MICHIGAN PAY TELEPHONE ASSN V MPSC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SBC MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 28, 2006
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
No. 254980
MPSC
LC No. 00-011756
Appellee,
and
MICHIGAN PAY TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
MICHIGAN PAY TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and SBC MICHIGAN, d/b/a AMERITECH
MICHIGAN, f/k/a MICHIGAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Appellees,
and
VERIZON NORTH, INC., f/k/a GTE NORTH,
INC.,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
-1-
No. 261341
MPSC
LC No. 00-011756
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 254980, SBC Michigan (SBC) appeals and the Michigan Pay Telephone
Association (MPTA) cross-appeals an order on remand entered on March 16, 2004 by the
Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) granting in part and dismissing in part the MPTA’s
complaint. In Docket No. 261341, the MPTA appeals1 from the March 16, 2004, order and the
PSC’s February 10, 2005, order denying rehearing, and Verizon North, Inc., f/k/a GTE North,
Inc. (Verizon), cross-appeals from the March 16, 2004, order. These cases have been
consolidated for purposes of hearing and decision. We affirm in each case.
I. Underlying Facts and Proceedings
As a general rule, payphone service in Michigan is provided by local exchange carriers
(LECs), such as SBC and Verizon, and independent payphone providers (IPPs). An IPP is an
organization that operates any number of payphones.2
In 1984, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued an order requiring LECs
to offer payphone access services to IPPs. At that time, the payphones, known as “dumb sets,”
owned by LECs were operated by central office equipment, and were connected to the network
through a line known as a coin line. In order to utilize this type of line, IPPs were required to
purchase payphones known as “smart sets.” These units function as a computer and have the
ability to perform tasks such as answer detection, error messaging, etc., at the phone itself.
Payphones owned by IPPs are connected to LECs’ networks by customer owned coin operated
telephone (COCOT) access lines.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Telecommunications Act (FTA) of 1996, 47 USC
151 et seq., which included provisions designed to enhance local competition. Section 276 of the
FTA, 47 USC 276, prohibited LECs from subsidizing their own payphone service and from
discriminating in favor of their service and against service offered by IPPs. 47 USC 276
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Nondiscrimination safeguards
After the effective date of the rules prescribed pursuant to subsection (b)
of this section, any Bell operating company that provides payphone service—
(1) shall not subsidize its payphone service directly or indirectly from its
telephone exchange service operations or its exchange access operations; and
(2) shall not prefer or discriminate in favor of its payphone service.
(b) Regulations
1
The MPTA raises the same issues as both appellant and cross-appellant.
2
The MPTA is a trade organization comprised of IPPs.
-2-
(1) Contents of regulations
In order to promote competition among payphone service providers and
promote the widespread deployment of payphone services to the benefit of the
general public, within 9 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall take
all actions necessary (including any reconsideration) to prescribe regulations that(A) establish a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone
service providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate
and interstate call using their payphone, except that emergency calls and
telecommunications relay service calls for hearing disabled individuals shall not
be subject to such compensation;
(B) discontinue the intrastate and interstate carrier access payphone
service elements and payments in effect on such date of enactment,3 and all
intrastate and interstate payphone subsidies from basic exchange and exchange
access revenues, in favor of a compensation plan as specified in subparagraph
(A);
(C) prescribe a set of nonstructural safeguards for Bell operating company
payphone service to implement the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (a) of this section, which safeguards shall, at a minimum, include the
nonstructural safeguards equal to those adopted in the Computer Inquiry—III (CC
Docket No. 90-623) proceeding;4
(D) provide for Bell operating company payphone service providers to
have the same right that independent payphone providers have to negotiate with
the location provider on the location provider’s selecting and contracting with,
and, subject to the terms of any agreement with the location provider, to select
and contract with, the carriers that carry inter-LATA calls from their payphones,
unless the Commission determines in the rulemaking pursuant to this section that
it is not in the public interest; and
(E) provide for all payphone service providers to have the right to
negotiate with the location provider on the location provider’s selecting and
contracting with, and, subject to the terms of any agreement with the location
provider, to select and contract with, the carriers that carry intraLATA calls from
their payphones.
