IN RE EST OF CECIL C WARREN JR DEC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of CECIL C. WARREN, JR., Deceased.
CINDY WARREN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2006
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
JEFFREY J. WARREN, SUSAN WARREN and
SUSAN VALDISERRI, Personal Representative
of the Estate of CECIL C. WARREN, JR.,
Deceased,
No. 262937
Saginaw Probate Court
LC No. 04-116725-DE
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals from an order of the probate court denying her an intestate share of her
deceased husband’s estate. Specifically, petitioner objects to the probate court’s ruling that
under Michigan’s pretermitted spouse statute, MCL 700.2301, she was not entitled to claim an
intestate share because the decedent had devised his entire estate in trust for the benefit of his
son, respondent Jeffrey J. Warren, the decedent’s child from a previous marriage. We affirm.
Petitioner first argues that the lower court erred when it ruled that she was not a
pretermitted spouse under MCL 700.2301. Petitioner argues that as a pretermitted spouse, she is
statutorily entitled to an intestate share of the decedent’s estate, notwithstanding the provisions of
the will. We agree with petitioner that she is, in fact, a pretermitted spouse, but we disagree that
the lower court erred in not awarding her a share of the decedent’s estate. We review the probate
court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re Bennett Estate, 255 Mich App 545, 549; 662 NW2d
772 (2003). “A finding is clear error when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
In re Estes Estate, 207 Mich App 194, 208; 523 NW2d 863 (1994). We review an issue of law
de novo. Danse Corp v Madison Heights, 466 Mich 175, 178; 644 NW2d 721 (2002).
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Michigan provides for the recovery of an intestate share by a surviving spouse if a
testator fails to provide by will for a surviving spouse who married the testator after the
execution of his will. MCL 700.2301. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2),[1] if a testator’s surviving spouse
marries the testator after the testator executes his or her will, the surviving spouse
is entitled to receive, as an intestate share, not less than the value of the share of
the estate the surviving spouse would have received if the testator had died
intestate as to that portion of the testator’s estate, if any, that is not any of the
following:
(a) Property devised to or in trust for the benefit of a child of the testator
who was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and who is not the
surviving spouse’s child. [MCL 700.2301(1) (footnote added).]
Petitioner married the testator on May 14, 2004, 14 years after he executed his will on
May 9, 1990. Petitioner is not specifically named in the decedent’s will or trust as a beneficiary
of his estate. The probate court concluded, “in reviewing the statute 2301[, petitioner] would not
be a pretermitted spouse.” The court’s order goes on to simply state that petitioner “is not
entitled to claim an intestate share as a Spousal Election under MCL 700.2301.”
Petitioner is, in fact, a pretermitted spouse because she and the testator were married after
the testator executed his will. Any uncertainty with respect to the application of MCL 700.2301
that was created by the court’s statement at the hearing was resolved by the court’s order. The
court clearly ruled that petitioner is not entitled to an intestate share under MCL 700.2301(1)(a).
The next issue is whether petitioner, as a pretermitted spouse under MCL 700.2301, is
entitled to any share of the decedent’s estate. In In re Bennett Estate, supra at 549-551, this
Court discussed the application of MCL 700.2301. In In re Bennett Estate, the testator’s will left
his entire estate to his first wife, providing that in the event she predeceased him, the estate
would go in equal shares to the testator’s four natural children and his four stepchildren (his first
wife’s children from a prior marriage). Id. at 546. The decedent married his second wife after
the execution of this will. Id. This Court held that “the statute provides that a surviving spouse
in . . . [the second wife]’s position, i.e., one who married the testator after he executed his will, is
entitled to an intestate share of her spouse’s estate.” Id. at 550. The Court then held that in order
to determine the intestate share of the second wife, a court must “look to the will, deduct the
devises to the natural children, and pay the surviving spouse’s statutory share under MCL
700.2102(1)(f) [the intestacy statute] to the extent possible, from the remainder.” Id. at 550
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the second spouse in In re Bennett Estate received the intestate
share that was not devised to the testator’s natural children. Id. at 554.
