CHRISTOPHER HARWOOD V STATE FARM MUT AUTO INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTOPHER HARWOOD,
UNPUBLISHED
January 10, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 263500
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-433378-CK
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CLYDE ANTHONY OWENS,
Defendant.
Before: White, P.J., and Jansen and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals of right from a trial court opinion and order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,1 with
regard to plaintiff’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits. We affirm.
I
On November 20, 2001, plaintiff, a Detroit Police Officer, initiated a traffic stop when he
witnessed Clyde Anthony Owens disregarding a red traffic signal. Upon being asked to exit the
vehicle, Owens grabbed plaintiff’s arm, accelerated his vehicle, and pulled plaintiff down the
road. Owens was uninsured at the time. Plaintiff was injured and sought recovery of uninsured
motorist benefits under his policy with defendant. Defendant refused to pay on the basis that
plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the policy.
1
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company named Clyde Anthony Owens as a nonparty at fault. Owens is not a party to this appeal, thus, the use of the term defendant, in this
opinion, refers solely to State Farm.
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On October 27, 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint, and alleged breach of contract because
defendant refused to pay plaintiff uninsured motorist benefits. Subsequently, defendant filed a
motion for summary disposition, and argued that the claim is barred pursuant to the terms of the
policy because: (1) plaintiff failed to name Owens as a party; (2) plaintiff received worker’s
compensation benefits and disability benefits from the city of Detroit; (3) under the terms of the
policy a cause of action against defendant was prohibited until thirty days after defendant
received insured’s notice of filing the lawsuit, and plaintiff failed to provide notice until the
lawsuit was filed; (4) under the terms of the policy plaintiff cannot seek benefits for a loss that
was incurred more than one year before the action was brought and the action was not brought
until three years after the accident; (5) the “fireman’s rule,”2; and (6) plaintiff has sustained no
permanent serious disfigurement.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint adding Owens to the complaint.
Plaintiff also filed a brief in response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition and argued
that: (1) he complied with the terms of the agreement; (2) as a matter of law plaintiff’s workers’
compensation carrier is not entitled to reimbursement from defendant’s payment of plaintiff’s
uninsured motorist claim; (3) the claim is timely; (4) plaintiff’s wife provided defendant with
notice of the collision and claim for uninsured motorist benefits in the summer of 2004, which is
more than thirty days prior to the commencement of the action; (5) plaintiff’s claim is not barred
by the “fireman’s rule”; and (6) plaintiff has sustained a serious permanent disfigurement.
After a hearing and further briefing, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding that plaintiff did not provide defendant with
written notice thirty days prior to the initiation of the lawsuit. The trial court also denied
defendant’s motion to amend his complaint as moot.
II
Plaintiff’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. We disagree.
We review de novo the grant or denial of summary disposition to determine if the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
2
Before the Legislature enacted the statutory "firefighters' rule" pursuant to 1998 PA 389,
Michigan recognized the common-law "fireman's rule," which precluded a firefighter or police
officer from recovering damages from a private party for negligence that required the safety
officer's assistance at the scene. See Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co, 429 Mich
347, 367-368; 415 NW2d 178 (1987). The firefighters' rule generally waives the duty of care
that third parties owe safety officers. Roberts v Vaughn, 459 Mich 282, 285; 587 NW2d 249
(1998). Michigan courts recognized several exceptions to this rule. Harris-Fields v Syze, 461
Mich 188, 191-192; 600 NW2d 611 (1999). The Legislature abolished the common-law
firefighters' rule, however, when it enacted 1998 PA 389. The statute replaced the common-law
rule with a statutory scheme that generally incorporated the common-law exceptions, but
expanded the circumstances under which a safety officer could recover for damages sustained
while on duty beyond the narrow, common-law rule. See MCL 600.2965 to MCL 600.2967.
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NW2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
sufficiency of the complaint. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342
(2004). When deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court must consider the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A motion for summary disposition based on the lack of a
material factual dispute must be supported by documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b);
Scalise v Boy Scouts of America, 265 Mich App 1, 10; 692 NW2d 858 (2005). The moving party
must specifically identify the matters which have no disputed factual issues, MCR 2.116(G)(4);
Maiden, supra at 120; Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 140; 694 NW2d 65 (2005), and has the
initial burden of supporting his position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence, Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
The party opposing the motion then has the burden of showing by evidentiary materials that a
genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Id.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition finding that plaintiff
failed to provide defendant with written notice of the accident or loss thirty days prior to filing
his complaint. Defendant contends, on appeal, that plaintiff was provided actual notice, thus,
summary disposition was not proper.
In Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 465-466; 703 NW2d 23 (2005), our
Supreme Court provided the following with regard to uninsured motorist insurance:
Uninsured motorist insurance permits an injured motorist to obtain coverage from
his own insurance company to the extent that a third-party claim would be
permitted against the uninsured at-fault driver. Uninsured motorist coverage is
optional--it is not compulsory coverage mandated by the no-fault act.
Accordingly, the rights and limitations of such coverage are purely contractual
and are construed without reference to the no-fault act. [Footnotes omitted.]
Defendant denied plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with the terms of the contract.
