PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD WESLEY YORK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 262112
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-199391-FH
RICHARD WESLEY YORK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Sawyer and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Richard York of receiving or concealing a stolen motor
vehicle1 and sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender2 to 10 to 25 years’
imprisonment. York appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
On June 28, 2004, York responded to an ad in a Wayne County newspaper for a Ford
Expedition, pretending to be an interested buyer. However, he had no intention of purchasing
the car and absconded with the vehicle during a test drive. York testified that he planned the
theft at the behest of another individual and that he delivered the Expedition to this other
individual the day after he stole it. However, approximately one week after the theft, an Oakland
County Sheriff deputy, driving an unmarked minivan, identified York in the Expedition in
Madison Heights.
II. Admission Of Prior Convictions
A. Standard Of Review
York argues that the trial court erred when it admitted as impeachment evidence his prior
convictions for second-degree retail fraud3 and larceny by conversion.4 Although York objected
1
MCL 750.535(7).
2
MCL 769.12.
3
MCL 750.356d.
4
MCL 750.362.
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at trial to admission of his prior second-degree retail fraud conviction, he did so on other grounds
than the ones he now contends should warrant reversal. Therefore, York has not preserved the
argument that this conviction was improperly admitted and must show that any error in its
admission was plain and affected his substantial rights.5 However, because York objected at trial
to the trial court’s decision to admit the larceny by conversion conviction, we will review that
issue for an abuse of discretion.6 An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an
outcome falling outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.7
B. MRE 609
The prosecution may impeach the credibility of a witness with evidence of prior
convictions if those convictions satisfy the criteria in MRE 609, which provides as follows:
(a) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
the witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unless the
evidence has been elicited from the witness or established by public record during
cross-examination, and
(1) the crime contained an element of dishonesty or false statement, or
(2) the crime contained an element of theft, and
(A) the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or
death under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
(B) the court determines that the evidence has significant probative value
on the issue of credibility and, if the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial,
the court further determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.
C. Second-Degree Retail Fraud
Second-degree retail fraud is punishable by less then one year in prison.8 Thus, this prior
conviction cannot be admitted for impeachment purposes under MRE 609(a)(2).
To be admissible under MRE 609(a)(1), the circumstances surrounding the crime must
indicate that the defendant committed some act involving dishonesty or false statement.
Although some of the specific conduct prohibited under MCL 750.356d does involve dishonesty
or false statements, not every distinct circumstance under which a second-degree retail fraud
5
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
6
People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995).
7
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
8
MCL 750.356d(1).
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conviction may arise involves dishonesty or false statements.9 Here, the trial court admitted
York’s second-degree retail fraud conviction without evaluating the circumstances surrounding
its commission; thus, we are unable to determine from the record before us whether that crime
involved dishonesty or false statement.
Nonetheless, even if the retail fraud conviction did not involve dishonesty or false
statement, reversal is not required because York has failed to show that the alleged error was
outcome determinative.10 Strong evidence of York’s guilt exists even without considering the
second-degree retail fraud conviction. York admitted at trial that he stole the vehicle on June 28,
and an eyewitness observed him driving it on July 7. In addition, the prior conviction for
second-degree retail fraud was admitted as one of four prior convictions. The prosecution only
dealt with these convictions in a cursory fashion and did not comment on them during closing
arguments. Under these circumstances, we conclude that York has failed to prove that the
admission of this conviction was outcome determinative. Therefore, we need not reverse
because any error that occurred when the second-degree retail fraud conviction was introduced
did not rise to the level of “plain error” and did not affect York’s substantial rights.
D. Larceny By Conversion
York does not dispute that his larceny by conversion conviction was a theft crime
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year. York contends that admission of the
conviction should have been barred because its use for impeachment was more prejudicial than
probative. In general, “[t]heft crimes are minimally probative” of truthfulness and admissible
under MRE 609 only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.11
MRE 609(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
For purposes of . . . probative value determination . . . , the court shall
consider only the age of the conviction and the degree to which a conviction of
the crime is indicative of veracity. If a determination of prejudicial effect is
required, the court shall consider only the conviction’s similarity to the charged
offense and the possible effects on the decisional process if admitting the
evidence causes the defendant to elect not to testify.
