PEOPLE OF MI V MARK KELLY RHODUS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 262241
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 04-033719-FH
MARK KELLY RHODUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Markey and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of manufacturing methamphetamine
(meth), MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), operating or maintaining a meth lab, MCL 333.7401c(2)(a), and
possession of meth, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third
habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 10 to 40 years’ imprisonment on the manufacturing and
operating or maintaining a meth lab convictions and 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment on the
possession conviction. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand to the trial
court for reconsideration of its order imposing on defendant the obligation to reimburse the
county for his attorney fees.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the discovery of a meth lab in the apartment he shared
with his girlfriend, Megan McCartney. Defendant’s father, Donald Lee Rhodus, had been
staying with defendant and McCartney for an extended period of time and was also convicted on
various offenses related to the discovery of the meth lab.
Defendant first contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support
his convictions. Specifically, defendant contends that the prosecution cannot prove that he was
involved in these crimes because the meth lab was discovered in the guestroom occupied by
Donald Rhodus. Defendant also challenges the credibility of the testimony provided by
McCartney and the officer in charge of the investigation. We disagree.
When reviewing a claim that insufficient evidence was presented to support a defendant’s
conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find all of the essential elements of the crime
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748
(1992), mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising
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from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Lee,
243 Mich App 163, 167-168; 622 NW2d 71 (2000).
Accepting all of the evidence as true and properly admitted, the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for all three offenses. First, the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence that defendant “possessed” meth. “A person need not
have actual physical possession of a controlled substance to be guilty of possessing it.
Possession may be either actual or constructive.” Wolfe, supra at 519-520. Moreover,
possession does not require ownership, and “may be joint, with more than one person actually or
constructively possessing a controlled substance.” Id. at 520. To establish constructive
possession, the prosecution must show that defendant had the right to exercise control of the
controlled substance and knew that it was present. Id.
Although no drugs were found on defendant’s person at the time of his arrest, the police
found meth in several locations around the apartment’s guestroom. Further, although
defendant’s name was not on the lease, he was the primary financial provider in the home.
McCartney testified that defendant was allowed entry into the locked guestroom whenever he
knocked and that defendant had provided meth for her to sell to the confidential informant on
one occasion. Furthermore, the detective in charge of the investigation testified that defendant
admitted upon his arrest that he was a “meth cook” and had assisted his father in constructing the
meth lab. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the fact that most of the evidence was found in the
guestroom then occupied by his father did not negate his ability to possess the narcotics. Rather,
the evidence was sufficient to establish joint possession of the meth and meth lab. At a
minimum, the evidence supports a finding that defendant constructively possessed meth.
Defendant challenges the evidentiary support for his convictions on the basis of the
questionable credibility of McCartney and the officer to whom he confessed. But the
determination of witness credibility is the sole province of the jury. Wolfe, supra at 514-515.
“[U]nless it can be said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was
deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it’ or contradicted indisputable
physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination.”
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 645-646; 576 NW2d 129 (1998) (citations omitted). Such is
not the situation here. Accordingly, we may not interfere with the jury’s determination.
Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a bill of
particulars. We review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars for
an abuse of discretion. People v Rosen, 136 Mich App 745, 761; 358 NW2d 584 (1984). Even
though defendant waived his right to a preliminary examination, the need for a bill of particulars
was obviated in this case by the discovery provided to defendant and the information he already
had. Defendant’s pretrial motions demonstrated that he was aware of the evidence to support a
finding of guilt on all three charges. Defendant has failed to establish any prejudice from the
lack of a bill of particulars. Id.
Defendant further contends that the trial court should have suppressed the statement he
made to the officer in charge of the investigation. The trial court conducted a Walker hearing,
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), and determined that
defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda v Arizona,
384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). We review a trial court’s findings of fact at a
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suppression hearing for clear error. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614 NW2d 152 (2000).
However, we review the application of constitutional law and the trial court’s ultimate ruling on
the motion to suppress de novo. Id. at 629-630.
