PEOPLE OF MI V PERCY DONELLE CUMMINGS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 262294
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 04-013530-FC
PERCY DONELLE CUMMINGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Kelly and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felony murder, MCL 750.316b, firstdegree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530, and carjacking,
MCL 750.529a. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, third offense, MCL
769.11, to life imprisonment for felony murder, 14 to 40 years’ imprisonment for home invasion,
14 to 30 years’ imprisonment for unarmed robbery, and 46 to 70 years’ imprisonment for
carjacking. Defendant appeals as of right. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
convictions and sentences of defendant.
This case arises from the murder of Nadine Lightsey, which occurred during the weekend
of June 14, 2003, in Flint, Michigan. The victim’s sister discovered the victim dead in her home.
According to the sister, she initially believed that the victim’s home had been robbed or that
there had been a fight. However, she soon discovered the victim’s dead body, wrapped in a
blanket, on her bed. Blood was spattered on every wall of the room.
There was physical blood and DNA evidence which placed defendant at the crime. A
small bloodstain found on defendant’s right shoe was tested for DNA evidence and the test
concluded that the victim’s blood was present on the shoe. Other physical evidence linking
defendant to the crime included shoe impressions found outside the victim’s house and inside the
home on the kitchen floor that matched the running shoes that defendant was wearing. In
addition, a chess set that was stolen from the victim’s home was recovered from defendant’s
house. The police were unable to match any fingerprint evidence at the scene of the crime to
defendant however, and they were unable to secure any DNA evidence from the victim’s
fingerprints that matched defendant. In addition to the aforementioned evidence, defendant
made a videotaped statement to the police in which he admitted to fighting with the victim, tying
-1-
her up, robbing her, and stealing her car. However, defendant consistently denied that he killed
the victim.
Defendant first asserts on appeal that his statements to the police should not have been
introduced at trial because the police obtained them in violation of his constitutional rights.
Defendant argues that his statements were not voluntary and that waiver of his rights was not
knowingly and intelligently made. Defendant also argues that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights because the police continued to question him after he invoked his right to an
attorney.
The circumstances surrounding defendant’s statements to the police are as follows. On
June 21, 2003, Trooper Robert Mossing stopped a vehicle driven by defendant. The vehicle
belonged to the victim. Defendant was arrested and taken into custody. Detective Sergeant
Terry Coon, the officer in charge of the case, interrogated and took statements from defendant in
the early morning of June 22, 2003. Sergeant Mitch Brown was in the room for the interviews,
which were all videotaped. This first interview was very short because defendant quickly asked
to have an attorney present. Detective Coon stopped the interrogation as soon as defendant
asserted his right to counsel, and defendant was taken to booking. On the way to the booking
department, no detectives or officers interrogated defendant. A short time later a police officer
informed Detective Coon that defendant wanted to give a statement. Before Detective Coon
resumed questioning defendant, he again advised defendant of his Miranda1 rights, and he had
defendant sign written waivers. During this second police interview, defendant told police that
he broke into the victim’s house after he heard fighting inside between his girlfriend and the
victim. He told the officers that he pushed the victim onto her bed and tied her up. He also
stated that he and his girlfriend robbed the victim, taking a television and a computer to sell for
crack. However, defendant stated that the victim was alive when he left her home, and he
consistently denied killing the victim. He asserted that he went back to the victim’s home a few
hours later, found her dead, and tried to clean up the crime scene.
On appeal, defendant challenges both the voluntariness of his waiver and whether his
waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Whether a defendant’s statement was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary is a question of law that a court evaluates under the totality of the
circumstances. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 27; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). “When reviewing a
trial court’s determination of the voluntariness of inculpatory statements, this Court must
examine the entire record and make an independent determination, but will not disturb the trial
court’s factual findings absent clear error.” People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 372-373; 662
NW2d 856 (2003). Similarly, this Court reviews de novo the entire record to determine whether
an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. Cheatham,
supra at 30. However, deference is given to the trial court’s assessment of the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, id.; Shipley, supra at 373, and the trial court’s
findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous and leave “this Court with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Shipley, supra at 373. Although this
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
-2-
Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings regarding a defendant’s knowing
and intelligent waiver of his rights, the meaning of “knowing and intelligent” is a question of
law. People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640; 683 NW2d 597 (2004), quoting People v Daoud,
462 Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). We review questions of law de novo. Id.