3
This subsection has been amended, and the phrase “on such date of enactment” has been
replaced with the phrase “February 8, 1996.”
4
See In the Matter of Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards
and Tier I Local Exchange Company Safeguards, CC Docket No. 90-623, Report and Order, 6
FCC Rcd 7571 (December 20, 1991) (Computer III).
-3-
****
(c) State preemption
To the extent that any State requirements are inconsistent with the
Commission’s regulations, the Commission’s regulations on such matters shall
preempt such State requirements.
In the First Payphone Order,5 the FCC held that to implement the nonstructural
safeguards requirement of 47 USC 276(b)(1)(C), LECs were obliged to comply with the
nonstructural safeguards in the Computer III order. LECs were required to unbundle payphone
line services and file tariffs for those services using the New Services Test (NST), a forward
looking, cost-based test that establishes the direct cost of providing a new service as a price floor,
and then adds a reasonable amount of overhead to compute the overall price of the new service.
The MPTA requested that the PSC initiate an investigation to determine whether the
tariffs filed by Ameritech, now SBC, and GTE, now Verizon, complied with the FTA and the
Michigan Telecommunications Act (MTA), MCL 484.2101 et seq. The PSC declined to initiate
a contested case, but ordered Ameritech/SBC and GTE/Verizon to provide the MPTA with
access to cost studies approved in PSC Case Nos. U-11280 and U-11281.
Thereafter, the MPTA filed a complaint against Ameritech/SBC and GTE/Verizon
alleging that: (1) the prices for network services charged by Ameritech/SBC and GTE/Verizon
were not consistent with the NST; (2) the services provided by Ameritech/SBC and
GTE/Verizon were discriminatory; and (3) Ameritech/SBC and GTE/Verizon subsidized their
payphone operations with revenue from noncompetitive services.
In an order entered on March 8, 1999, the PSC found that the MPTA failed to meet its
burden of showing that Ameritech’s/SBC’s and GTE’s/Verizon’s payphone service rates did not
comply with the NST. The PSC found that IPPs should be charged as business customers and
not wholesale customers, and that the comparison of an IPP line to a business line was
appropriate under the circumstances. The PSC also rejected the MPTA’s assertion that the end
user common line (EUCL) charge should be deducted when calculating rates under the NST.
In MPTA v Public Service Comm, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued October 23, 2001 (Docket No. 219950), another panel of this Court affirmed the
PSC’s decision. The MPTA sought leave to appeal this Court’s decision to our Supreme Court,
and filed a petition with the FCC seeking a declaratory ruling that the PSC’s March 8, 1999,
order was not consistent with the NST.
5
See Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-128, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd
20541 (September 20, 1996). The First Payphone Order and subsequent orders are known
collectively as the Payphone Orders.
-4-
While those proceedings were pending, the FCC issued its Wisconsin Order.6 In that
order, the FCC noted that Congress enacted 47 USC 276 to promote competition between Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs) and IPPs, and that 47 USC 276 required BOCs to set intrastate
payphone line rates in compliance with the NST. The FCC asserted that its order would “assist
states in applying the new services test to BOCs’ intrastate payphone line rates in order to ensure
compliance with the Payphone Orders and Congress’ directives in section 276.” Wisconsin
Order, ¶ 2.