Whether a defendant’s waiver is voluntary is dependant on the absence of police
coercion. Id. at 635. In determining whether a defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent,
the court must determine the defendant’s level of understanding without consideration of police
conduct. A defendant need only understand the general tenor of his or her rights and not the
ramifications of waiving those rights. Id. at 636-637. “Credibility is crucial in determining a
defendant’s level of comprehension, and the trial judge is in the best position to make this
assessment.” Id. at 629.
The detective who questioned defendant testified that defendant was asleep when the raid
team entered, but that defendant was not questioned for a half hour. During that time, defendant
expressed concern that he did not want his girlfriend, McCartney, to get arrested. On the way to
the detective’s patrol car, defendant made several “unsolicited comments” and attempted to
avoid being charged in this case. Defendant indicated that he “was fifth or sixth level meth
cook” and offered to educate the police on the methods of manufacturing the drug. The officer
then read defendant his Miranda rights from a preprinted card. Defendant asked to see the card
and read his rights silently to himself. Defendant subsequently admitted that he had built the
meth lab in his apartment with his father but only made meth for personal consumption.
Defendant also admitted that he had previously sold meth but only in Missouri. The detective
indicated that he did not include these statements in the police report in order to protect
defendant’s confidentiality in the event he became an informant.
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was very tired during this interaction. He
asserted that he had been sleeping for more than 30 hours at the time of his arrest. Defendant
claimed that he had been awake for 31 full days and consumed large quantities of meth during
the period before he finally fell asleep. Defendant further testified that he did not recall being
read his Miranda rights or making any statement to the police. As noted in Daoud, supra at 629,
the credibility of defendant’s assertion was a matter for the trial court. The court determined
from the conflicting testimony that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
his right, and we have no reason to disturb that finding.
Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to elicit
expert testimony from a lay witness and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by doing so.
We disagree. Generally, a trial court’s decision to admit evidence will be reversed only for an
abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). However,
when a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence involves a preliminary question
of law, we review the issue de novo. Id. We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a
case-by-case basis, examining any remarks in context, to determine if the defendant received a
fair and impartial trial. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
Over defendant’s continuing objections, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to elicit
testimony from a police officer that certain untested substances taken from the meth lab were
identical in appearance to other substances that tested positive for meth, cocaine, and
pseudoephedrine. It is undisputed that the officer was not qualified as an expert in this case.
Therefore, the admissibility of the challenged testimony depends on MRE 701, which provides:
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If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
In People v Oliver, 170 Mich App 38, 50; 427 NW2d 898 (1988), mod 433 Mich 862
(1989), this Court found that a police officer may provide lay opinion testimony regarding topics
within his or her personal knowledge as long as it is not overly scientific or technical. The
Oliver Court continued this Court’s liberal application of MRE 701 “in order to help develop a
clearer understanding of facts for the trier of facts.” Id. at 50. This Court later reaffirmed Oliver
in People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 478; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). In Daniel, this Court admitted
the lay opinion testimony of a police officer that had not been qualified as an expert in drug
enforcement. Id. at 57. That officer was allowed to testify that he believed the defendant to be
involved in narcotics trafficking because he observed motor vehicles park in front of the
defendant’s apartment on four separate occasions. The defendant ran to each vehicle as it
stopped and “lean[ed] inside the window for ten to fifteen seconds.” Id. This Court found that
the officer’s opinion was rationally based on his perception of events and was helpful to the jury
in making their determination. Id.
At the time of the current search, the testifying officer had only been involved with the
narcotics unit for six weeks and had never been involved with the raid of a meth lab. The
officer, however, had five years prior experience as a police officer, and by the time of
defendant’s trial, he had additional experience with the narcotics unit. While this officer was not
as experienced as the officers in Oliver and Daniel at the time of the raid, the detective’s
testimony regarding the appearance of the discovered substances was “rationally based on [his]
perception.” MRE 701. The testifying officer was in charge of labeling the various substances,
collecting samples, and transporting those samples to the forensics lab. Given his contact with
the various substances, the detective could form reasonable opinions that certain substances
looked similar to others, including those substances that tested positive for controlled substances.
The officer could make this comparison without any specialized training. This testimony was
helpful to the jury as it provided a “clear understanding” regarding why the officers found the
large number of various substances to be incriminating. Moreover, any potential error in the
admission of this testimony did not affect the outcome of this case given that the prosecution
later presented an expert witness that provided identical testimony.
