PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID KEITH RUMPH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 19, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 257354
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-194888-FH
DAVID KEITH RUMPH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of vehicular manslaughter, MCL
750.321, failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in death, MCL 257.617(3), operating
a vehicle while license suspended causing death, MCL 757.904(4), operating a vehicle while
license suspended causing serious impairment, MCL 257.904(5), failure to stop at the scene of a
serious personal injury accident, MCL 257.617, and felonious driving, MCL 257.626c. We
affirm.
It was undisputed at trial that, shortly after 1:00 a.m. on January 25, 2004, a red Dodge
Ram pickup truck, with a snowplow mounted on the front, struck Jeremy Bartle and Stephanie
Hughes on Oakland Avenue in the city of Pontiac. The vehicle was observed traveling
erratically and dangerously before the crash. Witnesses observed only one occupant in the
vehicle. Bartle was killed and Hughes was critically and permanently injured, including the loss
of a limb.
The primary issue at trial was the identity of the driver of the red Dodge Ram pickup
truck. The evidence revealed that Scott Legas owned the pickup truck. Legas and two other
witnesses testified that, sometime before the accident, Legas gave the vehicle keys to defendant
while they were in Lucky’s bar in Pontiac. Defendant thereafter left the group with whom he
had been socializing in the bar. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Legas left Lucky’s bar with three
friends, and he spent the night with one of them. He next saw his vehicle when he returned
home with two of his friends on the afternoon of January 25, 2004. Legas and his friends
observed the pickup truck in Legas’ driveway and noted that the snowplow, hood, and rear
taillight were damaged. The keys were on the floorboard of the truck.
There was also evidence that defendant called his ex-girlfriend at approximately 2:00
a.m. on January 25, 2004, and indicated that he had bad luck and did not know what he was
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going to do. He called the same ex-girlfriend again on the afternoon of January 25, 2004, and
indicated that he had to figure out what to do. Defendant’s ex-girlfriend was suspicious that
defendant may have been involved in the hit and run incident about which she had heard. She
confronted defendant about the incident. He later informed her that he was scrolling through his
cellular telephone numbers and accidentally swerved. He admitted that he “did it.”
Additionally, there was evidence that, on the afternoon of January 25, 2004, Legas and
defendant were overheard having a conversation. Defendant stated that “maybe he hit
something.” Legas testified that, on the same afternoon, defendant offered to have the damage to
Legas’ truck repaired, and defendant commented that he hoped he did not hit anyone with the
truck. When Legas learned that the police were looking for his vehicle, he talked to defendant
about the hit and run incident. Defendant stated, “Don’t worry, you can’t take the hit for this,
you got enough alibis.”
Defendant’s defense was that he was not the driver of the vehicle at the time of the
accident. He relied on the testimony of Darrell Davenport, a witness who called 911 early on the
morning of January 25, 2004, to report a suspected drunk driver on Oakland Avenue. Davenport
testified at trial that, before he called 911, he observed the driver of the vehicle at a stoplight. At
trial, Davenport identified Legas, not defendant, as the driver he observed. Davenport’s
credibility was challenged at trial because he previously attended a lineup and indicated that
participant number four looked like the driver. Participant number four was neither defendant
nor Legas. Moreover, when Davenport telephoned 911, he did not indicate that he could identify
the driver. To the contrary, he indicated that he was trying to get out of the way of the vehicle
and could not even get a license plate number.
I
Defendant first challenges the trial court’s admission of a 911 tape containing several
calls from people, who contacted the police at the approximate time of the hit and run incident.
Defendant argues that, even if this evidence was marginally relevant, it was unfairly prejudicial
and should have been excluded under MRE 403. We review the admission of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. People v Bowman, 254 Mich App 142, 145; 656 NW2d 835 (2002). “[A]
preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless ‘after an examination of the
entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not that the error was
outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Outside the jury’s presence, the trial court heard the 911 tape containing a series of three
telephone calls. The first call was from an anonymous caller, who indicated that he observed a
red Dodge pickup truck with a snowplow on the front heading south on Telegraph. The caller
indicated that the truck was hitting everything in sight and that he had to pull to the side of the
road to allow the truck to pass. The second call was placed by Davenport, who indicated that he
observed a red Dodge pickup with a snowplow on it. Davenport informed the 911 operator that
the driver was “drunk.” Davenport indicated that he could not see the license plate number on
the truck because he was “trying to get the hell out of the way.” Davenport provided the 911
operator with a telephone number and address where he could be reached for further information
if necessary. The final call was from Gretchen and Peter Sans, who were flagged down by an
unidentified woman yelling for help. The Sans stopped at the scene and attempted to aid the
victims and the unidentified woman, who appeared to be in shock. Gretchen informed the
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operator that a red pickup truck had “nailed” the victims and that they were in pieces. She
further indicated that she saw the truck swerving all over the road and that there was a girl in the
middle of the road screaming that the driver had killed people. Gretchen provided information
about the locations of the victims, their appearance when found, and their condition. Peter took
the telephone from Gretchen during the telephone call and continued to talk to the 911 operator
while Gretchen, a registered nurse, assessed the victims. Peter informed the 911 operator that the
hit and run vehicle was a red pickup truck with a snowplow on the front. Peter also informed the
operator that he did not obtain a license plate number on the truck. The trial court found that the
evidence was both relevant and admissible. We agree.
