HARRY J HILL JR V IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HARRY J. HILL, JR.,
UNPUBLISHED
December 7, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263147
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-117235-CK
IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JEFFREY STONER,
Defendant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Bandstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
IKON appeals as of right the final judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor in this age
discrimination and sales commission dispute following a nine-day jury trial. We affirm.
On appeal, IKON first argues that its motion for JNOV should have been granted with
regard to plaintiff’s age discrimination claim because plaintiff failed to present sufficient direct,
indirect, or circumstantial evidence to support his claim. However, IKON has failed to provide
this Court with the complete record on appeal as required under MCR 7.210(A)(1). In particular,
IKON has neither provided the trial exhibits nor the transcript of the hearing on its motion for
JNOV. See MCR 7.210(B)(1)(a), 7.210(C). Therefore, this Court may consider this issue
abandoned or waived. See Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 160; 693 NW2d 825 (2005); People
v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 615; 493 NW2d 471 (1992); Nye v Gable, Nelson & Murphy, 169
Mich App 411, 413-416; 425 NW2d 797 (1988). But, because our review is de novo, we will
consider the issue with the caveat that our review is limited by the circumstances created by
defendant, i.e., we do not have the benefit of the trial exhibits or the trial court’s significant
insight derived from presiding over this nine day trial, witnessing the testimony, and reviewing
the trial exhibits.
Michigan employers may not discriminate against an individual with respect to
employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of age.
MCL 37.2202(1)(a). Proof of discriminatory treatment may be established by direct evidence or
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by indirect or circumstantial evidence. Sniecinski v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 469
Mich 124, 132; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). Direct evidence is ‘“evidence which, if believed,
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the
employer’s actions.”’ Id. at 133, quoting Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628
NW2d 515 (2001), quoting Jacklyn v Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp, 176 F3d
921, 926 (CA 6, 1999). Examples of direct evidence have included (1) racial slurs and
derogatory remarks made by a decisionmaker, Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App
601, 610; 572 NW2d 679 (1997), (2) statements by a decisionmaker such as, “If I have to, I will
get rid of the older guys—you older guys and replace you with younger ones,” Downey v
Charlevoix Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621, 633; 576 NW2d 712 (1998), and (3) a
supervisor’s statement, "[You're] getting too old for this shit," made during the conversation in
which he terminated the plaintiff, DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463
Mich 534, 538-539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001). In other words, the contested remark is considered,
as well as the context of the contested remark, to determine whether it constitutes evidence of
defendant’s discriminatory intent without need of inferences.
However, if there is not direct evidence of discriminatory intent, indirect or
circumstantial evidence may be presented to establish an inference of discriminatory intent. The
plaintiff must proceed using the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US
792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Sniecinski, supra at 133. A rebuttable prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination is created if the plaintiff presents evidence that (1) he belonged
to a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, (3) he was qualified for the
position, and (4) his failure to obtain the position occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If a defendant
produces such evidence, the presumption is rebutted, and the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reasons were not the true reasons, but a
mere pretext for discrimination. [Id. (citations omitted).]
Under both the direct and indirect evidence methods of establishing unlawful discrimination, the
plaintiff must still prove a causal link between the discriminatory animus and the adverse
employment action. Id. at 134-135.
Here, plaintiff appears to have argued that he presented both direct and indirect evidence
of age discrimination. He offers as “direct evidence” his testimony that he was replaced, first on
an account, and then completely, by younger females. Plaintiff also offers testimony that, after
he was fired, plaintiff’s boss referred to IKON as “his new dynamic organization.” But, none of
this evidence requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating
factor in IKON’s actions, if the evidence is believed. Replacement by a younger individual by
itself is not sufficient, and the reference to a “dynamic organization” is facially neutral, neither
implying youth nor implicating age. Thus, plaintiff’s proffered “direct evidence” of IKON’s
discriminatory intent is without merit.
So, to have properly succeeded on his age discrimination theory using indirect or
circumstantial evidence, plaintiff must have satisfied the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary
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standard, i.e., that (1) he belonged to a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment
action, (3) he was qualified for the position, and (4) his termination occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Hazle, supra at 463 n
6 (the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case should be tailored to fit the factual
situation at hand”). IKON does not dispute the first two elements; however, IKON claims that
plaintiff was not qualified for the sales representative position because he was a thief.