We also disagree with defendant’s assertion that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Defendant first contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a Ginther
hearing, People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), before denying his motion for
a new trial on this ground. Defendant then challenges defense counsel’s failure to follow up on
plea negotiations with the prosecution and failure to seek the suppression of the evidence found
in his apartment based on the inadequacy of the search warrant.
We review a trial court’s determination regarding a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Cress (After Remand), 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). Absent
a Ginther hearing, our “review of the relevant facts is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record.” People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). Effective
assistance of counsel is presumed and defendant bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise. Id. at
140; People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). To establish ineffective
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assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that counsel’s deficient performance denied him the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceedings would have
resulted differently. Id. at 599-600.
Absent a Ginther hearing, there is very little record information to analyze defendant’s
challenge that he was unable to enter into a plea agreement with the prosecution because his
replacement counsel failed to follow up on an agreement being negotiated by his originally
appointed counsel. The only mention that any plea negotiation had possibly occurred comes
from defendant. Defendant cannot show that the prosecution was willing to enter into a plea
agreement with him or that the prosecution gave defendant false information regarding his
possible sentences. We note that the prosecution’s “enhancement” of defendant’s potential
sentences after the alleged plea arrangement fell through was not inexplicable. With no plea
entered, the prosecution was free to charge defendant as a third, rather than as a second habitual
offender. The prosecution was also free to seek the amendment of the information to ensure that
the charges coincided with the evidence. Defendant was ultimately tried and convicted.
Accordingly, defendant has not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions and that we
need not remand for a Ginther hearing.
Moreover, defense counsel had no grounds to seek the suppression of the evidence based
on a purported inadequacy in the search warrant because the warrant was supported by probable
cause. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). First, investigating
officers witnessed McCartney twice leave the apartment to sell meth and cocaine to the
confidential informant. Those buys standing alone amount to probable cause to issue a warrant.
See People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 209; 535 NW2d 563 (1995) (in which this Court found
two controlled buys sufficient to support a search warrant for a residence). Second, the
confidential informant told officers that defendant and his father were manufacturing meth in the
apartment and that he could arrange a sale through McCartney. The officers verified the fact that
the informant could arrange a sale through McCartney when she actually met the informant and
sold him meth and cocaine. Accordingly, the officers had reason to believe that the informant
was also correct in asserting that defendant and his father were manufacturing meth in the
apartment. See id. Because the two controlled buys formed sufficient probable cause to issue a
search warrant and were included in the affidavit, defendant’s contention that the officer omitted
pertinent information from the search warrant affidavit is without merit. Moreover, contrary to
defendant’s assertion on appeal, there is no indication in the record that the testifying officer left
the scene in the middle of the search to belatedly secure the search warrant.
Defendant further challenges defense counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor
elicited information from the search warrant return through the testimony of a police officer.
Although this evidence might have been cumulative, it was relatively minor compared to the
bulk of the testimony. Accordingly, the evidence was not overly prejudicial and an objection by
defense counsel, even if sustained, would not have effected the outcome of the trial. As neither
potential error would require reversal, remand for a Ginther hearing is unnecessary.
Next, defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel,
misstated the standard of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, gave a faulty example of
circumstantial evidence, and allegedly denigrated defense counsel. We agree that the prosecutor
improperly criticized defense counsel in front of the jury for “wasting time” by raising objections
to the evidence; however, the trial court sustained defendant’s objection and instructed the jury
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to disregard the prosecutor’s comment. Moreover, the trial court cured any potential error by
instructing the jury at the close of trial that the comments and questions of the attorneys are not
evidence. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 563; 675 NW2d 863 (2003).
Furthermore, while the prosecutor gave a rather inartful explanation of the reasonable
doubt standard during voir dire and opening statement, the trial court later gave the jury the
standard jury instruction in this regard. See CJI2d 3.2. Finally, we note that appellate counsel is
grasping at straws by challenging the prosecutor’s example of circumstantial evidence. The
example was identical to that provided in the standard jury instructions. See CJI2d 4.3(2).
