PEOPLE OF MI V SHAMON LYNN BEAVERS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 264178
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 04-198633-FC
SHAMON LYNN BEAVERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a, and
armed robbery, MCL 750.529. He was sentenced to 5 ½ to 20 years in prison on each of his
convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his
statements to the police. We disagree. We review de novo issues of law pertaining to a motion
to suppress. People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 496; 668 NW2d 602 (2003).
A prosecutor generally may not use custodial statements as evidence unless he
demonstrates that, before any questioning, the accused was warned that he had a right to remain
silent, that his statements could be used against him, and that he had the right to retained or
appointed counsel. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966);
People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 633; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). Miranda warnings are not required
unless the accused is subject to a custodial interrogation. People v Hill, 429 Mich 382, 384, 395;
415 NW2d 193 (1987); People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8, 25; 620 NW2d 537 (2000). A
custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after the accused has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 449; 594 NW2d 120 (1999). Whether an accused was in
custody depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. The key question is whether the
accused could reasonably believe that he was not free to leave. Id. “The determination of
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation rather than the subjective
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Id.
Defendant testified that he felt he was not free to leave and that if he attempted to leave
police would have prevented him from doing so and would have arrested him. The police
detective testified that once defendant admitted his participation in the robbery, in the detective’s
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mind, defendant was no longer free to leave and if defendant had attempted to leave police
would have arrested him. However, the determination of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation rather than the subjective views harbored by either the
interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Zahn, supra, p 449. Defendant voluntarily
went to the police station and asked to speak with detectives. Defendant was never told that he
was under arrest or could not leave, was not restrained in any way, and was left alone on more
than one occasion in an unlocked, unguarded room. Before defendant spoke with police, he
verbally acknowledged his understanding that he was not under arrest. Defendant’s written
statement also establishes that he knew he was not under arrest when the statement was given.
Thus, viewing the circumstances objectively, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it
found that defendant could not have reasonably believed that he was not free to leave, and thus,
was not in custody. Id. Therefore, even though it is undisputed that defendant was never
informed of his Miranda rights before he gave the challenged statements, the trial court properly
denied defendant’s suppression motion. Hill, supra, pp 384, 395; Zahn, supra, p 449.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it allowed jurors to submit questions
to the witnesses. Defendant failed to object to the trial court’s instruction informing the jurors
that it would allow them to ask the witnesses questions, and furthermore, failed to object to any
specific question submitted by the jurors. Because this argument is not properly preserved for
appeal, People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), we review defendant’s
argument for plain error affecting substantial rights, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 773;
597 NW2d 130 (1999).
“The practice of permitting questions to witnesses propounded by jurors should rest in
the sound discretion of the trial court.” People v Heard, 388 Mich 182, 187; 200 NW2d 73
(1972).1 Defendant does not claim any abuse of discretion, or challenge any specific question
that was asked, but argues that the practice of permitting jurors to ask questions should be
deemed “structural error . . . as a matter of law reform.” This Court is bound to follow our
Supreme Court’s decision in Heard, which holds that the practice of allowing jurors to ask
witnesses questions is within the trial court’s discretion. See People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364,
369-370; 408 NW2d 798 (1987) (holding that it is the Supreme Court’s obligation to overrule or
modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until the Supreme Court takes such action, the Court
of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority).
In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jurors that if they had questions after a
witness was done testifying, they could write down questions and submit them to the court, and
if the prosecution, defense counsel and the court deemed the question to be appropriate, the court
would ask the witness the question that was submitted. Thus, the trial court employed a
procedure that ensured that inappropriate questions were not posed to witnesses, and allowed the
parties the opportunity to object to any questions. Hence, defendant has failed to show that the
1
We note that recently enacted MCR 6.414(E) codifies Heard by stating that “[t]he court may, in
its discretion, permit the jurors to ask questions of witnesses. If the court permits jurors to ask
questions, it must employ a procedure that ensures that inappropriate questions are not asked,
and that the parties have the opportunity to object to the questions.”
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trial court erred by permitting jurors to ask questions. Carines, supra, p 763; Heard, supra, p
187.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to instruct
the jury on “attempt” and “abandonment.” We disagree. We review a trial court’s determination
whether a jury instruction was applicable to the facts of the case for an abuse of discretion.