This qualification requirement has been described as follows: “[a]n employee is qualified
if he was performing his job at a level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations.” Town v
Michigan Bell Tel Co, 455 Mich 688, 699; 568 NW2d 64 (1997). It is primarily to rule out the
possibility that the employee was fired for inadequate job performance. Id. at 699 n 22. IKON
does not reference case law to support its claim that allegedly stealing company property renders
an employee unqualified within the context of a McDonnell Douglas analysis. It appears that the
emphasis of the analysis is on actual job performance and qualifications, not such purported
violations. See Hazle, supra at 469-470. Here, because plaintiff was a very successful
salesperson for IKON for many years, and there was no evidence that his job performance was
inadequate, it appears that plaintiff was “qualified” within the context of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis. But, even if stealing company property did render plaintiff unqualified, it was an issue
of fact for the jury whether plaintiff did, indeed, steal the property.
But, IKON argues that plaintiff also failed to meet the fourth requirement of the
McDonnell Douglas test, i.e., that plaintiff’s termination occurred under circumstances giving
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Considering the testimony and all legitimate
inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we disagree and conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to create an issue for the jury. See Attard, supra.
There was evidence from which a jury could conclude that plaintiff’s termination
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The
evidence included that: (1) at least one of plaintiff’s accounts, the U.S. Car account, was taken
from plaintiff and given to a younger salesperson, (2) other salespersons were provided company
perks such as company cars and credit cards, (3) plaintiff was replaced with a younger
salesperson, (4) other ethical violations had occurred, of note is one involving a younger
salesperson [so-called poaching on plaintiff’s sales territory], without reprisal, (5) younger
salespersons received more assistance from plaintiff’s supervisor, Jeff Stoner, (6) plaintiff was
denied some training and travel opportunities, (7) IKON had a progressive disciplinary program
in place that began with a written warning but plaintiff did not receive one before he was
terminated, and (8) IKON was not attempting to “down-size” the major account department of
which plaintiff was a member at the time of his termination. Obviously, there could be other
explanations for most if not all of these actions, as Stoner’s testimony appears to imply, but it
was for the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and determine these issues of fact.
Thus, plaintiff established a rebuttable prima facie case from which a jury could infer that
plaintiff was subjected to unlawful discrimination.
But, IKON argues, even if plaintiff did establish a presumption of unlawful
discrimination, it rebutted the presumption with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
plaintiff’s termination—plaintiff stole company property. Whether plaintiff “stole” company
property was an issue of fact for the jury. But, plaintiff met his burden of showing that this
purported reason for his termination was mere pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff proved, at
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least, that (1) IKON knew he had the intention to purchase the copy machine for his chiropractor,
(2) IKON knew where the machine was because it delivered it, (3) the proper paperwork for the
transaction was completed, (4) IKON did not attempt to retrieve the copier for non-payment as it
had in other instances of customer non-payment, (5) plaintiff was never asked to authorize a
deduction from his paycheck for the copy machine as he had been in the past when he purchased
other equipment, (6) plaintiff was never told that he would be fired if he did not pay for the
machine before his commission payment disputes were resolved (plaintiff testified that he may
have paid for the machine via one of the several unexplained deductions and charge-backs), and
(7) IKON did not require that plaintiff pay for the machine after plaintiff’s termination. In light
of the evidence, the jury could have concluded that plaintiff did not steal the copy machine and
that IKON was using this purported ethical violation as an excuse to terminate plaintiff because
of his age.
In summary, plaintiff did not establish his age discrimination claim by direct evidence but
he did create a rebuttable presumption using direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury
could infer that he was terminated because of his age. IKON rebutted the presumption with its
claim that plaintiff was terminated because he stole company property, but plaintiff provided
evidence from which a jury could conclude that IKON’s proffered reason was a mere pretext for
discrimination and that plaintiff was actually terminated because of his age. Accordingly,
IKON’s motion for JNOV with regard to this claim was properly denied.
Next, IKON argues that its motion for JNOV should have been granted with regard to
plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because there was an express contract covering the same
subject matter and the jury concluded that plaintiff was not the procuring cause of sales after his
discharge. However, as discussed above, IKON has failed to provide this Court with the
complete record on appeal. See MCR 7.210(A)(1). Again, this Court may consider this issue
abandoned or waived but, because our review is de novo, we will consider the issue under the
same limiting circumstances identified above.
