CAMILLE REGISTER V WILLIE SLEDGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CAMILLE REGISTER,
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 256360
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-049087-NO
WILLIE SLEDGE and RYAN SLEDGE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Borrello and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition in this residual bodily injury claim. Because plaintiff has failed to raise a justiciable
question of fact that her injuries are objectively manifested, we affirm.
Plaintiff asserts that she presented evidence that the aggravation of her preexisting
injuries met the threshold requirement of a serious impairment of body function. The presented
claim arises out of a minor rear-end collision motor vehicle accident occurring on June 9, 2000.
In 1999, plaintiff suffered a slip and fall accident on the premises of her employer that resulted in
separate litigation for her injuries. As a result of the 1999 slip and fall accident, plaintiff was
injured and treated for the same injuries that she now claims were aggravated. Approximately
seven weeks before her automobile accident, her reported injuries essentially consisted of head,
neck, and back injuries, pain in the affected areas, radiculopathy, hip pain, temporomadibular
joint syndrome (TMJ), cognitive deficits, dizziness, ringing in her ears constantly, light flashes,
and blurred vision. Plaintiff had not returned to work since her 1999 fall. She provided graphic
descriptions of her ailments and claims that she sleeps all day, does not want to do anything, it
takes her a long time to complete a task, she is forgetful, lost and confused at times, and does not
have feelings of care or concern for anyone. Against this backdrop of reported physical and
emotional disability, plaintiff claims an aggravation of her preexisting conditions caused by the
automobile accident.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Dressel
v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Corley v Detroit Bd of
Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). When reviewing a motion for summary
disposition, this Court considers the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other
documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A
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motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted when there is no genuine issue
of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v
Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 246; 631 NW2d 760 (2001). When the burden of proof at trial
would rest on the nonmoving party, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials
in the pleadings, but must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996); Karbel v Comerica Bank, 247 Mich App 90, 96-97; 635 NW2d 69 (2001). A genuine
issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the
opposing party, leaves open an issue on which reasonable minds could differ. West v Gen
Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
Under the no-fault act, “[a] person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss
caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person
has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.”
MCL 500.3135(1). A serious impairment of body function is defined as “an objectively
manifested impairment of an important body function that affects a person’s general ability to
lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7).
In determining whether a plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function, the
trial court must consider the following: (1) whether an important body function of plaintiff has
been impaired; (2) whether the impairment is objectively manifested; and (3) whether the
impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. Kreiner v Fischer,
471 Mich 109, 132-133; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). A plaintiff does not satisfy the first prong of the
serious impairment test if an unimportant body function is impaired or if an important body
function has been injured but not impaired. Id. at 132. Further, “for an impairment to be
objectively manifested, there must be a medically identifiable injury or condition that has a
physical basis.” Jackson v Nelson, 252 Mich App 643, 653; 654 NW2d 604 (2002), quoting with
express approval SJI2d 36.11.
While we agree with plaintiff that MCL 500.3135 does not preclude a claim based on
aggravation of preexisting injuries, Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388, 395-397; 617 NW2d 305
(2000) (holding that a plaintiff may recover under MCL 500.3135 if the trauma caused by the
accident triggered symptoms from the preexisting condition), for such a claim to be successful
under the no-fault act, plaintiff must show that there is a causal connection between the accident
and the aggravation of the preexisting injuries and that the resultant injuries meet the threshold
requirements. Therefore, the resultant injuries, preexisting and aggravation injuries or sequelae
combined, must constitute an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function
that affects her general ability to lead her normal life.
In response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition plaintiff presented no
reported or diagnostic evidence to support her claim that the auto accident aggravated her
preexisting injuries. A close review of the supporting documentation belies the claim. Plaintiff
provides the emergency room report from her visit following the accident. She reports neck pain
and advises the physician of her preexisting head injury from a fall at work. The physical
examination is remarkable for the absence of complaints on testing and findings. Routine
imaging was unremarkable and she was discharged with a diagnosis of cervical strain. Attached
to plaintiff’s answer to defendants’ motion were three preprinted fill in the blank affidavits each
consisting of eight relatively identical conclusory statements. None of the statements described
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or indicated the asserted aggravation of preexisting conditions. Finally, plaintiff provides some
reports from her treating neurologist, Dr. Bharat Tolia to supplement his affidavit. The first
report supplied is the initial report of April 19, 2001 to plaintiff’s treating and referring
physician, Dr. Del Charbonier.
