PEOPLE OF MI V JERRY JONATHAN NEWBERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256567
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-412008-FH
JERRY JONATHAN NEWBERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Neff and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), against a person under 13 years of age. Defendant was sentenced
as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 102 to 270 months in prison. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting prejudicial
testimony that he was in jail during the investigation of this case; that he failed to register as a
sex offender; and that he would be placed on probation, and therefore must have had a prior
conviction. We review de novo preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct to determine if the
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453; 678
NW2d 631 (2004). We review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error.
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). In order to avoid forfeiture
under the plain error rule, defendant must demonstrate plain error that was outcome
determinative. Id. When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we examine the
pertinent portion of the record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Defendant maintains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting testimony
from a police officer that defendant was in jail during their interview. The police officer testified
that the investigation into the instant charge began as a result of letters that were written by jail
inmates indicating that defendant may have had inappropriate sexual contact with the victim.
The police officer affirmatively indicated that in talking with defendant about the victim,
defendant wanted to discuss “these other persons in jail.” At trial, defense counsel objected on
the grounds of hearsay and relevance, and the trial court overruled the objection. On appeal,
defendant claims that this testimony was irrelevant, MRE 402, and prejudicial, MRE 403.
Because an objection based on one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack
based on a different ground, defendant’s claim that the evidence was irrelevant is preserved, but
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his claim that the evidence was prejudicial is unpreserved. People v Bulmer, 256 Mich App 33,
35; 662 NW2d 117 (2003).
MRE 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Here, the police officer explained that an
investigation was opened after one of defendant’s fellow inmates reported that defendant talked
about his feelings for and conduct towards the victim. The genesis of the charge against
defendant and his subsequent attempt to discuss “these other persons in jail” was relevant
because it established a foundation for testimony concerning their motivations. That is, evidence
that the investigation was prompted by incarcerated individuals tended to make the reliability of
their statements more or less likely than it would have been without the evidence. Because all
relevant evidence is admissible, MRE 402, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by
eliciting testimony from the police officer that defendant was in jail at the time of their interview.
MRE 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, evidence that defendant was in
jail was probative of the impetus for and veracity of the inmates’ statements concerning
defendant’s comments about his relationship with the victim, and was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Indeed, defense counsel attempted to impeach one
of defendant’s fellow inmates by alleging that his testimony was given in exchange for a shorter
sentence, which made defendant’s own incarceration evident. Moreover, defendant has not
demonstrated that the prosecutor’s elicitation of evidence that he was in jail amounted to plain
error that was outcome determinative. Watson, supra at 586. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited.
Id.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting testimony
from a probation officer that defendant failed to register as a sex offender. At trial, defense
counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, and the trial court sustained the objection and
instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. The following day, the trial court addressed the
incident, and indicated that the jury members stated that they were unable to hear because of a
heavy rainfall at the moment the probation officer offered the damaging testimony. Indeed,
defense counsel agreed that the jury likely did not hear the harmful testimony and declined the
trial court’s offer of another curative instruction, so as not to draw further attention to the matter.
The trial court then inquired “[s]o you will give up that issue?,” to which defendant responded
affirmatively, thereby intentionally relinquishing or abandoning a known right. People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). A defendant may not waive an objection to an issue
before the trial court and then raise it as an error on appeal—defendant’s waiver extinguished
any error. Id. at 219.
Further, in light of the fact that defense counsel conceded that the jury did not hear the
testimony that defendant failed to register as a sex offender, we find no merit to defendant’s
argument that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial in violation of MRE 403. Moreover,
defendant did not object on that ground at trial, and he has failed to demonstrate that such
testimony amounted to plain error that affected his substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Because evidence was introduced at trial that defendant
had been and was currently sexually attracted to young children and that he took measures to
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control his urges, defendant is unable to meet his burden of showing prejudice, i.e., that the error
affected the outcome of the trial. Id. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited. Watson, supra at 586.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting unduly
prejudicial testimony from a probation officer that she told defendant that he would be placed on
probation, consequently implying that he had a prior conviction. Defense counsel failed to
object to this alleged claim of misconduct, and has not demonstrated the prosecutor’s elicitation
of this evidence amounted to plain error that was outcome determinative. Id. The prejudicial
effect of evidence implying that defendant had a prior conviction could have been cured by a
timely instruction; therefore, no error requiring reversal will be found. Id. Accordingly, the
issue is forfeited. Id.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred by
engaging in an upward departure from the statutory sentencing guidelines, where the departure
was based on factual findings not determined by the jury.1 Defendant relies on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d
403 (2004) to support his argument. However, our Supreme Court and this Court have
concluded that Blakely does not apply to sentences imposed in Michigan. People v Wilson, 265
Mich App 386, 399; 695 NW2d 351 (2005), citing People v Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730 n 14;
684 NW2d 278 (2004) and People v Drohan, 264 Mich App 77, 89 n 4; 689 NW2d 750 (2004),
lv gtd in part 472 Mich 881; 693 NW2d 823 (2005).