“[T]he Fifth Amendment right to counsel is a corollary to the amendment’s stated right
against self-incrimination and to due process.” People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364, 372-373;
586 NW2d 234 (1998). The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by both the United
States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17;
Cheatham, supra at 9. Statements of an accused made during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible unless the accused voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives that Fifth
Amendment right. Miranda, supra 384 US at 444. Although a defendant may waive his right to
counsel, the waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and every reasonable
presumption is against waiver. Williams, supra at 641.
Whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary and whether an otherwise
voluntary waiver is knowing and intelligent are separate questions. While the
voluntariness prong is determined solely by examining police conduct, a
statement made pursuant to police questioning may be suppressed in the absence
of police coercion if the defendant was incapable of knowingly and intelligently
waiving his constitutional rights. Whether a suspect has knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights depends in each case on the totality of the
circumstances, including the defendant’s intelligence and capacity to understand
the warnings given. [People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 538; 575 NW2d 16
(1997) (citations omitted).]
The prosecutor must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right. Daoud, supra at 634.
Furthermore, the Miranda analysis must be bifurcated, considering (1) whether the waiver was
voluntary, and (2) whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. Id. at 639. Whether a
statement was voluntary is determined solely by examining police conduct, but the determination
whether it was made knowingly and intelligently depends, in part, on the defendant’s intelligence
and capacity to understand the warnings given. Howard, supra at 538. Intoxication from
alcohol or other substances can affect the validity of a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, but is
not dispositive. People v Leighty, 161 Mich App 565, 571; 411 NW2d 778 (1987).
The right to counsel found in the Fifth Amendment is “designed to counteract the
‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation . . . .” McNeil v Wisconsin, 501 US
171, 176; 111 S Ct 2204; 115 L Ed 2d 158 (1991). When an accused specifically requests
counsel prior to making a confession, safeguards are necessary to ensure that any subsequent
waiver by defendant of his Miranda rights is knowing and voluntary. See People v Paintman,
412 Mich 518, 525-526; 315 NW2d 418 (1982). Accordingly, in a custodial interrogation,
where the accused requests counsel, interrogation must cease when counsel is requested, and
police officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, regardless of whether
the accused has consulted with counsel. Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 153; 111 S Ct 486;
112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990). However, the police may engage in further interrogation if the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. Paintman,
-3-
supra at 525, quoting Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378
(1981).
In the case before us, it is undisputed that defendant invoked his right to have an attorney
present during questioning the first time that he was questioned by the police. Following
defendant’s request, the two detectives who were interrogating defendant ceased their
questioning and took defendant to be booked. The record supports that 24 minutes after the
initial interview concluded however, defendant initiated further communication by asking to
speak with the detectives. Before the lead detective resumed questioning, he read defendant his
rights. Following a reading of the Miranda rights, defendant signed a Miranda rights waiver.
After defendant signed the waiver, the detectives once again began questioning defendant about
the murder. Following the interview, the detectives again made sure that defendant understood
his rights. Defendant clearly stated on a videotape that he willingly made his statements and had
not been coerced. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we do not find any clear error in
the trial court’s determination that the waiver was voluntary. The two pieces of undeniable,
tangible evidence, the videotape of defendant’s statements to the police and the signed waiver,
both suggest that defendant was fully apprised of all his rights and, contrary to defendant’s
claims, that the police did not engage in misconduct to secure the waiver of rights. We therefore
reject defendant’s claim that his waiver was involuntary.
Defendant also contends that his statements were not knowing and intelligent, due to his
mental state at the time they were made. When determining whether a defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights, his intelligence and capacity to understand the warnings given
must be considered, Howard, supra at 537, along with the duration of detention, the manifest
attitude of the police toward their prisoner, the physical and mental state of the prisoner, and the
diverse pressures which sap or sustain the prisoner’s powers of resistance and self-control.
People v Watkins, 178 Mich App 439, 448; 444 NW2d 201 (1989), rev’d on other grounds 438
Mich 627 (1991). Advanced intoxication, whether the product of drugs or alcohol, may preclude
the effective waiver of Miranda rights. People v Davis, 102 Mich App 403, 410; 301 NW2d 871
(1980).