People v Hawthorne, 265 Mich App 47, 50; 692 NW2d 879 (2005), rev’d on other grounds 474
Mich 1108 (2006). Because defendant failed to reference his “attempt” argument in his
statement of questions presented, we will review that argument for plain error affecting
substantial rights. MCR 7.212(C)(5); Carines, supra, p 763; People v Brown, 239 Mich App
735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000).
A trial court must instruct the jury regarding the applicable law. A criminal defendant
has a right to a properly instructed jury, and a requested instruction that is supported by the
evidence must be given. MCL 768.29; People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 474; 620 NW2d 13
(2000). “A criminal defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to present a defense,”
and thus, “[i]nstructional errors which directly affect a defendant’s theory of defense can infringe
a defendant’s due process right to present a defense.” People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 326
327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002). “Conversely, an instruction that is without evidentiary support
should not be given.” People v Wess, 235 Mich App 241, 243; 597 NW2d 215 (1999). “A
defendant asserting an affirmative defense must produce some evidence on all elements of the
defense before the trial court is required to instruct the jury regarding the affirmative defense.”
People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 620; 591 NW2d 669 (1998). In People v Droste, 160
Mich 66, 80; 125 NW 27 (1910), our Supreme Court held that where a defendant denied the
crime altogether rather than arguing that he committed the crime but only did so out of self
defense, the trial court did not err when it denied the defendant’s request to have the jury
instructed on self-defense. Similarly, in People v Trammell, 70 Mich App 351, 355; 247 NW2d
311 (1976), this Court held that where the defendant argued that his actions were an accident, the
trial court did not err when it did not instruct the jury on self-defense.
The trial court denied defendant’s request for an attempt instruction, finding that it was
not supported by a rational view of the evidence because defendant did not present an attempt
theory, but rather, argued that he was not criminally involved whatsoever in the events. In
People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357-358; 646 NW2d 127 (2002), our Supreme Court held that,
pursuant to MCL 768.32(1),2 a lesser offense instruction may be given only if it is a necessarily
included lesser offense or an attempt, and the instruction is supported by a rational view of the
evidence.
The evidence presented by the prosecution establishes that defendant and five other men
discussed robbing a store before defendant drove two of the men to a building adjacent to a wine
2
The statute reads as follows: “Except as provided in subsection (2), upon an indictment for an
offense, consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the jury, or the judge in a
trial without a jury, may find the accused not guilty of the offense in the degree charged in the
indictment and may find the accused person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior to that
charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit that offense.” MCL 768.32(1).
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store where they met up with the other three men. The evidence established that the men carried
out their plan to rob the wine store by sending one man in to the store to check out the store, who
subsequently called three other men in to the store to help rob the store. One of these men was
armed. At trial, defendant testified that he was never involved in any discussion about a robbery
and knew nothing about a robbery. Defendant contended that he merely drove a couple of
friends to an apartment complex in Southfield, and when he exited the car, “Rat” waived a gun in
his face and told him to wait in the car. Defendant argued that he was completely innocent, not
that an armed robbery was attempted, but not completed. Thus, the evidence presented
established either that defendant was innocent or that he aided and abetted an armed robbery.
People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 67; 679 NW2d 41 (2004); People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443,
458; 687 NW2d 119 (2004); People v Coomer, 245 Mich App 206, 223; 627 NW2d 612 (2001).
A rational view of the evidence did not support an instruction on attempted armed robbery.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, or commit plain error, when it declined
defendant’s request to instruct the jury on attempted armed robbery. Cornell, supra, pp 357-358;
Droste, supra, p 80; Wess, supra, p 243.
The trial court also denied defendant’s request for an abandonment instruction on the
ground that such an instruction is a proper defense only to an attempt charge. It has been
established that “voluntary abandonment is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for criminal
attempt. The burden is on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he
or she has voluntarily and completely abandoned his or her criminal purpose. Abandonment is
not ‘voluntary’ when the defendant fails to complete the attempted crime because of
unanticipated difficulties, unexpected resistance, or circumstances which increase the probability
of detention or apprehension.” People v Kimball, 109 Mich App 273, 286-287; 311 NW2d 343
(1981), mod on other grounds 412 Mich 890 (1981). The evidence presented did not support an
attempted armed robbery instruction, and accordingly, defendant was not charged with attempted
armed robbery, nor was an attempt instruction given. Thus, an abandonment defense was not
available. Id. Moreover, the evidence presented by defendant sought to establish that he was
completely innocent, not that he abandoned an armed robbery. In contrast, the prosecution’s
evidence established that defendant aided and abetted the armed robbery and left the scene only
because he heard a commotion. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for
an abandonment instruction. Droste, supra, p 80; Crawford, supra, p 620; Trammell, supra, p
355.
