PEOPLE OF MI V VIVIAN DIANE BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 257107
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 04-050138-FH
VIVIAN DIANE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Bandstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of felonious assault, MCL
750.82. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12, to concurrent terms of forty-six months to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Defendant
appeals by right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose from an altercation involving defendant, Freda Wood, and
Donna Copeland during which defendant, at various points, held scissors, a knife, a screwdriver
and a stick.
Defendant first contends that the prosecution failed to introduce evidence sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she feloniously assaulted Freda Wood. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, this Court
must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution a
rational trier of fact could conclude the prosecution proved all the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 522; 675 NW2d 599 (2003).
To sustain a conviction for felonious assault the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) committed an assault (2) with a dangerous weapon, (3)
with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.
People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). In addition, the defendant must
have the present ability or apparent present ability to commit a battery. People v Grant, 211
Mich App 200, 202; 535 NW2d 581 (1995).
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Defendant challenges only the third element, arguing that the prosecution failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite
intent.
“Intent, like any other fact, may be proven indirectly by inference from the conduct of the
accused and surrounding circumstances from which it logically and reasonably follows.” People
v Johnson, 54 Mich App 303, 304; 220 NW2d 705 (1974). In People v Lawton, 196 Mich App
341, 350; 482 NW2d 810 (1992), this Court concluded that the intent to place a victim in fear of
an immediate battery was properly inferred where the defendants approached the victim with
guns drawn and forced the victim from a parked car to the back door of a home. Similarly, in
People v Strong, 143 Mich App 442, 452-453; 372 NW2d 335 (1985), this Court concluded there
was sufficient evidence of intent where the defendant drove the victim to a deserted factory area,
turned off the car’s headlights, and placed the blade of a knife against the victim’s throat.
In this case, there is no evidence that defendant touched Wood with the knife or the
scissors. But, Wood testified that defendant stood one foot away from her, gestured with the
scissors in her direction, and threatened to kill her. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence
from which a rational trier of fact could infer that defendant had the intent to place Wood in
reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.
We recognize that defendant testified that she was using the scissors to cut her hair and
testified that she never intended to injure or scare Wood with the scissors; however, a witness
testified that defendant had actually cut her hair the day before. The jury must resolve conflicts
in witness testimony. Strong, supra at 453. Therefore, this Court will resolve credibility
conflicts in favor of the jury’s verdict. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 640-641; 664 NW2d
159 (2003).
Thus, we find that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed a felonious assault upon Freda Wood.
Defendant next contends that the prosecution failed to introduce evidence sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed a felonious assault upon Donna Copeland.
We again disagree.
An assault may be committed by an unlawful act that places another in reasonable
apprehension of receiving an immediate battery. Grant, supra at 202. We conclude that the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant committed a simple assault upon
Copeland at the front door of the home. Copeland testified that when she arrived at the front
door, defendant answered the door holding a stick and a screwdriver. She further testified that
defendant, who was standing five or six feet away from Copeland, said to her, “Come on, Donna.
Come on” while making threatening gestures with the screwdriver.
Moreover, in light of the demonstration at trial of how defendant was holding the stick
and the screwdriver when defendant opened the front door, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that defendant was holding the screwdriver in a manner that rendered the screwdriver a
dangerous weapon. Copeland testified that when defendant opened the front door, she had a
screwdriver raised above her head, and said, “Come on, Donna. Come on.” Therefore, it was
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reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant intended either to injure Copeland or to place
her in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. In addition, while standing near
Copeland at the front door, defendant had the present ability or apparent present ability to
commit the battery.
Furthermore, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant also feloniously assaulted Copeland at the side door of the home. Copeland
testified that when she went to the side door, defendant was standing near the door holding a
knife. Although defendant was inside and Copeland was outside, defendant still had the present
ability or apparent present ability to commit a battery. See Grant, supra.
Thus, viewing the evidence most favorable to the prosecution, we find a rational trier of
fact could conclude that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
feloniously assaulted Donna Copeland.
We affirm.
/s/ William C.Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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