JUDY LOUIS V EDWARD H LOUIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDY LOUIS and JOYCE REDMAN, trustees of
the SAMUEL T. LOUIS TRUST,
UNPUBLISHED
June 20, 2006
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
WILLIAM LOUIS, SAMUEL R. LOUIS, and
ROGER LOUIS,
Plaintiffs,
v
No. 258299
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 03-051661-CH
EDWARD H. LOUIS, JOSEPHINE LOUIS,
EDWARD J. LOUIS, SUZANNE LOUIS, and
SAM P. LOUIS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs-appellants (“plaintiffs”) appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
This appeal concerns two parcels of land in Paw Paw Township. Antonette Louis
conveyed Parcel A to her sons Edward H. Louis, Robert Louis, and Samuel T. Louis in August
1980. That deed lists the Louis sons as “joint tenants with rights of survivorship.” A Michigan
form deed was used for the conveyance, but all parties to the deed lived in Illinois at the time.
The attorney that prepared the 1980 deed was licensed in Illinois. Robert Louis died in August
1992.
Parcel B was part of Antonette Louis’s estate at the time of her death in 1994. On
December 5, 1995, the Van Buren Probate Court assigned Parcel B to Edward H. Louis, who
was also named as the executor of Antonette Louis’s estate. That same day, Edward H. Louis
and his wife, Josephine Louis, then conveyed Parcel B to Edward H. Louis and Samuel T. Louis
by way of a quitclaim deed. On December 12, 1995, the probate court recorded its December 5
assignment to Edward H. Louis. The quitclaim deed was recorded on March 12, 1996.
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On January 6, 1996, Edward H. Louis and his wife Josephine Louis executed a quitclaim
deed conveying both Parcels A and B (“the property”) from themselves to Edward H. Louis,
Josephine Louis, and their sons Sam P. Louis and Edward J. Louis as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. The 1996 deed purported to destroy a joint tenancy and create a tenancy in
common that included Samuel T. Louis.
On March 27, 2003, Samuel T. Louis died. His heirs brought this action, complaining
that Edward H. Louis and his family improperly excluded them from the property. They argued
that they in fact were title holders to the property based on (a) the 1980 deed which created a
joint tenancy in Parcel A with survivorship rights that were destroyed by the 1996 deed; and (b)
the 1995 deed, which conveyed a one-half interest in Parcel B even though the assignment to
Edward H. Louis was not recorded until one week later.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the 1980 deed pertaining to Parcel A “…created the
peculiar Michigan–type of ‘joint tenancy with rights of survivorship.’”
In Michigan, “survivorship” language in a deed creates a life estate with dual contingent
remainders (that is, indestructible survivorship rights). Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271, 275-276;
454 NW2d 85 (1990). In Illinois, only a joint tenancy with destructible survivorship rights may
be created, apparently even if “survivorship” terms are used. See, e.g. Jackson v O’Connell, 23
Ill2d 52, 55-56; 177 NE2d 194, 195 (1961), and Dolley v Powers, 404 Ill 510, 513-514; 89 NE2d
412, 414 (1949). If the 1980 Michigan deed created a joint tenancy with indestructible
survivorship rights, then the 1996 deed had no effect on Edward H. Louis’s survivorship rights,
and Samuel T. Louis’s interest in Parcel A was extinguished and reverted to Edward upon
Samuel’s death. If the 1980 deed created a joint tenancy with destructible survivorship rights,
then the 1996 deed destroyed Edward H. Louis’s survivorship rights and Samuel T. Louis’s
interest in Parcel A passed to plaintiffs, Samuel T. Louis’s heirs.
With regard to Parcel A, the trial court held that even if the parties intended to create a
joint tenancy with destructible survivorship rights by way of the 1980 deed, such an interest
would not be recognized in Michigan because “survivorship” language in a deed necessarily
creates indestructible survivorship rights. But, in fact, Michigan recognizes two forms of joint
tenancy: the joint tenancy “with rights of survivorship,” which creates in each grantee a life
estate with indestructible alternative contingent remainders; and, the less commonly seen joint
tenancy with destructible rights of survivorship that may be destroyed by an act of one joint
tenant. See Albro, supra at 275-276, and Townsend v Chase Manhattan Mtg Corp, 254 Mich
App 133, 136; 657 NW2d 741 (2002). A joint tenancy with indestructible survivorship rights is
created when express words of survivorship are used in a particular conveyance and is the more
common type of joint tenancy in Michigan. Albro, supra at 275, 277.
Here, however, the 1980 deed at issue clearly involves property located in the State of
Michigan and specifically provides that the “[i]ndenture is between Antonette Lewis . . . and
Sam T. Louis, Edward H. Louis and Robert Louis . . . as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship.” (Emphasis added). In a suit involving land, a conveyance of land depends on the
law of the state where it is situated unless there is some ambiguity as to the interest of the
grantor, parties and the attorney who prepared the deed. Taylor v Taylor 310 Mich 541, 548
(1945). Because the 1980 deed expressly states that the joint tenancy is with rights of
survivorship and there is no indication of any ambiguity, each of the grantees received
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remainders that may not be destroyed by any act of the other. Albro, supra at 287. Moreover, in
his opinion, the trial court addressed the factual scenario pertaining to intent and specifically held
that,
I don’t find that there is any question that there was an intention to create not a
tenancy in common, but a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship and I think
that’s evidenced by the behavior and actions of the parties thereafter as to how
they understood it. . . . But my conclusion is that these facts tell me there was a
joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship.
Thus, the trial judge reached the correct conclusion and unequivocally determined that no
genuine issue of material fact existed that the grantees to parcel A were joint tenants with rights
of survivorship. Consequently, he properly granted summary disposition as to parcel A,
notwithstanding his comment indicating his incorrect understanding that Michigan no longer
recognized the other type of joint tenancy.
With regard to Parcel B, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to
defendants. Plaintiffs assert that the December 5, 1995, quitclaim deed conveyed a one-half
interest in Parcel B to Samuel T. Louis even though Edward H. Louis’s interest in Parcel B was
not recorded until one week later. We disagree. A quitclaim deed conveys a grantor’s complete
interest in real property but neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid. DNR v
Carmody-Lahti, 472 Mich 359, 377-378; 699 NW2d 272 (2005). The grantee in a quitclaim
deed receives only that title then held by the grantor and not any after-acquired title. Doelle v
Read, 329 Mich 655, 657; 46 NW2d 422 (1951). Consequently, if a grantor has no interest in the
property at the time of conveyance, title does not pass to the grantee. Id.; Brownell Realty Inc v
Kelly, 103 Mich App 690, 695-696; 303 NW2d 871 (1981).
Because Edward H. Louis did not have title in Parcel B until December 12, 1995, he had
no interest to convey by way of a quitclaim deed on December 5, 1995. Contrary to plaintiffs’
contentions, neither the doctrine of equitable estoppel nor equitable title changes this long-settled
tenet of property law in Michigan.
Further, in response to plaintiffs’ additional argument, we note that Edward H. Louis’s
1995 conveyance was not made by the estate of Antonette Louis. Edward did not convey Parcel
B to Samuel T. Louis on behalf of Antonette Louis’s estate or in his capacity as executor of the
estate. Rather, he conveyed Parcel B to Samuel T. Louis naming “Edward H. Louis and
Josephine Louis, husband and wife,” as grantors. The deed therefore conveyed the interest
Edward H. Louis and Josephine Louis held, not the interest the Antonette Louis estate held. The
trial court’s grant of summary disposition with regard to Parcel B is affirmed.
We affirm.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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