PEOPLE OF MI V ALANZO CALES SEALS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 255873
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 04-002074-FC
ALANZO CALES SEALS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Talbot and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of armed robbery of Allyn Goodlock, MCL
750.529, and assault with intent to rob Susan Mayes while armed (AWIRWA), MCL 750.89.
Related to those convictions, defendant was also found guilty of two counts of possessing a
firearm while committing a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Prior to trial, at the
suggestion of the trial judge, defendant also stipulated to the fact that he had a prior felony
conviction and was not legally entitled to possess a firearm, agreeing that if the jury convicted
him of armed robbery, he would automatically be guilty of being a felon in possession of a
weapon, MCL 750.224f, and, related to that, a third count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b.
The judgment of sentence indicates that defendant was sentenced for these two counts after a
“finding by the court,” rather than after convictions.
The trial court sentenced defendant as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to
concurrent terms of 260 months to 780 months’ imprisonment for the convictions for armed
robbery and AWIRWA, and two to five years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of a
firearm “finding.” Defendant was also sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on the felonyfirearm convictions relating to the armed robbery and AWIRWA, as well as for the felonyfirearm “finding” relating to the felon in possession of a firearm charge. The felony-firearm
sentences were to be served consecutively to the other sentences but concurrently with each
other. Defendant now appeals by right. We affirm defendant’s convictions for armed robbery
and assault with intent to rob, and the two felony-firearm convictions related to those counts.
We, however, vacate defendant’s “convictions” on the felon in possession of a firearm and
felony-firearm counts that were not submitted to the jury, and we remand for a new trial on those
counts.
This case arises out of the armed robbery of Allyn Goodlock on December 20, 2003.
Goodlock was sitting in a truck with his date, Susan Mayes, in a Bob Evans parking lot when the
-1-
driver’s side door “popped open” and two assailants demanded Goodlock’s money, cell phone,
and truck keys, which Goodlock gave them. One of the assailants had a gun that he pressed
against Goodlock’s chest. The gunman never pointed the gun directly at Mayes, and neither of
the assailants demanded anything from her, other than to tell her to “put [her] hands up.” Both
Goodlock and Mayes identified defendant as the gunman.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime of
assault with intent to rob with respect to Mayes. We disagree.
Defendant has mischaracterized his argument as a sufficiency question. He is, in reality,
asking the legal question of whether a conviction for AWIRWA requires the specific intent to
rob the person assaulted. Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. People v Wolfe,
251 Mich App 239, 242; 651 NW2d 72 (2002) (citations omitted).
In People v Harris, 110 Mich App 636, 640; 313 NW2d 334 (1981), the four defendants
entered a bank; two were carrying weapons. A security guard fired at one of the defendants and
that defendant aimed his gun at the guard. Id. at 640-641. Another defendant shot at the guard.
Id. On appeal, the defendants argued that the crime of assault with intent to rob required the
prosecution to prove that they intended to rob the guard. Id. at 643. This Court rejected that
argument and stated the following:
The statute in question does not specify that “the intent to rob” be directed at the
person assaulted. A more reasonable interpretation would be that the assault be
committed as a means to further the intended robbery, be it of the assaulted
person or another. . . . The assaults were not gratuitous or committed on whim
but rather to perpetuate the robbery. We interpret such an assault to fall within
the statutory language. [Id. at 643-644.]
In the present case, although there is no evidence that defendant intended to take anything
from Mayes, he told her to put her hands up and reasonably put her in fear for her life. On crossexamination, Mayes testified that she “was scared to death to go near [defendant], after what [she
had] been through.” Defendant’s assault on Mayes prevented her from aiding Goodlock herself,
or from running away to seek help from authorities, thus furthering the intended robbery of
Goodlock. Based on this Court’s holding in Harris, defendant’s argument is without merit.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the
crime of AWIRWA requires the specific intent to rob Mayes and not just an intent to rob. We
disagree.
Defendant has waived his right to appeal the jury instructions. After instructing the jury,
the trial court stated, “with regards to the instructions of the Court, any objections, deletions,
etcetera?” To which defense counsel responded, “If your honor please, none of the Court’s
instructions.” Similarly, in People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688; 660 NW2d 322 (2003), the
trial court asked if there were any objects to the jury instructions and defense counsel responded,
“No, your honor.” This Court determined that the defendant had, therefore, expressly approved
the instructions and waived his right to appeal. Id., citing People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215;
612 NW2d 144 (2000). Like the defendant in Lueth, defendant in the present case expressed
acceptance of the instructions, thereby waiving his right to appeal this issue. In any event,
-2-
defendant’s challenge of the jury instruction on the charge of AWIRWA is without merit
because, as we stated previously, the statute does not require the specific intent to rob the person
assaulted.
Finally, defendant argues that his stipulation not to send to the jury the charge of felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, and to allow an
automatic conviction on those counts if he was found guilty of the armed robbery, was analogous
to a waiver of a jury trial and pleading guilty, and so the court erred by not adhering to the
procedural requirements for jury waivers and guilty pleas. We agree.
At an April 2, 2004, hearing,1 defendant stipulated to the fact that he was a felon at the
time the robbery occurred, thereby eliminating the need for the prosecution to present evidence
1
The following is an excerpt from the hearing:
THE COURT:
This is the matter of People v. Alanzo Cales Seals, S-E-A-
L-S; 04-2074. Kathleen Rezmierski is here on behalf of the People, Paul R. Adams is
here on behalf of the Defendant
MR. ADAMS:
matter this afternoon.
If Your Honor please, thank you very much for taking the
Mr. Seals – there was a question of whether or not we could waive jury trial, and
Mr. Seals would like to stay on a jury trial docket.
Is that correct, Mr. Seals?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. ADAMS:
And – but, however, with regard to the matter of proofs,
one of the charges in the case is felon being in possession of a firearm.