In the Wisconsin Order, the FCC concluded that: pursuant to 47 USC 276, it had
jurisdiction over the intrastate payphone rates charged by BOCs, but not those charged by nonBOC LECs, id. at ¶ ¶ 31-42; the use of a forward-looking pricing methodology, such as total
element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) or total service long-run incremental cost
(TSLRIC) was acceptable when applying the NST, id. at ¶ ¶ 43-50; states could continue to use
UNE loading factors to evaluate a BOC’s overhead allocation for payphone services, id. at
¶ ¶ 51-58; under the NST, a BOC cannot charge more for payphone line service than is necessary
to recover “all monthly recurring direct and overhead costs incurred” in providing payphone
lines, id. at ¶ 60, and when establishing a cost-based state-tariffed charge for payphone line
service, a BOC must reduce its line charge by the amount of the federally tariffed charge, id. at
¶ 61; and that the NST applies to usage sensitive as well as to flat-rate elements of services
offered to IPPs, i.e., “all payphone service line rates, including per-call or per-minute rates
applicable to local usage.” Id. at ¶ 63.
Following the issuance of the Wisconsin Order, the FCC instructed the PSC to “re
evaluate” its decision “concerning the pricing of BOCs’ intrastate payphone line rates and
overhead ratios to ensure compliance with the Wisconsin Order.” Our Supreme Court vacated
this Court’s previous decision and remanded the matter to the PSC for reconsideration in light of
the Wisconsin Order. MPTA v Public Service Comm, 466 Mich 883; 646 NW2d 471 (2002).
On March 16, 2004, the PSC issued an order on remand granting in part and dismissing
in part the MPTA’s complaint. The PSC rejected SBC’s and Verizon’s argument that the
Wisconsin Order substantially changed the NST by establishing that payphone rates, including
overhead allocations, be established on the basis of forward-looking costs, such as TELRIC
pricing, by requiring that the subscriber line charge (SLC) be removed from payphone rates, by
stating that local usage was subject to the NST, and by allowing the inclusion of certain retail
costs in calculating direct costs. The PSC observed that the FCC had used forward-looking cost
methodologies, such as TELRIC or TSLRIC, when applying the NST, and approved the use, at
the state’s discretion, of either the methodology explained in the Physical Collocation Order7 or
6
In the Matter of Wisconsin Public Service Commission: Order Directing Filings, CCB/CPD
No. 00-01, Mem Op and Order, FCC 02-25 (released January 31, 2002).
7
In the Matter of Local Exchange Carriers’ Rates, Terms and Conditions for Expanded
Interconnection Through Physical Collocation for Special Access and Switched Transport, CC
Docket No. 930162, Second Report and Order, FCC 97-208, 12 FCC Rcd 18730 (1997).
-5-
the Open Network Architecture (ONA) Order.8 In addition, the PSC noted that the FCC relied
on its prior orders and precedent when holding that payphone rates must be reduced by the SLC,
and that usage charges were subject to the NST. Moreover, the PSC observed that the FCC
noted that inclusion of certain retail costs in direct costs had never been precluded.
In its order, the PSC also: reaffirmed the holding in its March 9, 1999, order that
required Verizon’s payphone rates to be subjected to the NST; found that, with the exception of
the EULC, SBC and Verizon demonstrated that their IPP rates complied with the NST, and that
it was authorized to compare business line rates with IPP rates as one factor in determining
whether the companies’ IPP rates complied with the NST; rejected the MPTA’s argument that
the LECs should be required to use the UNE method for determining whether their IPP rates
complied with the NST, noting that the FCC stated in the Wisconsin Order that LECs had three
options for use in reaching that determination; rejected the MPTA’s assertion that SBC’s
analysis of its IPP rates relied on cost studies that had been rejected in previous proceedings, and
that SBC understated its cost to provide payphone service because the costs on which SBC relied
did not match those filed pursuant to the 1999 order; found that SBC was required to account for
the intrastate EULC, a non-cost-based charge, in determining whether its IPP rates comply with
the NST, and that with this adjustment, SBC’s IPP rates complied with the NST; rejected the
MPTA’s assertion that Verizon’s proposed overhead allocation methodology was inconsistent
with the ONA/ARMIS9 cost methodology for determining whether its IPP rates complied with
the NST, but that Verizon erroneously ignored the end user subscriber line charge (EUSLC) in
analyzing its coin line rates, and that with that correction, Verizon’s IPP rates would comply
with the NST; and that to the extent that SBC and Verizon had charged IPP rates in excess of the
ceiling established by the NST, the companies’ rates were unlawful, and their customers were
entitled to refunds but not attorney fees.
