IN RE BELL/BATTLE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TORRIE BELL and JAVON
BATTLE, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 3, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 267074
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-397541-NA
LINDA M. LADACH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TIRNEY BELL,
Respondent.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Jansen and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm. This appeal is
being decided without oral argument. MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent first argues that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with
her children pursuant to MCL 712A.19. Contrary to respondent’s position, MCL 712A.19 does
not contain any requirement that the petitioner make reasonable efforts to reunite a parent with a
child in foster care or relative placement. Moreover, even assuming that there were such a
statutory requirement, petitioner in this case adopted a service plan and specifically referred
respondent to services. In short, petitioner was not required to take steps toward reunification of
respondent with the minor children in this case. Respondent’s failure to rectify the conditions
that led to adjudication was not caused by petitioner’s failure to make reasonable efforts toward
reunification.
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Respondent next challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g).1 Respondent contends that because she substantially complied with
the treatment plan, the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights under these
subsections. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds contained in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re
Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Once this has occurred, the trial court
must terminate parental rights unless it finds that termination is clearly contrary to the best
interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407
(2000). We review the trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR
3.977(J); In re Trejo, supra at 356-357.
At the time the petition was filed in this case, the evidence showed that respondent was
neglectful of her minor children, allowing them to wander unsupervised at the same time as she
was unaware of their whereabouts. The petition alleged that respondent’s boyfriend had
committed domestic violence in respondent’s home, and had attempted to strike at least one of
respondent’s children. It also alleged that respondent’s home was not clean or suitable for
raising children. The minor children’s grandmother testified that respondent’s boyfriend had
physically abused the children, and stated that the police had been called on at least one occasion
as a result of domestic violence between respondent and her boyfriend. Respondent testified that
at the time of the termination hearing, her boyfriend no longer came to the house. However,
certain evidence tended to contradict this testimony. In addition, respondent had completed a
parenting class. However, according to the foster care worker’s testimony, respondent had not
benefited from the class. The testimony showed that even after attending the class, respondent
slapped her young son in the face during a Clinic for Child Study evaluation. This testimony,
coupled with the strong evidence that respondent still lacked suitable housing more than four
years after the first petition was filed, supports the trial court’s finding in this case. We find no
clear error in the trial court’s determination that the statutory grounds of MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
and (g) were established by clear and convincing evidence. For the same reasons, we find no
error in the trial court’s finding that termination was not clearly contrary to the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354.
Respondent next contends that her due process rights were denied because the trial court
refused to allow her therapist to testify by speakerphone, pursuant to a request made by counsel
on the second day of trial. Respondent also contends that the trial court violated her due process
rights when it denied her request for a recess, which was intended to allow the therapist to testify
in person. Respondent failed to raise this due-process argument below, and thus failed to
preserve it for review. In re Hildebrant, 216 Mich App 384, 389; 548 NW2d 715 (1996). We
review unpreserved claims of constitutional error for outcome-determinative plain error. Id.
1
Respondent’s appeal brief does not address the trial court’s findings with respect to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) and (j). Accordingly, appellate review of the trial court’s findings under
(c)(ii) and (j) is necessarily precluded. Muci v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 267 Mich App 431,
443 n 8; 705 NW2d 151 (2005).
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Respondent gives this issue only cursory treatment, and cites no relevant legal authority.
A mere statement with no citation to controlling legal authority is insufficient to bring an issue
before this Court. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). Nevertheless,
even if this issue were properly before us, we would be compelled to reject respondent’s cursory
argument. Respondent does not identify what testimony her therapist would have offered. Nor
does respondent identify how the therapist’s testimony would have altered the result of the
proceedings. Therefore, respondent cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s refusal to admit the
therapist’s testimony constituted plain error that affected her substantial rights. In re Hildebrant,
supra at 389. Quite simply, there is no evidence before us that the therapist’s testimony would
have changed or otherwise influenced the outcome reached by the trial court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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