CHERYL SALOKA V SHELBY NURSING CENTER JOINT VENTURE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHERYL SALOKA,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
SHELBY NURSING CENTER JOINT
VENTURE, a/k/a PINEHURST EAST INC, a/k/a
BEAUMONT NURSING HOME, CRYSTAL
REICK, VICTORIA CICONE, PREMIERE
HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT INC, and
RENEE DECEMBER,
No. 255954
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-005423-NZ
Defendant-Appellees.
CHERYL SALOKA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
SHELBY NURSING CENTER JOINT
VENTURE, a/k/a PINEHURST EAST INC, a/k/a
BEAUMONT NURSING HOME, CRYSTAL
REICK, VICTORIA CICONE, PREMIERE
HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT INC, and
RENEE DECEMBER,
No. 257200
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-005423-NZ
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, plaintiff, Cheryl Saloka, appeals as of right from circuit court
orders granting defendants’ (Shelby Nursing Center Joint Venture (SNC), Assistant Director of
Nursing Crystal Reick, Corporate Compliance Officer Victoria Cicone, Premiere Healthcare
Management, Inc. (PHM), and Administrator Renee December) motions for summary
disposition and case evaluation sanctions, in this case involving alleged: retaliation in violation
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of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and public policy, civil conspiracy, promissory
estoppel, and fraud. We affirm.
I
SNC is a nursing home facility providing assisted living for the elderly. In 1999, plaintiff
was hired as the Director of Medical Records for SNC. Plaintiff was an at will employee. As
Director of Medical Records, plaintiff’s job entailed “coding of resident diagnoses for
reimbursement to the facility. Also maintaining confidentiality of the patient medical records,
maintaining correct documentation and required documentation in the medical record charts,
working with doctors to take care of deficiencies in medical records [sic].” Plaintiff’s immediate
supervisor at the SNC was Renee December. During this employment PHM was under contract
with SNC to provide management services and was the employer of two supervisors Victoria
Cicone, Corporate Compliance Officer, and December, Administrator for SNC.
In late August 2002, SNC apparently learned of alleged medical chart violations through
anonymous allegations, at which time an investigation began. According to plaintiff, in August
2002, Cicone approached her regarding researching deaths that occurred in the facility. There
was a medical record for a patient referred to as Patient #1 that had been changed by Reick, who
was the assistant director of nursing for SNC, and plaintiff claims she forwarded this information
to Cicone who wanted to know of information changes. Plaintiff claimed that she thought this
was improper, and that Ann Bendit, a nurse, was asked by Crystal Reick to fix the chart, but she
did not bring it to the attention of Cicone or December prior to the investigation. Plaintiff also
claims that Patient #2’s medical records were altered by Nurse Beverly Burgess, which later
made her believe something was being covered up. Plaintiff acknowledged that she did not bring
this to the attention of December, but claims she told Cicone in August or early September, and
that Gloria Yerkovich, a unit manager, told her that she had informed December and the director
of nursing, Janice Rogers. Plaintiff claims that during an August 29, 2002, meeting with Cicone
she got the idea that any problem was going to be “swept under the table,” because of the
attitude. SNC ultimately concluded that errors were isolated mistakes and did not result in
harm.
On September 11, 2002, plaintiff was told that she was terminated because she did not
inform the Administrator, December, or the Administrator’s superior, Cicone of the
improprieties she believed were occurring. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not inform
December, and that she did not inform Cicone until August 2002. On the day of her discharge,
plaintiff informed December that she was going to report SNC. After being discharged, plaintiff
contacted the Michigan Bureau of Health Systems and reported nursing home abuse at the
Shelby Nursing Center.
On November 22, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint against SNC, PHM, Cicone,
December, and Reick alleging: (1) they violated the Whistleblower’s Protection Act (WPA)
when plaintiff was discharged for engaging in protected activities; (2) statutes and public policy
were violated when defendants discharged plaintiff in retaliation for participating in an internal
investigation and refusing to cover up illegal activities; (3) promissory estoppel requires that
plaintiff keep her job because definite promises were made to her that if she reported patient
mistreatment she would not be retaliated against, and she relied on these representations; (4)
fraud based on fraudulent representations made by defendants to plaintiff; and (5) civil
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conspiracy because December, Cicone, and Reick engaged in concerted activity pursuant to an
agreement to a accomplish a criminal purpose by altering medical records and covering up
patient mistreatment to avoid statutory reporting requirements. Subsequently, defendants SNC
and Reick filed a motion for summary disposition, and a separate motion for summary
disposition was filed by PHM, Cicone, and December.
