PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY JON BODMAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 259970
Montcalm Circuit Court
LC No. 04-001168-FC
TIMOTHY JON BODMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Cavanagh and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) or (b); three counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a); and two counts of attempted CSC II, MCL
750.92; MCL 720.520c(1)(a). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 18 to 50 years for
each of the CSC I counts, 10 to 15 years for each of the CSC II counts, and 3 to 5 years for each
of the attempted CSC II counts. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to object at an earlier point to the prosecutor’s alleged leading questions of
the youngest complainant. We disagree. Because defendant failed to move for a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court’s review is
limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 453; 709 NW2d
152 (2005); People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). “Whether a
person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The trial
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its constitutional determinations are
reviewed de novo. Id.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and any
defendant seeking to prove otherwise bears a heavy burden. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643,
687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). First, defendant must show that counsel was deficient. Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); see also People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy. Strickland, supra at
690. “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
-1-
Id. at 687. Specifically defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.
Leading questions are appropriate when they are necessary to develop testimony. MRE
611(c)(1). Because of the witness’s young age, the embarrassment she presumably felt from
having to discuss sexual topics in front of an audience, and her general discomfort with
testifying, the witness often had difficulty expressing what happened to her, was unable to
answer the questions, or gave incomplete answers. Consequently, the majority of the
complained of questions were not meant to suggest an answer but, rather, were properly used to
ask the question in a simpler form, recollect the witness’ previous statements, or attempt to get
her to expand on her yes and no answers. Regardless, even if some of the questions were
leading, “a considerable amount of leeway may be given to a prosecutor to ask leading questions
of child witnesses.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
Moreover, it is possible that part of counsel’s trial strategy was to try to make few
objections during this child’s testimony. Counsel may not have wanted to appear as an
obstructionist, or she might not have wanted the jury to resent her for compounding the young
victim’s trauma of testifying. This Court will not “substitute[] its judgment for that of counsel
regarding matters of trial strategy, nor make[] an assessment of counsel’s competence with the
benefit of hindsight.” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Accordingly, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to
immediately object to the prosecutor’s alleged leading questions of the child witness.
Defendant also contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel
consented to keeping a juror after the juror was caught sleeping during trial. We disagree.
Defendant did not move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on this issue, and therefore this
Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.1 Cox, supra at 453. It is not clear
from the record when the juror began sleeping, how long the juror was sleeping, or whether she
missed any testimony. Moreover, the victims presented undisputed testimony as to the sexual
abuse and rapes. Therefore, based on the information apparent from the record, defendant has
not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s consent to keeping the juror at issue in the pool
because it is not clear that juror missed any critical testimony. See People v Carbin, 463 Mich
590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001) (the defendant has the burden of showing the factual predicate
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). Further, trial counsel may have had sound
strategic reason not to seek to remove the juror at issue. Particularly, counsel may have thought
that confusion in the juror’s recollection due to her sleeping through testimony and/or being tired
would render her more likely to have a reasonable doubt about defendant’s guilt due to missing
incriminating evidence.
1
We note that defendant characterizes the juror as “sleeping” or being “asleep” during trial.
However, when the prosecutor made a record of the juror’s conduct, the prosecutor characterized
it as “dozed off.” Without any additional record in the trial court or an evidentiary hearing, we
cannot conclude that the juror was sleeping through the trial.
-2-
Defendant also contends he was denied his right to an impartial jury because of the
sleeping juror. However, the record clearly reflects that defense counsel consented to the juror at
issue remaining on the jury. Thus, to the extent that defendant presents argument distinct from
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to this matter, defendant’s argument has been
waived. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 217-218; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), quoting New York
v Hill, 528 US 110, 114-115; 120 S Ct 659; 145 L Ed 2d 560 (2000) (explaining that, absent a
showing of ineffectiveness, trial counsel can generally waive a defendant’s rights regarding the
conduct of a trial). Such waiver extinguishes any possible error in this regard. Id. at 216.
Defendant next contends the court erred by asking an expert witness questions that,
according to defendant, bolstered the ten-year-old complainant’s credibility. We disagree.
Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised before the trial court.
People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). In this case, defendant did not
object to the court’s questioning of the witness. Therefore, the issue was not preserved for
appeal. However, this Court will review unpreserved issues that could result in a denial of a fair
trial. People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 697; 425 NW2d 118 (1988). Such unpreserved
issues are reviewed for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
“The court may interrogate witnesses whether called by itself or by a party.” MRE
614(b). However, the court’s questioning of a witness should not pierce the veil of judicial
impartiality. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). Although a court may
question a witness in order to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant information, the court
“must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its questions are not intimidating,
argumentative, prejudicial, unfair or partial. . . . The test is whether the judge’s questions and
comments may well have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the mind of the jury as to a witness’
credibility, . . . and whether partiality quite possibly could have influenced the jury to the
detriment of defendant’s case.” People v Conyers, 194 Mich App 395, 405; 487 NW2d 787
(1992) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “A trial court may not
assume the prosecutor’s role . . . .” People v Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 109; 514 NW2d
493 (1994).
In this case, the ten-year-old complainant testified to three episodes of sexual abuse
where defendant touched her vagina with his fingers, but she did not testify in court as to any
genital-to-genital contact. One of the expert witnesses testified that during his visits with the
victim, she used anatomically correct dolls to show that there was genital-to-genital contact
between her and defendant. The court asked the expert to provide reasons for the apparent
discrepancy. The court then summarized what it believed the expert was attempting to say. The
court’s questions were neither intimidating nor argumentative. Rather, the court was attempting
to assist the jury in understanding a complex issue, specifically why a child witness’s testimony
could differ depending on with whom she is speaking. Thus, the trial court’s questions were not
improperly partial.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in scoring offense variable seven (OV
7) of the sentencing guidelines at 50 points. We disagree. “We review the trial court’s scoring
of a sentencing guidelines variable for clear error.” People v Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 522; 675
NW2d 599 (2003) (internal citations and references omitted). Questions of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 671; 672 NW2d
-3-
860 (2003). “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored,
provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v Hornsby, 251
Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). When there is any evidence supporting the trial
court’s scoring decision it is not clearly erroneous and will be upheld. People v Witherspoon,
257 Mich App 329, 335; 670 NW2d 434 (2003).
OV 7 should be scored at 50 points if a victim was treated with sadism. MCL
777.37(1)(a). Sadism is defined as “conduct that subjects a victim to extreme or prolonged pain
or humiliation and is inflicted to produce suffering or for the offender’s gratification.” MCL
777.37(3). The plain language of the statute does not require actual physical abuse, and
emotional or psychological abuse that leads to humiliation will suffice. People v Mattoon, ___
Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2006).2 Evidence was presented that both complainants were
subjected to extreme or prolonged pain or humiliation. Specifically, both girls were sexually
assaulted over a long period of time by defendant, their stepfather. Additionally, the assaults
began at an early age for both girls, and they were told to keep the assaults secret for many years.
Moreover, with regard to the fifteen-year-old victim, defendant used numerous objects including
markers, pencils, pens, his penis, and his fingers in order to penetrate, degrade, and humiliate
her. Undoubtedly, the assaults upon the girls were intended to provide defendant gratification.
Therefore, defendant’s conduct subjected the victims to prolonged humiliation and pain. MCL
777.37(3). Clearly, there was evidence in support of the trial court’s scoring of OV 7. Thus, the
scoring was not clearly erroneous. Witherspoon, supra at 335.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
2
Docket No. 259822, issued June 6, 2006, slip op p 2.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.