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MCL 700.2301 (2) sets forth certain exceptions to the rights granted by subsection (1). Both
parties concur that none of the exceptions are applicable in this case.
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In this case, the will and trust plan executed by the decedent leaves everything to the
decedent’s first wife, Sue Ann E. Warren. However, in accordance with the document terms,
Sue Ann, as a divorced spouse, is deemed to have predeceased the decedent. The will and trust
provide that if Sue Ann predeceases the decedent, the entire estate goes to their son, Jeffrey.
Under the principles outlined in In re Bennett Estate, supra at 549-550, petitioner is entitled to
her intestate share under 700.2102(1)(f) as a pretermitted spouse, less the devise to the
decedent’s son Jeffrey. In this case, Jeffrey was devised the entire estate. Hence, there exists no
“remainder” from which plaintiff’s intestate share can be drawn. Thus, the trial court correctly
held that under MCL 700.2301(1)(a), petitioner should receive nothing from the decedent’s
estate.
Petitioner next argues that she is entitled to her intestate share of the decedent’s estate
because there is a factual issue with respect to how the decedent wanted his subsequent spouse
treated, and extrinsic evidence shows the decedent intended to provide for her. We disagree.
“The role of the probate court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the testator as derived
from the language of the will.” In re McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App 410, 412; 534 NW2d 140
(1995). The settlor’s intent at the time the instrument was created should be ascertained and
carried out as nearly as possible. In re Maloney Trust, 423 Mich 632, 639; 377 NW2d 791
(1985).
“The rules of construction applicable to wills also apply to the interpretation of trust
documents.” In re Reisman Estate, 266 Mich App 522, 527; 702 NW2d 658 (2005). “Absent an
ambiguity, the court is to glean the testator’s intent from the four corners of the testamentary
instrument.” In re McPeak Estate, supra at 412. However, if a document does evidence an
ambiguity, “a court may establish intent by considering two outside sources: (1) surrounding
circumstances, and (2) rules of construction.” In re Allen Estate, 150 Mich App 413, 416; 388
NW2d 705 (1986). An ambiguity may be patent or latent. Thurston v Thurston, 140 Mich App
150, 153; 363 NW2d 298 (1985). A patent ambiguity exists if uncertainty regarding meaning
“clearly appears on the face of a document, arising from the language itself.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th ed); see also In re Woodworth Trust, 196 Mich App 326, 328; 492 NW2d 818
(1992). “A latent ambiguity exists where the language and its meaning are clear, but some
extrinsic fact creates the possibility of more than one meaning.” In re Woodworth Trust, supra at
328. “Since the detection of a latent ambiguity requires a consideration of factors outside the
instrument itself, extrinsic evidence is obviously admissible to prove the existence of the
ambiguity, as well as to resolve any ambiguity proven to exist.” McCarty v Mercury Metalcraft
Co, 372 Mich 567, 575; 127 NW2d 340 (1964).
In this case, no patent ambiguity exists because no uncertainty is evident on the face of
the relevant documents. The language of the will clearly shows that “my spouse” and “my
beloved spouse” refer to Sue Ann E. Warren, the decedent’s first wife. Likewise, the trust
specifically states: “My spouse, SUE ANN E. WARREN, herein referred to as ‘spouse.’” This
language clearly identifies Sue Ann E. Warren as the spouse to whom the testator made the
bequest. The words of restriction used by the decedent create no patent ambiguity.
The next issue is whether a latent ambiguity exists because of some extrinsic fact that
creates the possibility of more than one meaning in otherwise clear language. See In re
Woodworth Trust, supra at 328. In Thurston, supra at 153, this Court found the adoption of a
child by the testator’s son after the execution of the testamentary instrument rendered a bequest
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to the testator’s grandchildren ambiguous. The will in Thurston referred to the testator’s son’s
“children” but did not identify the specific children and did not state whether “children” included
adopted children. Id. at 154. A latent ambiguity existed “because the language employed is
clear and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact, i.e., defendant’s adoption,
creates the possibility of more than one meaning.” Id. at 153. In that case, the Court applied the
statutory rebuttable presumption that an adopted child is included in the term “child.” Id. at 154.