After a hearing, the trial court, in granting defendants’ motions for summary disposition,
found: (1) plaintiff has not stated a claim under the WPA as the decision to terminate plaintiff
could not have been based on retaliation of her intent to file a report with the state because the
decision to terminate was made first; (2) summary disposition was proper on plaintiff’s public
policy claim because she did not make report under MCL 333.21771, thus, is not entitled to the
protections and the evidence establishes plaintiff was terminated for failing to report the incident
when they first occurred; (3) plaintiff’s reliance on the Corporate Compliance Manual’s
statement that employees would not be retaliated against for reporting patient mistreatment and
other improper conduct is misplaced because plaintiff failed to report the incidents when she first
knew of them and instead participated after someone else reported, thus, summary disposition is
proper on the promissory estoppel claim; (4) plaintiff’s fraud claim is impermissibly based on
future promises and she has not proffered any evidence that statements made were false or with
reckless disregard for the truth; and (5) plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim fails for lack of any
underlying tort.
Subsequently, defendants filed a motions for case evaluation sanctions and contended
that they accepted the case evaluation award, plaintiff rejected, and, subsequently, the trial court
granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition. Following a hearing, the trial court issued
and opinion and order granting defendants’ motions for case evaluation sanctions. The trial
court found that there was nothing unusual in the course of litigation warranting the interests of
justice exception and there were no issues of first impression. In addition, the trial court
examined the requested attorney fees in connection with the November 2003 Michigan Bar
Journal providing the median income, and noted that Attorneys Glazek and Smith should receive
more than the median amount because of their extensive experience, was satisfied with the
submitted amounts, except for Attorney Glazek’s which it reduced from $345 per hour to $250
per hour. A judgment was entered in favor of defendants SNC and Reick for $7,785 for case
evaluation sanctions. And, a judgment was entered in favor of defendants PHM, Cicone, and
December for $5,895 in case evaluation sanctions.
II
Plaintiff argues, on appeal, that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions for
summary disposition with regard to her claims pursuant to the WPA, public policy, and civil
conspiracy.
A. Standard of Review
"Whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the WPA is a question of
law subject to review de novo." Manzo v Petrella, 261 Mich App 705, 711; 683 NW2d 699
(2004). This Court also reviews de novo the grant or denial of summary disposition to determine
if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich
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109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681
NW2d 342 (2004). When deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court must consider the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A motion for summary disposition based on
the lack of a material factual dispute must be supported by documentary evidence. MCR
2.116(G)(3)(b); Scalise v Boy Scouts of America, 265 Mich App 1, 10; 692 NW2d 858 (2005).
The moving party must specifically identify the matters which have no disputed factual issues,
MCR 2.116(G)(4); Maiden, supra at 120; Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 140; 694 NW2d 65
(2005), and has the initial burden of supporting his position by affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other documentary evidence, Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597
NW2d 28 (1999). The party opposing the motion then has the burden of showing by evidentiary
materials that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Id.
B. Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition with regard to her WPA claim. MCL 15.362 provides:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an
employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of
the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of
this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public
body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee
is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry
held by that public body, or a court action.
A prima facie violation of the WPA requires a plaintiff to show "that (1) the plaintiff was
engaged in protected activity as defined by the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, (2) the plaintiff
was discharged, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
discharge." Shallal v Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 610; 566 NW2d 571
(1997); Phinney v Verbrugge, 222 Mich App 513, 553; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
Claims made under the WPA are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework used for
claims under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Roulston v Tendercare, Inc, 239 Mich
App 270, 280; 608 NW2d 525 (2000). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie violation of the WPA. Id. at 280-281. If the plaintiff
succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate business reason for the
adverse employment action against the plaintiff. Id. at 281. If the defendant produces evidence
establishing the existence of a legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action, the
plaintiff must be provided an opportunity to prove that the legitimate reason offered by the
defendant was not the true reason, but was only a pretext for the adverse employment action. Id.
