CHRISTY LEE SCHNEEMILCH V J J SHIELDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTY LEE SCHNEEMILCH and
RAYMOND CALECA,
UNPUBLISHED
October 17, 2006
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
J.J. SHIELDS, M.D., HURON VALLEY
RADIOLOGY, P.C., and TRINITY HEALTH,
a/k/a TRINITY HEALTH–MICHIGAN, d/b/a ST.
JOSEPH MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM
MCAULEY BREAST CARE,
No. 267881
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 04-000910-NH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Hoekstra and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action alleging medical malpractice, plaintiffs appeal by right the trial court’s
order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff Christy Lee Schneemilch1 went to Trinity Health for bilateral mammography
studies. During the examination, she showed an attendant a lump in her left breast. Defendant
J.J. Shields, M.D., interpreted the mammography and found no significant abnormality. Almost
a year later, Schneemilch went to her gynecologist with a complaint of an enlarged lump on her
left breast. She was referred for another mammogram, biopsy, and ultrasound, which indicated
an irregular solid nodule in the lower part of plaintiff’s left breast. Subsequent biopsies revealed
invasive ductal carcinoma. Schneemilch subsequently underwent a radical mastectomy.
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Schneemilch and plaintiff Raymond Caleca are husband and wife. Caleca’s claim for loss of
consortium is entirely derivative of his wife’s claim.
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Plaintiffs served their complaint, jury demand, and affidavit of merit on defendants,
alleging medical malpractice. Plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit addressed the issue of standard of
care and proximate cause, stating:
3. The standard of care required J.J. Shields, M.D., to closely and thoroughly
review mammography studies. The standard of care required Dr. Shields to note
any abnormalities which were present on the mammography studies in his/her
written report and/or otherwise notify the attending physician that the
radiographic studies were abnormal. The standard of care required Dr. Shields to
note the presence of a BB placed over Ms. Schneemilch’s left breast, presumably
by the technician after being informed that Ms. Schneemilch felt a lump or
abnormal density in her left breast during self-examination. The standard of care
required Dr. Shields to himself/herself note the aforementioned abnormal density,
and further, to recommend and/or perform diagnostic studies to determine the
nature and composition of the density. The standard of care also required Dr.
Shields to inform Ms. Schneemilch of the abnormal density in her breast. The
standard of care also required Dr. Shields to issue an accurate report depicting any
abnormalities present on the screening mammograms and, further, to perform a
diagnostic mammogram and/or other studies on March 14, 2002 before Ms.
Schneemilch was released from the mammography facility.
4. J.J. Shields, M.D.[,] did none of these things and his/her failure to do so i[s]
below the acceptable standard of care.
5. Had J.J. Shields, M.D., acted properly and within the standard of care, the
abnormalities present in Ms. Schneemilch’s left breast would have been noted,
further diagnostic studies performed and early medical/surgical intervention
[would have been] carried out.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10).
Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit does not specify the manner in which the
alleged breach of the standard of care was the proximate cause of the injury alleged in the notice
of intent as required by MCL 600.2912d(1)(d). On October 12, 2005, the trial court granted
defendants’ motions, stating that the affidavit was “insufficient as to the element of proximate
cause.” Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the court denied.
This Court reviews de novo the grant of summary disposition. Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich
642, 647; 677 NW2d 813 (2004). The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ action
because the affidavit of merit does not adequately address the issue of proximate cause as
required by MCL 600.2912d(1)(d) and because the limitation period has expired so that plaintiffs
can no longer submit a timely and adequate affidavit of merit. To commence a medical
malpractice action, a plaintiff must file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit signed by a
healthcare professional that complies with MCL 600.2912d. Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547,
548; 607 NW2d 711 (2000). The purpose of an affidavit of merit is to have a health professional
certify the allegations in the complaint. Id. MCL 600.2912d(1) requires that the affidavit must
certify that the signing health professional “has reviewed the notice and all medical records
supplied to him or her” and must contain a statement of each of the following:
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(a) The applicable standard of practice or care.
(b) The health professional’s opinion that the applicable standard of
practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility
receiving the notice.
(c) The actions that should have been taken or omitted by the health
professional or health facility in order to have complied with the applicable
standard of practice or care.
(d) The manner in which the breach of the standard of practice or care was
the proximate cause of the injury alleged in the notice.
This case turns on whether plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit adequately details the “manner in
which the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury alleged
in the notice.” MCL 600.2912d(1)(d). The mere correlation between alleged malpractice and an
injury is insufficient to show proximate cause. Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 93; 684
NW2d 296 (2004). Proximate cause consists of both factual and legal causation. Factual cause
is “but for” causation such that a plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred “but for” the
defendant’s conduct. Legal causation depends on whether a defendant could have foreseen a
plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 90-93.
In this case, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of merit signed by Liane Philpotts, M.D.,
which addressed the issue of proximate cause by simply stating that:
5. Had J.J. Shields, M.D., acted properly and within the standard of care, the
abnormalities present in Ms. Schneemilch’s left breast would have been noted,
further diagnostic studies performed and early medical/surgical intervention
[would have been] carried out.
This statement does not precisely describe the manner in which the breach of the standard of
practice was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Essentially the affidavit of merit states
that defendant Shields’s failure to properly and timely diagnose the lump in plaintiff’s breast
resulted in delayed treatment. However, the affidavit of merit does not state how the delayed
treatment factually caused the metastasis of the cancer and foreseeably required a radical
mastectomy of plaintiff Schneemilch’s left breast. Therefore, plaintiff’s affidavit of merit is
insufficient to satisfy MCL 600.2912d(1)(d), and, under Geralds v Munson Healthcare, 259
Mich App 225, 235-236; 673 NW2d 792 (2003) and Mouradian v Goldberg, 256 Mich App 566,
574; 664 NW2d 805 (2003), plaintiffs’ action must be dismissed with prejudice because
plaintiffs failed to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint that complies with MCL
600.2912d before the two-year limitation period on Schneemilch’s medical malpractice action
expired.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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