MRE 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence “having any tendency to make the
existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 402 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the United States or Michigan Constitutions, the rules
of evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. MRE 403 prohibits the admission of
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of the cumulative evidence. In the context of MRE 403,
“prejudice means more than simply damage to the opponent’s cause.” People v Vasher, 449
Mich 494, 501; 537 NW2d 168 (1995). It means that evidence has an undue tendency to move
the tribunal to decide on an improper basis such as an emotional basis. Id. Relevant
considerations in determining unfair prejudice include whether the jury will give the evidence
undue or preemptive weight and whether the use of the evidence is inequitable. People v Mills,
450 Mich 61, 75-76; 537 NW2d 909, mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995). Mere prejudice is insufficient
to justify reversal of a conviction. People v Albers, 258 Mich App 578, 591; 672 NW2d 336
(2003).
In this case, the evidence of the 911 telephone calls was relevant for several reasons.
First, all three calls were relevant to the identification of the hit and run vehicle and whether the
vehicle was out of control and appeared to be driven by a drunk driver. It was necessary to
establish that the vehicle involved in the incident was the same vehicle to which defendant had
keys and to establish that the vehicle was being operated in a grossly negligent manner. Second,
the Sans’ telephone call was relevant to show that one victim died at the accident scene and that
one remained alive and suffering while the driver of the pickup truck was not there to render
assistance or provide information. Hughes had no recollection of the accident, and could not
testify about the accident or its aftermath. Third, the evidence of the Sans’ 911 telephone call
was relevant to support the credibility of their trial testimony, which was called into question by
defense counsel on cross-examination before the 911 tape was played. The 911 statements
corroborated their trial testimony about what they saw, heard, and did. Finally, the evidence of
Davenport’s 911 telephone call was relevant to refute his trial testimony that Legas was the
driver of the vehicle. At trial, Davenport testified that he was at a red stoplight while the red
pickup truck was next to him. He claimed that he studied the profile of the driver and that it was
Legas. In his 911 call, Davenport told the operator that he was trying to get out of the way of the
pickup truck and did not even get the vehicle’s license plate number. Davenport made no
statements indicating that he had time to study the driver’s identification.
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The evidence was also not unfairly prejudicial. Even if the 911 calls evoked an
emotional response by describing the erratic manner of the driving of the red truck, the panic of
other drivers on the road, and the conditions of the victims and unidentified witness, they were
not so prejudicial as to require exclusion. Nothing in the record evidences that the 911 calls
would be, or were, given undue or preemptive weight or that the probative value of that evidence
was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the challenged evidence. Furthermore, even if we accepted defendant’s argument that
the evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403, we would not reverse. Upon a review
of the entire cause, it does not appear more probable than not that the admission of the 911 calls
was outcome determinative. See Lukity, supra. They did not establish defendant’s identity as
the perpetrator, which was the primary issue at trial. Moreover, at trial, there was ample
evidence to support defendant’s identity as the driver of the vehicle.
II
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s departure from the applicable sentencing
guidelines range of 50 to 125 months under the legislative guidelines. The trial court articulated
three factors to justify its departure from the sentencing guidelines range when sentencing
defendant for his three convictions related to Bartle’s death. Defendant argues that one of the
factors was improperly considered, and that, where multiple reasons are given for a departure
and one is not a sustainable reason, remand for resentencing is the appropriate remedy.
A departure from the sentencing guidelines range is only allowed if there is a substantial
and compelling reason for the departure. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 255, 272; 666 NW2d
231 (2003). A “substantial and compelling” reason is an objective and verifiable reason that
keenly or irresistibly grabs our attention, is “of considerable worth” in deciding the length of the
sentence, and exists only in exceptional cases. Id. at 257, 272.
[T]he existence or nonexistence of a particular factor is a factual
determination for the sentencing court to determine, and should therefore be
reviewed by an appellate court for clear error. The determination that a particular
factor is objective and verifiable should be reviewed by the appellate court as a
matter of law. A trial court’s determination that the objective and verifiable
factors present in a particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons
to depart from the statutory minimum sentence shall be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. [Id. at 264-265, 273-274.]
Where a trial court articulates multiple “substantial and compelling” reasons for departure, this
Court must determine whether the alternate reasons are substantial and compelling, and if some
are not, it must determine whether the trial court would have departed and would have departed
to the same degree on the basis of the substantial and compelling reasons alone. Id. at 260, 273.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside of the
principled range of outcomes. Id. at 269, 274.
