JENNIFER LEE CALIBEO V SECRETARY OF STATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JENNIFER LEE CALIBEO,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 262631
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 04-005341-AL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Bandstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Secretary of State, appeals by leave granted from an order setting aside the
five-year revocation of petitioner’s driver’s license. We reverse. This case is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This action arises out of respondent’s revocation of petitioner’s driver’s license for five
years following petitioner’s third drinking and driving conviction. On appeal, respondent argues
that the circuit court erroneously applied MCL 257.303 in setting aside the five-year license
revocation. We agree.
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Morales v
Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand), 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003). The cardinal
principle of statutory construction is that courts must give effect to legislative intent. Dressel v
Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 562; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). “The first step in discerning intent is to
examine the language of the statute,” which is to be read “according to its ordinary and generally
accepted meaning.” Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000). When the statute
is clear on its face, a court is not to articulate its view of policy, but apply the plain language of
the statute. Id.
Michigan law requires respondent to revoke the driver’s license of an individual with two
drinking and driving convictions occurring within seven years, MCL 257.303(2)(c)(i), or three
drinking and driving convictions occurring within ten years, MCL 257.303(2)(g)(i).1 Regarding
1
Regarding drunk driving, MCL 257.303(2)(g)(i) refers to section 625(1), which expressly
(continued…)
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the reissuance of a license to a person whose license was previously revoked for drinking and
driving, MCL 257.303(4) provides in relevant part:
The secretary of state shall not issue a license under this act to a person
whose license has been revoked under this act or revoked and denied under
subsection (2) until all of the following occur, as applicable:
(a) The later of the following:
(i) The expiration of not less than 1 year after the license was revoked or
denied.
(ii) The expiration of not less than 5 years after the date of a subsequent
revocation or denial occurring within 7 years after the date of any prior
revocation or denial. [Emphasis supplied.]
On May 10, 2002, respondent imposed two revocation penalties on petitioner. First,
respondent revoked petitioner’s driver’s license for one year as a result of her second drinking
and driving offense within seven years that occurred on March 5, 2002. Petitioner does not
challenge this revocation. Second, respondent revoked petitioner’s driver’s license for five years
as a result of her third drinking and driving offense within ten years that occurred on April 12,
2002. At issue is whether MCL 257.303 renders invalid the five-year revocation of petitioner’s
driver’s license because it was imposed on the same date as the one-year revocation.
On its face, MCL 257.303(4) only authorizes respondent to issue a license under certain
circumstances. Notwithstanding this, the plain language of MCL 257.303(2) pertains expressly
to license revocation. Specifically, MCL 257.303(2) provides:
Upon receiving the appropriate records of conviction, the secretary of state
shall revoke the operator’s . . . license of a person and deny issuance to a person
having any of the following . . . :
(g) Any combination of 3 convictions within 10 years for any of the
following . . .:
(i) A violation or attempted violation of section 625(1) . . . . [Emphasis
supplied; see footnote one, supra.]
Thus, because MCL 257.303(4)(a)(ii) pertains to the issuance rather than the revocation of a
driver’s license, that petitioner’s five-year revocation occurred on the same date as her one-year
revocation is of no consequence. Bunce v Secretary of State, 239 Mich App 204, 207; 607
NW2d 372 (1999). Moreover, there is no requirement in MCL 257.303 that respondent impose
revocations on different dates. Therefore, the circuit court’s order was erroneous.
(…continued)
prohibits operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.
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We note that even if MCL 257.303(4) were applicable, as petitioner argues, the circuit
court nevertheless erred in setting aside the five-year license revocation. “In interpreting the
statute at issue, we consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as ‘its
placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.’” Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230,
237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133
L Ed 2d 472 (1995). Further, “[s]tatutes should be construed to avoid absurd consequences,
injustice, or prejudice to the public interest.” Morris & Doherty, PC v Lockwood, 259 Mich App
38, 44; 672 NW2d 884 (2003). Petitioner claims that MCL 257.303(4) requires that the
imposition of a five-year license revocation occur after the date of the imposition of a one-year
license revocation to be valid. However, in light of the placement and purpose of the words
“after the date” in the statutory scheme of MCL 257.303, petitioner’s argument fails.
In evaluating the statutory scheme, it is clear that the Legislature intended to punish a
third-time repeat drinking and driving offender. Specifically, the statute provides that respondent
shall revoke a license of an individual with three drinking and driving convictions within ten
years. MCL 257.303(2)(g)(i). To construe MCL 257.303(4)(a)(ii) to require that the imposition
of a valid five-year revocation occur on a different date than a one-year revocation would render
the power granted to respondent to punish third-time habitual drinking and driving offenders
void in this case. Indeed, “courts . . . must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of
the statute surplusage or nugatory.” People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626, 638; 703 NW2d 448
(2005). Further, to hold that the statute required respondent to impose the five-year revocation
on different dates would lead to the absurd and unjust result of petitioner avoiding punishment
because of the close proximity in time between her second and third drinking and driving
offenses. Morris & Doherty, PC, supra at 44. In addition, given that this is petitioner’s third
drinking and driving offense, she is, at least arguably, a threat to the public safety on the road.
Id. Therefore, the circuit court’s order was erroneous.
We note that respondent cites Rodriguez v Secretary of State, 215 Mich App 481; 546
NW2d 661 (1996), and Bunce, supra at 204, in support of its argument that a circuit court lacks
jurisdiction to set aside a driver’s license revocation of an habitual offender unless the revocation
was arbitrary and capricious. However, this argument is an incomplete statement of the law.
Rodriguez holds that a petitioner whose driver’s license was revoked by respondent may appeal
to the circuit court, which may only set aside respondent’s decision provided that the petitioner’s
substantial rights were prejudiced. Rodriguez, supra at 482-483. This prejudice includes not
only an arbitrary and capricious revocation, but also a material error of law. Id. at 483.2 Further,
Bruce merely stands for the proposition that it is improper for the circuit court to order
respondent to reconsider a petitioner’s petition under a different standard of review than the
standard that respondent had the statutory right to create. Bruce, supra at 219-220. Thus, this
2
Regarding prejudice to petitioner’s substantial rights, Rodriguez cites MCL 257.323(6).
Rodriguez, supra at 482-483. Although this section number was subsequently amended by 1994
PA 449 to MCL 257.303(4), there were no substantive changes and the current language is
identical.
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argument fails. However, in light of the prior analysis, the circuit court’s order setting aside
petitioner’s five-year driver’s license revocation was erroneous.
Reversed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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