Defendant raises several challenges to his sentences for these convictions. Defendant
contends that the trial court improperly based his scores for offense variable (OV) 13, OV 14,
and OV 15 on facts not found by a jury in violation of Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S
Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). But our Supreme Court has already determined that Blakely is
inapplicable to Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140,
164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006); People v Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730 n 14; 684 NW2d 278 (2004).
Defendant also contends that the sentencing court erred in the scoring of the abovechallenged variables. “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to
be scored, provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). We must uphold the sentencing
court’s decision where there is “any evidence” to support that score. Id.
Defendant challenges the sentencing court’s assessment of ten points in relation to OV
13, arguing there was no evidence he was involved in “an organized criminal group.” The term
“organized criminal group” is not defined in the statute; however, the Legislature provided the
following guidance:
The presence or absence of multiple offenders, the age of the offenders, or
the degree of sophistication of the organized criminal group is not as important as
the fact of the group’s existence, which may be reasonably inferred from the facts
surrounding the sentencing offense. [MCL 777.43(2)(b).]
The evidence supports the sentencing court’s score in this regard. When arrested,
defendant admitted that he had constructed the meth lab with his father and to manufacturing
meth. McCartney testified that the trio went shopping as many as four times each week to
purchase the supplies to manufacture meth. Also according to McCartney, defendant and his
father manufactured the meth in the guestroom while she delivered the meth to purchasers.
Although the “organization” was small and relatively unsophisticated, the trio did join together
to manufacture and sell meth.
Defendant further contends that the sentencing court erroneously assessed points for OV
14 because the evidence tends to establish that Donald Rhodus, rather than defendant, was the
leader in this situation. A court may score ten points for a defendant’s leadership role in a
multiple offender situation. MCL 777.44(1)(a). Because three individuals were charged in this
situation, the court could find that more than one offender was a leader. MCL 777.44(2)(b).
McCartney testified that defendant had access to the guestroom after Donald Rhodus installed
the locking door handle. She also indicated that defendant and his father spent a lot of time in
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that room. It is undisputed that the meth lab was constructed in the guestroom. Moreover,
defendant admitted to police that he was a “fifth or sixth level meth cook.” Accordingly, the
evidence supports a finding that both defendant and his father were leaders in this situation.
Finally, defendant challenges the sentencing court’s scoring of OV 15 arguing that there
is no evidence that he engaged in drug trafficking. As defined in the statute, “trafficking” is “the
sale or delivery of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances on a continuing
basis to 1 or more other individuals for further distribution.” MCL 777.45(2)(c). We also agree
with the sentencing court’s scoring of this variable. While there is no evidence in this case that
defendant ever sold drugs directly to a purchaser, defendant provided meth to McCartney to
deliver to others. Because defendant supplied drugs to one individual who further distributed
those drugs, defendant’s conduct amounted to “trafficking” as defined in the statute.
In his pro per brief, defendant contends that he was entitled to shorter sentences than
Donald Rhodus because he was only an aider and abettor to the charged offenses. But the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant as a principal in this case.
Moreover, it has long been established that an aider and abettor may be sentenced to the same
term as the principal. People v Shepherd, 63 Mich App 316, 319; 234 NW2d 502 (1975).
Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecution properly charged defendant as a
third habitual offender. A defendant may be sentenced as a third habitual offender if he or she
has been previously convicted of two or more felonies or attempts to commit felonies. MCL
769.11. The statute applies to all felonies unless specifically exempted. People v Bewersdorf,
438 Mich 55, 69; 475 NW2d 231 (1991). No exception applies to this case because defendant
was not convicted of a “major controlled substance” offense. MCL 769.11(1)(c); MCL 761.2.
Defendant next contends that the sentencing court improperly exceeded the minimum
sentencing guidelines range for his conviction operating or maintaining a meth lab. Defendant
argues the court erroneously sentenced him for a violation of MCL 333.7401c(2)(f), a Class B
offense, rather than MCL 333.7401c(2)(a), a Class D offense. Defendant also contends that his
maximum sentence was greater than that allowed under MCL 769.11(1)(a). We disagree.
The penalty for violating MCL 333.7401c(1), operating or maintaining a drug lab, is set
forth in MCL 333.7401c(2)(a). That subsection states: “Except as provided in subdivisions (b) to
(f), by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $100,000.00, or both.”