In an order entered on February 10, 2005, the PSC denied the MPTA’s petition for
rehearing. The PSC held, inter alia, that to the extent that SBC and Verizon were required to
issue refunds, only those 62 members of the MPTA named in the MPTA’s complaint were
entitled to receive refunds.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for PSC orders is narrow and well defined. Pursuant to MCL
462.25, all rates, fares, charges, classification and joint rates, regulations, practices, and services
prescribed by the PSC are presumed, prima facie, to be lawful and reasonable. Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co v Public Service Comm, 389 Mich 624, 635-636; 209 NW2d 210 (1973).
A party aggrieved by an order of the PSC has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the order is unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8). To establish that a PSC
8
In the Matter of Open Network Architecture Tariffs of Bell Operating Companies, CC Docket
No. 92-91, FCC Order 93-532, 9 FCC Rcd 440 (1993).
9
ARMIS stands for Automated Reporting Management Information System, which is a federally
mandated reporting system.
-6-
order is unlawful, the appellant must show that the PSC failed to follow a mandatory statute or
abused its discretion in the exercise of its judgment. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint,
460 Mich 396, 427; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). An order is unreasonable if it is not supported by
the evidence. Associated Truck Lines, Inc v Public Service Comm, 377 Mich 259, 279; 140
NW2d 515 (1966).
A final order of the PSC must be authorized by law and be supported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; Attorney Gen v
Public Service Comm, 165 Mich App 230, 235; 418 NW2d 660 (1987).
We give due deference to the PSC’s administrative expertise, and will not substitute our
judgment for that of the PSC. Attorney Gen v Public Service Comm No 2, 237 Mich App 82, 88;
602 NW2d 225 (1999). We give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory
scheme that the PSC is empowered to administer, Champion’s Auto Ferry, Inc v Public Service
Comm, 231 Mich App 699, 708; 588 NW2d 153 (1998), but we may not abandon our
responsibility to interpret statutory language and legislative intent. Miller Bros v Public Service
Comm, 180 Mich App 227, 232; 446 NW2d 640 (1989). Whether the PSC exceeded the scope
of its authority is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Complaint of Pelland Against
Ameritech Michigan, 254 Mich App 675, 682; 658 NW2d 849 (2003).
III. Analysis
A. Application of the NST to Usage Sensitive Services
The MPTA argues that the PSC failed to properly apply the NST to the usage sensitive
service rates charged by SBC and Verizon.10 Neither SBC nor Verizon provided any evidence to
support their usage sensitive services in their May 1997 compliance filings; therefore, the MPTA
concludes, the PSC could not find that the usage sensitive service rates charged by SBC or
Verizon complied with the NST. See MCL 24.285; Attorney Gen v Public Service Comm, 206
Mich App 290, 295; 520 NW2d 636 (1994).
The MPTA also asserts that the PSC erred in finding that it was authorized to compare
overhead allocation rates charged by LECs for business lines with overhead allocation rates
charged for payphone lines to determine if the payphone line rates complied with the NST. The
FCC rejected reliance on business line rates as a comparison to support payphone line rates.
Wisconsin Order, ¶ 55. The PSC cannot impose a state requirement that is inconsistent with the
FCC’s regulations. 47 USC 276(c).
10
An IPP pays an LEC such as SBC or Verizon a flat monthly fee for the use of a payphone line
itself, plus an amount for each call made from the payphone. This amount is known as the
“usage sensitive service” rate element. The NST requires an LEC to price network services at
the direct cost of the service, plus a reasonable overhead allocation. An LEC is not entitled to
recover “more than a reasonable portion” of its overhead costs. See 47 CFR § 61.49(g)(2).
