PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN LEE WIECZOREK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263592
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-003466-FC
JOHN LEE WIECZOREK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f), and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,
MCL 750.84.1 Pursuant to MCL 769.12, he was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to
concurrent prison terms of 30 to 100 years for the CSC I conviction, and 6 to 100 years for the
assault conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Underlying Facts
On the evening of May 13, 2004, defendant picked up the victim on Eight Mile Road in
Detroit. The victim testified that she agreed to have sex with defendant in exchange for money.
Defendant drove his company truck to a dark area behind a factory off Eight Mile Road. The
victim testified that as soon as defendant parked, he punched her in the face, and thereafter
pulled her hair and repeatedly struck her in the face and head. Defendant then pulled down his
pants, held the victim’s head, and briefly “stuck his penis” in her mouth. Defendant then pulled
down the victim’s pants, directed her to kneel, and announced that he was going to have anal sex
with her. Defendant placed his penis in the victim’s anus briefly, as he continued to pull her hair
and punch her. Eventually, the victim unlocked and opened the passenger side door, and rolled
out of the truck onto the ground. Defendant “jumped out [of the truck] on top of [the victim] and
started punching [her] again in the face.” He then allegedly choked her and threatened to kill
her. The victim managed to escape, and obtained a ride to a nearby gas station where Richard
Radtke, her former husband, was waiting. The victim did not report the matter to the police.
1
Defendant was acquitted of an additional charge of CSC I.
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On May 14, 2004, the police questioned defendant after his company’s foreman reported
that blood, vomit, and hair were in the truck that defendant had returned. Testimony from the
foreman and police officers revealed that there was a “large amount” of “blood splatter
throughout the passenger side,” “smears on the window,” “blood splatters” on the floor, roof, and
seat, and hair “wrapped around” the window handle. Defendant gave four different explanations
about what happened in the truck. Defendant first stated that he had cut his finger, but later
claimed that he had assaulted a female prostitute on Eight Mile Road after she attempted to rob
him at knifepoint. After learning about defendant’s arrest, the victim contacted the police. DNA
testing of the blood found in the truck matched a DNA sample taken from the victim. Testing of
blood found on the shirt defendant was wearing on May 13, 2004, revealed a mixture of
defendant’s and the victim’s DNA. But “[m]ost of the blood was from [the victim].”
Defendant testified on his own behalf, and claimed that he was acting in self-defense.
Defendant admitted that he solicited the victim for oral sex. He claimed, however, that after he
parked and pulled down his pants, the victim brandished a knife, demanded money, and
indicated that her accomplice was nearby.2 As the victim reached for defendant’s money, he
struck her and forced her out of the passenger side door. Defendant struck the victim again when
she held onto the door, and they both fell out of the truck. Defendant got back in the truck and
left. Defendant claimed that he repeatedly lied to the police to conceal his act of soliciting a
prostitute.
II. Venue
Defendant first agues that he was improperly tried in Macomb County because the
offenses occurred in Wayne County. We disagree. “A trial court’s determination regarding the
existence of venue in a criminal prosecution is reviewed de novo.” People v Webbs, 263 Mich
App 531, 533; 689 NW2d 163 (2004) (citation omitted). Venue is part of every criminal
prosecution and must be proven by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Due process
requires that the trial of criminal prosecutions should be by a jury of the county or city where the
offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by the Legislature. Id. The following
exception is provided in MCL 762.3(1):
Any offense committed on the boundary line of 2 counties or within one
mile of the dividing line between them, may be alleged in the indictment to have
been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished in either county.
Defendant does not dispute that the offenses occurred within one block of Eight Mile
Road. Defendant only argues that the acts occurred on the Detroit side of Eight Mile Road,
which is Wayne County. In the relevant area, Eight Mile Road is the boundary between Wayne
County and Macomb County. Because the offenses occurred within one mile of the boundary
between the two counties, venue was proper in either county. MCL 762.3(1). Consequently, the
trial court was authorized to try defendant in Macomb County.
2
The victim denied possessing a knife.
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III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant also argues that his convictions and sentences for CSC I and assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, arising from a single assault, violate his double
jeopardy protections against multiple punishments for the same offense. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to raise this issue below, we review this claim for plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 752-753, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in
jeopardy for a single offense, including multiple punishments for the same offense. US Const,
Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Torres, 452 Mich 43, 63-64; 549 NW2d 540 (1996).