The jury verdict form in this case was completed as follows:
Question 1: Was the Plaintiff the procuring cause of sales that were made
by Defendant to General Motors after his termination?
Answer:
No [addressed in #5]
*
*
*
Question 5: Was Defendant unjustly enriched by the efforts of Plaintiff?
Answer:
Yes
And an award of $110,500 was rendered. After the verdict was read, the trial court questioned
the jury about the notation associated with the answer to question number one. The foreperson
explained that “the new employee got 18 percent” and plaintiff got 35 percent for the General
Motors account. So, the jury subtracted 18 from 35 and got 17 percent. IKON received a profit
of $1.3 million and the jury allocated as unjust enrichment the difference between the two
commissions. The court asked “And so you didn’t think that fit in with answer number 1, and
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you thought it was better addressed in your answer to number 5?” The foreperson responded,
“Right, because we didn’t want to pay him twice for it. Another person said “You said we could
only do it once.” Then the foreperson continued, “So we thought it would be included in number
5 and just not even put it in number 1.”
It appears then, that the jury rendered the disputed award by considering that both
plaintiff and Stoner testified that IKON earned $1.3 million from its facilities management
agreement with General Motors and plaintiff testified that he had worked on securing that
agreement for years before his termination. It was undisputed that the agreement was actually
signed after plaintiff’s termination. So, the jury seems to have combined the procuring cause
theory with the unjust enrichment theory. The confusion may not have been aided by the
wording on the jury verdict form with respect to question five which does not reference a time
frame to consider. In any case, defendant argues that the jury could not have rendered an unjust
enrichment award in light of its acknowledgement of an express contract between IKON and
plaintiff with respect to commission payments. IKON disingenuously argues that the jury
concluded that plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the facilities management contract
although, as discussed above, it is clear that the computations made by the jury to determine the
award were based entirely on that contract.
A claim of unjust enrichment requires proof that the defendant received a benefit from
the plaintiff and that permitting the defendant to retain the benefit would result in inequity to the
plaintiff. Barber v SMH (US), Inc, 202 Mich App 366, 375; 509 NW2d 791 (1993). The law
will imply a contract to prevent an unjust enrichment; but, if an express contract covering the
same subject matter exists, no other contract will be implied. Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell, 254
Mich App 300, 328; 657 NW2d 759 (2002). If there are questions of fact concerning the
existence and terms of the contract, a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained. Id.
Defendant argues that, because the jury concluded that defendant breached its contract
with plaintiff by using a commission percentage that was different than the commission
percentage agreed to by the parties, resulting in $23,000 in damages, as a matter of law plaintiff
could not succeed on his unjust enrichment claim. But, to arrive at its conclusion that plaintiff
was entitled to $23,000 in damages, it appears that the jury relied on plaintiff’s testimony that
consisted of the following, in relevant part:
Q.
And assuming you were entitled to your 35 percent on all of the
transactions with General Motors, did you add up the amount of money that you
felt you had lost because the wrong commission was applied?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
And what did you come up with?
A.
Approximately 23 thousand dollars and change. [Tr IV, p 22.]
Thus, the jury’s determination necessarily included the conclusion that this breach of contract
occurred during plaintiff’s employment at IKON.
The jury’s unjust enrichment award would appear to derive from the fact that IKON
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benefited from the facilities management contract that plaintiff had helped to secure before his
termination, but which was actually consummated and became fruitful after plaintiff was
terminated when, because of his termination, plaintiff did not have a contract with IKON.
However, this is just one means of reconciling the jury’s verdict; there are obviously other
explanations. But, it clearly appears that the jury concluded that plaintiff’s efforts in securing the
facilities management contract with General Motors required compensation, even though he was
terminated before the deal was actually consummated. In other words, whether through the
procuring cause doctrine or through the unjust enrichment theory, the jury concluded that
equitable considerations should prevail on this issue. There was sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that IKON was unjustly enriched by plaintiff’s efforts; thus, defendant’s motion for
JNOV with regard to this claim was properly denied.
Next, IKON argues that its motion for JNOV should have been granted with regard to
plaintiff’s claim that he was not paid the proper rate of commissions because the change of rate
was in accordance with the parties’ agreement. However, as discussed above, IKON has failed
to provide this Court with the complete record on appeal. See MCR 7.210(A)(1). Again, this
Court may consider this issue abandoned or waived but, because our review is de novo, we will
consider the issue under the same limiting circumstances identified above.