-7-
We disagree. The NST is a forward-looking, cost-based test that establishes the direct
cost of providing a new service as a price floor, and then adds a reasonable amount of overhead
to compute the overall price of the new service. The NST is, by its nature, flexible, and does not
require the use of a single method by which to calculate the cost of a service. Wisconsin Order,
¶ 58. On remand, the PSC was charged with reevaluating its earlier decision to ensure that the
intrastate payphone line rates charged by SBC and Verizon complied with the NST and the
Wisconsin Order. The PSC concluded that, with minor exceptions, the rates charged by SBC
and Verizon adhered to the NST.
The PSC correctly found that, with the exception of the failure to account for the EUCL
charge, SBC’s IPP rates complied with the NST. The PSC properly relied on the FCC’s
statement that the NST is flexible to reject the MPTA’s assertion that SBC should be required to
use the UNE methodology to calculate overhead allocations when establishing rates for IPP
services. Furthermore, the PSC’s finding the SBC’s application of the NST to its usage sensitive
services was appropriate was supported by the requisite evidence, and we defer to its
administrative expertise. Public Service Comm No 2, supra at 88.
Moreover, the PSC did not err by comparing SBC’s IPP rates to SBC’s business line
rates. The FCC did not preclude such a comparison in the Wisconsin Order, but rather stated
that such a comparison could not serve as the sole basis for approving IPP line rates pursuant to
the NST. The PSC did not rely on this comparison as its sole basis for approving SBC’s IPP
rates, but instead used the comparison as merely one factor in its analysis. The removal of
business line rates from regulation by 2005 PA 235 does not affect the validity of the PSC’s
comparison because the comparison was not based on the fact of regulation.
Similarly, the PSC correctly found that Verizon applied the NST to its usage sensitive
rates in an appropriate manner, with the exception of Verizon’s failure to take into account the
EUSLC in analyzing the coin line rate. Verizon used the ONA/ARMIS method of demonstrating
compliance with the NST, as permitted by the Wisconsin Order. Verizon’s calculation of the
direct costs associated with a COCOT line included usage. The PSC’s acceptance of this method
of calculation on the basis that usage cannot be purchased on a stand-alone basis, and must be
analyzed along with access, was reasonable and is entitled to deference. Champion’s Auto
Ferry, supra.
Finally, we reject the MPTA’s argument that Verizon improperly relied on TSLRIC
figures that did not match those approved in previous cases. The approved figures were not
available in May 1997 when Verizon submitted its compliance filings in this matter.
B. Adoption of Verizon’s Direct Costs
The MPTA argues that the PSC’s order as it pertains to Verizon is unlawful and
unreasonable because the order relies on: (1) a cost study for its coin line service submitted by
Verizon after the study had been rejected in an arbitration proceeding between AT & T and then
-8-
GTE; and (2) a cost study for its COCOT line service that was rejected in PSC Case No. U
11281.11
Moreover, the MPTA contends that Verizon improperly relied on cost studies that used
different assumptions for coin line service and COCOT line service, thereby resulting in
significantly different costs for the services. The PSC’s acceptance of Verizon’s studies in this
proceeding was arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.
The MPTA’s assertion that the PSC should have required Verizon to rely on modified
studies approved in another case is groundless in light of the fact that those studies did not exist
when Verizon made its compliance filing in May 1997 in this case. Given the lack of evidence
to show that Verizon’s studies were unreasonable at the time they were conducted, we decline to
second-guess the PSC’s decision to rely on the studies. Champion’s Auto Ferry, supra.
Verizon’s use of different cost studies for its coin line service and its COCOT line service
resulted in differences in the overhead allocations for the services, but does not, in and of itself,
demonstrate that Verizon failed to comply with the NST. The NST allows a flexible approach to
calculating costs. Wisconsin Order, ¶ 58. The PSC’s decision to rely on cost studies not shown
to have been invalid at the time they were conducted is entitled to deference. Public Service
Comm No 2, supra at 88.
