YVONNE HERRINGTON V LIFECARE AMBULANCE SERV
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
YVONNE HERRINGTON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROLAND
HERRINGTON,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
LIFECARE AMBULANCE SERVICE, JOHN
SCOTT, CHRISTINA ROBINSON, MELISSA
SCHALABACH, and DUANE MORAN,
No. 263583
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000021
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s March, 2005, order granting defendant summary
disposition, holding that plaintiff failed to allege defendant emergency medical technicians were
grossly negligent under Michigan’s Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA), MCL 333.20901,
et seq., and thus were barred from recovery. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedure
Plaintiff’s decedent was on a business trip in October, 2000, when, while staying at a
hotel, he suffered an asthma attack. Decedent called the hotel’s front desk, reported that he was
having an asthma attack, and asked for directions to the nearest hospital. Hotel personnel called
911. Upon arrival, the defendant emergency medical technicians (EMTs) treated the decedent
using a nebulizer, 100 percent oxygen in a bag valve mask, Epinephrine, and inserting, first, an
esophageal tracheal double lumen airway tube (combitube) into decedent and, that not working
sufficiently to revive decedent, who had collapsed, inserting an endotracheal tube (ET). During
the course of treatment, decedent was transported to Borgess Hospital where he was pronounced
dead.
The trial court concluded that defendants were entitled to immunity under EMSA and
granted them summary disposition. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in
granting summary disposition because a question of fact exists as to whether defendants were
grossly negligent in their treatment of decedent. We disagree.
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II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.
Grahovac v Munising Twp, 263 Mich App 589, 591; 689 NW2d 498 (2004). When deciding a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), which tests whether a claim is barred because of immunity
granted by law, this Court must take all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them in
favor of the nonmoving party. Id. “If the facts are not in dispute and reasonable minds could not
differ concerning the legal effect of those facts, whether a claim is barred by immunity is a
question for the court to decide as a matter of law.” Id., quoting Poppen v Tovey, 256 Mich App
351, 354; 664 NW2d 269 (2003).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In reviewing a court’s decision
on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must consider the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Morris & Doherty, PC v Lockwood, 259 Mich App 38, 41-42; 672 NW2d
884 (2003). If the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Franchino v Franchino, 263 Mich App 172, 181; 687
NW2d 620 (2004). Where a motion for summary disposition is brought under both MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), but the parties and the trial court relied on matters outside the
pleadings, as is the case here, MCR 2.116(C)(10) is the appropriate basis for review. Driver v
Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 562; 575 NW2d 31 (1997).
B. Statutory Immunity Under EMSA
The purposes of the EMSA are: (1) to provide for the uniform regulation of emergency
medical services and (2) to limit emergency personnel’s exposure to liability. Jennings v
Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 230 (1994). Thus, the EMSA provides:
Unless an act or omission is the result of gross negligence or willful
misconduct, the acts or omissions of a medical first responder, emergency
medical technician, emergency medical technician specialist, paramedic, medical
director of a medical control authority or his or her designee . . . while providing
services to a patient outside a hospital . . . do not impose liability in the treatment
of a patient on those individuals . . . . [MCL 333.20965(1).]
For purposes of the EMSA, gross negligence is defined as “conduct so reckless as to
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Jennings, supra at 136.
Moreover, evidence of ordinary negligence does not create a material question of fact regarding
gross negligence. Maiden, supra at 122-123; Costa v Community Emergency Medical Services,
Inc, 263 Mich App 572, 578; 689 NW2d 712 (2004). Thus, a plaintiff must come forward with
specific facts to show reckless conduct on the part of the defendant. Maiden, supra at 123.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants were grossly negligent because they failed to follow the
written protocol for airway management when they inserted an esophageal tracheal double lumen
airway (combitube) before they attempted to insert an endotracheal tube (ET). However, Dr.
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William Fales, the medical director for emergency medical services for the Kalamazoo County
Medical Control Authority, who helped formulate the regional protocols, testified that the
protocol is a guideline and that paramedics are not expected to follow the procedures set forth in
the protocol in sequential order. Rather, he stated that paramedics are permitted and encouraged
to use professional judgment in determining when it is appropriate to implement a particular
protocol. Moreover, he testified that the protocol does not prohibit paramedics from using the
combitube as the primary airway.