Subsection f, MCL 333.7401c(2)(f), provides: “If the violation involves or is intended to involve
the manufacture of a substance described in section 7214(c)(ii), by imprisonment for not more
than 20 years or a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both.” Section 7214c(ii), MCL
333.7241c(ii), includes “[a]ny substance which contains any quantity of methamphetamine,
including its salts, stereoisomers, and salts of stereoisomers.” The trial court permitted the
prosecutor to amend the information before trial to reflect that defendant’s punishment for this
charge, if convicted, would be the punishment outlined in subsection (2)(f), a Class B controlled
substance offense. MCL 777.13m. Thus, because defendant was charged and convicted of
operating or maintaining a methamphetamine lab, the appropriate sentence guidelines crime class
is B. As a third habitual offender, defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range was 78 to
195 months’ imprisonment, MCL 777.63, and defendant’s maximum term of imprisonment was
40 years, MCL 769.11(1)(a). Because defendant’s sentence of 10 to 40 years’ imprisonment
clearly falls within the appropriate guidelines range, we must affirm. MCL 769.34(10).
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We reject defendant’s contention that the sentencing court improperly departed upward
from the minimum guidelines range on his sentence for possession of meth. Violation of MCL
333.7403(2)(b)(i) is a Class D felony under MCL 777.13m. The sentence the trial court imposed
was concurrent with and equal to or less than a lawful sentence imposed that was within the
guidelines recommended range for a higher class felony. Error warranting reversal did not
occur. MCL 771.14(2)(e); People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).
Defendant also raises several challenges to the accuracy of his PSIR for the first time on
appeal. Defendant contends that he could have challenged those inaccuracies in a timely fashion
had he been given adequate time to review the PSIR before sentencing and had defense counsel
reviewed the information. We agree that defendant lost the opportunity to attack the accuracy of
the challenged information on appeal by not objecting at the sentencing hearing. MCR 6.429(C);
MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004).
Moreover, defendant is not prejudiced by his inability to challenge the accuracy of the
PSIR. The accuracy of the dates of his prior convictions, the unchecked box regarding
defendant’s bond status that was otherwise accurately reported, the misspelling of defendant’s
daughter’s name, and the fact that he received a certification from a company that constructs
manufactured homes, would not affect defendant’s sentences. Furthermore, defendant’s gang
involvement could not be corrected in this case. Defendant already denied any prior gang
involvement and the information that he had previously been involved in two different gangs was
included in a PSIR produced in 1999.
Defendant’s final challenge is that the sentencing court improperly entered an order
requiring him to reimburse the county for his attorney fees without first determining his financial
ability to do so. This Court in People v Nowicki, 213 Mich App 383, 388; 539 NW2d 590
(1995), held that a defendant may be required to reimburse the county for the cost of his courtappointed attorney. In People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240; 690 NW2d 476 (2004), the
defendant complained that the trial court failed to assess his ability to pay his attorney fees
before entering an order imposing those costs. Id. at 252. This Court opined:
The crux of defendant’s claim appears to be that the trial court should
have made a specific finding on the record regarding his ability to pay. We do not
believe that requiring a court to consider a defendant’s financial situation
necessitates such a formality, unless the defendant specifically objects to the
reimbursement amount at the time it is ordered, although such a finding would
provide a definitive record of the court’s consideration. However, the court does
need to provide some indication of consideration, such as noting that it reviewed
the financial and employment sections of the defendant’s presentence
investigation report or, even more generally, a statement that it considered the
defendant’s ability to pay. The amount ordered to be reimbursed for courtappointed attorney fees should bear a relation to the defendant’s foreseeable
ability to pay. A defendant’s apparent inability to pay at the time of sentencing is
not necessarily indicative of the propriety of requiring reimbursement because a
defendant’s capacity for future earnings may also be considered. [Id. at 254-255
(citations omitted).]
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Because defendant did not object to the imposition of attorney fees, the sentencing court
was not required to make formal findings of fact regarding defendant’s financial situation.
