PEOPLE OF MI V DONYELL GERARD JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 258101
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-005339-01
DONYELL GERARD JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Jansen and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions for felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f, and carrying or possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to
commit a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced, as a second habitual offender, MCL
769.10, to two years’ probation for his felon in possession of a firearm conviction, and to five
years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution’s loss of the weapon confiscated from the
scene of the crime denied defendant his right to present a defense. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo a constitutional issue. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 310;
613 NW2d 694 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has held that “unless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51,
58; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). Further, this Court has held that, “[a]bsent the
intentional suppression of evidence or a showing of bad faith, a loss of evidence that occurs
before a defense request for its production does not require reversal.” People v Johnson, 197
Mich App 362, 365; 494 NW2d 873 (1993). “The presence or absence of bad faith by the police
for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” Youngblood, supra at 56
n 1.
Defendant did not introduce any evidence of bad faith on the part of the police. At trial,
Officer Young, the officer in charge of defendant’s case, testified that he did not discover that the
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confiscated gun was missing until the morning of defendant’s trial. He testified that it was
standard procedure to destroy evidence after a case was dismissed,1 and that the property officer
destroyed the confiscated gun because he was unaware that Officer Young had refiled the case
against defendant. Although defendant characterizes the police’s conduct as being “grossly
negligent” in his statement of the issue on appeal, defendant makes no showing of bad faith on
the part of the police or prosecution. Defendant bears the burden of showing bad faith conduct
by the police—that they knew the gun had an exculpatory value to defendant and that they
destroyed it after discovering its exculpatory value. Youngblood, supra at 56 n 1. Because
defendant did not show the police acted in bad faith when they destroyed the gun, his Due
Process rights were not violated. Johnson, supra at 365; Youngblood, supra at 58.
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it
denied his motion to suppress evidence of the confiscated gun. We disagree.
In evaluating a motion to suppress, this Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings for
clear error. People v VanTubbergen, 249 Mich App 354, 359-360; 642 NW2d 368 (2002). “To
the extent that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law
or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.”
People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001).
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963 art 1, § 11.
Generally, a search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless
there exists both probable cause and exigent circumstances establishing an
exception to the warrant requirement. Probable cause to search exists when facts
and circumstances warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the evidence sought will be found in a stated place.
Whether probable cause exists depends on the information known to the officers
at the time of the search. [People v Jordan, 187 Mich App 582, 586-587; 468
NW2d 294 (1991) (internal citations omitted).]
In order for the exigent-circumstance exception to apply, the police must have “probable
cause to believe that an immediate search will produce specific evidence of a crime and that an
immediate search without a warrant is necessary in order to (1) protect the officers or others, (2)
prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, or (3) prevent the escape of an accused.” Id. at 587.
Officer Joubert testified, during the preliminary examination, that on May 22, 2004, she
was working with Officer Garcia when she was called to 14752 Mansfield to respond to a
“Family Trouble, Assault, and Battery.” Officer Joubert further testified that after she was let
into the house by an aunt, she went up the stairwell and observed defendant standing in the
doorway of a bedroom, and a woman standing inside of the bedroom. She observed that he was
holding what appeared to be a handgun. Officer Joubert instructed him to drop whatever he had
1
Defendant’s case was dismissed the first time because the testifying officers were unavailable.
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in his hands and he complied. She then placed him under arrest and confiscated the handgun
from underneath a pile of clothing about one foot from the doorway. From this testimony, the
trial court could have reasonably found that Joubert had probable cause to believe a crime had
occurred, and that the search was necessary to protect herself, others present in the house, and
the destruction of the weapon.
