PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL FRANCIS WELSH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 17, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 252561
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 03-013348-FH
MICHAEL FRANCIS WELSH,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Jansen and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court “for reconsideration of the
issue whether defendant’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions are supported by
sufficient evidence in light of People v Carlson, 466 Mich 130, 140 (2002), and the applicable
statutory text that requires ‘force or coercion.’ MCL 750.520d(1)(b) and MCL 750.520f(1)(i)(v)[1].” 474 Mich ___ (2005). We again affirm.
Defendant argues, in regard to his two convictions of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(b), the prosecution failed to present any evidence that defendant
used force or coercion. We disagree. This Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508,
515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). This review is undertaken de novo. People v Herndon, 246 Mich
App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
MCL 750.520d(1)(b) provides that “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree if the person engages in sexual penetration with another person . . . and force or
coercion is used to accomplish the sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not
limited to any of the circumstances listed in section 520b(1)(f)(i) to (v).” Pursuant to MCL
750.520b(1)(f), force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, any of the following
circumstances:
1
It appears that the Court meant to cite MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i) to (v) because that is the statute
cited in MCL 750.520d(1)(b). Further, MCL 750.520f(1) does not contain any subdivisions.
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(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of
physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use
force or violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the
present ability to execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate
in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that
the actor has the ability to execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, “to
retaliate” includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of
the victim in a manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as
unethical or unacceptable.
(v) When the actor, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is
able to overcome the victim.
In People v Carlson, 466 Mich 130, 140; 644 NW2d 704 (2002), our Supreme Court
held:
To be sure, the “force” contemplated in MCL 750.520d(1)(b) does not
mean “force” as a matter of mere physics, i.e., the physical interaction that would
be inherent in an act of sexual penetration, nor, as we have observed, does it
follow that the force must be so great as to overcome the complainant. It must be
force to allow the accomplishment of sexual penetration when absent that force
the penetration would not have occurred. In other words, the requisite “force” for
a violation of MCL 750.520d(1)(b) does not encompass nonviolent physical
interaction in a mechanical sense that is merely incidental to an act of sexual
penetration. Rather, the prohibited “force” encompasses the use of force against a
victim to either induce the victim to submit to sexual penetration or to seize
control of the victim in a manner to facilitate the accomplishment of sexual
penetration without regard to the victim’s wishes.
In other words, force cannot be found simply because sexual penetration occurred despite
the fact that some amount of force, generally speaking, is inherent in that act. On the other hand,
the force need not be so great as to overcome the victim. The force must either “induce the
victim to submit to sexual penetration” or allow the defendant to “seize control of the victim in a
manner to facilitate the accomplishment of sexual penetration without regard to the victim’s
wishes.” Id. Nothing in Carlson indicates that the force used must be physically violent.
Indeed, this Court has previously held that force or coercion is not limited to physical violence
but is instead determined in light of all the circumstances. People v Premo, 213 Mich App 406,
410; 540 NW2d 715 (1995); People v Brown, 197 Mich App 448, 450; 495 NW2d 812 (1992).
With regard to the August 2002 incident, the victim and his brother were staying
overnight at defendant’s house. While the victim was sleeping on his stomach, he was awakened
with defendant on top of him. Defendant pulled off the victim’s clothes and anally penetrated
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him. The victim testified that he tried to move away but was “kind of pinned down.” This, at
first blush, appears similar to the facts in Carlson, in which two teenagers kissed and
masturbated in a car precipitating the defendant’s suggestion that they have sexual intercourse.
Carlson, supra at 132. Even after the victim indicated that she did not want to, the defendant got
on top of her and achieved sexual penetration. Id. The victim, however, testified that she did not
resist. Id. When asked how the defendant “got it in,” she stated, “‘He got on top of me and put it
in.’” Id. at 132-133. In Carlson, there was no evidence of any force by which the defendant
came to achieve penetration. This case is distinguishable from Carlson. In this case, defendant
got on top of the victim’s back while he was asleep on his stomach, tore off his clothes, and
penetrated his anus. The victim testified, “I would try to move away. I was kind of pinned down
so I couldn’t really move.” When asked “Did you attempt to get away from [defendant] when he
was doing this to you?”, the victim responded “I tried to.” On the basis of this evidence, we
distinguish this case from Carlson, and conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found
sufficient evidence that defendant used force to achieve anal penetration of the victim.
With regard to the March 2001 incident, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence
of coercion under MCL 750.520d(1)(b). We note that MCL 750.520d(1)(b) uses the disjunctive
term “or” indicating that either force or coercion satisfies the statute. Further, even if
defendant’s conduct did not fall within the purview of the examples enumerated in MCL
750.520b(1)(f)(i) to (v), “the Legislature did not limit the definition of force or coercion to the
enumerated examples in the statute.” Premo, supra at 410. In Premo, the defendant was
convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (force or coercion) for pinching three
students’ buttocks. In affirming the conviction on the basis of coercion, this Court held that
coercion
“may be actual, direct, or positive, as where physical force is used to compel act
against one’s will, or implied, legal or constructive, as where one party is
constrained by subjugation to other to do what his free will would refuse.” [Id. at
410-411, quoting Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed), 234.]
This Court held:
[D]efendant’s actions constituted implied, legal, or constructive coercion because,
as a teacher, defendant was in a position of authority over the student victims and
the incidents occurred on school property.
Defendant’s conduct was
unprofessional, irresponsible, and an abuse of his authority as a teacher.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s conduct in this case is sufficient to
constitute coercion . . . .
Similarly, in this case, the victim was 16 years old at the time of the incident. Defendant,
an adult, was in a position of authority. Defendant himself testified, “I considered myself to be
an uncle” to the victim; he was, in fact, the victim’s cousin’s uncle. Defendant testified that he
knew the victim since he was a “little kid[].” The victim testified that he trusted defendant. The
victim went to defendant’s house “Just about every weekend” and did “a lot of work there” for
which defendant paid him. The victim and his brother occasionally stayed overnight at
defendant’s house. Sometimes, when the boys were at his house, defendant provided them with
alcohol. The victim’s father testified that defendant was considered a member of the family and,
after learning of the incidents, he felt that defendant had abused his family’s sense of trust. The
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victim testified that the charged offense occurred one evening at defendant’s house the day after
the victim’s birthday when defendant had taken a group of boys to a Kid Rock concert and
furnished them with alcohol. The victim testified that, while he was at defendant’s house,
defendant put his mouth on the victim’s penis. The victim did not say anything to defendant at
the time because he was “Just too embarrassed.” As in Premo, defendant was in a position of
authority and the incident occurred at defendant’s home. Defendant’s alleged conduct was
irresponsible and an abuse of his position of authority and trust. Therefore, we conclude that
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant achieved oral sex with the
victim through coercion.
In arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, defendant
points to other evidence that contradicts the victim’s testimony. However, we do not interfere
with the jury's role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People
v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to find that, for both charged offenses, force or coercion
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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