C. Uniform Application of the NST
The MPTA argues that the PSC erred by failing to order that the lower rates mandated by
the FCC be applied to all IPPs, and not to only those IPPs named in the complaint. The MPTA
asserts that the PSC’s decision results in discriminatory rate setting in violation of 47 USC
276(a). We disagree.
The MPTA initiated this case by filing a complaint with the PSC. Under the PSC’s rules
of practice and procedure, a complaint may be filed by a party “having an interest in the subject
matter of the complaint.…” 1997 AACS, R 460.17501 (Rule 501). The PSC has consistently
determined that an association like the MPTA cannot pursue a complaint in a representative
capacity because it has not suffered an injury in fact. Furthermore, absent statutory authority, the
PSC could not grant monetary relief to non-parties. Bolt v Lansing (On Remand), 238 Mich App
37, 57-58; 605 NW2d 745 (1999). The PSC’s order did not discriminate against IPPs not named
in the MPTA’s complaint.
D. Application of the NST to Verizon’s Rates
Verizon, a non-BOC LEC,12 argues that the PSC erred by holding that Verizon’s
payphone rates were subject to the NST. Verizon contends that this issue must be reexamined in
11
In that case, the PSC ordered Verizon to resubmit modified cost studies, and then approved the
modified studies.
12
Verizon was formerly known as GTE North, Inc. Verizon indicates that it did not become a
(continued…)
-9-
light of the Wisconsin Order, which held that the FCC lacked jurisdiction under 47 USC 276 to
apply the NST to non-BOC LECs. Wisconsin Order, ¶ 42. Furthermore, Verizon claims that
MCL 484.2318(2) does not give the PSC explicit authority to expand nonstructural safeguards to
non-BOCs. We disagree.
The PSC possesses only that authority granted to it by the Legislature. Authority must be
granted by clear and unmistakable language. Attorney Gen v Public Service Comm, 231 Mich
App 76, 78; 585 NW2d 310 (1998).
MCL 484.2318 provides:
(1) A provider of basic local exchange service shall not discriminate in
favor of its or an affiliate’s payphone service over similar services offered by
another provider.
(2) A provider of payphone service shall comply with all nonstructural
safeguards adopted by the federal communications commission for payphone
service.
We hold that the PSC did not err when it concluded that MCL 484.3218 authorized
application of the NST to Verizon’s payphone rates. Initially, we note that Verizon’s assertion
that MCL 484.2318 was repealed by 2005 PA 235, and thus no longer supports the PSC’s
position, is erroneous.13
Pursuant to 47 USC 276, the FCC is authorized to apply nonstructural safeguards to
BOCs, but has no congressional grant of jurisdiction over non-BOC LEC line rates. Wisconsin
Order, ¶ 14. However, a state commission, like the PSC, may choose to apply the provisions of
the Wisconsin Order to non-BOC LECs pursuant to state law. Id. at ¶ 3 n 12.
MCL 484.2318(2) requires “[a] provider of payphone service” to “comply with all
nonstructural safeguards adopted by the [FCC] for payphone service.” The statute does not limit
this requirement to BOCs. The PSC has the authority to administer the MTA, and to act in a
manner consistent with federal rules and regulations. MCL 484.2201. The PSC’s conclusion
that MCL 484.2318 grants it the authority to apply nonstructural safeguards, such as the NST, to
non-BOCs such as Verizon is reasonable in light of the plain language of MCL 484.2318(2),
Cherry Growers, Inc v Michigan Processing Apple Growers, Inc, 240 Mich App 153, 166; 610
NW2d 613 (2000), and is entitled to deference. Public Service Comm No 2, supra at 88.
(…continued)
BOC by virtue of GTE’s merger with Bell Atlantic Corporation. The term “Bell operating
company” does not include an “affiliate of any such company.” 47 USC 153.
