PEOPLE OF MI V YVONNE BETH HALL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 28, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263962
Schoolcraft Circuit Court
LC No. 04-006400-FH
YVONNE BETH HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J. and Zahra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant claims an appeal from those portions of her order of probation requiring her to
pay $1,600 in appointed representation costs and $100 to a victims’ restitution fund. We vacate
that portion of the order requiring defendant to pay $1,600 in representation costs, and remand
this matter to the trial court for reconsideration of defendant’s ability to make such restitution.
We affirm the order of probation in all other respects.
The trial court conducted a bench trial and found defendant guilty of three counts of
delivery of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7401(2). The presentence investigation report
recommended that defendant be placed on probation, and be ordered to pay various costs and
fees, including attorney fees of $1,600 and a Victims Restitution Fund fee of $100. The trial
court sentenced defendant to serve a term of 18 months’ probation, with nine months in jail, and
ordered her to pay $3,360 in fees and costs as outlined in the order of probation.1
A person who was afforded appointed counsel might be ordered to reimburse the county
for the costs of that representation, if such reimbursement can be made without substantial
hardship. A court need not make a specific finding on the record regarding the defendant’s
ability to pay, but must provide some indication that it considered the defendant’s financial
situation prior to ordering reimbursement. The amount ordered to be reimbursed must be related
to the defendant’s foreseeable ability to pay. A court must afford the defendant notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to ordering repayment for appointed counsel expenses. People v
Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 251-255; 690 NW2d 476 (2004); see also MCR 6.005(B).
1
The order of probation provided that defendant was to pay $1,600 in attorney fees and $100 to
the Victims Restitution Fund.
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Defendant argues that the trial court denied her due process when it ordered her to
reimburse the county $1,600 for appointed counsel costs without first considering her ability to
pay. Defendant failed to object to this requirement below; therefore, our review is for plain
error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
We vacate that portion of the probation order requiring defendant to reimburse the county
$1,600 for appointed counsel costs, and remand this matter with instructions that the trial court
consider defendant’s ability to pay and, if appropriate, enter an order for reimbursement
commensurate with defendant’s ability to pay. Dunbar, supra at 256. The parties agree that the
trial court gave no indication that it considered defendant’s ability to pay prior to ordering her to
reimburse the county for the cost of her appointed counsel. Under the circumstances, a remand
for further proceedings is necessary and plaintiff does not object to such a remand. Id.
A governmental entity is entitled to restitution if it suffered “direct physical or financial
harm as a result of a crime.” MCL 780.766(1). The general cost of investigating and
prosecuting criminal activity does not constitute direct financial harm. People v Newton, 257
Mich App 61, 68-69; 665 NW2d 504 (2003).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to pay $100 in restitution to the
county. She contends that the county suffered no direct financial harm as a result of her
activities, and that no authority allowed the trial court to require her to contribute to a fund that
provides restitution for other person’s crimes.
We disagree. Defendant did not object on this ground below; therefore, our review is for
plain error. Carines, supra. The trial court ordered defendant to pay $100 to the Victims
Restitution Fund, a fund which provides restitution to crime victims who cannot collect from
indigent defendants. A trial court may order a defendant to pay “any assessment” as a condition
of probation. MCL 771.3(2)(f). Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s order requiring
defendant to pay $100 to the restitution fund was authorized by statute, and was proper.
We vacate that portion of the order of probation requiring defendant to pay the county
$1,600 for the cost of her appointed counsel, and remand this matter to the trial court for
reconsideration of defendant’s ability to reimburse the county for the cost of her appointed
counsel. The order of probation is affirmed in all other respects. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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