IN RE COLIN WILSDON MINOR

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS In the Matter of COLIN WILSDON, Minor. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, UNPUBLISHED September 29, 2005 Petitioner-Appellee, v No. 262990 Hillsdale Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 03-000702-NA NICOLE WILSDON, Respondent-Appellant, and MICHAEL SHARP, Respondent. Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Neff and Donofrio, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent Nicole Wilsdon appeals as of right from an order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i) and (g). We affirm. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were each established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 450-451; 592 NW2d 751 (1999). From the time of the original petition in November 2003, until the termination hearing in April 2005, respondent did not maintain stable housing or employment. She did not support the child, and she shoplifted, failed to pay fines, and failed to comply with the court’s orders, leading to periods of incarceration. She stopped visiting her son after December 21, 2004, and failed to provide the court with her new address when she moved to the Detroit area. We disagree with respondent’s argument that termination was not warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because, at the time of the termination hearing, she had been living in the same apartment for over four months and had held the same job for two months. In light of respondent’s past history of frequent moves and job changes, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that those periods were too short to conclude that the pattern of unstable housing and employment had been rectified. -1- With respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), respondent argues that the trial court ignored the testimony of her pastor that she would be able to provide care for the child in six months. However, the pastor acknowledged that he had only begun counseling respondent and her boyfriend and they had not worked on or discussed the issue of parenting. The pastor was also unaware of the “particulars” of the case until he listened to the testimony at the termination hearing. Moreover, respondent’s failures to maintain stable housing or employment, despite previous counseling efforts, provided reason for the court to discount the pastor’s six-month estimate. The trial court did not clearly err in determining that respondent would not be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. Because only one statutory ground is necessary for termination of parental rights, In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 247; 599 NW2d 772 (1999), we need not determine whether the trial court properly relied on MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) as an additional statutory ground for termination. Because termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g), any error in this regard was harmless. Respondent also argues that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests because of the bond between herself and her child. However, the trial court found that respondent had deserted the child since December 21, 2004, that her history indicated that she could not maintain stability in her life for more than a few months, and that subjecting the child to an uncertain future was not in his best interests. The trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not contrary to the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We affirm. /s/ Richard A. Bandstra /s/ Janet T. Neff /s/ Pat M. Donofrio -2-

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