IN RE BODA/CROWE/EVANS MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SARAH NICOLE EVANS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 10, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 263760
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-373837-NA
JAMES ROME EVANS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CAROL LYNN BODA, TIMOTHY LEE DAVIS,
and BRIAN DALE CROWE,
Respondents.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and (g). We affirm. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory grounds for termination
of parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Respondent-appellant was incarcerated at
the time Sarah became a temporary court ward. Upon his release from prison, he visited Sarah
only four times and did not meet with the caseworker to discuss his parent agency agreement.
Mail sent to his address was returned as unclaimed. Respondent-appellant was again
incarcerated during this proceeding, and the evidence showed that his earliest release date was 14
months after termination and his latest release date was more than 20 years later.
The trial court did not merely paint respondent-appellant with the broad brush of
noncompliance, which it attributed to the other respondents in this case, as respondent-appellant
-1-
argues, but made definite and specific findings relating respondent-appellant’s incarceration to
termination of his parental rights. The evidence showed that respondent-appellant had not
provided proper care or custody for Sarah in the past because he had been incarcerated and left
her in the neglectful and abusive care of her mother, had not rectified the conditions of
incarceration and habitual criminality, would not be able to provide care and support for Sarah
for a minimum of 14 more months because of his incarceration, had not complied with services
while free in the community, and would not likely comply with services once released.
Respondent-appellant’s uncertain release date, and his lack of performance during the time he
was not incarcerated, demonstrated that there was no reasonable likelihood that he would rectify
the conditions of adjudication or be able to provide proper care or custody for Sarah within a
reasonable time.
Respondent-appellant asserts three additional instances in which the trial court made
erroneous findings, none of which has merit. First, the trial court’s finding that respondentappellant was offered a parent agency agreement but was incarcerated and unable to comply was
not erroneous. A parent agency agreement was prepared for respondent-appellant but not handdelivered and was returned by mail as unclaimed. Respondent-appellant made no effort to meet
with the caseworker to discuss what he must do to regain custody of Sarah. His incarceration
made delivery or non-delivery of the parent agency agreement a moot point because he was
unable to comply with its provisions. Second, the trial court’s finding that respondent-appellant
was present by speakerphone at hearings was supported by the record. Third, although
respondent-appellant was addressed by different names once or twice during this proceeding, he
was correctly named in court documents, including the termination order, thus rendering the
infrequent use of a different name inconsequential.
Additionally, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s
parental rights was clearly not in Sarah’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Sarah was a temporary court ward from ages 15 to
25 months and again from ages five to seven years. She knew respondent-appellant as her father
but strongly desired to be adopted by her foster family. There was no reasonable likelihood that
respondent-appellant would be able to provide Sarah with a stable home within a reasonable
time. No evidence showed that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was clearly
contrary to Sarah’s best interests, and the trial court did not err in finding that it was mandated to
terminate respondent-appellant’s parental rights once the statutory grounds for termination were
established.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