Defendant’s final argument is that the prosecutor committed misconduct that denied him
a fair and impartial trial. We disagree. Defendant failed to properly preserve this argument by
objecting to the prosecutor’s alleged instances of misconduct on the same ground that he asserts
on appeal. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 625; 601 NW2d 393 (1999); People v Stimage,
202 Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993) (holding that an objection based on one ground is
insufficient to preserve an appellate argument on a different ground). Thus, we review
defendant’s claim for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra, pp 763, 773.
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). A reviewing
court examines the record to evaluate the challenged prosecutorial remarks within the context of
the evidence, issues and defense arguments. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613
NW2d 370 (2000), overruled on other grounds Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct
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1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). A defendant’s opportunity for a fair trial can be jeopardized
when the prosecutor interjects issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. People
v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 438; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). “A prosecutor may not
imply in closing argument that defendant must prove something or present a reasonable
explanation for damaging evidence because such an argument tends to shift the burden of proof.”
People v Green, 131 Mich App 232, 237; 345 NW2d 676 (1983).3 However, a prosecutor is
entitled to fairly respond to issues raised by a defendant. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 352-353
n 6; 662 NW2d 376 (2003). Under the “fair response” doctrine, unless the prosecutor’s
comments burden the defendant’s right not to testify, or shift the burden of disproving an
element of the offense to the defendant, the comments are not improper. People v Fields, 450
Mich 94, 112-113; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). A prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s failure to
call witnesses in support of a defense theory advanced at trial does not shift the burden of proof
to the defendant, but simply are proper comments on the weakness of the defense theory. Id., pp
111-112, 115.
Defendant testified that the bullets that were found in the trunk of his car belonged to
“Grant,” and that when he attempted to get out of the car, “Rat” waived a gun in his face and told
him to stay in the car. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant if he planned on
calling “Grant” and “Rat” as witnesses to corroborate his testimony. During defense counsel’s
closing argument, defense counsel stated that it was not defendant’s “duty or obligation” to
produce “Rat.” During the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that
defendant, through his attorney, had the power to subpoena “Rat.” MCL 775.15; People v Duff,
165 Mich App 530, 547; 419 NW2d 600 (1987).
Defendant presented a theory of duress when he testified that “Rat” waived a gun in his
face and told him to stay in the car. Defendant denied ownership of a box of bullets when he
testified that the bullets in his car’s trunk belonged to “Grant.” Thus, we conclude that the
prosecutor’s questions posed to defendant during cross-examination regarding whether he
intended to produce certain witnesses, were proper questions that were strictly in response to
defense theories. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s questions did not shift the burden of disproving
an element of the crimes charged and did not deny defendant his right to a fair and impartial trial.
Jones, supra, pp 352-353 n 6; Fields, supra, pp 111-115.
We further conclude that the prosecutor’s rebuttal comments that defendant had the
power to subpoena witnesses was also in response to defendant’s testimony that “Rat” waived a
gun in his face and was a proper statement of Michigan law. Duff, supra, p 547. The
prosecutor’s rebuttal comments did not shift the burden of disproving an element of armed
robbery or conspiracy to commit armed robbery and did not deny defendant his right to a fair and
impartial trial. Jones, supra, pp 352-353 n 6; Fields, supra, pp 111-115; Duff, supra, p 547.
3
In Green, supra, this Court held that the prosecutor’s closing argument, which consisted of 11
questions the prosecutor felt the defendant should have to answer, was improper because it
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant by suggesting that the defendant had to
explain the evidence against him. Green, supra, p 237.
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Therefore, the prosecutor’s aforementioned actions do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct or
plain error. Carines, supra, pp 763, 773; Watson, supra, p 586.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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