FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INS CO V TITAN INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 25, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 262345
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-076529-NZ
TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and White and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We reverse.
Steven Onore was killed in an automobile accident while he was a passenger in a car
driven by Chad Furtick and owned by Larry Furtick. Larry Furtick owned four motor vehicles,
three of which, including the 1998 Chevy Camaro involved in the accident, were insured with
plaintiff, and one of which was totally unrelated to the accident and insured with defendant.
Onore was not the named insured on any no-fault policy, nor did he have a spouse or resident
relative with any such insurance.
Onore’s survivors claimed benefits from plaintiff, who paid personal injury protection
(PIP) benefits, then sought partial recoupment from defendant. When the defendant refused,
plaintiff commenced this action. The parties brought cross-motions for summary disposition on
the basis of their respective readings of MCL 500.3114(4), which provides in relevant part that
a person suffering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident
while an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance
benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied.
(b) The insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.
Plaintiff acknowledged that it specifically listed the Camaro on its insurance declaration
sheet, but nevertheless maintained that defendant was also technically an “insurer of the owner
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of the vehicle” in question because Larry Furtick insured the unrelated car through defendant.
Plaintiff asserted that the plain language of MCL 500.3114(4) made defendant an insurer of
equal priority, so the priority statute, MCL 500.3115(2), requires defendant to share the liability
for paying PIP benefits. Defendant argued that MCL 500.3114(4)(a) envisions only a single
insurer, so only plaintiff was liable as the provider of the policy of insurance on the Camaro.
The trial court agreed and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it interpreted MCL 500.3114(4)
to mean that only one insurance company could ever be responsible for providing PIP benefits.
We agree. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). Likewise, we review de
novo a trial court’s interpretation of a statute. Id. at 690. “‘The primary purpose of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.’” Id., quoting
Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass’n v Ware, 230 Mich App 44, 49; 583 NW2d 240 (1998).
Our Supreme Court’s handling of a similar situation in Detroit Automobile InterInsurance Exchange [DAIIE] v Home Ins Co, 428 Mich 43, 48; 405 NW2d 85 (1987), and the
statutory scheme itself contradicts defendant’s proposition that only one insurer is ever liable for
PIP benefits under MCL 500.3114(4)(a). In DAIIE, our Supreme Court held that two companies
that each insured a different car owned by one man should share liability for paying PIP benefits
to the man’s widow, even though neither insurance company covered the car that he was driving
at the time of his fatal accident. DAIIE, supra. The Court held the companies equally
responsible because the statute stated that, “the injured person’s insurer shall pay all of the
benefits . . . .” MCL 500.3114(1). Despite the statute’s plain use of the singular “insurer,” the
Court rephrased the statute as “Since benefits would be payable by either the insurer(s) of the
injured person . . . , or the insurer of the injured person’s spouse . . . , the benefits are to be paid
by the insurer(s) of [the deceased driver].” DAIIE, supra. Therefore, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Legislature’s use of the singular noun did not reflect its intent to hold only
one insurer responsible for paying benefits in a given case.
This interpretation of the statute accords with the Legislature’s adoption of MCL
500.3115(2), which states that two or more insurance companies of equal priority must split the
burden of paying PIP benefits. All of the priority provisions in MCL 500.3114 use the singular
form of the noun “insurer” when discussing priority, but MCL 500.3114(6) and MCL
500.3115(2) each indicate an awareness that multiple insurers might sometimes wind up in the
highest priority category. Obviously, if MCL 500.3114 ultimately held only one insurer liable in
each situation, the provisions requiring shared liability would be nugatory. Therefore, the
Legislature anticipated that more than one insurer might fit the description in MCL
500.3114(4)(a), and, through MCL 500.3115(2), it took precautionary steps to resolve any
controversy that would result. This forethought belies defendant’s argument that the Legislature
never intended to include more than one insurer in the priority category of MCL 500.3114(4)(a).
Defendant essentially wants us to superimpose our own priority configuration over the
Legislature’s so that we can narrow multiple statutorily liable insurers down to one, ultimately
liable insurer. Of course, defendant argues that it could not be “the [responsible] insurer”
because it did not list the Camaro on its declaration sheet and plaintiff did. However, defendant
fails to point to any statutory basis for its proposed “tiebreaker.” We do not believe that
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amending the statutory priority scheme according to our preferences would effectuate the
Legislature’s intent.
However, we will not order the trial court to enter summary disposition in plaintiff’s
favor either, because several questions remain regarding whether defendant fits into the same
category of priority with plaintiff. For example, the record lacks any indication that defendant
insured the accident at all, especially given the fact that plaintiff clearly insured it. We note that
many car insurance policies, including plaintiff’s, ordinarily exclude coverage for accidents that
occur in automobiles that the owner does not expressly insure under the policy but, instead,
insure with a different company under a different policy. Obviously, if defendant does not cover
the accident at issue, it is no more an “insurer” for purposes of MCL 500.3114(2) than the
insurer of Larry Furtick’s life, home, or boat. While we suspect that an exclusion of this type
will ultimately relieve defendant from liability, the issue is not before us.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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