PEOPLE OF MI V JACOB JAMES NANCE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 257266
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-195113-FH
JACOB JAMES NANCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Talbot and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, MCL
750.321, and sentenced to 12-1/2 to 30 years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s conviction arises from the beating death of Steve Pomorski. On January 4,
2004, at approximately 2:30 a.m., several people left the Overtyme bar in Waterford and
proceeded to the nearby home of Scott Moore to continue drinking and socializing. Amy
Motherman1 attended the party with two of her uncles and Angie Davison. Motherman testified
that there was a crowd at Moore’s house. Guests were consuming alcohol, and some were
openly using cocaine. Motherman met the victim outside of Moore’s house and talked to him for
a period of time before giving him her telephone number.
During the party, the victim engaged in a verbal altercation with defendant. Steven Ball,
one of Motherman’s uncles, subsequently overheard defendant indicating that he wanted to
“kick” the victim’s “ass.” At trial, defendant admitted that he argued with the victim at the party.
Their argument began when defendant changed the music on a CD player. There was tension at
the party after that time, and some of the guests left.
Motherman and Davison left the party at one point and went to a nearby restaurant.
When they returned, the party was nearing its end. The victim was still present, but defendant
had left. Davison, who was very intoxicated, wanted to see defendant. She telephoned him and
asked him to return to Moore’s house. Defendant, accompanied by Ross Oliver, did so.
1
Amy’s name is cited as both Motherman and Smotherman in the transcripts. When asked to
spell her last name at trial, she spelled it as Motherman.
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Motherman was upset by this. She wanted to go home and take Davison with her. Motherman
and Oliver argued about her desire to leave with Davison, and defendant joined the argument.
He called Motherman derogatory terms, prompting her to leave Moore’s house alone and return
to the car.
The victim approached Motherman outside and wanted to get into the car with her. She
refused to allow him to do so. She then began backing out of Moore’s driveway. At that point,
Davison ran out of the house and came to the car. Defendant and Oliver exited the house after
Davison. As they walked away from the house, they came upon the victim standing outside.
From the car, Motherman observed the victim’s mouth moving while he stood near defendant.
Motherman then saw defendant strike the victim in the left eye. The blow appeared very hard.
The victim fell over, hitting the back of his head on the pavement. Motherman testified that,
before defendant struck the victim, the victim did not move any part of his body. He did not
swing his arms at defendant or act as if he planned to hit him. After defendant struck the victim,
he and Oliver drove quickly away.
The victim died four days later at Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital. Defendant’s punch
caused fractures to the bones forming the victim’s left eye socket. While those injuries were not
fatal, the victim’s fall to the ground caused a linear fracture to his skull, which in turn caused
dramatic brain swelling. The impact actually shoved the victim’s brain stem through the opening
at the bottom of his skull. The victim was found to have an extraordinarily high blood alcohol
content after his injury, and cocaine was detected in his urine. Neither condition, however,
contributed to the manner, mechanism, or cause of his death.
Defendant claimed self-defense, arguing that the victim swung at him first, that he did not
intend to kill the victim, and that he just wanted to prevent the victim from harming him first.
The jury convicted defendant as charged.
I
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s misconduct deprived him of a fair and impartial
trial. The alleged claims of prosecutorial misconduct are not preserved because objections to the
challenged conduct were not made at trial. We review the claims for plain error. People v
Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
752-753, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be
met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3)
and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally
requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings. “It is the defendant rather than the Government who
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Finally, once a
defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the
plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant
or when an error “‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” [Carines,
supra at 763 (citations omitted).]
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No error requiring reversal will be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s conduct
could have been cured by a timely instruction. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629
NW2d 411 (2001).
Defendant first claims that the prosecutor violated hearsay rules and acted unfairly when
he both introduced an out-of-court statement at trial and argued that the statement was proof of
guilt. At trial, defendant called his friend Jason Blevins to testify that defendant was intoxicated
at the party but was getting along with everyone. Blevins further testified that defendant’s
demeanor did not change after his verbal altercation with the victim. On cross-examination, the
prosecutor challenged Blevins’ direct examination testimony regarding defendant’s demeanor at
the party. The prosecutor questioned Blevins about whether he had previously informed the
prosecutor that defendant was angry after his confrontation with the victim. Blevins denied that
he previously told the prosecutor that defendant was angry after arguing with the victim. The
cross-examination about Blevins’ prior statement to the prosecutor subsequently evolved into the
following dialogue:
Q. And you said that you and Joe said to let it [the argument] go, right?
A. Yes.
Q. To let it go?
A. Yes.
Q. Because he [defendant] was hanging on to it, wasn’t it [sic]?
A. Probably just to let it go, leave it alone.
Q. Listen to my question. You said to let it go because he was hanging on to it,
right?