Defendant testified that he was under the influence of a mixture of crack cocaine,
marijuana, and alcohol when he made the statements in question. The facts demonstrate,
however, that defendant was arrested at 10:00 p.m. and was put in a holding cell until 5:30 a.m.
the following morning. Therefore, even if defendant was intoxicated and under the influence of
drugs at the time of his arrest, the 7-1/2 hours in the holding cell provided defendant time to
sleep and become sober. The trial court reviewed the circumstances, especially relying on the
videotapes, and decided that the statements should not be suppressed. Defendant had great recall
of the events surrounding the making of his statements, including the layout of the police station.
Defendant recalled details from that time frame. For example, he identified the type of cellular
telephone that a female officer used in the booking area. Defendant’s actions at the time of
giving his statements, along with his recollection of details, support the conclusion that he was
not intoxicated and could knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. A finding of fact is only
clearly erroneous if it leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
People v Kvam, 160 Mich App 189, 196; 408 NW2d 71 (1987). There is no evidence that a clear
error was made by the trial court in determining that defendant was not intoxicated; thus, we
-4-
must determine that the trial court did not err in determining that defendant’s statements were the
product of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver.
Defendant next contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to be referred to the forensic center for a determination of competency. The
determination of a defendant’s competence is within the trial court’s discretion. People v Harris,
185 Mich App 100, 102; 460 NW2d 239 (1990). A defendant is presumed competent to stand
trial absent a showing that “‘he is incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the
nature and object of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational
manner.’” Id., quoting MCL 330.2020(1). A defendant is entitled to a competency hearing if
there is a bona fide issue as to his competency. See Harris, supra at 102. The trial court’s
decision as to the existence of a “bona fide doubt” will only be reversed where there is an abuse
of discretion.2 Id. A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial or submit a plea if he has a
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against
him. People v Belanger, 73 Mich App 438, 447; 252 NW2d 472 (1977).
Defendant expressed a high level of understanding and a high level of competency in this
case. He wrote many of his own motions. He also maintained a steady correspondence with the
Court Administrator, trying to ensure that he was given a fair trial. He was concerned about the
forensic evidence and articulated his belief that his attorneys were not advocating for him to the
best of their abilities. Defendant on occasion made these concerns known to the judge in open
court, despite his attorney’s efforts to restrain him. These disagreements between attorney and
defendant led defense counsel to file the motion for referral to the forensic center. Defendant,
however, made it clear in court that he wanted to proceed with trial and that he was fully aware
of the nature and object of the proceedings. Further, defendant had no history of mental illness,
although we acknowledge that defendant had a substance abuse problem. The trial court
observed defendant throughout the process, up to the point of the motion, and indicated that there
was no indication or evidence to suggest that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. For these
reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s
motion for a competency evaluation.
Defendant finally argues on appeal that his attorney’s failure to utilize a private
investigator and a forensic evidence expert, coupled with not having sufficient time to prepare
for trial, violated his rights to effective assistance of counsel. In making his arguments,
defendant offers no explanation or rationale for any of the claims asserted. “An appellant may
not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of
2
The abuse of discretion standard recognizes “‘that there will be circumstances in which there
will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled
outcome.’” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006), quoting
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Under this standard, “[a]n abuse
of discretion occurs when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the principled range
of outcomes.” Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006).
-5-
supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 645; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
However, we note that we actually reviewed defendant’s allegations and found that they are
either unsupported by the record or defendant has failed to demonstrate that, but for the errors, he
would have been acquitted.
A determination regarding whether a defendant was deprived of the effective assistance
of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640
NW2d 246 (2002). This Court must first determine the facts and then decide whether these facts
constitute a violation of defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. Factual findings
are reviewed for clear error, while constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo. Id.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and a defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the attorney’s performance must have been
“objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms” and “but for the attorney’s
error or errors, a different outcome reasonably would have resulted.” People v Harmon, 248
Mich App 522, 531; 640 NW2d 314 (2001). Because defendant failed to meet his burden of
proving the existence of errors that were objectively unreasonable and that, but for the alleged
errors, the trial result would have been different, we reject defendant’s claim that he did not
receive effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