But there is no violation of double jeopardy protections if one crime is complete before the other
takes place, even if the offenses share common elements. See People v Lugo, 214 Mich App
699, 708; 542 NW2d 921 (1995); People v Swinford, 150 Mich App 507, 515; 389 NW2d 462
(1986).
In Swinford, this Court upheld the defendant’s convictions of assault with intent to
commit CSC involving penetration and CSC I because “each offense occurred separately.” Id. at
516. The defendant engaged in a car chase with the victim, ultimately running her off the road.
Id. at 511. The defendant exited his car, approached the victim, “pulled the [victim] to the back
seat of the car and proceeded to commit various acts of criminal sexual conduct.” “After
threatening to kill her, the [defendant] drove away in his car.” Id. This Court explained that the
defendant was convicted of the assault charge based on his actions during the car chase, and the
CSC charge arose out of his actions after the cars had come to a stop. Id. at 515-516.
As it relates to this case, a person is guilty of CSC I if the person “(1) causes personal
injury to the victim, (2) engages in sexual penetration with the victim, and (3) uses force or
coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration.” People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 629; 685
NW2d 657 (2004). “Assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder requires
proof of (1) an attempt or threat with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an
assault), and (2) an intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” People v Parcha, 227 Mich
App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997).
The victim testified that, while inside the truck, defendant repeatedly punched her and
pulled her hair as he forced her to engage in anal sex. The victim opened the door and rolled
onto the ground. According to the victim, defendant then “jumped out on top of [her],” “started
punching [her] again in the face,” choked her, and threatened to kill her before she escaped.
Defendant’s CSC I charge arose out of his actions inside the truck, and the assault charge arose
out of his actions outside the truck after the CSC I offense had been completed. Because
defendant committed two distinct offenses during the same episode of criminal behavior, the
double jeopardy provisions do not prohibit multiple punishments for those separate acts.
Swinford, supra at 516. Consequently, there was no plain error in this regard.
IV. Offense Variables
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Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in scoring OV 4 (psychological
injury to a victim), OV 7 (aggravated physical abuse), and OV 8 (asportation) of the sentencing
guidelines. We disagree. “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of
points to be scored, provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.”
People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). A scoring decision for
which there is any evidence in support will be upheld. Id.
A. OV 4
MCL 777.34(1)(a) provides that ten points are to be scored if “[s]erious psychological
injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.” “In making this determination, the
fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive.” MCL 777.34(2). The trial court’s
score of ten points was supported by the victim’s impact statement, in which she stated that the
“crime has left [her] fearful and untrusting of people,” “[b]eing alone out in public often scares
[her],” and that “[t]he emotional injuries will probably never heal completely.”
B. OV 7
MCL 777.37(1)(a) directs a score of 50 points if the victim was “treated with sadism,
torture, or excessive brutality.” In her impact statement, the victim indicated that she suffered
numerous injuries, which took more than a month to heal. The victim testified that defendant
continuously beat her for 10 to 15 minutes. The victim explained that there were “bruises over
[her] whole face,” her “eyes were swollen and black,” her “mouth was swollen” with “lots of
cuts,” and “half [her] hair was ripped out.” Radtke testified that the victim’s “face was black and
blue,” her “hair was pulled out,” and she “had a bloody mouth, bloody nose, black eyes, [and]
fingerprints around her neck.” A police evidence technician opined that, given the amount of
blood splatter, “a substantial injury occurred to someone.” This evidence indicates that the
victim was treated with excessive brutality and supports the trial court’s score of 50 points for
OV 7.
C. OV 8
MCL 777.38(1)(a) directs a score of 15 points if the “victim was asported to another
place of greater danger or to a situation of greater danger.” The victim testified that, after
defendant picked her up, she told him that “there’s [sic] some areas that [she] used to park.”
Defendant told the victim that he could not park his truck in residential areas, but he “knew of a
place.” Defendant then drove about a mile, and parked in a “very dark” and secluded area
behind a factory. This evidence was sufficient to show that the victim was asported to a place of
greater danger. Defendant focuses on the fact that the victim “was not physically forced to
accompany [him].” But this Court has explained that “‘asportation’ as used in MCL
777.38(1)(a) can be accomplished without the employment of force against the victim.” People
v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 647; 658 NW2d 504 (2003). Because there was evidence to
support the trial court’s score of 15 points for OV 8, there was no abuse of discretion.