However, the sentencing court failed to indicate whether it had even considered defendant’s
financial ability to pay. The court failed to mention the employment and financial sections of
defendant’s presentence investigation report and made no mention of defendant’s potential future
ability to pay. Accordingly, the sentencing court plainly erred by failing to address even the
most minimal considerations required by Dunbar, supra.
But, this Court noted in Dunbar that although a defendant may not be forced to reimburse
the county for his attorney fees while he remains indigent, a reimbursement order may still be
entered and stayed during indigency. “[I]n most cases, challenges to the reimbursement order
will be premature if the defendant has not been required to commence repayment.” Id. at 256.
In this case, defendant was required to immediately commence repayment and was assessed a
late fee on June 9, 2005, for failure to repay these attorney fees. Accordingly, we must vacate
the order of reimbursement and remand to the sentencing court for reconsideration in light of
defendant’s ability to reimburse the county for his legal fees.
In his pro per brief, defendant also challenges the prosecution’s failure to comply with
the trial court’s order requiring discovery in this case. Defendant never objected to the
prosecution’s alleged noncompliance in the trial court. Moreover, there is no indication in the
record that the prosecution failed to produce evidence or prohibited defense counsel from
reviewing any of the requested discovery items.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to subpoena the
landlord of the apartment and the confidential informant. Defendant did request to subpoena the
landlord to establish that the apartment was leased to McCartney. While the trial court indicated
that this testimony would be unnecessary given McCartney’s admission that she alone was
named on the lease, the court did not deny defendant’s motion to subpoena that witness.
Moreover, defendant did subpoena a witness named “Gerald Henderson” who could possibly be
the confidential informant referred to as “Jerry.” The trial court allowed defendant to subpoena
that witness even though it failed to inform the prosecution of its intent to do so. Because the
trial court did not deny defendant’s request, defendant’s challenge completely lacks merit.
In his pro per brief, defendant argues that the prosecution should have charged him with
attempt to manufacture meth under MCL 750.92, rather than the completed offense. Defendant
further contends that the trial court should have sua sponte given the attempt instruction to the
jury and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request that instruction. We review
unpreserved, nonconstitutional challenges for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To the extent that
defendant challenges defense counsel’s performance in this regard, our review “is limited to
mistakes apparent on the record.” Riley, supra at 139. “We review a prosecutor’s charging
determination under an ‘abuse of power’ standard to determine if the prosecutor acted contrary to
the Constitution or law.” People v Russell, 266 Mich App 307, 316; 703 NW2d 107 (2005).
Attempt is a separate substantive offense from the completed offense. People v Johnson,
195 Mich App 571, 575; 491 NW2d 622 (1992). It is a cognate lesser offense, rather than a
necessarily included lesser offense. Id. at 574, citing People v Adams, 416 Mich 53, 57; 330
NW2d 634 (1982). A trial court may not instruct the jury regarding uncharged, cognate lesser
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offenses. People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 354-355; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). Therefore, the trial
court could not sua sponte give an instruction regarding attempt to manufacture meth, and the
court would be required to deny such a request made by defense counsel. Furthermore, we find
the prosecutor did not abuse his charging discretion in this case. The prosecutor has “broad
charging discretion” and may “bring any charges supported by the evidence.” People v Nichols,
262 Mich App 408, 415; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). Here, the prosecutor presented sufficient
evidence to establish that defendant had manufactured meth, rather than just attempted to do so.
Accordingly, the prosecutor was not required to charge defendant with attempt.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court repeatedly denied his request to conduct an
evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of the evidence against him and to determine
what evidence the prosecution possessed against him. We first note that defendant waived his
right to a preliminary examination and, therefore, waived his right to a hearing at which the
prosecution would be required to present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to
believe the charged crimes occurred and that defendant committed them. Furthermore, review of
the evidence was made available to defendant through discovery. Additionally, the trial court
conducted a Walker hearing to consider defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to the
police. The trial court also considered defendant’s motion in limine to exclude certain physical
evidence at the final pretrial conference. Contrary to defendant’s assertion on appeal, there is no
indication in the record that the trial court repeatedly postponed, and ultimately failed to conduct,
an evidentiary hearing related to any other matter.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but we vacate the trial court’s order
requiring defendant to reimburse the county for his legal fees and remand to the trial court for
reconsideration of that issue consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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