A. As far as hanging on to what, what do you mean?
Q. That he, his altercation with Steve Pomorski?
A. When he came up and said he was having an altercation we said, just let it go.
We’re at a party we’re having a good time.
Q. Because he was hanging on to the fact that he had had an altercation, right, it
was bugging him, right?
A. Oh, if you want to say that, yes, I guess.
Q. He was angry, right?
A. Not like you’re trying to make it out to be, no.
Q. I’m just using the word angry, that’s all I’m saying. He was angry, right?
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A. Okay, then, he was angry, not like that, though.
Q. Not like what?
A. Just all he said was they were having an altercation. It wasn’t like he come up
and he was, screaming at us or nothing about it.
Q. But he didn’t like the fact that this guy was bugging him, did he?
A. Of course not, no.
Q. That’s why he came up to you and Joe, wasn’t it?
A. You could say that, yes.
Q. And the fact was that you were kind of concerned that something was going to
happen weren’t you?
A. Well, not really.
Blevins subsequently admitted that he had previously told the prosecutor that there was tension
at the party.
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Blevins had admitted that defendant
was angry because the victim bothered him. The prosecutor argued to the jury that it had taken
Blevins several minutes at trial to admit that defendant was angry. On rebuttal, the prosecutor
additionally argued that Blevins had testified that there was tension at the party.
Prior inconsistent statements are not hearsay because they are not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. People v Hallaway, 389 Mich 265, 275-276; 205 NW2d 451 (1973).
They are offered to prove that the inconsistent statement was made for the purpose of
impeaching contrary testimony from the witness stand. Evidence of a witness’ prior inconsistent
statement may be admitted to impeach that witness. People v Kilbourn, 454 Mich 677, 683; 563
NW2d 669 (1997). In this case, Blevins testified on direct examination that defendant was
getting along with everyone and that his demeanor did not change after his verbal encounter with
the victim. The prosecutor questioned Blevins about his alleged prior statement to cast doubt on
his direct examination testimony. Blevins denied making a prior inconsistent statement that
defendant was angry. Thus, he was not impeached by his prior statements in that regard.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor was within his right to attempt to impeach Blevins with respect to
his prior statement regarding whether defendant was angry on the night of the victim’s death.
When Blevins denied the statement, the prosecutor asked direct questions about defendant’s
demeanor or mood before the assault on the victim. The prosecutor elicited Blevins’ testimony
that defendant was angry. This evidence was not objectionable. Testimony related to a
defendant’s demeanor before the incident is admissible. People v Medina, 100 Mich App 358,
362; 298 NW2d 648 (1980); People v Henderson, 25 Mich App 28, 32; 180 NW2d 903 (1970).
The prosecutor also attempted to impeach Blevins’ direct examination testimony about
defendant’s demeanor by questioning him about his prior statement regarding the existence of
tension after defendant complained about the victim hassling him. Blevins admitted making a
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prior statement to the prosecutor about the existence of tension. Thus, the prosecutor
successfully impeached Blevins’ credibility that defendant’s demeanor did not change after he
argued with the victim. Defendant’s demeanor created tension. The evidence of Blevins’ prior
statement was admissible for impeachment purposes. Hallaway, supra; Kilbourn, supra.
Defendant’s reliance on People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 688-693; 521 NW2d 557
(1994), to support his claim that the cross-examination was improper is misplaced. In Stanaway,
the Court announced a narrow rule of law, specifically that “impeachment [by a prior
inconsistent statement] should be disallowed when [both] (1) the substance of the statement
purportedly used to impeach the credibility of the witness is relevant to the central issue at the
case, and (2) there is no other testimony from the witness for which his credibility was relevant
to the case.” See Kilbourn, supra at 683. In this case, unlike Stanaway, Blevins offered other
testimony, apart from that related to the subject of the impeachment. He testified about the
events of the evening and testified that Motherman was intoxicated. This latter issue was hotly
contested at trial and was central to Motherman’s credibility. The impeachment was not
prohibited by the rule articulated in Stanaway, supra.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly used impeachment evidence as
substantive evidence during closing argument. In People v Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 260-262; 537
NW2d 828 (1995), the Court indicated that prior inconsistent statements are generally admissible
only to challenge credibility and not as substantive evidence. We have reviewed the challenged
closing argument and find that the prosecutor did not improperly use impeachment evidence as
substantive evidence when he argued that Blevins had testified that defendant was angry.