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s departure from the statutory minimum
sentencing guidelines range was unwarranted. The trial court must impose a minimum sentence
within the guidelines range unless a departure from the guidelines is permitted. MCL 769.34(2).
The trial court may depart from the guidelines if it “has a substantial and compelling reason for
that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.” MCL 769.34(3). The trial
court may depart from the guidelines for nondiscriminatory reasons where there are legitimate
factors not considered by the guidelines or where factors considered by the guidelines have been
given inadequate or disproportionate weight. MCL 769.34(3)(a), (b).
We review the trial court’s determination that a particular factor warranting departure
existed for clear error. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 273; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). We
review de novo as a matter of law the trial court’s determination that a particular factor is
objective and verifiable. Id. Finally, we review a trial court’s determination that the objective
and verifiable factors present in a particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons to
depart from the statutory minimum sentence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the
sentence falls outside the permissible principled range of outcomes. Id. at 274. However,
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Defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), a
Class C offense, and was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10.
Defendant’s prior record variable score of 45 points yielded a PRV level D, and his offense
variable score of 25 points yielded an OV level III, for a minimum sentence range of 29 to 71
months in prison. The statutory maximum for MCL 750.520c(1)(a) is 270 months in prison.
The trial court departed from the minimum sentencing guidelines range and sentenced defendant
to 102 to 270 months in prison.
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defendant failed to object to the sentence imposed by the trial court; therefore, the issue is
unpreserved and we review his claim of sentencing error for plain error affecting substantial
rights. People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211, 227-228; 646 NW2d 875 (2002).
Here, the trial court stated that the following aspects of the case led him to impose a
sentence outside the recommended range:
[(1)The g]uidelines do not give adequate weight or consideration to the fact that
the prior felony conviction was for criminal sexual conduct with a child[;] (2)
offense variable 10 scores 15 points for defendant’s predatory conduct, but does
not also consider the fact that there was a disparity in the age of the victim and
defendant, and that defendant was also a member of the same household as the
victim and exploited those factors in sexually assaulting the victim; (3)
insufficient weight is given to the numerous touchings/sitting of victim on
defendant’s lap for purposes of sexual gratification of the defendant throughout
his course of conduct; (4) the offense variables do not consider or give sufficient
weight to the fact that the victim was previously sexually abused by another
person, thus making her more vulnerable; (5) defendant was on probation for
failing to register as a sex offender, and deliberately sought out women to live
with who had poor self esteem and who had children to whom he would have
access.
Defendant argues that “[r]eason #3, sexual gratification, is not objectively verifiable.”
“Objective and verifiable factors are those that are external to the minds of the judge, defendant,
and others involved in making the decision, and are capable of being confirmed.” People v
Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 636; 683 NW2d 687 (2004). Here, several witnesses testified that
defendant admitted that he had sexual urges for the victim, had kissed her on the mouth, and
enjoyed it when she sat on his lap. Moreover, one of defendant’s fellow inmates testified that
defendant become aroused when talking about the victim; specifically, when he would mention
that he missed her sitting on his lap. While sexual gratification in general may not be objective
and verifiable, the fact that defendant had the victim sit on his lap for purposes of sexual
gratification became objective and verifiable when defendant revealed that fact to numerous
individuals who confirmed that fact through their trial testimony.
Defendant also argues that the other reasons given by the trial court for the departure
were given sufficient weight by the guidelines. MCL 769.34(3)(b) provides that “[t]he court
shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender characteristic already taken
into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the court finds from the facts
contained in the court record, including the presentence investigation report, that the
characteristic had been given inadequate or undue weight.”
Here, the trial court found that departure was warranted where, although defendant was
assessed 25 points for PRV 1 for his prior high severity felony conviction, MCL 777.51(1)(c),
inadequate weight or consideration was given to the fact that the previous conviction was for
criminal sexual conduct with a child. The trial court also found that departure was warranted
where, although defendant was assessed 15 points for OV 10 for exploitation of a vulnerable
victim where predatory conduct, i.e., “preoffense conduct directed at a victim for the primary
purpose of victimization” was involved, MCL 777.40(1)(a); (2)(a), consideration was not given
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to the fact that there was an age disparity between defendant and the victim and that defendant
was a member of the same household as the victim, and exploited those factors in sexually
assaulting the victim, factors that would have warranted an assessment of 10 points for
exploitation of a victim’s youth and a domestic relationship. MCL 777.40(1)(b). The trial court
also found that departure was warranted where the offense variables did not consider or give
sufficient weight to the fact that the victim was especially vulnerable because she had been
sexually abused in the past. Finally, the trial court found that departure was warranted where,
although defendant was assessed 15 points for OV 10 for predatory conduct, the guidelines did
not take into account that defendant was on probation for failing to register as a sex offender and
deliberately sought out women with poor self esteem and who had children to whom he would
have access.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the objective
and verifiable factors present in this case constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart
from the statutory minimum sentence. Babcock, supra at 274. We also conclude that the extent
of the departure, 31 months, is proportionate to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct. Id. at
272. There was no plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights in the trial court’s upward
sentencing departure, and defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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