The trial court found that plaintiff did not meet her initial burden of proof in establishing
a prima facie violation because there was nothing to support she was engaged in a protected
activity. On review de novo, we find that summary disposition was properly granted because
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plaintiff failed to produce any support for her claim that defendants were aware that she provided
or was about to provide information to a “public body.”
There is no dispute that plaintiff was discharged. The dispute is whether plaintiff was
engaged in protected activity, and, if so, whether there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and her discharge. A protected activity under the act consists of "(1) reporting
to a public body a violation of a law, regulation, or rule, (2) being about to report such a violation
to a public body, or (3) being asked by a public body to participate in an investigation."
Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998), citing the
WPA, MCL 15.362; Roulston, supra at 270, 279. A "public body" under the WPA is any body
that is either created or funded by state or local authority, including a member of that body.
Manzo, supra at 713-714.
It is undisputed that plaintiff did not file a complaint with a public body until nine days
after she was terminated, thus, there must be something to support that plaintiff was about to
report and that defendants were aware she was about to report. Employers are entitled to
objective notice of a report or a threat to report by a whistleblower. Id. Objective notice has
been interpreted by the courts to mean that the employer or the person who fired the employee
was aware of the protected activity in which the employee engaged. See Kaufman & Payton, PC
v Nikkila, 200 Mich App 250, 257-258; 503 NW2d 728 (1993).
Plaintiff contends that defendants were on notice of her intention to report because of
statements she made. Plaintiff, in her deposition, testified that she made the decision to file a
complaint with the state prior to her termination, and that December and Cicone were aware.
However, her testimony does not support that December and Cicone would be aware she was
about to report, as evidenced by the following colloquial from plaintiff’s deposition:
Q. On what day did you tell [December] that you were going to file a complaint
with a governmental body against [SNC]?
A. I did not use those exact words.
Q. On what day, tell me what day A. September 11, 2002.
Q. In the termination interview?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you tell her before September 11, 2002?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you tell [Cicone] before September 11, 2002?
A. In advertently I did.
Q. On what date did you tell [Cicone]?
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A. The day that her and [December] interviewed me, when I made the comment
about if the state came in and looked at (Patient #1’s) chart, would they follow
through going to the hospital to prove that it was not correctly - - what was in
the documentation was not correct.
***
Q. Okay, - - you made no other statement to [Cicone] or [December] prior to the
termination meeting on September 11th about filing charges or any complaints
with any governmental body, correct?
A. I did not.
Q. And the statement that you made in August - - I’ll say August 29th; I’m
assuming that’s the date - - the statement that you made, in the meeting with
[December] and [Cicone] regarding the state is the that you just reiterated?
A. Correct.
Q. So it’s correct that other than those two statements which you’ve just referred
to in the termination meeting and in the prior meeting with [Cicone] and
[December] - - I want to be clear - - you never told anybody else at [SNC] or
[PHM] anything about filing charges with a government body?
A. No, I told Karen Case the day she told me I was being terminated.
Q. That was the day before - - that was September 10th?
A. Correct.
Q. And what did you say to Karen Case specifically? I want the words.
A. Specifically I told her that the reason I was being fired is because they knew
that I knew they were sweeping things under the carpet and that they knew I
was going to report it to the state. And I believe at that time that - - I assumed
at that time that Karen went back to [Cicone] and [December].
***
Q. Sitting here today, can you tell me of your personal knowledge that Renee
December and Vicki Cicone when they made the decision to terminate you,
had been informed that you were about to file charges with a public body?
Sitting here today do you know that for a fact?
A. I do not know that for a fact. I was terminated, though. That should speak for
itself. . . .
Basically, plaintiff acknowledges that she did not specifically tell December and Cicone until
after she knew she was being terminated. Defendants presented documentary evidence
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supporting that they were not aware that plaintiff was going to file a complaint with the state
when the decision to terminate her was made. The statement plaintiff claims that she made to
Cicone is not the type of statement, even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, that
would put defendants on notice that plaintiff was filing a complaint with a public body. In
addition, the alleged statement to Case does not suffice because plaintiff acknowledges that she
said nothing to Case until the decision to terminate plaintiff had already been made. The fact
that plaintiff thinks they knew does not support the claim because her claims lacks any support
that they were aware. Summary disposition is proper because plaintiff knew her discharge was
imminent before there was any casual connection.
