J COLLINS INC V CLEANING SOLUTIONS INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
J. COLLINS INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 265124
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 01-011069-CK
CLEANING SOLUTIONS INC.,
Defendant
and
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY INC.
Garnishee/Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellant appeals by right the trial court’s June, 2005, order granting summary
disposition for plaintiff, holding that plaintiff was entitled to garnishment against defendantappellant based on an insurance policy with defendant. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedure
Plaintiff is the manufacturer and wholesale distributor of RHINO All Purpose Cleaners.
The cleaners are marketed to be colorless and odorless. In December, 1998, plaintiff contracted
to have defendant reconstitute a concentrated form of its cleaning product with four parts water,
after which defendant would bottle, label, and package the finished product. In the course of
reconstituting the cleaning solution, defendant added an anti-foaming agent1 to allow for faster
bottling. Along with the anti-foaming agent, defendant added a preservative, gluteraldahyde.
The preservative was intended to prevent the cleaning solution from “fermenting” in the bottles,
because of the addition of anti-foaming agent, and being ruined. The gluteraldahyde, though, did
not have the intended effect because it was substantially diluted by the addition of water to the
1
Referred to in the record as Lubrizol, the trade name.
-1-
concentrate. The end result was spoilage of the cleaning product that had been treated with the
anti-foaming agent. Plaintiff recalled contaminated batches of the cleaning solution, which had
acquired a foul odor and slimy viscosity. In November, 2003, a Consent Judgment against
defendant was entered in favor of plaintiff for $150,000. Pursuant to the order of judgment,
defendant also assigned its rights against defendant-appellant to plaintiff. In December, 2003,
plaintiff requested the trial court issue a writ of non-periodic garnishment against defendantappellant in the amount of $150,000. Defendant-appellant moved for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
The trial court denied defendant-appellant’s motion. The trial court stated its reasons for
the denial as follows:
[T]he building and personal property coverage provisions of the policy issued by
Citizens Insurance Company of America, the garnishee defendant, do apply to
these circumstances. I’m of the opinion that while I’m certain the consequence of
this intentional action was not itself intended, the purposeful action of adding an
ingredient to that property which was entrusted to the . . . defendant company, did
damage the product, which damages were reflected in the judgment which the
court entered into sometime previous.
The trial court then, sua sponte, granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.
Subsequently, the trial court granted defendant-appellant’s motion for reconsideration and
affirmed its original ruling. On appeal, defendant-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
granting summary disposition because defendant’s intentional action of adding the anti-foaming
agent to the cleaning solution were not an “occurrence” as contemplated by the parties to the
policy and that plaintiff’s garnishment action is time-barred by the terms of the policy.2 We
disagree.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Devillers v
Auto Club Ins. Ass'n., 473 Mich 562, 567; 702 NW2d 539 (2005). Additionally, “questions
2
On appeal, defendant-appellant also sought a declaratory judgment from this Court as to the
insurance policy’s applicability under a separate section. Because we affirm the trial court’s
determination, i.e., that the damaged property at issue was covered by the policy’s Building And
Personal Property Coverage Form, defendant-appellant’s request for declaratory relief is moot.
See Michigan Dept. of Education v. Grosse Pointe Public Schools, 266 Mich App 258; 701
NW2d 195 (2005). “A reviewing court will not reach moot issues or declare principles or rules
of law that have no practical effect on the case before it unless the issue is one of public
significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review. This Court can grant declaratory
relief only if there is an actual controversy. Because of the requirement of an actual controversy,
this Court may not decide moot questions in the guise of giving declaratory relief. Id at 266-267.
[Citations omitted.]
-2-
involving the proper interpretation of a contract or the legal effect of a contractual clause are also
reviewed de novo. In ascertaining the meaning of a contract, we give the words used in the
contract their plain and ordinary meaning that would be apparent to a reader of the instrument.”
Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW2d 23 (2005).
B. Meaning of Occurrence
We agree with defendant-appellant that damage to plaintiff’s property is covered by the
policy only if there is an “occurrence” that causes the damage. The policy’s Building And
Personal Property Coverage Form’s §C. LIMITS OF INSURANCE reads: “The most we will
pay for loss or damage in any one occurrence is the applicable Limit of Insurance shown in the
Declarations.” Thus, the parties to the contract agreed that any damage must be caused by an
“occurrence” if the language is to be given its plain meaning. Devillers, supra, at 582. With
such a condition in place, we now turn to the meaning of “occurrence.”
The word “occurrence” does not appear under §H DEFINITIONS of the Building And
Personal Property Coverage Form. The Property Extender Program Endorsement carries two
express modifications to §H DEFINITIONS of the Building And Personal Property Coverage
Form, neither of which applies here. The Causes of Loss – Special Form §F. DEFINITIONS
also does not define “occurrence.”
To define “occurrence,” defendant-appellant offers a definition included in a separate part
of the policy, the Commercial General Liability Part’s “Commercial General Liability Coverage
Form.” The form’s §V3 DEFINITIONS, 13., reads: “‘Occurrence’ means an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”
To support its definition of occurrence and accident, defendant-appellant offers nonbinding authority by analogizing to this Court’s holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v McCarn,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 3, 2000 (Docket No.
213041), rev’d by Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 284; 645 NW2d 20 (2002). In that
case, the insurer sought a declaratory ruling, asking that it not be made to indemnify the insureds,
who were defendants in a wrongful death suit. In McCarn, defendants’ grandson pointed a gun
he believed to be unloaded at his friend and pulled the trigger, killing his friend. This Court
attempted in McCarn to apply our Supreme Court’s reasoning in two similar cases, Nabozny v
Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000) and Frankenmuth Mutual Ins. Co. v Masters,
460 Mich 105; 595 NW2d 832 (1999), and determined that the boy set into motion the sequence
of events by intentionally aiming a gun at his friend’s face and pulling the trigger.
