DALE L SMITH V PARENTS & TEACHERS TOGETHER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DALE L. SMITH, Next Friend of JUAN
RODELA, JR., a Minor,
UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
PARENTS & TEACHERS TOGETHER, a/k/a
PATT, and RICK MCNEIL, MELISSA RENNER,
and MICHELLE PALPANT,
No. 254876
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-008459-NO
Defendants-Appellants,
and
KRISTEN ISOM, JAMES HARTLEY, DEBI
WAGNER, LORI COLE, and JUDY HAYES,
Defendants.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Hoekstra and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellants1 appeal as of right from the circuit court’s order denying their
motion for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity. We reverse the order
denying the motion for summary disposition, and remand for entry of an order granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I.
Facts and Procedures
This Court summarized the underlying facts in an earlier opinion in this case:
1
We will refer to appellants as defendants throughout this opinion.
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On January 25, 1999, plaintiff’s next friend, then two-year-old Juan
Rodela, Jr., was allegedly injured while he was under care provided by Parents
and Teachers Together (PATT), which was conducting a meeting at Madison
Junior High School that Juan’s mother was attending. Juan was struck in the head
by a student who was practicing a cheerleading maneuver. Thereafter, plaintiff
brought this action against the principal of the school, Debi Wagner, and the
cheerleading coach, Lori Cole, alleging negligence and gross negligence related to
the provision of such childcare services, including because it was rendered in the
vicinity of practicing cheerleaders.
Subsequently, plaintiff amended his complaint to include as defendants
PATT, Rick McNeil as president of PATT, Melissa Renner and Michelle Palpant
as representatives of PATT and members of its “babysitting committee,” Kristen
Isom as head of the athletic office for Madison Schools, James Hartley as
superintendent of Madison Schools, and Judy Hayes as the adult advisor for the
“Service Learning Class.” Plaintiff alleged that PATT, McNeil, Renner, Palpant,
Hartley, Wagner, and Hayes were negligent and grossly negligent with regard to
their “operation of a child care center” and associated provision of childcare
services. Plaintiff alleged that Isom and Cole were negligent and grossly
negligent for permitting cheerleading activities in the vicinity of children. [Smith
v Parents & Teachers Together, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued June 26, 2003 (Docket No. 236214), slip op at 1.]
The trial court initially granted summary disposition to all defendants on the ground that they
were entitled to governmental immunity and that none of the alleged negligence rose to the level
of gross negligence.2 This Court affirmed in connection with the defendants who were
employees of the school district, but reversed in connection with PATT and the individual
defendants affiliated with it. Id., slip op at 4-5.
On remand, the PATT defendants presented additional evidence and authorities to show
that they did indeed come under the protections of the governmental immunity statute. The trial
court expressed agreement with defendants’ position, but interpreted this Court’s earlier opinion
as foreclosing further consideration of that issue. The trial court therefore denied defendants’
motion, and this appeal followed. We conclude that the trial court understandably refrained from
deciding this question anew on summary disposition, but ultimately erred in failing to grant
defendants’ motion.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo
as a question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). A
motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity is decided by examining all
documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true,
2
See MCL 691.1407.
-2-
and construing all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 87; 687 NW2d 333 (2004).
Governmental agencies are generally immune from tort liability for actions taken in
furtherance of governmental functions. MCL 691.1407(1). Immunity also extends to every
“officer and employee of a governmental agency . . . while in the course of employment or
service . . . .” MCL 691.1407(2). An exception exists where the state agent’s conduct
constitutes “gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury . . . .” MCL
691.1407(2)(c). In this case, the trial court concluded that there was no gross negligence below,
and this Court unambiguously affirmed that aspect of the decision. Smith, slip op at 4. The
question that remains is whether the PATT defendants have shown on remand that PATT and its
members are entitled to governmental immunity.3
A public school district is a “level of government,” or more precisely a “political
subdivision,” for purposes of governmental immunity. Nalepa v Plymouth-Canton Community
School Dist, 207 Mich App 580, 587; 525 NW2d 897 (1994), aff’d without “indicating . . .
agreement with the reasoning set forth in the Court of Appeals opinion” sub nom Nalepa v
Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp, 450 Mich 934 (1995); MCL 691.1401(b). MCL
380.485(2)(a) states that the “board of a first class school district shall . . . [p]rovide for an
autonomous school-community organization in each school within the school district,” which
“shall be open to all parents and other residents of the school attendance area.” The PATT
defendants point to evidence that the Madison School District organized PATT in fulfillment of
its statutory duties, that the district funds PATT in part, that PATT places its money in the
district’s general account, and that PATT provides services to a plethora of school related
activities. The PATT defendants argue that PATT is a component of the district along with the
district’s sports programs, school newspaper, and student council.
On our de novo review of the record, we conclude that defendants are entitled to assert
governmental immunity, as the PATT falls within the statutory definitions and the individual
defendants were volunteers acting on behalf of a governmental agency. MCL 691.1407(2).
Specifically, a governmental agency is defined as, inter alia, a political subdivision, MCL
691.1401(d), while a political subdivision is defined to include school districts, as well as “a . . .
authority authorized by law or formed by 1 or more political subdivisions.” MCL 691.1401(b).
The PATT is an authority established by a political subdivision (the school district) by virtue of
MCL 380.485(2), which requires a first-class school district to “[p]rovide for an autonomous
school-community organization in each school within the school district.”
The undisputed evidence shows that the PATT was established pursuant to the mandate
of MCL 380.485(2). Additionally, the undisputed evidence establishes that the PATT functions
3
We recognize the somewhat contradictory provisions of our prior opinion. However, we
believe that our holding did not preclude a further analysis, based on additional evidence, of the
question of whether defendants were entitled to a defense of governmental immunity.
-3-
as intended, as it provides fundraising for school related items and functions, and the school
district provides financial accounts for the organization.4 That the PATT makes independent
decisions on how to spend the money raised for a school is consistent with the autonomy it is
given by statute. Therefore, PATT is entitled to governmental immunity. Additionally, the
remaining individual defendants were undisputedly acting as volunteers for PATT during the
course of the acts at issue in this case, and are only liable if their conduct was grossly negligent.
MCL 691.1407(2).
Because our prior opinion concluded that there was no evidence of gross negligence as
defined by statute, Smith, supra, slip op at 4, we hold that defendants were entitled to statutory
immunity. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for summary
disposition, and remand for entry of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
4
Plaintiff’s suggestion that the PATT also supports organizations other than the school is
without merit. The testimony was that the PATT would financially sponsor school groups who
were engaged in collective efforts on behalf of charitable organizations, for example, students
participating in Walk America. Thus, the only reason PATT made a contribution to a charitable
cause was because of student participation in the event.
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