Plaintiff also claims that MCL 333.20180 provides a cause of action, with all remedies
available to whistleblowers under the WPA, in favor of those individuals who make internal
complaints. However, this same issue was addressed in Manzo, supra at 718, and in denying a
similar claim this Court provided:
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, a plain reading of MCL 333.20180
demonstrates that no private right of action exists under the section. There are
repeated references in the text to assisting "the department," which clearly
reference a public entity, a governmental department or agency. Further, and
significantly, the statute even sets out conditions that must be met before making
a report to the governmental department. After reviewing the language of the
statute, and the framework set out within the statute, it is clear that the statute
does not create a private right of action.
For the same reasons stated in Manzo, plaintiff’s claim, in this regard, is without merit.
Because plaintiff has not raised a question of fact with regard to whether she was
engaged in a protected activity there is no prima facie case, thus, this Court need not address
whether the proffered reason for the termination was pretext, nor does the Court need to address
plaintiff’s claim regarding Bullard-Plawecki.1
C. Public Policy Claim
1
Even if plaintiff were engaged in protected activity, her claims fails because she has not
presented any support for there being a causal connection between her planning to file a report
and her discharge other than timing. However, "a temporal relationship, standing alone, does not
demonstrate a causal connection between [a] protected activity and any adverse employment
action. Something more . . . is required to show causation . . . ." West v Gen Motors Corp, 469
Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 (2003), citing, e.g., Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich
App 655, 662; 653 NW2d 625 (2002) (stating that a temporal relationship does not demonstrate
causation in a case alleging retaliation for alleged whistleblower activity). Plaintiff attempts to
stretch the argument beyond timing, but all contentions are related to timing. Further, even if
plaintiff was engaged in protected activity, "the fact that a plaintiff engages in a 'protected
activity' under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act does not immunize him from an otherwise
legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action." Id. at 187.
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Plaintiff’s next argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition with regard to her claim of discharge in violation of public policy. In
support of her claim, plaintiff relies on the language of MCL 333.21771, arguing that she was
discharged in violation of this legislative statement and for a failure to violate the law during her
employment. MCL 333.21771(6), of the Public Health Code, provides:
(1) A licensee, nursing home administrator, or employee of a nursing home
shall not physically, mentally, or emotionally abuse, mistreat, or harmfully
neglect a patient.
(2) A nursing home employee who becomes aware of an act prohibited by this
section immediately shall report the matter to the nursing home administrator or
nursing director. A nursing home administrator or nursing director who becomes
aware of an act prohibited by this section immediately shall report the matter by
telephone to the department of public health, which in turn shall notify the
department of social services.
(3) Any person may report a violation of this section to the department.
(4) A physician or other licensed health care personnel of a hospital or other
health care facility to which a patient is transferred who becomes aware of an act
prohibited by this section shall report the act to the department.
(5) Upon receipt of a report made under this section, the department shall make
an investigation. The department may require the person making the report to
submit a written report or to supply additional information, or both.
(6) A licensee or nursing home administrator shall not evict, harass, dismiss, or
retaliate against a patient, a patient's representative, or an employee who makes a
report under this section.
Plaintiff was an at will employee. There are limited exceptions to the general rule that an
employer may terminate the employment of an at-will employee at any time. In Edelberg v
Leco Corp, 236 Mich App 177, 179-180; 599 NW2d 785 (1999), this Court provided:
In [Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982)], our Supreme Court recognized three
situations where the discharge is so contrary to public policy as to be
actionable though the employment is at will. The three public policy
exceptions to the at-will doctrine apply when (1) the employee is
discharged in violation of an explicit legislative statement prohibiting
discharge of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or
duty, (2) the employee is discharged for the failure or refusal to violate
the law in the course of employment, and (3) the employee is discharged
for exercising a right conferred by a well-established legislative
enactment. 412 Mich at 695-696.
First, as noted by the trial court there is nothing supporting that plaintiff made a report
under MCL 333.21771. The plain language of the statute protects “an employee who makes a
report under this section.” Plaintiff did not make a report pursuant to MCL 333.21771 of the
Public Health Code, thus, she is not entitled to the protections of the provision.