13
MCL 484.2604 provides that the MTA is repealed effective December 31, 2009, and not
December 31, 2005.
-10-
E. Retroactive Application of the NST and Refunds
SBC argues that the PSC erred by holding that the Wisconsin Order should be given
retroactive effect, and that the IPPs named in the complaint were entitled to refunds back to April
15, 1997, the date by which the FCC required BOCs to comply with the NST. The Wisconsin
Order’s requirement that, “in establishing its cost-based, state tariffed charge for payphone line
service, a BOC must reduce the monthly per line charge determined under the new services test
by the amount of the federally tariffed SLC,” id. at ¶ 61, marked a substantive change in the
formulation of the NST. The FCC knew or should have known that BOCs had relied on its
earlier pronouncements regarding the formulation of the NST; nevertheless, the FCC did not
direct that the restructured NST be applied retroactively and that refunds be issued back to April
15, 1997. Furthermore, the PSC’s order violates the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking
and the filed rate doctrine. We disagree.
An FCC decision that clarifies a confusing or an unsettled area of the law does not
change the law. MCI Telecom, Inc v Michigan Bell Tel Co, 79 F Supp 2d 768, 801 (ED Mich,
1999). In the Wisconsin Order, the FCC clearly stated that it was relying on the 1996 Payphone
Orders as the bases for its explanation of the NST. Wisconsin Order, ¶ 1. In the First Payphone
Order, the FCC stated that in order to comply with 47 USC 276 and the Computer III order,
LECs were required to unbundled payphone line services and file tariffs for those services
pursuant to the NST. The FCC characterized the Wisconsin Order as one designed to “assist”
states in the application of the NST to ensure compliance with the Payphone Orders and 47 USC
276, Wisconsin Order, ¶ 2, and rejected an assertion that the Wisconsin Order changed the law.14
Therefore, we find that the PSC’s conclusion that the Wisconsin Order clarified but did not
change the law, and thus could be applied retroactively, was reasonable. Champion’s Auto
Ferry, supra.
Retroactive ratemaking in utility cases is prohibited. Detroit Edison Co v Public Service
Comm, 416 Mich 510, 523; 331 NW2d 159 (1982). Utility rates are set on the basis of estimates
of costs. When the estimates prove inadequate, the previously set rates cannot be changed to
correct the error. Michigan Bell Tel Co v Public Service Comm, 315 Mich 533, 544-547; 24
NW2d 200 (1946). The only step the PSC can take is to prospectively revise rates in order to
better estimate costs. Detroit Edison Co, supra. The bar against retroactive ratemaking applies
only to rates charged by a utility under a lawful order. The PSC can mandate a refund of monies
paid pursuant to rates set under an unlawful order. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 255 Mich
App 361, 366; 661 NW2d 611 (2003).
Under the filed rate doctrine, a public utility “can claim no rate as a legal right that is
other than the filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission.” MontanaDakota Utilities Co v Northwestern Public Service Co, 341 US 246, 251; 71 S Ct 692; 95 L Ed
2d 912 (1951); see also Detroit Edison Co, supra at 516. However, if a tariff rate is found to be
unlawful, the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable, and a refund can be ordered. In re MCI, supra.
14
See In the Matter of Request to Update Default Compensation Rates for Dial Around Calls
from Payphones, 19 FCC Rcd 15636, ¶ 60 (released August 12, 2004).
-11-
The PSC did not violate the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking by ordering SBC
and Verizon to refund monies to IPPs back to April 15, 1997. In its March 8, 1999, order, the
PSC approved the rates proposed by SBC and Verizon for IPP services. However, following the
issuance of the Wisconsin Order, our Supreme Court vacated this Court’s 2001 decision that
affirmed the PSC’s 1999 order, and remanded the matter to the PSC for reconsideration in light
of the Wisconsin Order. On remand, the PSC concluded that, with the exception of the failure to
account for the EUCL charge and the EUSLC, the rates charged by SBC and Verizon for IPP
services complied with the NST.