Defendant EMT Scott testified that he chose to use the combitube instead of the ET
because his partner, Duane Moran, was a basic EMT who was not authorized to intubate1
patients, because he could establish an airway more quickly with a combitube, because decedent
had a short, muscular neck, and because decedent’s mouth was clenched. Thus, because the
evidence demonstrates that Scott chose to use the combitube based on his professional judgment
and his assessment of the emergency, we conclude that Scott’s decision to use the combitube
rather than the ET did not constitute “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of
concern for whether an injury results.” Jennings, supra at 136.
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants were grossly negligent in failing to properly place
the combitube a sufficient distance from decedent’s teeth, causing the balloon on the combitube
to rupture, failing to confirm the placement of the combitube by listening for lung and belly
sounds, and failing to properly ventilate decedent during this emergency. However, Dr. Fales
testified that it is not uncommon for a combitube to be punctured by a patient’s teeth. Rather,
according to Dr. Fales, it happens with some frequency. Moreover, Scott testified that he
listened for lung sounds after placing the combitube and that he felt the bag to determine whether
any air was going into decedent’s lungs. Thus, we conclude that plaintiff’s allegations amount,
at most, to ordinary negligence because reasonable minds could not agree that defendants
engaged in “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an
injury results.” Jennings, supra at 136. And, because evidence of ordinary negligence does not
create a material question of fact concerning gross negligence, we hold that the trial court did not
err in granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. Maiden, supra at 122-123; Costa,
supra at 578.
C. Testimony By Plaintiff’s Witnesses
The trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of plaintiff’s expert paramedic, John
Grady, with regard to establishing gross negligence. In reviewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, Grady’s testimony established at most that defendants may have been
negligent in their treatment of decedent. However, Grady’s statement that defendants’ acts or
omissions amounted to gross negligence is not sufficient to create a question of fact as to gross
negligence. As the Supreme Court stated in Maiden:
[The doctor] averred that defendant’s performance was grossly negligent
as defined by statute. However, the witness did not create a question of fact by
1
The act of placing a tube inside a person’s passageway.
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merely opining that defendant’s performance violated the statutory standard.
Whether the statutory standard of care was violated is a legal conclusion. The
opinion of an expert does not extend to legal conclusions. Downie v Kent
Products, Inc, 420 Mich 197, 205; 362 NW2d 605 (1984). [Maiden, supra at 130
n 1.]
We also hold that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of Dr. Tucker
Bierbaum. “A party offering the testimony of an expert witness must demonstrate the witness’
knowledge of the applicable standard of care.” Bahr v Harper-Grace Hospitals, 448 Mich 135,
141; 528 NW2d 170 (1995). An expert familiar with the standard of care in a community may
testify concerning the standard of care in that community even if the expert has not practiced in
the community. Id. A trial court’s decision regarding the qualification of an expert witness is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Because local medical control authorities, which are organized and administered by local
hospitals, govern the statewide emergency medical services system, the applicable standard of
care in this case is a local standard of care. See MCL 333.20918; Denboer v Lakola Medical
Control Authority, 240 Mich App 498, 500-501; 618 NW2d 8 (2000). Plaintiff failed to present
any evidence that Dr. Bierbaum was familiar with the standard of care for Kalamazoo County or
a similar community. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Dr.
Bierbaum was not qualified to testify regarding the local standard of care.
D. Vicarious Liability Of Defendant Ambulance Service
Generally, “a master is responsible for the wrongful acts of his servant committed while
performing some duty within the scope of his employment.” Rogers v J B Hunt Transport, Inc,
466 Mich 645, 651; 649 NW2d 23 (2002). However, because plaintiff failed to produce
evidence of gross negligence on the part of the EMTs, LifeCare Ambulance Service cannot be
held vicariously liable for acts or omissions of its employees when recovery against the
employees is precluded by statute.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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