MERRI DORKINS V CITY OF PONTIAC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MERRI DORKINS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 269265
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-070761-CZ
CITY OF PONTIAC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Murray and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from the circuit court order granting summary disposition to
defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) on plaintiff’s claim alleging defamation and abuse of
process. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Defendant hired plaintiff as a clerk typist in February 1988. The employment application
asked applicants if they had ever been convicted of a felony and provided that “any misstatement
or omission of fact on this application shall be considered cause for disqualification of such
application, and that if employed shall be considered cause for dismissal.” In 2001, plaintiff
engaged in a protest to recall Willie Payne, defendant’s then mayor. After the protests, plaintiff
had several “run-ins” with Mayor Payne. On September 19, 2003, defendant, through the acting
director of community development, informed plaintiff that it had recently come to defendant’s
attention, without disclosing how, that plaintiff had pleaded guilty to attempted embezzlement on
August 20, 1984, but she had not disclosed this on her employment application. Defendant
immediately suspended plaintiff without pay with the intent to terminate plaintiff’s employment.
Plaintiff alleges that she subsequently was unemployed for 18 months and was sued by her
creditors because she was unable to pay her bills. Plaintiff also claims that she experienced
extreme embarrassment and economic loss. After plaintiff contested her firing through her
union, she was reinstated and given back wages.
Plaintiff sued defendant in November 2005 alleging defamation and abuse of process.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant abused process by firing her for an ulterior purpose and
improperly using “a lawsuit, ordinances and other police enforcement to threaten” her. Plaintiff
contended that defendant investigated her criminal background after her criticism of the mayor.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity)
and (8) (failure to state a claim). The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for summary
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disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7), reasoning that
defendant was engaged in a governmental function when it terminated plaintiff’s employment
and was therefore immune from liability for any statements made in connection with the
discharge.
On appeal, plaintiff first contends that defendant was not engaged in a governmental
function when it investigated her criminal background and, therefore, was not immune from tort
liability. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo the grant or a denial of a motion for
summary disposition. Spiek v Dept of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
(1998). Under the governmental immunity act, a governmental function is an activity that is
expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance,
or other law. MCL 691.1401(f); Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 204; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). The
term "governmental function" is broadly construed, and the statutory exceptions to immunity are
narrowly construed. Maskery v University of Michigan Board of Regents, 468 Mich 609, 613614; 664 NW2d 165 (2003); Kerbersky v Northern Michigan University, 458 Mich 525, 529; 582
NW2d 828 (1998). Further, governmental immunity continues to apply to a governmental
agency even when it improperly performs a general governmental function that is authorized by
law. Richardson v Jackson County, 432 Mich 377, 385; 443 NW2d 105 (1989). The screening,
hiring, and supervision of public employees are governmental functions. Bozarth v Harper
Creek Board of Education, 94 Mich App 351, 353; 288 NW2d 424 (1979). When defendant
hired, supervised, and later fired plaintiff after defendant learned that plaintiff had omitted
disclosing her felony conviction on her employment application, it was supervising a public
employee and, therefore, engaged in an authorized governmental function, even if it learned of
plaintiff’s criminal history by improper means. Therefore, governmental immunity applies to
defendant’s actions in this case.
Plaintiff also contends that she was not required to disclose this conviction because her
conviction was a misdemeanor or a “high-court misdemeanor.” However, plaintiff has not
shown any legal basis for this characterization of her conviction. When plaintiff pleaded guilty
in 1984, embezzlement by an agent involving property worth more than $100 was a felony
punishable by a sentence up to ten years in prison and a $5,000 fine. MCL 750.174 (1957).
Plaintiff was sentenced to two years’ probation with the first 30 days in the Oakland County Jail.
Plaintiff did not disclose this felony conviction on her application, even though she was required
to do so by the terms of the application.
Plaintiff next maintains, based on MCL 28.214(1)(a)(i), that a governmental agency’s use
of LEIN to obtain information about a person’s criminal history is statutorily limited to
“administer criminal justice or enforce any law.” However, review of the complaint reveals that
plaintiff did not allege a violation of the LEIN system. Moreover, there is no documentary
evidence to indicate that defendant conducted a LEIN check. Accordingly, the trial court
properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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