We conclude that the first factor for determining the probative value of the conviction—
the age of the conviction—weighs in favor of probative value because York was released from
prison on his larceny by conversion conviction in 2000.12 Turning to the second factor, we must
consider “the degree to which a conviction of the crime is indicative of veracity.”13 To be
9
People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 246; 575 NW2d 316 (1997).
10
See id. at 247.
11
People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 635; 696 NW2d 754 (2005); see also MRE
609(a)(2)(B).
12
MRE 609(c).
13
MRE 609(b).
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convicted of larceny by conversion, a defendant must have “embezzled, converted to his own
use, or hid the property with the intent to embezzle or fraudulently use it.”14 Because the crime
involves an element of stealth, larceny by conversion is more probative of truthfulness than other
crimes of theft.
To determine the prejudicial effect introduction of the conviction may have had, we must
consider the larceny by conversion conviction’s similarity to York’s receiving or concealing a
stolen motor vehicle charge.15 There is nothing in the record to support a finding that there was
any degree of similarity between the conviction for larceny by conversion and the charged
offense that would result in its prejudicial impact outweighing the aforementioned probative
value. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
York’s larceny by conversion conviction was indicative of veracity, was not similar to the
charged offense, and was not more prejudicial than probative.
III. Departure From Sentencing Guidelines
A. Standard Of Review
York argues that the trial court departed from the minimum sentencing guidelines without
citing a substantial and compelling reason for doing so and that the resulting sentence was cruel
and unusual punishment. Under the sentencing guidelines act,16 a trial court must impose a
sentence within the guidelines range unless there is a “substantial and compelling” reason for
departure.17 We review the “substantial and compelling” determination for abuse of discretion.18
In ascertaining whether the departure was proper, we must defer to the trial court’s direct
knowledge of the facts and the familiarity of the offender.19
B. Legal Standards
To determine whether a reason for departure is “substantial and compelling” the Court
must look to the following factors set forth in Babcock: (1) the reason must be objective and
verifiable, (2) the reason should keenly or irresistibly grab the attention of the court, (3) the
reason must be of considerable worth in deciding the length of a sentence, and (4) the reason
must be something that exists only in exceptional cases.20 If a trial court finds that there are
substantial and compelling reasons to believe that sentencing the defendant within the guidelines
14
People v Mason, 247 Mich App 64, 72; 634 NW2d 382 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
15
Because York did elect to testify, we need not address the second factor listed in MRE 609(b)
for determining prejudicial effect.
16
MCL 769.31 et seq.
17
MCL 769.34(3); Babcock, supra at 255-256.
18
Babcock, supra at 264-265.
19
Id. at 270.
20
Id. at 257.
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range is not proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and criminal history,
then the trial court should depart from the guidelines.21 But any departure must be proportionate
to both the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s criminal record.22
C. Applying The Standards
York’s minimum guidelines range was between 19 and 76 months.23 In departing from
this minimum range, the trial court cited York’s lengthy criminal record and parole violations,
which are objective and verifiable.24 Parole violations are not accounted for in the sentencing
guidelines; therefore, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
depart from the minimum guidelines range on this basis.25 In addition, while York received the
highest score possible for prior record variable (PRV) 1 (75 points), which accounts for “3 or
more prior high severity felony convictions,”26 and the highest score possible for PRV 2 (30
points), which accounts for “4 or more prior low severity felony convictions,”27 these scores do
not adequately reflect his 23 prior felony convictions.28 Additionally, the departure in this case,
three years and four months, was proportionate to both the seriousness of York’s conduct and
criminal record, and was within the range of principled outcomes. A proportionate sentence does
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.29 Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in departing from the minimum sentencing guidelines.