Dr. Tolia’s report documents plaintiff’s pre-accident
symptomology, her current symptoms, and her course of treatment. He provides historical
reference and describes her 1999 slip and fall incident. He also documents the instant
automobile accident relating an exacerbation of symptoms. He then conducts his physical and
neurological examinations. All of his testing demonstrated normal findings with the exception of
subjective tenderness and limitations on range of motion testing relative to the cervical and
lumbar spine. He concludes that the plaintiff is “Status post-slip-and fall (on wet floor at work),
Secondary head, neck, and low back injury, Post-traumatic headaches now, Cervical
flexion/extension injury with secondary pain and cervical radiculopathy, Post-traumatic
lumbosacral pain and lumbar radiculopathy, and Post-traumatic cognitive deficits.” He neither
identified an aggravation of preexisting conditions, nor identified automobile accident
conditions. He recommended further electronic diagnostic testing, four modalities in total, and
all of which were of normal findings. On each of the four subsequent reports as provided by
plaintiff, Dr. Tolia refers to plaintiff’s diagnosis as, “s/p (status-post) slip and fall.” The
automobile accident is never referenced again.
While plaintiff provided affidavits from her treating physicians to support her claims, that
the aggravation of her preexisting injuries were both objectively manifested and causally
connected to the auto accident, the trial court correctly noted the evidence was insufficient to
meet her burden. The affidavits from her treating physicians were conclusory at best, the reports
were based solely on plaintiff’s subjective complaints, neurological testing, objective physical
testing, and all electrodiagnostic testing were normal, and no objective medically identifiable
condition was revealed. Plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of material fact that her
medical status constituted an objectively manifested impairment caused in part by the automobile
accident. See Quinto, supra at 371-372 (finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden as
the party opposing summary disposition because the affidavit submitted to rebut defendant’s
evidence was conclusory and devoid of any factual details). Similarly, the statement by Dr.
Bharat Tolia that plaintiff’s symptoms were exacerbated by the auto accident was not enough to
establish that plaintiff’s preexisting injuries were aggravated by the automobile accident because
he does not explain how he reached that conclusion. Nor does Dr. Tolia explain what symptoms
were exacerbated, how, or to what extent. Even when viewing this evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s impairment was objectively manifested.
However, even if the aggravation of plaintiff’s preexisting injuries was objectively
manifested, we would still conclude that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition was
appropriate in this case because plaintiff failed to show that any such aggravation affected her
general ability to lead her normal life.
Under Kreiner, if a plaintiff can show that an important body function has been impaired,
and that the impairment is objectively manifested, the trial court must then determine if the
impairment affected the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. Kreiner, supra at
132. To determine whether a person is generally able to lead his or her normal life, the court
must consider whether the objectively manifested impairment has affected the course of the
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plaintiff’s life. Id., at 130-131. It must examine how, to what extent, and for how long the
plaintiff’s life has been affected by the impairment, looking at plaintiff’s life both pre- and postaccident. Id., at 133. In addition, it may consider such factors as the nature and extent of the
impairment, the type and length of treatment required, the duration of the impairment, the extent
of any residual impairment, and the prognosis for eventual recovery. Id., at 133-134. However,
self-imposed restrictions do not establish that an injury has affected a person’s ability to lead her
normal life. Id., at 133 n 17. And “[a] negative effect on a particular aspect of an injured
person’s life is not sufficient in itself to meet the tort threshold, as long as the injured person is
still generally able to lead his normal life.” Id., at 137.
We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s
aggravation of her preexisting injuries has affected her general ability to lead her normal life.
Although plaintiff testified that after the automobile accident, her symptoms increased – the
ringing in her ears got louder, her vision got worse, the stabbing pains in her legs and back got
worse, and her seizures became uncontrollable, she neither supported her testimony with medical
evidence, nor, does she explain how this increase in symptoms affected her general ability to led
her life in any way that is different from how she led her life before the automobile accident.
Plaintiff does not present any evidence that the increase in symptoms has affected the overall
course of her life. She does not refer this Court to any activities that she was able to do prior to
the automobile accident that she is now unable to participate. And while plaintiff claims that her
ability to sleep and to exist without pain have been affected by the aggravation of her preexisting
injuries, she presents no medical evidence of sleeplessness post-accident, and does not explain
how her ability to exist without pain is affected when she was already suffering by her own
account from substantial pain before the this accident occurred.
After Kreiner, it is not enough for plaintiff to show that the aggravation of her preexisting
injuries had some effect on her life. Rather, she must show that her resultant injuries as
aggravated affected the overall course of her life. See e.g. Kreiner, supra at 130-131. “A
negative effect on a particular aspect of an injured person’s life is not sufficient in itself to meet
the tort threshold, as long as the injured person is still generally able to lead his normal life.” Id.,
at 137. Here, because the evidence presented by plaintiff reflects that she is leading essentially
the same lifestyle as before the auto accident, plaintiff does not meet the threshold for a serious
impairment of body function.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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