At sentencing, the trial court announced its intention to exceed the guidelines. It then
stated:
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Based on the defendant’s driving record, which is deplorable, he has 27
traffic citations, which six are careless driving and reckless driving. He has
another prior failure to stop at an accident scene. His total OV’s are significantly
higher than the 75 points allowed by the sentencing grid. Therefore, the Court
finds there are substantial and compelling reasons to exceed the guidelines.
Further, his driving record is not accounted for in the guidelines.
The trial court prepared a written sentencing departure evaluation, which stated three reasons for
departing from the sentencing guidelines range:
1) Defendant’s prior deplorable traffic record. This involves 27 prior
suspensions for failure to appear or failure to comply with Court judgment.
Further, Defendant has six prior careless driving and/or reckless driving
convictions. Additionally, Defendant has one prior failure to stop at property
damage accident. In sum, the Defendant has 27 prior traffic citations since 1988,
four of which are for driving while license suspended. This reason is substantial
and compelling, and further, is objective and verifiable. Last, the Defendant’s
prior driving record is not accounted for in [the] sentencing guidelines.
2) Defendant’s total offense variable score grossly exceeds the top level
of the sentencing grid for the underlying offense. Here, sentence guidelines were
calculated for the homicide-manslaughter with motor vehicle charge. The
maximum OV level in the applicable grid is VI, which includes all points above
75 points. Total OVs for this offense are 121 points. There are 46 points that do
not impact the Defendant’s guidelines or sentence. Because the Defendant
substantially exceeded the maximum allowable points in the applicable grid (75),
the Defendant’s offense characteristics are given inadequate weight.
3) The sentencing guidelines do not adequately account for the extent of
the injuries suffered by one of the victims. Defendant was assessed 50 points for
OV #3. This variable accounts for a physical injury to a victim. Although the
instructions to the variable provide for an assignment of 50 points for death to a
victim if the defendant was operating the motor vehicle while impaired, this
guideline does not adequately take into account for the injury sustained to the
second victim of the underlying offense. Here, the second victim sustained
physical injuries, which have greatly reduced her capacity to function in every
day life. She has sustained amputation to the portion of her right leg below her
knee, she is forced to feed by means of feeding tube, she sustained a broken back,
lost a kidney, and broke her pelvis. Further, due to the severe injuries sustained,
she has been unable to care for her two children. The Court finds that the extent
of injuries sustained are objective and verifiable and keenly and irresistibly
attention grabbing. Further, the Court finds that the above facts are inadequately
accounted for in offense variable number 3.
Defendant does not challenge the first and second reasons articulated by the trial court.
He argues only that the third reason articulated by the court was improper to support a departure
from the guidelines. We disagree.
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In calculating the minimum sentence range under the guidelines, the trial court scored
defendant’s most serious offense conviction, manslaughter with a motor vehicle. The offense
variables accounted for the fact that there was a second victim to the offense, MCL 777.39(c),1
but they did not account for the severity of the injuries to that victim. Offense variable (OV) 3,
MCL 777.33, is the variable that takes into consideration physical injury to a victim. It provides
that 50 points are to be scored if a victim was killed and the offense involved the operation of a
vehicle. Offense variable 3 also provides for the scoring of points for injuries less than death.
However, the statute requires the trial court to assess the highest number of points possible.
People v Houston, 473 Mich 399, 402; 702 NW2d 530 (2005). In this case, the highest number
of points that could be scored for OV 3 was 50 points for Bartle’s death. The seriousness of
Hughes’ injuries was not accounted for in scoring OV 3 or in calculating the total offense
variable score. The plain language of OV 3 does not consider a situation where a second victim
is seriously injured by the same acts for which the guidelines are scored. We find no authority to
support defendant’s position that Hughes’ injuries were irrelevant and should have been
disregarded in sentencing defendant for his convictions arising out of Bartle’s death. Hughes’
injuries occurred during the same offense, and the severity of the offense was heightened by the
presence of a second victim with catastrophic injuries. Because the guidelines, as scored, did not
adequately account for Hughes’ injuries, the trial court was permitted to rely on those injuries as
an objective and verifiable, substantial and compelling reason to depart from the minimum
sentence range under the guidelines. See MCL 769.34(3)(b).
We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to
the extent of the departure. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum term of 15 years,
which is an upward departure of four years and seven months from the guidelines range of 50 to
125 months. The articulated reasons support the trial court’s particular departure, and we
conclude that the sentences are proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding
the offense and the offender. See People v Lowery, 258 Mich App 167, 172; 673 NW2d 107
(2003). They are within the principled range of outcomes. See Babcock, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
1
MCL 777.39(c) requires that offense variable (OV) 9 be scored at ten points if there are
between two and nine victims. Defendant was scored ten points for OV 9.
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