One basis for the denial was plaintiff’s failure to provide defendant with written notification of
the accident or loss thirty days prior to bringing an action against defendant. Defendant claims,
and plaintiff does not seem to dispute, that the first written notice was a letter from plaintiff’s
attorney to defendant dated October 1, 2004. The complaint was filed on October 27, 2004.
Plaintiff argues that defendant was on notice and submitted an affidavit supporting that
plaintiff’s wife called and notified the insurance company more than thirty days prior to the
complaint being filed.
We disagree with plaintiff as the policy unambiguously requires written notice of the
accident or loss, and provides that plaintiff has no right of action against defendant until thirty
days after providing this written notice. With regard to notice for an accident or loss, the policy
provides:
The insured must give us or one of our agents written notice of the accident or
loss as soon as reasonable possible. The notice must give us:
a. your name; and
-3-
b. the names and addresses of all the persons involved; and
c. the hour, date, place and facts of the accident or loss; and
d. the names and addresses of witnesses.
This provision unambiguously requires written notification of accident or loss and requires
specific information. The policy further provides, with regard to suits against defendant, that:
There is no right of action against us:
***
c. under uninsured motor vehicle, any physical damage, death, dismemberment
and loss of sight coverages, until 30 days after we get insured’s notice of accident
or loss.
This provision unambiguously requires that the notice described above be received more than
thirty days prior the initiation of an action against defendant.
"Insurance polices are subject to the same contract construction principles that apply to
any other species of contract." Rory, supra at 461 (emphasis in original). "'The primary goal in
the construction or interpretation of a contract is to honor the intent of the parties[.]" Klapp v
United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 473; 663 NW2d 447 (2003), quoting Rasheed v
Chrysler Corp, 445 Mich 109, 127 n 28; 517 NW2d 19 (1994). "The language of the parties'
contract is the best way to determine what the parties intended." Klapp, supra at 476. The
contractual language is to be given its ordinary and plain meaning. Hall v Equitable Life Assur
Soc of US, 295 Mich 404, 408; 295 NW 204 (1940). An insurance contract must be construed
so as to give effect to every word, clause, and phrase, and a construction should be avoided that
would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory. Klapp, supra at 467. "Unless a
contract provision violates law or one of the traditional [contract] defenses to the enforceability
of a contract applies, a court must construe and apply unambiguous contract provisions as
written." Rory, supra at 461. "The judiciary is without authority to modify unambiguous
contracts or rebalance the contractual equities struck by the contracting parties because
fundamental principles of contract law preclude such subjective post hoc judicial determinations
of 'reasonableness' as a basis upon which courts may refuse to enforce unambiguous contractual
provisions." Id. A provision in a contract is ambiguous if it irreconcilably conflicts with another
provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning. Mayor of the City of
Lansing v Public Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 165 n 6, 166; 680 NW2d 840 (2004).
Plaintiff clearly did not comply with the unambiguous language of the contract. Even
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, his submissions only support verbal notice, not
written, thus, summary disposition was properly granted in this regard.
Plaintiff also argues that, even if he failed to provide the required notice, his claim should
not be barred because defendant suffered no prejudice. We again disagree.
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Plaintiff cites to Koski v Allstate Ins Co, 456 Mich 439, 444; 572 NW2d 636 (1998), in
support of his contention that defendant must show prejudice. In Koski our Supreme Court
provided that “it is a well-established principle that an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility
on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice
immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position.” In the
present case, the time frame was thirty days prior to filing a lawsuit, which was not an issue with
respect to immediate notice or a reasonable time. The question in this case was with regard to
unambiguous language and an unambiguous thirty day period. We are required to construe and
apply unambiguous contract provisions as written, and pursuant to the same contract
construction principles that apply to other species of contract. Rory, supra at 461. Lack of
prejudice is not a traditional defense to the enforceability of a contract. For these reasons, we
find, on review de novo, that summary disposition was properly granted in favor of defendant.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for leave to file a
first amended complaint. We disagree as the amendment would have been futile.
This Court will not reverse a trial court's decision on a motion to amend a complaint
absent an abuse of discretion that results in injustice. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 393;
541 NW2d 566 (1995). MCR 2.118(A)(2) states: "Except as provided in subrule (A)(1), a party
may amend a pleading only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party.
Leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Further, our Supreme Court has provided
that:
A motion to amend ordinarily should be granted, and denied only for
particularized reasons:
"In the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the
leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.'" [Ben P Fyke & Sons,
Inc v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649, 656; 213 NW2d 134 (1973), quoting Foman v
Davis, 371 US 178, 182; 83 S Ct 227; 9 L Ed 2d 222 (1962).]
"On a motion to amend, a court should ignore the substantive merits of a claim or defense unless
it is legally insufficient on its face and, thus, . . . it would be 'futile' to allow the amendment."
Fyke, supra at 660. Where a plaintiff merely restates or slightly elaborates on counts or
allegations already pleaded, an amendment is futile. Dowerk v Oxford Charter Twp, 233 Mich
App 62, 76; 592 NW2d 724 (1998).
Because plaintiff’s amended complaint does not change the fact that plaintiff did not
provide notice as required by the policy, plaintiff’s amended complaint would have been futile.
Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to
amend.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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