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Even if plaintiff were covered by the provision her claims fails because she has not
presented any support for there being a causal connection between her filing this type of report
and her discharge other than timing. However, "a temporal relationship, standing alone, does not
demonstrate a causal connection between [a] protected activity and any adverse employment
action. Something more . . . is required to show causation . . . ." West v Gen Motors Corp, 469
Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 (2003), citing, e.g., Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich
App 655, 662; 653 NW2d 625 (2002) (stating that a temporal relationship does not demonstrate
causation in a case alleging retaliation for alleged whistleblower activity). Thus, plaintiff cannot
show causation, and summary disposition is proper.
Because plaintiff's claim fails on the basis of her not being engaged in the protected
activity provided, it is unnecessary to discuss plaintiffs' other assertions regarding this claim.
Furthermore, even if she was engaged in a protected activity, plaintiff has presented nothing
beyond timing to support her claim.
D. Civil Conspiracy Claim
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim of civil conspiracy
because defendants were in violation of several criminal and civil laws. The trial court dismissed
the civil conspiracy claim because there was no sustainable underlying tort.
The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) a concerted action (2) by a
combination of two or more persons (3) to accomplish an unlawful purpose (4) or a lawful
purpose by unlawful means. Admiral Ins Co v Columbia Casualty Ins Co, 194 Mich App 300,
313; 486 NW2d 351 (1992); Mays v Three Rivers Rubber Corp, 135 Mich App 42, 48; 352
NW2d 339 (1984). A civil conspiracy claim standing alone is not actionable; it is necessary to
prove a separate actionable tort underlying the conspiracy. Advocacy Organization for Patients
& Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 257 Mich App 365, 384; 670 NW2d 569 (2003). The claim
cannot "'exist in the air; rather, it is necessary to prove a separate, actionable tort.’" Advocacy
Organization for Patients & Providers, supra at 384, quoting Early Detection Center, PC v New
York Life Ins Co, 157 Mich App 618, 632; 403 NW2d 830 (1986). Thus, a civil conspiracy
claim fails as a matter of law in the absence of a viable underlying tort. Id.
As discussed, supra, plaintiff did not establish any viable underlying claim against
defendants. Nor can plaintiff establish any unlawful purpose or unlawful means in defendants'
actions. It is well settled that a claim for civil conspiracy, standing alone, is not actionable.
Cousineau v Ford Motor Co, 140 Mich App 19, 36-37; 363 NW2d 721 (1985). In other words,
a civil conspiracy claim may not be maintained where there are no legal and equitable claims
remaining in the case. See Detroit Bd of Ed v Celotex Corp, 196 Mich App 694, 713; 493 NW2d
513 (1992). Because plaintiffs failed to establish any actionable underlying tort, the conspiracy
claim must also fail. Thus, plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case of civil conspiracy.
Accordingly, this claim fails as a matter of law, and the trial court's grant of summary disposition
to defendants was appropriate.
III
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court’s award of case evaluation sanctions in favor of
defendants should be reversed because it is clearly in the interest of justice to refuse to award
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sanctions under the unique circumstances in this case. In addition, plaintiff argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding unreasonable sanctions based on unreasonable hours and
rates. We disagree with both contentions.
A. Standard of Review
In Harbour v Correctional Medical Services, Inc, 266 Mich App 452, 465; 702 NW2d
671 (2005), this Court provided the following standard of review:
A trial court's decision to grant or deny case evaluation sanctions is subject to
review de novo on appeal. Elia v Hazen, 242 Mich App 374, 376-377; 619
NW2d 1 (2000). However, because a trial court's decision whether to award costs
pursuant to the "interest of justice" provision set forth in MCR 2.403(O)(11) is
discretionary, this Court reviews that decision for an abuse of discretion.
Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich App 179, 205 n 9; 667 NW2d 887 (2003). An
abuse of discretion may be found only when the result is so palpably and grossly
violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of
judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias. Dep't of Transportation v Randolph,
461 Mich 757, 768; 610 NW2d 893 (2000).
If applicable to the circumstances, the imposition of case evaluation sanctions is
mandatory, and a court’s decision whether to grant sanctions is a question of law subject to de
novo review on appeal. Cusumano v Velger, 264 Mich App 234, 235; 690 NW2d 309 (2004).
