PEOPLE OF MI V CETRIC DEONDRAE SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263180
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 05-001102-01
05-001104-01
CETRIC DEONDRAE SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Wayne Circuit Court Docket No. 05-001102-01, defendant appeals as of right his jurytrial convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.
In Wayne Circuit Court Docket No. 05-001104-01, defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial
convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f,
and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to 180 to 360 months’
imprisonment for each of the armed robbery convictions, 32 to 48 months’ imprisonment for
each of the felonious assault convictions, 40 to 60 months’ imprisonment for the felon in
possession conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for each of the felony-firearm convictions.
We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion for
joinder of the lower court files at trial. We disagree.
Nothing in the record before us indicates that defendant brought a motion for severance
prior to the trial. It therefore appears that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate
review. A defendant who does not move for severance or object in the trial court fails to
preserve the issue for review. People v Mayfield, 221 Mich App 656, 660; 562 NW2d 272
(1997).1 We therefore review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Reversal is warranted only if
a plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant, or if the error seriously
1
Although defendant contends that he objected to the prosecution’s motion for joinder, the
record indicates only that defense counsel requested additional time to review the file before the
motion. This was not an objection on the merits of the prosecution’s motion.
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affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, independent of
defendant’s innocence. Id.
Two or more informations against a single defendant may be consolidated for a single
trial. MCR 6.120(A).2 Upon a defendant’s motion, the court must sever unrelated offenses for
separate trials. MCR 6.120(B). As previously stated, nothing in the record indicates that
defendant brought a motion to sever the offenses before trial. There are no severance motions
contained within the lower court file, and defendant does not point to any evidence
demonstrating otherwise. Although defendant contends that the trial court was required to sever
any offenses not based on the same conduct, series of connected acts, or part of a single scheme
or plan, defendant fails to mention the fact that defendant did not bring a motion for severance.
In accordance with the plain language of the court rule, because defendant did not bring such a
motion, the trial court was not required to sever any unrelated offenses for separate trials.
Defendant is unable to demonstrate the existence of a plain error affecting his substantial rights
in this regard.
Even assuming that defendant had objected to the prosecution’s motion for joinder,
defendant cannot demonstrate that error resulted from joinder of the cases. Before a court may
discretionarily join related charges for trial, the court should consider “the timeliness of the
motion, the drain on the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or prejudice stemming
from either the number of charges or the complexity or nature of the evidence, the potential for
harassment, the convenience of witnesses, and the parties’ readiness for trial.” See former MCR
6.120(C). The evidence in this case was certainly intertwined, in that defendant robbed the same
witness on two occasions while she was working in the same store, during the same time frame,
in the same manner, and within a relatively short period of time. Because defendant had robbed
Michelle Lauzon previously, she quickly recognized him on the second occasion. Separate trials
in this case would have essentially required Lauzon to provide identical testimony twice.
Further, the testimony of each of the victims would have been admissible in each of the separate
trials to prove defendant’s intent, scheme, plan, or system, as well as to prove defendant’s
identity. MRE 404; People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 674; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Because
evidence pertaining to each robbery would have been admissible in a separate trial concerning
the other robbery, we find no error in the trial court’s failure to sever the charges for trial.
People v Duranseau, 221 Mich App 204, 208; 561 NW2d 111 (1997). Any technical error
resulting from the joinder of these cases was harmless because it was not decisive to the
outcome. See People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 363-364; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).
Defendant alternatively argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the joinder of the cases and for failing to bring a motion for severance. We disagree.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue because he did not move for a new trial or
evidentiary hearing below. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973);
People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
2
Effective January 1, 2006, MCR 6.120 was amended. Essentially, MCR 6.120(B) now relates
to permissive joinder and severance, while MCR 6.120(C) now relates to mandatory severance.
Because the trial court decided this issue before January 1, 2006, and the parties have argued the
issue under the old rule, we will analyze this case in accordance with the rule in effect at the time
the decision was made.
