PEOPLE OF MI V PHILLIP ALLEN LESTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 28, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 262293
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-198274-FH
PHILLIP ALLEN LESTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of and sentence for assaulting,
resisting, or obstructing a police officer causing injury, MCL 750.81d(2). Defendant was
sentenced as a habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to a prison term of 4 to 15 years to
be served consecutively to a sentence related to a parole violation. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of August 27, 2004, Deputy Mike Blaszczak of the Oakland
County Sheriff’s Office saw a vehicle with a shattered back window traveling over the posted
speed limit. Deputy Blaszczak activated his lights and followed the vehicle into a driveway.
The driver of the vehicle, later identified as defendant, immediately exited the vehicle and, when
ordered by Deputy Blaszczak, went to the ground. Deputy Blaszczak knelt down to talk to
defendant, at which point defendant tried to grab his arms. During the ensuing struggle,
defendant kept reaching toward his pocket, bit Deputy Blaszczak, then grabbed Deputy
Blaszczak’s flashlight, indicating that he was going to harm Deputy Blaszczak with it. A White
Lake police officer eventually provided assistance and defendant was ultimately arrested.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion and severely
prejudiced him by allowing the prosecution’s trial-day endorsement of the injured deputy’s wife
as a witness. We disagree. A trial court’s decision to allow the late endorsement of a witness is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 291; 537 NW2d 813
(1995), as is its decision to sequester a witness and impose penalties for a violation of a
sequestration order, People v Nixten, 160 Mich App 203, 209-210; 408 NW2d 77 (1987). An
abuse of discretion occurs only where a court’s decision is so violative of fact and logic as to
constitute perversity of will or defiance of judgment. People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 456;
554 NW2d 586 (1996).
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A prosecutor must attach to the information a list of known witnesses who might be
called at trial. MCL 767.40a(1). No less than thirty days before trial, the prosecution is required
to send defendant (or his or her counsel) a list of all witnesses it intends to call at trial. MCL
767.40a(3). However, MCL 767.40a(4) permits the prosecutor’s late endorsement of a witness
at any time upon leave of the court and for good cause shown. Generally, the late endorsement
of a witness is permitted and a continuance is granted if necessary to prevent possible prejudice
to the defendant. People v Suchy, 143 Mich App 136, 141; 371 NW2d 502 (1985).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the prosecution’s trial-day
endorsement of the deputy’s wife. During cross-examination of the injured deputy, defense
counsel insinuated that defendant did not bite him, let alone cause an injury. The trial court
apparently allowed the deputy’s wife to testify to rebut defense counsel’s claim that no bite
occurred. Thus, good cause was shown to allow the assistant prosecutor in its case-in-chief to
endorse a witness to rebut the claim that the deputy had not been bitten.
Defendant claims that the trial court should have sua sponte granted a continuance citing
People v Lino (After Remand), 213 Mich App 89; 539 NW2d 545 (1995), overruled on other
grounds People v Carson, 220 Mich App 662, 673-674; 560 NW2d 657 (1996), in support of his
claim. However, Lino and People v Williams, 188 Mich App 54, 58-59; 469 NW2d 4 (1991), the
case cited in Lino, do not stand for the proposition that a trial court is required to fashion a
remedy when a discovery statute has been violated but rather that a trial court maintains
discretion in fashioning a remedy if defendant can show prejudice from the violation. Here,
defense counsel merely announced that § 40a(3) had been violated but did not ask for any type of
remedy to prepare for the witness. Thus, while arguable whether a remedy would have been
warranted if requested, the trial court was not required to sua sponte grant such relief.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the deputy’s wife was
allowed to testify in violation of the sequestration order. We disagree. A sequestration order
serves to prevent witnesses from coloring their testimony in relation to the testimony of other
witnesses. People v Stanley, 71 Mich App 56, 61; 246 NW2d 418 (1976). A defendant must
demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief for a sequestration order violation. People v Solak, 146
Mich App 659, 669; 382 NW2d 495 (1985).
Here, contrary to defendant’s claim, defendant was not prejudiced by the violation.
Specifically, the injured deputy testified that defendant bit him, and the deputy who treated the
wound testified that the mark looked like a bite mark. In that regard, because the testimony of
the deputy’s wife was cumulative, any prejudice that might have occurred was harmless. See,
e.g., People v Solomon, 220 Mich App 527, 531; 560 NW2d 651 (1996).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony concerning
whether defendant’s arm evidenced a bite mark without first conducting a Davis-Frye1 hearing.
We disagree. This alleged error is unpreserved because defense counsel did not ask for a Davis-
1
Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (DC Cir, 1923); People v Davis, 343 Mich
348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955).
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Frye hearing as to the admissibility of lay testimony concerning whether the deputy had been
bitten. Therefore, review is for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Under the Davis-Frye rule, novel scientific evidence must be established as having
achieved general scientific acceptance in order to be admissible at trial. People v Lee, 212 Mich
App 228, 262; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). However, when evidence becomes judicially recognized
as generally accepted in the scientific community, a Davis-Frye hearing is no longer required.