Determination of the rate for fees to include in a sanction is in the trial court’s discretion,
Zdrojewski v Murphy, 254 Mich App 50, 73; 657 NW2d 721 (2002), and this Court will uphold
the determination of the amount of the award absent an abuse of discretion, Elia, supra at 377.
An abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court’s decision was grossly violative of fact and
logic, or it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or
bias. Harbour, supra at 465.
B. Award of Case Evaluation Sanctions
Plaintiff contends that the case evaluation sanctions awards should be reversed based on
the interests of justice exception. A party who rejects an evaluation is subject to sanctions if he
fails to improve his position at trial. Elia v Hazen, 242 Mich App 374, 378; 619 NW2d 1 (2000).
MCR 2.403(O) provides in relevant part:
(1) If a party has rejected an evaluation and the action proceeds to verdict, that
party must pay the opposing party's actual costs unless the verdict is more
favorable to the rejecting party than the case evaluation. However, if the
opposing party has also rejected the evaluation, a party is entitled to costs only if
the verdict is more favorable to that party than the case evaluation.
(2) For the purpose of this rule "verdict" includes,
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(c) a judgment entered as a result of a ruling on a motion after rejection of the
case evaluation.
***
(11) If the "verdict" is the result of a motion as provided by subrule (O)(2)(c), the
court may, in the interest of justice, refuse to award actual costs.
Thus, if the verdict is the result of a judgment entered as the result of a motion after rejection of
the case evaluation, the court may, in the interests of justice, refuse to award actual costs. MCR
2.403(O)(11); Haliw v Sterling Hts, 471 Mich 700, 706; 691 NW2d 753 (2005). Such an interest
of justice exists when there is a legal issue of first impression presented, when the law is
unsettled and substantial damages are at issue, when a party is indigent and an issue merits
determination by a trier of fact, or when the effect on third persons might be significant. Haliw v
Sterling Heights, 257 Mich App 689, 707; 669 NW2d 563 (2003), rev’d on other grds 471 Mich
700; 691 NW2d 753, on rem 266 Mich App 444; 702 NW2d 637 (2005). The "interest of
justice" exception should be implicated only in "unusual circumstances." Id. at 707-709, citing
Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship (On Remand), 243 Mich App 461, 472; 624 NW2d 427
(2000), and Luidens v 63rd Dist Ct, 219 Mich App 24, 35-36; 555 NW2d 709 (1996). "'Other
circumstances, including misconduct on the part of the prevailing party, may also trigger [the
interest of justice] exception.'" Haliw, supra, 257 Mich App 707, quoting Luidens, supra at 36.
Absent such unusual circumstances discussed above, the general rule mandating an award of
costs applies. Id. 709.
The trial court in its opinion and order carefully addressed plaintiff’s arguments for the
interest of justice exception, and found that there was nothing unusual in the course of litigation
warranting the interests of justice exception and there were no issues of first impression. We are
not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to invoke the "interest of
justice" exception. As noted by the trial court, the reason for any delay for a trial court decision
was plaintiff’s request for leave to file a brief to exceed twenty pages and adjournments that were
granted at the request of plaintiff. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there are unusual
circumstances justifying application of this narrow exception. Contrary to plaintiff's argument,
this case does not present an issue of first impression. Rather, the issues raised have been
adequately addressed and covered by Michigan case law. There was no misconduct shown on
the part of defendants. Plaintiff rejected evaluation, and failed to improve her position at trial,
and no unusual circumstances exist to invoke the interest of justice exception. As such, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
C. Reasonableness of Case Evaluation Sanctions
Lastly, plaintiff disputes the amount of time and the hourly rates of the attorneys
requested and received as case evaluation sanctions. If sanctions are appropriate, the actual costs
to be charged are the costs taxable in any civil action plus a reasonable attorney fee. MCR
2.403(O)(6); Dessart v Burak, 470 Mich 37, 40; 678 NW2d 615 (2004). A reasonable attorney
fee must be based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate, as determined by the trial judge, for
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services necessitated by the rejection of the evaluation. MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b); Dessart, supra. If
the reasonableness of the fees is challenged, the court should conduct an evidentiary hearing
unless the parties have created a sufficient record. Jager v Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc, 252
Mich App 464, 488; 652 NW2d 503 (2002), overruled on the grounds in Elezovic v Ford Motor
Co, 472 Mich 408, 411; 697 NW2d 851 (2005).