IV. Accuracy Of Sentencing Information
York argues that the trial court relied on inaccurate information during sentencing.
However, this issue is not properly before us for two reasons. First, this issue is unpreserved
because York failed to properly challenge the presentence investigation report (PSIR) pursuant to
MCL 769.34(10).30 And, second, York’s counsel waived appellate review of this argument by
verbally assenting to the accuracy of the PSIR.31
21
Id. at 264.
22
Id.
23
See MCL 777.21(3)(c); MCL 777.65.
24
People v Schaafsma, 267 Mich App 184, 185-186; 267 Mich App 184 (2005).
25
Id.
26
MCL 777.51.
27
MCL 777.52.
28
MCL 769.34(3)(b); Schaafsma, supra at 186 (affirming a sentencing departure where the trial
court found that the defendant’s 10 felony convictions and 31 misdemeanor convictions were
given inadequate weight under the sentencing guidelines).
29
People v Colon, 250 Mich App 59, 65-66; 644 NW2d 790 (2002).
30
See also MCL 771.14(5) and MCR 6.425(D)(2)(b).
31
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 208-209, 213-214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
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V. Blakely v Washington
York argues that, because the prosecutor did not prove the facts underlying the scoring of
his guidelines during trial, the enhancement of his sentence represents an unconstitutional
violation of his Sixth Amendment32 right to a jury trial under Blakely v Washington.33 The
Michigan Supreme Court, however, has held that Michigan’s sentencing scheme does not offend
the Sixth Amendment on the basis that its minimum sentences are based on facts not determined
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and that Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s sentencing
scheme.34
VI. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
York argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because it is
unpreserved, we consider York’s claim only to the extent that counsel’s claimed mistakes are
apparent on the record.35
B. Legal Standards
A defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel was effective
and must meet a two-pronged test to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.36 First, the
defendant must show that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances and according to professional norms.37 In doing so, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s performance constituted sound
trial strategy.38 Second, the defendant must show that this performance so prejudiced him that he
was deprived of a fair trial.39 To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.40
C. Applying The Standards
York argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare for trial and failed to
32
US Const, amend VI.
33
Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).
34
People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
35
People v Johnson, 144 Mich App 125, 129-130; 373 NW2d 263 (1985).
36
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
37
Id. at 687-688; People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 312-313; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
38
Strickland, supra at 690-691.
39
Id. at 687-688; Pickens, supra at 309.
40
People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000).
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call alibi witnesses. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”41 Ordinarily, “[d]ecisions
regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be
matters of trial strategy, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel
regarding matters of trial strategy.”42 The failure to call witnesses only constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.43
York’s argument relies solely on information and allegations that are not part of the lower
court record. In addition, York fails to provide any indication of what these witnesses would
have testified to or how the purported evidence would have been outcome determinative. Thus,
there is no basis to conclude on the existing record that York was denied a substantial defense or
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses or introduce certain
evidence.44
York also argues that his counsel erred when he opened the door to testimony from the
investigating officer that York admitted that he knew the unmarked minivan was being driven by
a police officer, a statement that effectively places York in the Expedition in Oakland County on
July 7. The trial court had originally told the jury to disregard this testimony when the
investigating officer presented it. When defense counsel asked York on direct examination about
this statement, the trial court instructed the jurors that they could now consider it. York has
failed to demonstrate that this alleged error was outcome determinative. The prosecution was
required to prove that York possessed the vehicle in Oakland County. York argues that the
challenged testimony essentially constituted an admission that he possessed the car in Oakland
County. However, York specifically admitted at trial to stealing the vehicle in Wayne County
and to delivering it to another individual in Oakland County. An Oakland County deputy sheriff
observed York driving the vehicle in Oakland County. This evidence provides more than
adequate support for the proposition that York possessed the vehicle in Oakland County. Any
deficiencies that may have existed in York’s counsel’s performance can, therefore, not be said to
have contributed to the outcome of the case.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
41
Strickland, supra at 691.
42
People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
43
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).
44
Id.
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