IKON concedes that plaintiff was originally promised a 35 percent commission on all
transactions with General Motors, but it claims that this commission rate changed and such
change was evidenced by a written compensation program; therefore, the jury verdict of $23,000
should have been vacated. But, as plaintiff maintained throughout the trial, although the
compensation program indicated a change in rate, it did not reference plaintiff’s General Motors
transactions, the rate of which had been establish through an oral contract. IKON did not refute
that position with any admissible evidence.
In fact, although plaintiff’s commission rate was allegedly reduced in 1999, it appears
that the audit that was conducted used a rate of 35 percent with respect to various charge-backs
and other deductions. However, as noted previously, this Court was not provided any of the trial
exhibits, including the audit documents. But, plaintiff testified that the audit used a rate of 35
percent and IKON has not provided any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, it appears that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that plaintiff was entitled to a 35 percent
commission on General Motors transactions; thus, the trial court properly denied defendant’s
motion for JNOV premised on this ground.
Next, IKON argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of
Greg Ploch, which included that Ploch felt he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment
while employed at IKON. After review for an abuse of discretion, we agree. However, reversal
is not warranted.
First, we note that it appears that IKON acquiesced to having Ploch testify regarding his
alleged discriminatory treatment, because defense counsel said, “[b]ring him in I cross examined
him once I’ll do it again and show the court there was no discrimination.” A party may not
obtain relief on appeal based upon an issue the resolution to which he or she acquiesced at trial.
Hilgendorf v St John Hosp & Medical Ctr Corp, 245 Mich App 670, 683; 630 NW2d 356
(2001). However, before Ploch actually testified, defense counsel objected under MRE 401, 402,
and 403. The trial court overruled the objection, holding that testimony of similar acts or
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conduct was admissible.
MRE 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, with limited exceptions.
“Relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” MRE 401. Here, IKON claims that Ploch’s testimony about
discrimination that he was allegedly subjected to while employed by IKON was irrelevant. It
appears that the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was premised on a conclusion that
such testimony may tend to show that IKON had a predisposition to discriminate based on age.
This ruling may have been based on MRE 406 which provides that evidence of the routine
practice of an organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the organization on a
particular occasion was in conformity with that routine practice. But, the firing of one other
older person, even if the termination was because of his age, does not establish a “routine
practice.”
Plaintiff’s claim was that he was terminated because of his age. Whether Ploch was
terminated because of his age does not tend to establish that plaintiff also was terminated
because of his age. However, “[o]ur courts are reluctant to overturn a jury’s verdict, particularly
if there is ample evidence to justify the jury’s decision, and we will not do so on the basis of an
erroneous evidentiary ruling unless refusal to take this action would be inconsistent with
substantial justice.” Krohn v Sedgwick James of Michigan, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 295; 624
NW2d 212 (2001). In this case, there was ample evidence to justify the jury’s decision, even
without Ploch’s short and relatively innocuous testimony. Although Ploch testified that he felt
that he had been denied promotional opportunities because of his age, he also testified to a poor
sales performance that led to his termination. Therefore, even if IKON did not acquiesce to the
admission of this testimony, the testimony was of little evidentiary consequence in light of the
other evidence justifying the jury’s decision. Accordingly, no relief is warranted with regard to
this issue. See MCR 2.613(A).
Next, IKON claims that the trial court improperly advised the jury that it could consider
the existence of MCL 408.471 with regard to the motive and credibility of the witnesses because
it gave the jury the impression that the court was vouching for plaintiff’s credibility and
effectively advised the jury that it was permissible to steal company property. We disagree.
Before the trial court read the jury instructions, it stated the following:
All right, before we get into the instructions I want to give you a limiting
instruction. And that is that there is a law in Michigan, that addresses the timing
and procedure to recover retroactive wage deductions. However, it does not serve
as a basis for any claim by the plaintiff against the defendant in this case.
You’re not allowed to consider this law as a factor in your disposition of liability
or damages in this case. The fact of the existence of the law is only being offered
for your consideration as to the motive or credibility of witnesses.