Blevins directly testified that defendant was, in fact, angry, although he was not screaming “or
nothing.” The prosecutor was entitled to argue the evidence and reasonable inferences. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
We agree with defendant, however, that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, that Blevins
testified there was tension, was improper. The prosecutor elicited on cross-examination that
Blevins had previously told him that there was tension after the argument. Blevins’ admission
about his prior statement was impeachment testimony. Blevins did not otherwise testify that
tension existed at the party. Thus, the prior inconsistent statement was admissible only to
challenge credibility and not as substantive evidence. Id. Nevertheless, reversal is not required.
Carines, supra. Defendant cannot demonstrate that the error in the prosecutor’s argument
affected the outcome of trial. Id. The prosecutor argued that Blevins, Ball, and Chris Heath, a
defense witness, all testified about the tension. He added that “[t]here was tension and
everybody wanted to get out.” Heath did, in fact, testify that he left the party because of tension.
Ball testified that he was scared and wanted to the leave the party after hearing defendant state
that he wanted to “kick” the victim’s “ass.” Ball’s testimony supported an inference that there
was tension after the argument. Clearly, there was additional evidence to support the
prosecutor’s argument regarding tension. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the
attorneys’ statements and arguments were not evidence. Additionally, any prejudice could have
been cured by a timely instruction upon request. Watson, supra. Under the circumstances, the
outcome of trial was not affected by the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument related to Blevins’
testimony about tension at the party.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were not in
evidence. A prosecutor may not make a statement of fact that is unsupported by the evidence.
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People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Specifically, defendant
challenges the following statement:
And Chris Heath told us that he saw Jake [defendant] talking with Scott
[Moore] and he said that he asked Jake that [sic] were you guys talking about, he
said well, I was telling him to tell his buddy to back off. Back off or I’m going to
kick his ass.
Defendant argues that Heath never testified to hearing defendant state that if the victim did not
back off, defendant would “kick” his “ass.” Thus, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s
argument was improper. We disagree.
We review the prosecutor’s argument in context. See, e.g., People v Nimeth, 236 Mich
App 616, 627; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s argument was
supported by the evidence. Bahoda, supra. The challenged argument was immediately prefaced
by the following:
And we heard Steve Ball testify. Remember Steve Ball. And he said that
their -- -- he heard some words between Steve [the victim] and Jake [defendant]
down on the first floor. He said that, that altercation that he heard came from like
in this area someplace. And then he said he moved into here and he came into
this room and he said he saw Jake talking to Scott [Moore], remember - - and he
said he heard Jake say I’m going to kick this guy’s ass. This guy’s bothering me,
I’m going to kick his ass.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecutor never claimed that Heath heard defendant say
he wanted to “kick” the victim’s “ass.” Rather, the prosecutor argued that Ball overheard the
statement. After recalling the testimony of Ball and Heath, the prosecutor summed up by saying,
“Back off or I’m going to kick his ass.” This argument comported with the evidence at trial.
The prosecutor was free to argue the evidence. Id.
II
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Our
review of the ineffective assistance claim is limited to errors apparent on the record because no
Ginther2 hearing was held. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997).
In order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for defense
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Stanaway, supra at 687-688. A defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a
fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). He must overcome a
strong presumption that the assistance of his counsel was sound trial strategy. Stanaway, supra;
People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991).
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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In this case, the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated to admit defendant’s past
conviction for making a false statement in an application for a driver’s license. On direct
examination, defense counsel asked defendant whether he was convicted for “false statement in
an application for a driver’s license.” Counsel then inquired whether the conviction meant that
defendant had “lied under oath for his application.” Defendant contends that, by asking the
specific question about the prior conviction, counsel opened the door for further questioning
about the crime. The prosecutor later cross-examined defendant about the details of the conduct
underlying his prior conviction. Defense counsel did not object to this questioning.
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the admission of his prior conviction, counsel’s
decision to stipulate to the admission of that prior conviction, or the prosecutor’s act of
questioning defendant about the details of the conduct underlying the conviction. Rather, he
argues that counsel was ineffective by opening the door to the prosecutor’s further questioning.