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Review of unpreserved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to error apparent on
the record. Id. at 659. If review of the record does not support the defendant’s claims, he has
effectively waived the issue of effective assistance of counsel. Id.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden to
prove otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant
as to deprive him of a fair trial.” People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797
(1994). With respect to the prejudice prong of the test, a defendant must “demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different . . . .” People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001); see also
People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). In addition, a defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s action constituted sound trial strategy under
the circumstances. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 156; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).
Here, defendant cannot establish that trial counsel’s failure to request severance or to
object to the prosecution’s motion for joinder was not a matter of trial strategy. Further,
defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings
would have been different in the absence of counsel’s alleged errors. There was substantial
evidence to support defendant’s conviction on each charge. On the first occasion, defendant
entered the restaurant in the early hours of the day. Both Lauzon and her mother, Donna Cieslak,
were able to see defendant because the restaurant was well lit, and Lauzon stood in close
proximity to defendant during the robbery. After taking the money from the cash drawer,
defendant ordered Lauzon, Cieslak, and a customer to the back room where he demanded their
cellular phones and physically ripped the phone cords out of the wall before leaving. On the
second occasion, Lauzon was working alone when she noticed defendant enter the restaurant
again. Lauzon immediately recognized defendant from the first incident, specifically
remembering his eyes. Defendant stood closely to Lauzon as he took money from the cash
drawer. Defendant then ordered Lauzon to the back of the restaurant and again exited the
building. Based on this evidence, defendant is unable to establish that the result of the
proceedings would have been different had he been tried separately for each charge. We
perceive no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to request severance or to object to joinder
of the cases.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was not provided
notice of a photographic lineup used to identify him before trial, and because use of the
photographic lineup was improper as he was already in custody at the time. We disagree. A trial
court’s decision whether to admit identification evidence is reviewed for clear error. People v
Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993).
“Under due process principles, the prosecution is obligated to disclose evidence that is
both favorable to the defendant and material to the determination of guilt or punishment.
Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been
different, had the evidence been disclosed.” People v Fink, 456 Mich 449, 453-454; 574 NW2d
28 (1998). Moreover, the prosecution’s violation of a discovery order, even if done
inadvertently in good faith, warrants reversal unless it is clear that the failure to comply with the
order was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v McConnell, 124 Mich App 672, 680;
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335 NW2d 226 (1983). Even if the prosecution violated a discovery order and in fact failed to
disclose evidence of the photographic lineup, the trial court did not commit error requiring
reversal in denying defendant’s motion. The trial court eliminated any potential prejudice by
offering defendant additional time to prepare. Moreover, substantial independent evidence
supported the identification of defendant as the perpetrator. Specifically, Lauzon independently
picked defendant out of a corporeal lineup. We therefore cannot conclude that, absent Cieslak’s
identification of defendant during the photographic lineup, the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different. Because the photographic lineup was not decisive to the outcome of
the proceedings, the prosecution’s failure to disclose it was not error requiring reversal. Id. at
680-681; Fink, supra at 453-454. The failure to notify defendant of the photographic lineup did
not prejudice defendant, and any error in this regard was harmless.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence because
defendant was already in custody at the time of the photographic lineup. Ordinarily, an accused
should not be identified by photograph if he is in custody unless a legitimate reason for doing so
exists. Kurylczyk, supra at 298. While defendant contends that there was no evidence on the
record regarding the reasoning behind the use of the photographic lineup, the prosecution
informed the court that, on the date of the lineup, defendant was not available to the Detroit
Police because another police agency had defendant in custody. Although defendant was in
custody at the time, he was in custody for an unrelated offense, which is not “custody” for the
purposes of a photographic lineup. People v Wyngaard, 151 Mich App 107, 113; 390 NW2d
694 (1986). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit clear error in admitting evidence of the
photographic lineup.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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