BEN PHILLIPS V EST OF JACOB HEIKKINEN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BEN PHILLIPS and DEBRA PHILLIPS,
UNPUBLISHED
October 13, 2005
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 258703
Chippewa Circuit Court
LC No. 01-005942-CZ
THE ESTATE OF JACOB HEIKKINEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Sawyer and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this quiet-title action involving the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA), MCL
565.101 et seq., defendant appeals as of right an order of the circuit court granting summary
disposition in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9). This appeal also involves a prior
order of the court denying defendant’s motion for entry of a formal order of dismissal pursuant to
MCR 2.502 for lack of progress. This case revolves around a reservation of mineral rights set
forth in a 1918 deed of conveyance that was not found in any documents of conveyance after
August 1948. We affirm, albeit on grounds different than those cited by the circuit court.
We review lower court decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Dressel v
Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion for summary disposition
brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) entitles the movant to judgment if the opposing party has
failed to state a valid defense to a claim. Such a motion “is tested solely by reference to the
parties’ pleadings.” Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 47; 457 NW2d 637 (1990).
While we agree that the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of
plaintiffs under MCR 2.116(C)(9), we find that summary disposition was proper under MCR
2.116(C)(10).1 “[I]f a trial court errs in granting summary disposition under the wrong subrule,
1
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant failed to file notice of their purported mineral interest within
the forty-year statutory window, as prescribed by MCL 565.103. Defendants denied this
allegation as untrue. Although subsequent discovery revealed that plaintiffs’ allegation was, in
fact, accurate, it is irrelevant for purposes of a (C)(9) motion. Where “‘a material allegation of
the complaint is categorically denied, summary [disposition] under [MCR 2.116(C)(9)] is
improper.’” Nasser, supra at 47, quoting Pontiac School Dist v Bloomfield Twp, 417 Mich 579,
(continued…)
-1-
this Court may review the issue under the correct subrule. Also, it is axiomatic that this Court
will not reverse a trial court’s decision if the correct result is reached for the wrong reason.”
Computer Network, Inc v AM Gen Corp, 265 Mich App 309, 313; 696 NW2d 49 (2005)(citation
omitted).
The MRTA provides that any person with the legal capacity to own land “who has an
unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for 20 years for mineral interests and 40
years for other interests, shall at the end of the applicable period be considered to have a
marketable record title to that interest[.]” MCL 565.101.2 An unbroken chain of title is
considered to exist where public records disclose a conveyance occurring “not less than 20 years
in the past for mineral interests and 40 years for other interests, which conveyance . . . purports
to create the interest in that person, with nothing appearing of record purporting to divest that
person of the purported interest,” MCL 565.102(a), or where the same occurs through a series of
conveyances, MCL 565.102(b). Where an individual acquires marketable title, any claim of
interest which depends on an act, transaction, event, or omission outside the appropriate term of
years for its existence is extinguished, declared null and void, and of no legal effect. MCL
565.103.3 Such an interest may be preserved, however, by the filing of proper notice identifying
the interest within the applicable twenty- or forty-year timeframe. Id.
Plaintiffs can establish an unbroken chain of title, devoid of defendant’s purported
interest, rooted in an August 1948 quitclaim deed. There is nothing in that deed purporting to
(…continued)
585; 339 NW2d 465 (1983) (alteration by Nasser Court).
2
The MRTA defines “mineral interest” to be “an interest in minerals in any land if the interest in
minerals is owned by a person other than the owner of the surface of the land. Mineral interest
does not include an interest in oil or gas or an interest in sand, gravel, limestone, clay, or marl.”
MCL 565.101a. Here, whether the mineral interest at issue satisfies the statutory definition
remains a question of fact unresolved by the trial court. There was some indication on the record
that the interest is a limestone derivative, which would not fall under the above definition. This
question is irrelevant for purposes here, because as will be shown, summary disposition was
proper in any case.
3
MCL 565.103 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Marketable title shall be held by a person and shall be taken by his or her
successors in interest free and clear of any and all interests, claims, and charges
whatsoever the existence of which depends in whole or in part upon any act,
transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to the 20-year period for
mineral interests, and the 40-year period for other interests, and all interests,
claims, and charges are hereby declared to be null and void and of no effect at law
or in equity. However, an interest, claim, or charge may be preserved and kept
effective by filing for record within 3 years after the effective date of the
amendatory act that added section 1a or during the 20-year period for mineral
interests and the 40-year period for other interests, a notice in writing, verified by
oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. [Footnote omitted.]
-2-
divest the vendee of a fee simple interest in the property, and thus nothing purporting to divest
subsequent titleholders of the same. Under the plain terms of the MRTA, plaintiffs have
established an unbroken chain of title, MCL 565.102, and thus have acquired marketable title,
MCL 565.101. While defendant’s purported mineral interest might have been preserved by the
filing of a proper statutory notice, MCL 565.103, it is undisputed that no such notice was filed
within the requisite timeframe. Indeed, defendant admitted the same in their response to
plaintiffs’ interrogatories. As a result, defendant’s claimed mineral interest is, as a matter of law,
extinguished and rendered null and void. MCL 565.103; see also Fowler v Doan, 261 Mich App
595, 600; 683 NW2d 682 (2004).
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim
twenty-eight days after the court issued a notice of dismissal for lack of progress. We disagree.
“The removal of a case from the no-progress docket or the dismissal of a cause of action for want
of prosecution are addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Eliason Corp, Inc v Dep’t of
Labor, 133 Mich App 200, 203; 348 NW2d 315 (1984); accord Wickings v Arctic Enterprises,
Inc, 244 Mich App 125, 137; 624 NW2d 197 (2000). Our review is restricted to determining
whether there is any justification in the record for the trial court’s ruling. Eliason, supra at 203.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. MCR 2.502(A)(1) provides
that a “court may order that an action in which no steps or proceedings appear to have been taken
within 91 days be dismissed for lack of progress unless the parties show that progress is being
made or that the lack of progress is not attributable to the party seeking affirmative relief.” MCR
2.502(B) provides as follows:
(1) If a party does not make the required showing, the court may direct
the clerk to dismiss the action for lack of progress. Such a dismissal is without
prejudice unless the court specifies otherwise.
(2) If an action is not dismissed under this rule, the court shall enter
orders to facilitate the prompt and just disposition of the action.
Within the time frame provided for in its notice of dismissal, plaintiffs filed a motion for
summary disposition with the court. It was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that
plaintiffs’ filing of such a motion constituted sufficient progress as to obviate the need for
dismissal under MCR 2.502.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