This is the instruction that IKON argues was prejudicial. It is unclear on what grounds the trial
court relied upon to issue the instruction. However, MRE 105 provides that “[w]hen evidence
which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or
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for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”
In this case, plaintiff repeatedly testified that IKON did not have the right to withhold his
earnings for charge-backs and deductions that accrued over six months before such charge-backs
and deductions were discovered. Plaintiff referenced a statute that provided the legal authority
for his position. In essence, plaintiff was rebutting IKON’s reason—that its audit revealed that
plaintiff actually owed IKON almost $26,000—for not paying plaintiff the commissions to
which he was entitled. The audit documents were admitted into evidence as exhibits. Plaintiff’s
counsel sought to have the statute admitted into evidence to support plaintiff’s testimony and to
discredit the trustworthiness of the audit. After the trial court denied the request, in accordance
with IKON’s objection that it would confuse the jury, plaintiff requested “acknowledgement by
the court that there is such a statute as [plaintiff] has alleged and taking judicial notice of it in
that regard.” It appears that the trial court’s action was a fair compromise.
The trial court could have taken judicial notice of the existence of the statute under MRE
202(a), which permits judicial notice of public statutes. The existence of the statute was relevant
to facts in issue. It pertained to whether plaintiff had any good faith basis upon which to claim
that IKON had illegally withheld certain charge-backs and deductions, thus justifying his failure
to make full payment for the equipment IKON alleged was stolen. However, instead, the trial
court merely advised that the statute existed and neither detailed the provisions of the statute nor
explained its specific application with respect to this case. Contrary to IKON’s argument on
appeal, the instruction did not vouch for plaintiff’s credibility or have the effect of condoning
stealing to resolve disputes. IKON’s audit information was admitted into evidence and the
statute was plaintiff’s only means of corroborating his testimony that the audit was not accurate
or trustworthy.
In light of the fact that none of the statutory language was admitted into evidence, it is
questionable whether its existence had any impact on either plaintiff’s or IKON’s credibility. In
fact, it likely did not impact the jury’s decision because the jury concluded that defendant did not
breach its contract with plaintiff in the manner in which deductions were made from his
commission and no damages were awarded on this claim. The trial court is entitled to some level
of deference under the abuse of discretion standard of review if the decision to give or withhold a
certain jury instruction depends on a factual determination, i.e., whether the evidence will
support the instruction. See Hilgendorf, supra. IKON has not established that the failure to
reverse for this purported instruction error would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MRE
2.613(A). Accordingly, relief is not warranted.
Next, IKON argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied its motion for
new trial with regard to plaintiff’s age discrimination claim because the jury verdict was against
the great weight of the evidence. This issue is abandoned for failure to provide this Court with a
copy of the transcript of the hearing on its motion for new trial in violation of MCR 7.210(A)(1),
7.210(B)(1)(a), 7.210(C). See Reed, supra; Wilson, supra; Nye, supra. Because an abuse of
discretion standard applies to the issue whether the trial court improperly denied IKON’s motion
for new trial, it may not be reviewed. See MCR 2.611(F). Further, it appears for the reasons
discussed above, that this issue is without merit.
Next, IKON argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that Section
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3(R) of the Year 2000 Equipment Sales Compensation Manual was void pursuant to MCL
600.2961(8). Again, IKON’s failure to provide a complete copy of the lower court record,
including trial exhibits, stunts this Court’s ability to review this issue. The lack of record,
coupled with IKON’s failure to clearly set forth what commissions were disputed with respect to
this argument, almost precludes any thoughtful consideration of this issue. But, it appears that
the commissions for which the disputed jury verdicts applied were not related to the General
Motors facilities management contract, i.e., the procuring cause doctrine, but were related to
other commissions that were earned and due, but were not paid after plaintiff was terminated.
Plaintiff testified that he submitted commission statements in August, September, and October of
2000 that totaled $12,866.55, which had “hold” notations written on them and were never paid.
The jury awarded plaintiff $14,990, as commission due on or after plaintiff’s termination, of
which $12,866.55 was intentionally withheld by IKON.
Apparently, this jury verdict is being contested on the ground that IKON was improperly
precluded from arguing that, according to its contract with plaintiff, plaintiff was not entitled to
any post-termination commissions. In particular, Section 3(R) of IKON’s Year 2000 Equipment
Sales Manual provided:
R.
Rep Termination
Commission for deals booked but not paid at the time of the employee’s
termination will continue to be paid but not beyond the final day of the month
following the month in which the employee terminates and only if the employee
voluntarily terminates with written notice of at least one (1) week and returns all
company property. No additional compensation shall be paid from date of
termination.