Moreover, at trial, Officer Garcia testified that as he and Officer Joubert approached
defendant’s house, someone’s niece ran out into the driveway, screaming, and asked the officers
to help her aunt. Officer Garcia continued to hear a male and female arguing from the upstairs
portion of the house, and he called for more police vehicles. Officer Joubert heard a woman
crying from the upstairs portion of the house. After entering the house, Officers Garcia and
Joubert both saw defendant holding an object by his side that they thought was a gun. Officer
Garcia testified that he “saw a dark object. You know, a black object, what appeared to be a
handgun. I couldn’t describe it exactly, which model it was or anything. But to me it appeared
to be a handgun.” Officer Joubert testified that the stairway was well lit and that she observed
defendant holding something black in his left hand, which she believed was a handgun.
Officer Garcia drew his weapon because he feared for his life. He ordered defendant to
drop his weapon and to get down to the ground. Officer Joubert also drew her weapon and
ordered defendant to drop whatever he had in his hand. Defendant bent down slightly and threw
the object which appeared to be a weapon into the bedroom where he was previously arguing,
the room to his left. Officers Joubert and Garcia testified that they believed he was holding a
weapon, and they had just heard screaming and arguing coming from inside the room in which
he threw the object they believed to be a weapon.
Officers Joubert and Garcia went to defendant’s house in response to a domestic violence
call. Upon seeing defendant, Officer Joubert thought he had a weapon in his hand, and she saw
defendant throw the object into a room where she heard screaming and crying. As such, Officer
Joubert had probable cause to believe that an immediate search of the room would produce the
gun, meeting the first prong of the exigent circumstances warrant exception. The fact that
Officer Joubert heard screaming from the room also supports the finding that the search was
necessary to protect herself and others. The number of people in the bedroom was unknown
when Officer Joubert opened the door to look for what she believed was a weapon. The search
also prevented the potential loss of evidence of the crimes defendant had committed. Officer
Joubert acted to protect herself and others from what she believed was an unsecured weapon.
Thus, the warrantless search did not violate defendant’s constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures because it met the exigent circumstance requirement.
Jordan, supra at 587. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Finally, defendant claims his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because
his trial counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss based on delay of arrest. We disagree.
To preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must raise a
motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing. People v Westman, 262 Mich App 184, 192;
685 NW2d 423 (2004). Defendant did not make a motion for a new trial or an evidentiary
hearing. When reviewing an unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, where an
evidentiary hearing is not previously held, this Court’s review is limited to the facts contained on
the record. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). As a matter of
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constitutional law, this Court reviews the record de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579;
640 NW2d 246 (2002).
The Michigan Supreme Court rearticulated the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel in People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). The Court adopted
the two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466
US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). “First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland,
supra at 687. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's
performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at 690. “Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Because the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice, the defendant necessarily
bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim. See People v Hoag, 460
Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
On appeal, defendant argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because of his
failure to file a motion to dismiss based on the delay between the date of the incident, May 23,
2003, and the date the arrest warrant was issued, July 21, 2003. In order to determine whether a
defendant’s Due Process rights were violated by a delay in arrest, the defendant must first show
“some prejudice” because of the delay. People v Bisard, 114 Mich App 784, 786; 319 NW2d
670 (1982). “Once a defendant has shown that some prejudice has occurred as a result of a
delay, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show (1) an explanation for the delay, (2) that the
delay was not deliberate, and (3) that no undue prejudice attached to the defendant.” Id. at 786787.
Here, defendant has not demonstrated how he was in any way prejudiced by the delay.
The lower court file does not indicate, nor does defendant suggest on appeal, that he ever
requested that the gun be tested for fingerprints or any other sort of identification analysis.
Defendant asserts that the fact that key evidence was lost prejudiced defendant, however, the
destruction of the weapon actually may have benefited defendant because no physical evidence
was produced at trial.
Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss based
on delay in arrest was an error “so serious that counsel was not performing as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,” especially being mindful of the strong presumption that
counsel's performance constituted sound trial strategy. Strickland, supra at 687, 690.
Defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress based on illegal search and seizure, he crossexamined witnesses, and brought a motion for a directed verdict which was successful regarding
one of the three counts against defendant. Defendant does not rebut the presumption that his trial
counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss based on delay was sound trial strategy. Thus, his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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