In determining a reasonable hourly or daily rate, the trial court should use empirical data
contained in the Law Practice Survey and other reliable studies. This information should be
coordinated with other relevant criteria, including: (1) the professional standing and experience
of the lawyer; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results
achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client. Zdrojewski, supra at 72; Temple v Kelel
Distributing Co, 183 Mich App 326, 333; 454 NW2d 610 (1990); Jernigan v General Motors
Corp, 180 Mich App 575, 587; 447 NW2d 822 (1989). Reasonable fees are not equivalent to
actual fees charged. Zdrojewski, supra. Reasonable fees can include fees incurred through
representation by multiple lawyers. Attard v Citizens Ins Co, 237 Mich App 311, 329-330; 602
NW2d 633 (1999). Attorney fees necessitated by rejection of an evaluation must be causally
connected to the rejection. Haliw, supra, 471 Mich 711 n 8.
Defendants PHM, Cicone, and December requested $5,855 in actual attorney fees with an
hourly rate of $190 per hour for Attorney Richard Smith and $170 per hour for attorney Rebecca
Smith, and $40 in costs. Defendants SNC and Reick filed a motion for case evaluation sanctions
requesting $10,299.50, which included $345 per hour for Attorney Glazek and $120 per hour for
Attorney Viviano.
The trial court issued an opinion and order granting defendants’ motions for case
evaluation sanctions, but reduced Attorney Glazek’s rate from $345 per hour to $250 per hour.
A judgment was entered in favor of defendants SNC and Reick for $7,785 for case evaluation
sanctions, and a judgment was entered in favor of defendants PHM, Cicone, and December for
$5,895 in case evaluation sanctions.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating a reasonable attorney fee for
Attorney Glazeks' services at a rate of $250 an hour. The trial court was presented with evidence
of the relative experience of each attorney and affidavits stating that the rates were reasonable,
given the legal experience of each attorney and the locality of the action. The court was also
referred to statistics published by the State Bar of Michigan Bar Journal in 2003, which listed a
reported median hourly rate of $175.00. Attorney Glazek had requested $345 per hour. The trial
court, at the hearing, did ask Attorney Glazek representing SNC and Reick, the justification for
his $345 rate, and he replied that it was the same rate he charged all of his clients and that it was
comparable to what other firms in the same area charged. The trial court in allowing for $250
per hour recognized Attorney Glazek’s experience, and that his value should be above the
median. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering $250 per hour a reasonable fee
for Attorney Glazek because of his experience and longstanding relationship with the client.
Clearly, the trial court carefully considered this, and made a decision of what it thought was
reasonable. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s fee determination with regard to Attorney
Glazek did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
-12-
Plaintiff also objected to the alleged hours spent by the attorneys for SNC and Reick, who
spent a combined 21.6 hours to review and prepare a response to plaintiff’s brief in opposition to
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The trial court reviewed the parties’ briefs below
and heard arguments on the issue, and there is nothing on the record supporting this submitted
time was excessive. To the contrary, the record supports that plaintiff filed a lengthy brief,
raising issues, and citing a significant number of cases. Under the circumstances, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
We further note that plaintiff has cited no authority for her arguments that the number of
attorney hours was excessive and, thus, has abandoned the issue. The appellant may not merely
announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998); Ambs v Kalamazoo County
Road Comm, 255 Mich App 637, 650; 662 NW2d 424 (2003), nor may he give issues cursory
treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority, Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655
n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984); Silver Creek Twp v Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 99; 631 NW2d 346
(2001). Argument must be supported by citation to appropriate authority or policy. MCR
7.212(C)(7), Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351
(2003). An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes
abandonment of the issue. Yee v Shiawassee County Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406;
651 NW2d 756 (2002).
Plaintiff also argues that the fees requested by the attorneys for PHM, Cicone, and
December were excessive, but again cites no authority, thus, the issue has been abandoned. In
addition, there is nothing supporting that hours were excessive or unreasonable in light of the
fact that defendants were responding to such a lengthy brief from plaintiff. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion. 2
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
2
Plaintiff does not appear to have raised issue with the grant of summary disposition in regard to
her claims for promissory estoppel and fraud; thus, we need not address these issues on appeal.
-13-
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