RODGER G WALTZ V TIMOTHY M STOREY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RODGER G. WALTZ,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
TIMOTHY M. STOREY and MEGAN STOREY,
No. 265145
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 04-018331-NI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Wilder and H. Hood*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Rodger G. Waltz, appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants, Timothy M. Storey and Megan Storey. We affirm.
In October 2003, plaintiff and defendant Timothy Storey were involved in a head-on
automobile collision in Monroe. At the time, plaintiff was 65 years old. He had been receiving
social security disability insurance benefits since October 1989 due to severe scoliosis and
degenerative arthritis of the lumbar spine. Following the 2003 accident, plaintiff complained of
pain in his lower back, knees, and legs. Although plaintiff obtained some relief from epidural
steroid injections, it was only temporary. He did not participate in physical therapy, and he is not
a candidate for surgery. Plaintiff claims that the accident exacerbated or aggravated his existing
condition and pain. Plaintiff also asserts that the pain has restricted him as follows: 1) he
requires a cane to walk and cannot walk long distances; 2) he requires assistance to fully
complete certain household tasks, such as cleaning the floors, laundry, and cooking; 3) he
requires a device to put on his socks and is unable to tie his shoelaces; 4) he no longer hunts or
fishes as often; 5) he no longer shops or visit friends; and 6) he sleeps poorly and can only lay in
one position.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition and in finding
that his injury did not affect his general ability to lead his normal life under Michigan’s no-fault
act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition. Rose v Nat’l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). When
reviewing a decision on a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), “we
consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence
submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Rose,
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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supra at 461. Summary disposition is appropriately granted, “if there is no genuine issue
regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
This appeal concerns the threshold question whether plaintiff suffered a serious
impairment of a body function. Such impairment (1) must be objectively manifested, (2) must
be of an important body function, and (3) must affect the plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal
life. MCL 500.3135(7). It is well documented and objectively manifested that plaintiff has
experienced pain in his lower back, knees, and legs since the accident. We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to plaintiff. Rose, supra at 461. Although the parties dispute whether
the increased pain is caused by the accident or plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions,1 this dispute is
not material to determining whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a body function.
Whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of a body function is therefore a question of
law. MCL 500.3135(2); Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 131-132; 683 NW2d 611 (2004).
Walking is an important body function, Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 343;
612 NW2d 838 (2000), and a medically documented injury to the lower back or leg constitutes
an impairment of an important body function, Kreiner, supra at 136. In determining whether any
difference in the plaintiff’s pre- and post-accident lifestyle affected his general ability to conduct
the course of his life, we consider the following nonexhaustive list of objective factors: “(a) the
nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, (c) the
duration of the impairment, (d) the extent of any residual impairment, and (e) the prognosis for
eventual recovery.” Kreiner, supra at 133 (footnotes omitted). None of these factors is
dispositive; we must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 133-134. We examine
specific activities, being mindful that not all activities have the same significance in one’s overall
life and that minor changes in one’s performance of a certain activity may not change the fact
that he is still generally able to perform the activity. Id. at 131.
Plaintiff suffered significant pain before the accident, and his current impairment is the
aggravation or exacerbation of an existing condition and pain, the extent of which is difficult to
quantify. He received several epidural steroid injections, which provided only temporary relief.
While the preexisting conditions are permanent without a prognosis for recovery, the duration of
any aggravation is difficult to predict, but likely long-term or permanent. However, selfimposed, rather than physician-imposed, restrictions based on pain are not sufficient to establish
residual impairment. Kreiner, supra at 133 n 17; McDanield v Hemker, ___ Mich App ___; ___
NW2d ___ (2005), slip op, p 8. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the restrictions on his
hunting, fishing, shopping, or socializing activities are anything other than self-imposed. In
1990, plaintiff complained to doctors at the coordinated chronic pain program of the University
of Michigan that he was no longer able to hunt or fish because of his back pain. At that time, he
was also walking with a cane and was frustrated with his inability to complete household
activities. He also complained of his inability to sleep well.
1
We note that, regardless of a plaintiff’s preexisting conditions, recovery is permitted if the
plaintiff can show that the accident triggered his symptoms. Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388,
395; 617 NW2d 305 (2000).
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Since the accident, plaintiff was able to go fishing four times and deer hunting once,
although he testified at his deposition that he has discontinued these activities. However, he
admitted that he is still able to hunt small game, drive his own vehicle, cook, clean his apartment
except the floors, do his own grocery shopping, and wash half his laundry. While we
acknowledge that some aspects of plaintiff's entire normal life may be interrupted by the
aggravation or exacerbation of symptoms, we conclude that the course or trajectory of his normal
life has not been affected by these slight changes. Therefore, his general ability to lead his
normal life has not been affected and he does not meet the serious impairment of body function
threshold. Kreiner, supra at 131.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court engaged in fact finding in considering
defendants’ motion for summary disposition, thereby depriving him of his right to a jury trial.
Plaintiff is correct that a trial court may not make findings of fact or determinations of credibility
when deciding a motion for summary disposition. In re Handelsman, 266 Mich App 433, 437;
702 NW2d 641 (2005). However, plaintiff neither identifies any fact finding by the trial court
nor develops this argument in any meaningful way. His failure to properly address the merits of
this assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue. Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich
App 353, 356; 683 NW2d 250 (2004).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Harold Hood
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