V. Defendant’s Supplemental Brief
A. Effective Assistance of Counsel
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In a supplemental brief filed in propria persona, defendant contends that a new trial is
required because defense counsel was ineffective, or alternatively, that remand is necessary to
enable him to develop this claim. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to raise this issue in the trial court in connection with a motion
for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on
the record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin (On
Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Id.
Defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to “attempt to cross
examine the complaining witness on inconsistent, conflicting, or possible perjured testimony
given at preliminary examination, and during trial.” Defense counsel did, in fact, question the
victim about certain inconsistencies in her testimony at the preliminary examination. Defendant
has not identified any other contradictions, or what factual information could potentially be
obtained at an evidentiary hearing. As the appellant, defendant is required to do more than
merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for
his claims. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to “investigate [the
victim’s] and witness [R]ichard Radke’s prior criminal history for purposes of impeachment.”
But defendant has failed to provide any information regarding what criminal background should
have been introduced, on what basis defense counsel could have successfully moved to introduce
the evidence, or how he was prejudiced by the omission of the evidence. Furthermore, at trial,
the victim testified that she did not initially contact the police because she “had warrants out for
[her] arrest.” Additionally, evidence was introduced that the victim was a prostitute who used
heroin and crack cocaine, and that Radtke was a drug user and acted as the victim’s pimp.
Against this backdrop, and the evidence against defendant, there is no reasonable probability that
additional impeachment evidence would have changed the result of the proceedings.
We reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request
appointment of an expert witness to aid in investigating a defense theory of self-defense. A
defendant is entitled to the appointment of an expert at public expense only if he cannot
otherwise proceed safely to trial. MCL 775.15; People v Hill, 84 Mich App 90, 95-96; 269
NW2d 492 (1978). Here, defendant was able to adequately present his self-defense claim
through his testimony at trial, and the trial court’s jury instructions. Moreover, defendant does
not explain what possible assistance an expert could have provided, or what information would
potentially be obtained at an evidentiary hearing.
We also reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the prosecution’s production of its witness list on the first day of trial. The record citation
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provided by defendant does not show that the prosecution’s witness list was untimely. Rather, it
shows that on the first day of trial, the prosecutor presented a “witness list which [he] narrowed
to help [the trial court] and [defense counsel].” The prosecutor named the witnesses he intended
to call, which included the victim, Radtke, defendant’s foreman, and five police officers.
Moreover, defendant does not claim that he was surprised by any of these witnesses. Because
there was no basis for a proper objection in this regard, defendant cannot establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502
(2000) (counsel is not required to make a futile objection or to advocate a meritless position).
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to interview him before
the preliminary examination in order to effectively challenge the victim’s identification of him as
the perpetrator. However, identification was not an issue in this case. The defense was selfdefense, i.e., that the victim attempted to rob defendant at knifepoint. Defendant admitted that he
picked up the victim to engage in oral sex. DNA testing of blood found on defendant’s shirt and
in the truck matched a DNA sample taken from the victim. There is simply nothing in the record
that supports defendant’s assertion in this regard, and defendant has not identified what useful
information could be produced at an evidentiary hearing.
We reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to “object
to Investigating Detective’s testimony on forensic crime lab reports/evidence as that testimony is
to be given by an expert in that field.” Defendant does not identify the detective or the
“reports/evidence,” makes no argument regarding the actual admissibility of the
“reports/evidence,” and has not indicated how a remand would further develop this claim.
Matuszak, supra at 59.
Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call his wife
as a defense witness. Defendant claims that his wife would have testified that he told her that the
victim attempted to rob him with a knife. But defendant has not provided a witness affidavit
disclosing the witness’s proposed testimony or indicating that the witness would have been
willing to testify on his behalf. Additionally, the proposed testimony would have been hearsay,
MRE 801, and defendant has not identified any exception allowing its introduction, MRE 802.
In short, defendant’s mere assertion in his brief that the witness could have supported his defense
is insufficient to warrant a remand.
Defendant also cursorily argues that remand is necessary to develop his claim that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), for failing to obtain rulings on pretrial motions regarding venue and “Appointment of
Investigator,” and for failing to request a jury instruction on venue. First, defendant has
presented no persuasive case law or facts that would support a motion for JNOV, id., and counsel
is not required to advocate a meritless position. Snider, supra. Also, defendant has made no
argument concerning what possible assistance an investigator could have provided, or how he
was prejudiced by the lack of an investigator. Further, in light of our determination in part II that
venue was proper, it follows that counsel’s inaction in this regard did not deprive defendant of
the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, with regard to all of these claims, defendant has
failed to indicate what useful information could possibly be obtained at an evidentiary hearing.
