PEOPLE OF MI V CURTIS LEE MARTIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 263531
Schoolcraft Circuit Court
LC No. 05-006434-FH
CURTIS LEE MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the circuit court’s order reversing the district
court’s decision to bind defendant over for trial on a charge of domestic violence, third offense,
MCL 750.81(4). We reverse and remand.
Defendant was charged with assaulting his wife. At issue is the admissibility of
statements made by complainant recounting the circumstances of the assault to her landlord, who
was also her neighbor, and to an investigating officer shortly after the assault had occurred. At
the preliminary examination, complainant’s landlord testified that she heard loud voices and
“scuffling” from upstairs where defendant and complainant resided. Complainant came
downstairs and entered her apartment. Complainant was crying, and was trembling and upset.
Complainant sat in a chair, and “right away” stated that defendant had scraped or scratched her
with a comb. The landlord saw that complainant had sustained an injury to her arm.1
Complainant went back upstairs, and when she returned, defendant followed her. Defendant was
visibly intoxicated. The landlord testified that several days later, she heard defendant tell
complainant to make certain when they came to court that she stated that they were just drunk
and arguing.
A police officer responded to a request for assistance shortly after the incident. He noted
that complainant appeared very upset. He asked her to describe what had happened. She
explained how defendant had assaulted her. The interview took approximately 15 minutes. The
1
She also testified that she had seen a previous injury to complainant’s nose. Complainant said
that defendant had “backhanded” her in the face.
-1-
officer prepared a report and photographed complainant’s arm as well as the previous injury to
her nose.
The district court bound defendant over for trial on a charge of domestic violence, third
offense. The prosecutor filed a notice of sentence enhancement charging defendant as a third
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, in light of defendant’s two prior convictions of domestic assault.
The prosecutor filed a motion in limine with the circuit court to admit the testimony of the
landlord and the officer regarding complainant’s statements pursuant to MCR 803(2). The
circuit court determined that the testimony was admissible under MRE 803(2), but that its
admission would violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under People v
Crawford, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), because complainant likely
would be unable to testify at trial.2 The trial court treated the matter as a defense motion to
quash the bindover, granted the motion, and remanded the case to the district court without
dismissing the charge. The trial court also granted the prosecution’s motion for a stay pending
appeal.
We review a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to quash an information de
novo to determine if the district court abused its discretion in binding over a defendant for trial.
People v Green, 260 Mich App 710, 714; 680 NW2d 477 (2004).
“A district court must bind a defendant over for trial when the prosecutor presents
competent evidence constituting probable cause to believe that (1) a felony was committed and
(2) the defendant committed that felony.” People v Northey, 231 Mich App 568, 574; 591
NW2d 227 (1998). In order to bind the defendant over for trial the court is not required to find
that the evidence presented at the preliminary examination proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 278; 615 NW2d 784 (2000). When
deciding to bind a defendant over, the magistrate may factor into its consideration direct or
circumstantial evidence. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it found that complainant’s statements were
“testimonial” and could thus not be used against defendant at trial. We agree in part.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal
accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .” See also Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
In Crawford the United States Supreme Court articulated a bright-line rule against admission of
custodial statements by a nontestifying witness against a criminal defendant. The Court held that
the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.” Crawford, supra at 53-54. The Court did not set forth comprehensive
criteria for determining what constituted testimonial statements for this purpose. It did, however,
set out “various formulations” of the core class of “testimonial” statements. The Court did not
2
Complainant, age 92, was admitted to a long-term care facility for reasons apparently unrelated
to the assault. We decide this appeal under the assumption that complainant will not be available
to testify.
-2-
endorse any of these formulations, but noted that “some statements qualify under any definition,”
including ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing, and “statements taken by police officers in
the course of interrogations.” Id. at 52. The Court also determined that answers that were
“knowingly given in response to structured police questioning” qualified under any definition of
police interrogation. Id. at 53 n 4.
In Davis v Washington, 547 US ___; 126 S Ct 2266; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006), which dealt
with statements made to police officers, the United States Supreme Court refined its definition of
testimonial statements somewhat. It held that:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
[Id. at 2273-2274.]
Applying this principle, the Court found that a recording of the early parts of
conversation between a victim of domestic abuse and a 911 operator, in which the victim mainly
described her need for assistance, was nontestimonial, and therefore not absolutely excluded by
the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 2271, 2276-2277. However, in Davis’ companion case,
where the police responded to a report of a domestic disturbance, separated the parties, asked
questions about what had occurred, and then had the complainant fill out and sign a “battery
affidavit,” the Court held that the statements provided by the complainant were testimonial and
thus excluded by the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2272-2273, 2278. The Davis Court further
held that statements made in the absence of questioning were not necessarily nontestimonial. Id.
at 2274 n 1. The Court declined, however, to further decide “whether and when statements made
to someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’” Id. at 2274 n 2.
In the present case, defendant challenged two separate sets of hearsay statements, those
complainant made to her neighbor when initially seeking help, and those she later made to the
police officer. As to the statements to the officer, we conclude that they were testimonial as that
term is defined in Crawford, supra, and Davis, supra. Despite the lack of formal questioning,
complainant’s remarks were made to essentially build a case against defendant for assault, and
were similar to the statements made in Davis, supra. Even if those remarks qualified as excited
utterances, or as some other form of otherwise admissible hearsay, they were testimonial in
nature and thus barred from use at trial by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The
trial court did not err when it held that these statements were inadmissible.
However, we conclude that complainant’s initial requests for help were not testimonial.
Instead, like the 911 caller in Davis, supra, complainant made those statements to obtain a
position of temporary safety with her landlord. The testimony that defendant continued to
attempt to pursue complainant as she sought assistance supports a finding that complainant’s
initial statements related to an ongoing emergency rather than to a description about a past event.
She was not seeking, at that time, to create a record to be used against defendant. Therefore,
even assuming that Crawford, supra, would bar testimonial statements to persons other than
-3-
police officers, we hold that the trial court erred when it found that the use of complainant’s
initial statements to her landlord was barred by the Confrontation Clause.
With this in mind, we find that the magistrate did not err in binding defendant over for
trial. Complainant’s initial statements to her landlord provided evidence of the identity of her
assailant and the means and manner of the assault. When these statements are coupled with the
witnesses’ observations of complainant’s demeanor, the testimony concerning defendant’s
actions during and after the event in question, and the photographs of complainant’s injuries, the
evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant assaulted the complainant.
Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to quash the information.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