[W]e conclude that Robert's intentional actions created a direct risk of harm that
precludes coverage. The shooting of the gun was caused by Robert's intentional
act. Although Robert did not intend to fire a bullet into Kevin, he did intend to
3
Defendant-appellant uses a different nomenclature in the two parts of the policy, which further
distinguishes them. The Commercial General Liability Coverage Form uses Roman numerals
(here V); whereas the Building And Personal Property Coverage Form uses English letters.
-3-
aim the gun at Kevin's face, to pull back the hammer and to pull the trigger. In
other words, Robert intended to set in motion a dangerous weapon, but with
limited consequences. Although Robert was merely "playing" with the victim or
attempting to frighten him, far greater harm resulted. It is irrelevant whether the
harm that resulted, Kevin's death, was different from or exceeded the harm
intended, scaring him. Robert reasonably should have expected the consequences
of his actions because of the direct risk of harm created by pointing a gun at
another human being and pulling the trigger. Accordingly, we agree with plaintiff
that there can be no coverage because Robert's intentional actions created the
resulting direct risk of harm. McCarn, supra, at 6-7. [Citations omitted.]
In this case, defendant-appellant argues that defendant’s deliberate introduction of the
anti-foaming agent into plaintiff’s cleaner concentrate is similarly not at “accident” because
defendant knew or should have known that the anti-foaming agent would contaminate and ruin
plaintiff’s property. To emphasize this point, defendant-appellant also cites and relies upon, as
did this Court in McCarn, our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Masters, 460 Mich 105, 114; 595
NW2d 832 (1999):
[A]n accident is an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance,
something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated,
and not naturally to be expected.
In Masters, a father and son started a fire in their clothing store with the intention of
causing smoke damage to their inventory for the purpose of collecting casualty insurance. They
lost control of the fire, which damaged several buildings. The court declared that the Masters’
insurer was not obligated to indemnify them against claims brought by other parties who suffered
loss from the fire because their intentional act was not an accident. Specifically, the court stated:
[V]iewed from the standpoint of the Masters, the fire, which was the underlying
event, was caused by the Masters’ intentional act. Also, there is no question that,
in perpetrating the intentional act, the Masters intended to do property damage.
Thus, the Masters’ act cannot be characterized as an “accident,” and there was no
“occurrence” for purposes of coverage under either policy. It is irrelevant
whether the harm that resulted, damage to the clothing store and surrounding
businesses, was different from or exceeded the harm intended, minor damage to
the clothing inventory. Id at 116-117.
Subsequent to our Supreme Court’s decision in Masters, our Supreme Court reversed this
Court’s holding in McCarn. In doing so, and in harmonizing its view with Masters, the court
stated:
[T]he Masters test is not objective. On the contrary, the inquiry is entirely
subjective – did the insured intentionally create a direct risk of harm? In this case,
there was no intentional creation of a direct risk of harm because of the
undisputed evidence that Robert McCarn believed he was pulling the trigger of an
unloaded gun. Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 284; 645 NW2d 20
(2002) [Emphasis original.]
-4-
We find relevant here this distinction between the two cases: In Masters, the father and
son intended to create some risk of harm, if only a little; therefore their acts were not accidental
and their insurer was relieved of liability for the harm they caused. In McCarn, the boy did not
intend to create any risk of harm, not even a little, because he subjectively believed the gun was
not loaded; therefore, his act was accidental and subjected the insurer to liability.
In this case, the affidavit of defendant’s plant supervisor, Thomas Stoutjesdyck, is
instructive. Stoutjesdyck stated that:
[O]n a number of occasions, your Affiant inquired of (defendant’s president)
Ronald Balk the potential impact of the Lubrizol with the cleaning product but
[sic] Ronald Balk rejected any concerns due to the additional inclusion of the
preservative. In discussions between your Affiant and Ronald Balk, Mr. Balk
knew that the final product as constituted per the formula supplied by (plaintiff)
with the inclusion of the Lubrizol could go “bad” without the proper preservative
to off set the fermenting process. Ronald Balk was not concerned as to such side
effects based upon his opinion that the inclusion of the additional preservative
would off set the potential fermentation of the product resulting in the rotten smell
and poor viscosity. [Emphasis added.]
In addition to the affidavit, we note that while defendant-appellant asserts Balk
reasonably should have expected the consequences of adding the anti-foaming agent to the
RHINO concentrate because of his knowledge of the chemicals and processes involved,
defendant-appellant fails to assert that Balk or defendant intended to create any risk of harm,
even if only a little, as in the case of Masters.
Therefore, based upon the affidavit and upon defendant-appellant’s failure to assert
defendant’s intent to create a risk of harm, we find that Balk, who ultimately was in charge of
making the decision for defendant to add the anti-foaming agent, subjectively believed there was
no risk of harm to plaintiff’s product, i.e., defendant did not intend to create any risk of harm by
adding the anti-foaming agent and the preservative. Because defendant subjectively believed he
was creating no risk of harm, his actions were an accident and, as a matter of law, those actions
constitute an occurrence as contemplated by the parties to the policy.
C. Time Bar of Plaintiff’s Garnishment Action
Defendant-appellant asserts on appeal, for the first time in this matter, the affirmative
defense that plaintiff’s garnishment action is time-barred under the terms of the insurance policy.
We note that under MCR 2.111(F)(3)(b), defendant-appellant should have asserted this defense
with its motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) or in its first responsive pleading or it would be
waived. Because this issue was not properly raised before the appeal and presented to the trial
court, we decline to address it.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.