On the record before us, we cannot conclude that counsel was ineffective with respect to his
handling of the prior conviction. In response to the prosecutor’s cross-examination, the jury
heard that defendant lied on the application because he was out of work, wanted to work, needed
a license to work, and lied to secure that license. This testimony placed defendant’s conviction,
which was already properly before the jury, in a more positive light. It portrayed defendant as a
nonviolent, prior offender whose conviction was related to an act taken to secure a job, to be a
productive member of society. We are not convinced that defense counsel’s conduct with
respect to the prior conviction was not matter of trial strategy. Matters of trial strategy will not
be second-guessed. People v Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715
(1996). Moreover, defendant has failed to demonstrate that, but for defense counsel’s failure to
object to the prosecutor’s questioning, the outcome of trial would have been different.
Stanaway, supra.
Additionally, we reject defendant’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel where his counsel failed to request CJI2d 4.5(1),3 the limiting instruction related to
impeachment evidence. We agree with defendant that competent counsel would have requested
the instruction. The prosecutor attempted to, and succeeded in part, in impeaching Blevins with
his prior inconsistent statement regarding defendant’s demeanor at the party following the
argument. Defendant has met his burden of proof that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Stanaway, supra. However, defendant is not only required
to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. He is also required to show that his
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive him of “a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Defendant is required to
demonstrate that, but for his counsel’s failure to request the instruction, the outcome of trial
3
CJI2d 4.5(1) provides:
If you believe that a witness previously made a statement inconsistent with
[his] testimony at this trial, the only purpose for which that earlier statement can
be considered by you is in deciding whether the witness testified truthfully in
court. The earlier statement is not evidence that what the witness said earlier is
true.
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would have been different. Stanaway, supra. Defendant has not met this latter burden of proof.
Regardless of Blevins’ impeachment with respect to defendant’s demeanor at the party, there
was ample evidence that defendant argued with the victim, that defendant thereafter made the
statement that he wanted to harm the victim, and that there was tension after the argument. Thus,
even if the evidence of Blevins’ prior inconsistent statement was limited by CJI2d 4.5(1), there
was evidence of a similar nature, which was argued by the prosecutor, to support his theory of
the case. On the record before us, we are satisfied that the failure to request the limiting
instruction did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
We note that defendant also requests a remand for a Ginther hearing to explore the issues
of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a). This request is not only
untimely, MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a), but defendant has not set forth, by affidavit or offer of proof,
additional facts that would be established at a hearing if one was held. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(ii).
We deny the request for a Ginther hearing.
III
Defendant finally argues that the trial court improperly scored offense variable (OV) 3 of
the sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.33, at ten points. He argues that, where the sentencing
offense is a homicide, zero points must be scored for OV 3 as a matter of law. The alleged
scoring error is not preserved for review because it was not raised at sentencing, in a proper
motion for resentencing, or in a motion to remand filed in this Court. MCL 769.34(10).
However, because defendant argues that the error resulted in a sentence outside the appropriate
guidelines range, we review the issue for plain error. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-314;
684 NW2d 669 (2004). Defendant must show that a clear or obvious error affected his
substantial rights. Id.
MCL 777.33 provides in relevant part:
(1) Offense variable 3 is physical injury to a victim. Score offense
variable 3 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the
number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points . . . .
One hundred points should be scored if the victim was killed, MCL 777.33(1)(a), unless the
sentencing offense is a homicide, MCL 777.33(2)(b). Ten points should be scored if there is
bodily injury requiring medical treatment. MCL 777.33(1)(d). Zero points should be scored if
no physical injury occurred to the victim. MCL 777.33(1)(f).
Our Supreme Court recently rejected the precise argument made by defendant in this
case. In People v Houston, 473 Mich 399, 405-408; 702 NW2d 530 (2005), the Court held that
zero points should be assessed under OV 3 “only when ‘[n]o physical injury occurred to a
victim.’” Where physical injury occurs, and the sentencing offense is a homicide, a score of ten
or twenty-five points is appropriate. Id. In this case, there was no dispute that physical injury
occurred to the victim. When defendant punched the victim in his left eye, he shattered the
bones comprising the eye socket. Therefore, a score of zero points would have been
inappropriate. Id. Further, because there was a bodily injury requiring medical treatment, the
score of ten points was proper. MCL 777.33(1)(d).
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Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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