However, in In re McPeak Estate, supra at 412-413, this Court held that a latent
ambiguity did not exist when the decedent’s will contained the following provision: “My
Children/My Descendants . . . . All references to ‘my descendants’ are to Kristine and Kerry and
the descendents of Kristine and Kerry.” Kristine and Kerry were the natural daughters of the
decedent. Id. at 412 (emphasis in original). The decedent executed his will while married to
JoAnn McPeak, and at the time of the will’s execution was considering adoption of Emily,
JoAnn’s daughter from a previous marriage. Id. at 411. The will provided for a bequest of onethird of the residuary estate to Emily in the event JoAnn did not survive the decedent. Id. at 412.
The decedent did later adopt Emily, but did not change his will to expressly include Emily as a
“child” or “descendant.” Id. at 411-412. The issue before the Court was whether the testator
intended to include adopted children when he referred to “my children” or “my descendants.”
Id. at 412.
Relying on the Court’s holding in Thurston, JoAnn argued on Emily’s behalf “the
decedent’s post-execution adoption of Emily creates a latent ambiguity regarding the definition
of ‘children’ or ‘my descendants.’” In re McPeak Estate, supra at 412-413. Although Thurston
also involved a post-execution adoption, the In re McPeak Estate Court held that the similarities
ended there. Id. at 413. “In Thurston, the adoption was not by the testator, but rather by a
devisee under her will, and there was no indication that the testator was even aware of the
adoptee at the time of execution.” Id. In contrast, In re McPeak Estate, “Emily was living with
decedent and [he] . . . was contemplating adoption at the time he executed his will.” Id. “Under
these circumstances,” the Court held, “there can be no ambiguity concerning whether decedent
meant to exclude prospective adoptees when he sought to define ‘children’ and ‘my
descendants.’” Id. “The testamentary plan was a thoughtful and careful one,” the Court
concluded, executed while the testator was contemplating the inclusion of Emily into his
immediate family. Id. at 414. Furthermore, because Emily was provided for in a separate,
contingent devise, the Court held that Emily did not qualify as a pretermitted heir, finding it
“unlikely that the subsequent adoption would have altered the testator’s intent, especially where .
. . the testator was already contemplating adoption of his spouse’s child at the time of execution
and therefore had the opportunity to devise a greater portion of his estate to the child in the event
that the contemplated adoption occurred.” Id. Accordingly, Emily was not permitted to share in
the decedent’s estate as a “child” or “descendant” of decedent. Id. at 414-415.
Similar to the decedent’s estate plan in In re McPeak Estate, the thorough and precise
nature of the decedent’s testamentary plan suggests it was thoughtfully and carefully executed.
The decedent specifically named Sue Ann E. Warren as his “spouse” in the documents. Further,
while the decedent drafted the will long before he was divorced from his first wife, the trust
language indicates that, at the time of its execution, the decedent anticipated the possibility of a
future divorce and took pains to prepare for it accordingly. It is reasonable to conclude that
given an awareness of the possibility of divorce, the decedent was also aware of the possibility of
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remarriage at the time the instruments were created. However, the decedent did not elect to
substitute a future spouse in Sue Ann’s place. The parties do not dispute petitioner’s assertion
that she and the decedent enjoyed several years of courtship, during which time they lived
together, and remodeled a home where they planned to reside. The decedent had ample time
before he dated petitioner, during their courtship, and during their short marriage to effectuate
changes to his testamentary documents. Decedent failed to make any such revisions. No
evidence exists to suggest the decedent intended for petitioner to be a beneficiary under his will
and trust. Further, the fact that the decedent died shortly after the marriage began does not allow
for the conclusion that the language used in the documents might have had more than one
meaning. The evidence does not support an assertion that a latent ambiguity exists in the
decedent’s will and trust.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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