V J BRANDON GOICHAI V LENDER LTD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
V. J. BRANDON GOICHAI,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 262823
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-431801-CL
LENDER LTD., d/b/a HOMETOWN
MORTGAGE LENDING,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court’s orders granting defendant summary
disposition and denying a motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
Plaintiff served as an officer for defendant, a provider of loans for home mortgages. The
federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act1 prohibits the use of bribes or kickbacks in
connection with mortgage-customer referrals. 12 USC 2607(a) and (b). Suspecting that such
violations were occurring within defendant’s operation, plaintiff reported his suspicions to the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. Plaintiff maintains that
defendant then retaliated with a campaign of harassment, resulting in his constructive discharge.
Plaintiff filed suit, initially asserting a violation of his rights under the Whistleblowers’
Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq. Then, conceding that state law did not provide
whistleblower protection to persons reporting to federal agencies, plaintiff asserted instead that
he was constructively discharged in violation of public policy.
1
12 USC 2601 et seq.
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The trial court initially granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the
ground that plaintiff failed to respond to it. However, after plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration, the trial court addressed and rejected plaintiff’s arguments.2
In general, “either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate
it at any time for any, or no, reason.” Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich
692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982). However, an exception exists “based on the principle that
some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable.”
Id. Normally such public policy is spelled out legislatively, but sometimes courts recognize
“sufficient legislative expression of policy to imply a cause of action for wrongful termination
even in the absence of an explicit prohibition on retaliatory discharges.” Id. Accordingly, a
cause of action for wrongful discharge may lie if the employee was terminated because of “the
failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment” or if termination was in
retaliation for “the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative
enactment.” Id. at 695-696. See also Dudewicz v Norris Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 79-80; 503
NW2d 645 (1993).
The trial court held that plaintiff’s actions in reporting suspected misdeeds to the federal
agency had no special “statutory blessing” and that plaintiff offered no evidence that he was
discharged for refusing to break the law. On appeal, plaintiff does not dispute the latter prong of
the trial court’s reasoning, but he argues that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that his
actions did enjoy statutory protection and that he was insulated from employment retaliation on
public policy grounds. We disagree.
Plaintiff points to 12 USC 2607(d)(5), which provides as follows: “In any private action
brought pursuant to this subsection, the court may award to the prevailing party the court costs of
the action together with reasonable attorneys fees.” This provision clearly envisions private
actions but does not imply that general public-spirited whistleblowers, as opposed to persons
actually suffering damages from the forbidden practices, can sue to enforce this legislative
scheme.
In arguing that Congress has encouraged mortgage lenders to implement internal
procedures to avoid improper kickbacks or referral fees, plaintiff cites 12 USC 2607(d)(3), which
provides:
No person or persons shall be liable for a violation of the provisions of
subsection (c)(4)(A) of this section if such person or persons proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that such violation was not intentional and resulted
from a bona fide error notwithstanding maintenance of procedures that are
reasonably adapted to avoid such error.
2
The trial court referred to the resulting order as a denial of reconsideration. However, because
the court in fact decided this case on the merits, we will review the decision accordingly.
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12 USC 2607(c)(4)(A) in turn establishes that affiliated business arrangements do not constitute
violations if proper disclosures and estimates are provided. Plaintiff suggests that legislation
shielding from liability lenders who can show the “maintenance of procedures . . . reasonably
adapted to avoid . . . error” in providing disclosures or estimates constitutes congressional
authorization to lenders’ officers to report violations. This reasoning is strained.
Although plaintiff had a right to displease his employer and report whatever misconduct
concerned him to whatever authorities he chose, he was not in this instance acting in furtherance
of a sufficiently identified legislative right so as to insulate him from termination of his at-will
employment in response. As the trial court noted, plaintiff’s conduct may have been
commendable, but it was not protected from his employer’s retaliation. The trial court correctly
granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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