The PSC concluded that to the extent that SBC and Verizon had charged rates for IPP
services that exceeded the ceiling established by the NST, those rates were unlawful, and the
IPPs were entitled to refunds. The PSC did not change rates to account for shortfalls resulting
from a failure to properly estimate costs; thus, its order did not violate the prohibition against
retroactive ratemaking. In re MCI, supra.
Similarly, the filed rate doctrine was inapplicable under the circumstances. Id. The FCC
required LECs to adjust their rates charged to IPPs to comply with the NST. This obligation is a
nonstructural safeguard, First Payphone Order, ¶ 146, with which the LECs are bound to
comply. MCL 484.2318(2). The PSC, in its order of March 16, 2004, found that rates charged
by SBC and Verizon to IPPs violated the NST. Any tariff approved prior to April 15, 1997, was
preempted by the FCC’s Payphone Orders. SBC and Verizon were not entitled to rely on any
such tariff, and the existence of any such tariff did not preclude the PSC from ordering refunds.
Under these circumstances, the PSC’s conclusion that those rates did not fully comply with the
NST and that the IPPs were entitled to refunds is reasonable and entitled to deference. Public
Service Comm No 2, supra at 88.
The PSC is authorized to “order remedies and penalties to protect and make whole
ratepayers and other persons who have suffered an economic loss as a result” of a violation of
the MTA. MCL 484.2601. Specifically, MCL 484.2601(c) authorized the PSC to order that
monies collected as a result of SBC and Verizon charging excessive rates to IPPs be refunded.
F. Reduction of IPP Charge for Intrastate EUCL Charge
SBC argues that the PSC exceeded its authority on remand by holding a further contested
case hearing, and by determining that SBC was required to account for the intrastate EUCL in its
NST analysis. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court remanded the case to the PSC for reconsideration in light of the
Wisconsin Order. On remand, SBC argued that because the FCC had changed the NST, it
should have the opportunity to present evidence based on that change. The PSC concluded that
because the remedy sought by the MPTA, i.e., refunds, was significant, due process demanded
that the parties have the fullest opportunity possible to present evidence, and on that basis
reopened the record. Neither the FCC nor our Supreme Court precluded the PSC from reopening
the record in order to fulfill the remand orders. Moreover, Rule 401 of the PSC’s Rules of
Practice and Procedure, AACS R 460.17401(1), allows the PSC to reopen proceedings to receive
further evidence in order to develop a complete record or to consider changes of fact or law.
-12-
Furthermore, the PSC did not exceed its authority by requiring SBC to account for the
intrastate EUCL charge in the formulation of its IPP rates. The EUCL charge duplicates certain
elements of LECs’ direct costs associated with providing access services to IPPs. SBC correctly
notes that the FCC did not address the intrastate EUCL charge in the Wisconsin Order.
However, in that order, the FCC made it clear that various non-cost based charges must be
accounted for when determining whether an LEC’s IPP rates comply with the NST, including the
federally tariffed SLC. The FCC indicated that if such charges were not accounted for, LECs
would make a double recovery of some costs, in contravention of federal law. Wisconsin Order,
¶ ¶ 12, 59-61. The PSC reasoned that because it was required by MCL 484.2318(2) to ensure
that LECs complied with all nonstructural safeguards, it should require SBC to account for the
EUCL charge to prevent double recovery of costs. The PSC’s application of its authority under
MCL 484.2318(2) is reasonable and entitled to deference. Champion’s Auto Ferry, supra. The
PSC did not exceed its authority on remand by addressing this issue. In re Complaint of Pelland,
supra.
IV. Conclusion
The PSC’s orders granting in part and dismissing in part the MPTA’s complaint and
denying rehearing are lawful and reasonable, and are supported by the requisite evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.