For these reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective, and
we are not persuaded that remand is necessary.
-6-
B. Peremptory Challenges
We also reject defendant’s claim that he was entitled to 20 peremptory challenges, as
provided by MCL 768.13. The right to exercise a peremptory challenge is provided by court rule
and statute. MCL 768.13 provides that “[a]ny person who is put on trial for an offense
punishable by death or imprisonment for life, shall be allowed to challenge peremptorily 20 of
the persons drawn to serve as jurors, and no more[.]” But MCR 6.412(E)(1) provides that a
defendant is entitled to 12 peremptory challenges when the offense charged is punishable by life
imprisonment. The trial court did not err in following the court rule in this instance, and
allowing only 12 peremptory challenges. MCR 1.104 provides: “Rules of practice set forth in
any statute, if not in conflict with any of these rules, are effective until superseded by rules
adopted by the Supreme Court.” Therefore, provisions of the court rules governing practice and
procedure take precedence over conflicting statutes. People v McGuffey, 251 Mich App 155,
165-166; 649 NW2d 801 (2002) (when the court rule pertains to practice and procedure, it takes
precedence over the statute); see also Const 1963, art 6, § 5 (requiring the Supreme Court, and
not the Legislature, to enact rules of practice and procedure for the Michigan courts).
We also reject defendant’s related claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to request the eight additional peremptory challenges. As previously indicated, under MCR
6.412(E)(1), defendant was entitled to only 12 peremptory challenges. Further, MCR
6.412(E)(2) allows the trial court to increase the number of peremptory challenges “[o]n a
showing of good cause.” Not only has defendant failed to argue a basis on which defense
counsel could have shown good cause for additional peremptory challenges, he has not identified
one juror whom he would have removed. Because there was no basis for defense counsel to
request 20 peremptory challenges, defendant cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
C. 180-day Rule
We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the charges for violation of the 180-day rule.3 Defendant claims that his trial was
delayed 231 days, which was 51 days beyond the 180-day cutoff.4 The purpose of the 180-day
rule is to resolve untried charges against prisoners so that the sentences may run concurrently.
People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 279, 280; 593 NW2d 655 (1999), overruled on other
grounds People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 252; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). The failure to bring an
incarcerated defendant to trial within the requisite 180-day period divests the court of jurisdiction
and requires dismissal of the charges. MCL 780.133; MCR 6.004(D)(2)5; Williams, supra. The
180-day rule does not, however, require that trial commence within 180 days. Rather, if
apparent good-faith action is taken within that period, and the prosecutor proceeds promptly
3
In arguing the motion, defense counsel stated, “my client has asked me to make a motion on the
180 day rule.” Defendant thereafter argued on his own behalf.
4
When defendant was arrested, he was placed on a parole hold for previous offenses.
5
MCR 6.004(D) has been amended to conform to the 180-day rule set forth in MCL 780.131,
effective January 1, 2006.
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toward preparing the case for trial, the rule is satisfied. MCR 6.004(D); People v Hendershot,
357 Mich 300, 303-304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959); People v Bradshaw, 163 Mich App 500, 505; 415
NW2d 259 (1987). This Court reviews a trial court’s attribution of delay for clear error. People
v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 612; 591 NW2d 669 (1998).
We agree with the trial court that there was no violation of the 180-day rule in this case.
The record shows that the prosecution made a good-faith effort to bring defendant to trial, and
that the largest delay was not attributable to the prosecution. The record shows that defendant
filed several pretrial motions. Defendant also requested at least four adjournments, which caused
delays of several days. For example, at defense request, a pretrial hearing was adjourned from
November 22, 2004, until December 15, 2004. A hearing scheduled for January 19, 2005, was
adjourned until February 18, 2005. A hearing scheduled for January 25, 2005, was initially
adjourned until February 18, 2005, and again adjourned until March 3, 2005. In sum, although
defendant was not brought to trial within 180 days, the delay was principally caused by the
defense,6 and there is no indication that the prosecutor failed to make a good-faith effort to bring
the criminal charges to trial within the required time. This claim does not warrant reversal.
D. CJI2d 3.10
As we determined above, venue was proper in Macomb County. MCL 762.3(1). We
therefore decline defendant’s request to remand because the trial court failed to sua sponte
instruct the jury on venue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
6
At the hearing on this issue, the court clerk reviewed the record and remarked that “Everything
was defense caused except one 20 day adjournment.”
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