People v Tanner, 255 Mich App 369, 395; 660 NW2d 746 (2003), rev’d on other grounds 469
Mich 437 (2003).
Here, defendant’s argument that a Davis-Frye hearing was required is misplaced because
none of the three witnesses who testified about the bite mark testified as expert witnesses under
MRE 702.2 Moreover, the trial did not involve any scientific testimony. Thus, defendant’s
argument is without merit.3
Defendant next argues that the assistant prosecutor submitted and elicited improper MRE
404(b) testimony and evidence concerning defendant’s prior convictions and actions involving
assaultive behavior with officers from the White Lake Township Police Department.
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing
to object to the testimony and evidence. This error is, as admitted by defendant, unpreserved.
Review of the alleged evidentiary error is thus for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Carines, supra at 762-763. Review of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385; 624 NW2d
227 (2001).
Under MRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if the
evidence is (1) offered for a proper purpose rather than to prove the defendant’s character or
propensity to commit the crime, (2) is relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and (3)
is not unduly prejudicial under the balancing test of MRE 403. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich
52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended on other grounds 445 Mich 1205 (1994). A proper
purpose includes “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in
doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material,
whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to
the conduct at issue in the case.” MRE 404(b).
2
Notably, this Court has previously concluded that a Davis-Frye hearing concerning expert bitemark analysis is unnecessary because that science has gained general acceptance in the scientific
community. People v Marsh, 177 Mich App 161, 162; 441 NW2d 33 (1989).
3
The factors that a court may consider in determining whether expert opinion evidence is
admissible under MRE 702 have been amended explicitly to incorporate the standard set forth in
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579, 589; 113 S Ct 2786, 125 L Ed 2d
469 (1993). See Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 781; 685 NW2d 391 (2004).
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Evidence of misconduct similar to that charged is logically relevant to show that the
charged act occurred if the charged and other acts are sufficiently similar to support an inference
that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system. People v Sabin (After
Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). However, a general similarity does not alone
establish a plan, scheme or system. Id. at 64. Rather, there must be such a concurrence of
common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as individual manifestations
caused by a general plan. Id. at 64-65.
Here, defendant’s statements to the deputy who transported him to jail about the
frequency with which he fought with White Lake Police Officers and his later admission during
trial that he believed that the arresting deputy was a White Lake Police Officer are indicative of a
common scheme to fight with those officers. We thus find no plain error because defendant’s
statements may have been admissible for a proper purpose, namely showing a common plan,
scheme, or system.
Defendant alternatively argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
where his trial attorney failed to object to the admission of the alleged improper MRE 404(b)
evidence. We disagree.
Whether a person has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question
of fact and constitutional law. A judge first must find the facts, and then must decide whether
those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The trial court’s factual
findings are reviewed for clear error, while its constitutional determinations are reviewed de
novo. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To prevail
on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make two showings. First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was so deficient that, under an objective
standard of reasonableness, the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Carbin, supra at 599-600.
Assuming that an objection would have been sustained concerning the alleged improper
evidence, defense counsel’s failure to object may have been an issue of trial strategy. Counsel
could, for example, have thought it wise to allow defendant to explain differences in how he
acted on the night at issue in relation to prior incidents when he had admitted fighting with other
officers. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel on matters involving
trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Moreover, there
is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the alleged
improper testimony, given the remaining testimony presented at trial concerning defendant’s
struggle with the deputy.
Acknowledging that there is no right under MCL 750.81d to resist a peaceful arrest
regardless of its legality, defendant next argues that the jury should have been instructed that an
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individual has the right to resist an excessively forceful arrest. However, this issue has been
waived because defense counsel twice agreed with the instructions that had been given. People v
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). “One who waives his rights under a rule
may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has
extinguished any error.” Id.
Defendant finally argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him outside the
minimum sentencing guidelines range because defendant exercised his right to a jury trial.
However, defendant was sentenced to 4 to 15 years, which appears to be within the minimum
sentencing guidelines range. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s claim, the record clearly
indicates that defendant’s minimum sentence was not increased as compared to the apparent plea
offer because defendant exercised his right to a jury trial. To the contrary, the trial court clearly
indicated that it was sentencing defendant at the top of the guidelines range because of his prior
convictions and his apparent danger to the public. While a sentencing court may not consider
factors for sentencing purposes that violate a defendant’s constitutional rights, People v Miller,
179 Mich App 466, 469; 446 NW2d 294 (1989), “‘it is not [constitutionally] forbidden to extend
a proper degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas[,]’” People v Godbold, 230 Mich App 508,
519; 585 NW2d 13 (1998), quoting Corbitt v New Jersey, 439 US 212, 223; 99 S Ct 492; 58 L
Ed 2d 466 (1978) (alteration by Godbold). In that respect, the converse is also true, it is
constitutionally proper to extend leniency in exchange for a plea of guilty and not to extend
“‘leniency to those who have not demonstrated those attributes on which leniency is based.’”
Godbold, supra at 519-520, quoting Corbitt, supra at 224. Again, the trial court’s sentence was
based on factors that were permissible to consider. Thus, defendant is not entitled to
resentencing. MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684 NW2d 669
(2004).
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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