Plaintiff argued that this section violated the Michigan Sales Representative Act, MCL 600.2961,
which provides, in part:
(4) All commissions that are due at the time of termination of a contract between
a sales representative and principal shall be paid within 45 days after the date of
termination. Commissions that become due after the termination date shall be
paid within 45 days after the date of which the commission became due.
Other relevant sections of MCL 600.2961 provide as follows:
(2) The terms of the contract between the principal and sales representative shall
determine when a commission becomes due.
(3) If the time when the commission is due cannot be determined by a contract
between the principal and sales representative, the past practices between the
parties shall control . . . .
*
*
*
(8) A provision in a contract between a principal and a sales representative
purporting to waive any right under this section is void.
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Plaintiff appears to have argued that, by law, plaintiff was entitled to receive
commissions for sales that he earned but that became due after his termination, contrary to
Section 3(R) of IKON’s Manual. The trial court agreed that a sales representative could not be
deprived of commissions that were earned during his employment but that became due after his
involuntary termination; thus, Section 3(R) was void.
The construction and interpretation of contracts and statutes present questions of law that
are reviewed de novo. Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32;
658 NW2d 139 (2003); Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d
190 (1999). The goal of both is to determine and enforce the underlying intent of the contracting
parties, and the Legislature, on the basis of the plain language of the contract and statute. See
Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 (2003); Old Kent Bank v
Sobczak, 243 Mich App 57, 63; 620 NW2d 663 (2000).
Here, a plain reading of Section 3(R) indicates that only commissions for deals booked,
but not paid, will be paid “but not beyond the final day of the month following the month in
which the employee terminates” and only if the sales representative voluntarily terminates with
written notice. It does not allow the payment of any commissions if a sales representative is
involuntarily terminated, as was the case here. And, Section 3(R) does not indicate when a
commission is “due.” It appears from the testimony that commissions become “due” after the
equipment is installed and paid for by the customer. IKON argues that “the terms of the parties’
contract explicitly set forth the terms under which commissions would be due upon a sales
representative’s termination, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not satisfy those terms in order
to be “due” a commission at the time of his discharge. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not
‘voluntarily terminate with written notice of at least one week and return[] all company
property.’” Defendant seems to be implying that when a commission becomes “due” changes
when a sales representative is terminated. But, the clear and unambiguous testimony of both
plaintiff and Stoner indicated that a commission becomes “due” after the equipment is installed
and paid for by the customer. But, whether “due” or not, under Section 3(R), commissions will
not be paid to a sales representative who is fired. Conversely, MCL 600.2961(4) expressly
provides that commissions that are “due” at termination must be paid within 45 days of
termination and those that become “due” after termination must be paid within 45 days after the
date on which the commission became “due.”
In Walters v Bloomfield Hills Furniture, 228 Mich App 160; 577 NW2d 206 (1998), a
case involving unpaid commission following termination, this Court held that, with regard to
MCL 600.2961,
A court must look to the object of a statute and the harm that it was designed to
remedy and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of
the statute. The text of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended to ensure
that sales representatives are paid the commissions to which they are entitled,
especially where those commissions come due after the termination of the
employment relationship. [Id. at 164.]
In this case, as the trial court noted, according to Section 3(R) of IKON’s Manual, a sales
representative could secure a sale and then, to insulate IKON from having to pay a large
commission on the sale, IKON could fire the sales representative before the commissions
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become “due.” This seems to be exactly what the statute was designed to prohibit. In other
words, commissions that are due—after the installation and payment of the sold equipment—at
the time of termination must be paid within 45 days and those that become due—after the
installation and payment of the sold equipment—following termination must be paid within 45
days of date the commission became due. See MCL 600.2961(4). IKON could not force
plaintiff to waive this statutory right. See MCL 600.2961(8). Therefore, Section 3(R) of
IKON’s Manual was properly excluded.
Finally, IKON argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied IKON’s
motion for a new trial with regard to plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because the jury verdict
was against the great weight of the evidence. This issue is abandoned for failure to provide this
Court with a copy of the transcript of the hearing on its motion for new trial in violation of MCR
7.210(A)(1), 7.210(B)(1)(a), 7.210(C). See Reed, supra; Wilson, supra; Nye, supra. Because an
abuse of discretion standard applies to the issue whether the trial court improperly denied
IKON’s motion for new trial, it may not be reviewed. See MCR 2.611(F). Further, it appears
for the reasons discussed above, that this issue is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
-11-
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