exist at the time of the
termination trial, and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified
within a reasonable time considering the age of the minor child. Given respondent’s history of
criminality, there was a reasonable likelihood that the minor child would be harmed if returned to
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the care of respondent. Furthermore, respondent was imprisoned for a period exceeding two
years and would be unable to provide a normal home for the minor child at that time or within a
reasonable period of time.1
The trial court also did not err in its best interests determination. MCL 712A.19b(5).
Respondent engaged in activities that caused her incarceration even after the minor child was
taken into the temporary custody of the court. Respondent’s earliest out date was in 2010. The
minor child was entitled to permanency and stability, and respondent could not provide that for
him while she was incarcerated.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
1
The trial court did not address the issue of MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(a) in its opinion although it
included this statutory subsection in its order. Any error in this regard is harmless because the
court had ample evidence to find that the other statutory sections were met.
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