We will stipulate – the Defense will stipulate that Mr. Seals has been convicted of
a felony. I don’t think the jury needs to know what kind of felony, but, when Your
Honor instructs, you can – Your Honor could indicate to them that it is stipulated
between the parties that he does have a felony. So, that takes care of one of the
elements of proof that (inaudible).
THE COURT:
What was done in the past is that – I don’t know, people are
going to – going to want to hear is that it would be stipulated to that, if he were to be
found guilty of any of the others, that is was stipulated that he was a – a felon at the
time this occurred, and if the jury then proved that he did have a firearm in his
possession that that then would be automatic proof so that the whole matter of felon in
possession of a firearm would not come to the jury to taint the jury.
MR. ADAMS:
And this won’t –
(continued…)
-3-
(…continued)
Do you under stand what he’s saying?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
MR. ADAMS:
He’s saying they’ll take that away from the jury, but we
agree that, if the jury says you did and armed robbery with a gun, then we would – then
that takes away – then it is automatic that you are a felon in possession of the firearm.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible) –
MR. ADAMS:
If they find you guilty –
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
MR. ADAMS:
– of doing anything –
THE COURT:
See, the idea is that, otherwise, the jury hears that you’ve
got a prior felony conviction. This way, the idea is to have the jury not hear that you’ve
got a prior felony, but, instead, just agree that, if the jury says you did an armed robbery
and you had a pistol in you possession, then its agree that you are automatically guilty
of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The jury doesn’t consider that. So the jury doesn’t hear about it. It’s to your
advantage.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT:
Prosecutor –
MR. ADAMS:
Does that sound like the way we ought to go?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. ADAMS:
Okay.
Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
We’ve done that before.
MS. REZMIERSKI: Does that mean also – that’s certainly fine with me. Does
that mean they’re also in agreement the he would be guilty of a felony firearm count –
THE COURT:
Yeah. He’d be –
MS. REZMIERSKI: – for that charge as well? Because there is –
(continued…)
-4-
of that element of the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Beyond that, however, the
procedure by which the trial court allowed defendant to agree that he is “automatically guilty of
being a felon in possession of a firearm,” and of the corresponding felony-firearm count, is not
provided for in any statute or court rule. The trial court failed to follow the procedural
requirements of MCR 6.402 and 6.403 for defendant to waive his right to a jury trial and for the
court to convict him after a bench trial. The trial court also failed to meet the requirements of
MCR 6.302 that would permit the court to accept defendant’s stipulation as a guilty plea. In fact,
our review of the record reveals that defendant was never convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, or of the corresponding felony-firearm charge, at all. Rather, as the
judgment of sentence indicates, plaintiff was sentenced for these crimes on the basis of a
“finding by the court.”
Generally, a party cannot stipulate to something and then raise a claim of error on appeal
based on the result; such affirmative conduct constitutes waiver. See People v Aldrich, 246 Mich
App 101, 111; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). A defendant’s entry of a plea of guilty and concomitant
waiver of a jury trial, however, cannot correspondingly constitute a waiver of the burden placed
on the government to prove its case. See Patterson v New York, 432 US 197, 215; 97 S Ct 2319;
53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977), (“[A] State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt and . . . may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that
ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense.”). Accordingly, the burden of proof
is not the defendant’s to waive. See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d
368 (1970) (noting the importance “in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs have confidence that the Government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty”).
Moreover, unpreserved constitutional error classified as structural error requires
automatic reversal. People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 51; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). “Structural
errors are defects that affect the framework of the trial, infect the truth-gathering process, and
deprive the trial of constitutional protections without which the trial cannot reliably serve its
function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” People v Watkins, 247 Mich App
14, 26; 634 NW2d 370 (2001), aff’d on other grounds 468 Mich 233; 661 NW2d 553 (2003),
citing United States v Pavelko, 992 F2d 32, 35 (CA 3, 1993).
The Supreme Court articulated the difference between trial error and
structural error in Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed
2d 302 (1991). A trial error occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury.
It can be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence for the purpose
of determining whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 307308.
(…continued)
THE COURT:
Well did they –
Oh, I see. It would be Count VI.
-5-
A structural error, on the other hand, affects the framework of the trial
proceeding. It is more than a mere error in presenting the proofs of guilt. Id. at
310. When a structural error occurs, a criminal trial cannot serve as a reliable
vehicle for the determination of guilt. No criminal punishment could be fair if
structural error existed in the framework of the trial. Id. [People v Bell, 473 Mich
275, 311; 702 NW2d 128 (2005) (KELLY, J., dissenting).]
Although the United States Supreme Court has found structural errors only in a very
limited class of cases,2 the error in the case at bar was structural in as much as defendant was
denied his constitutional right to have his guilt determined by a jury of his peers without
knowingly and voluntarily waiving that right. The trial court in this case told defendant,
[T]he idea is to have the jury not hear that you’ve got a prior felony, but, instead,
just agree that, if the jury says that you did an armed robbery and you had a pistol
in your possession, then it’s agreed that you are automatically guilty of being a
felon in possession of a firearm.
The jury doesn’t consider that. So the jury doesn’t hear about it. It’s to
your advantage.
If defendant was entering a conditional plea, the trial court failed to follow the procedural
safeguards mandated by MCL 6.302, assuring an understanding, voluntary, and accurate plea. If,
on the other hand, defendant was waiving his right to a jury trial and allowing the felon in
possession of a firearm and felony-firearm charges to be tried by the court, stipulating that he
was a felon at the time of the crime, the trial court failed to either advise defendant of his
constitutional right to a jury trial and determine that he voluntarily waived that right, or to state
its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, as required by MCL 6.402 and 6.403.
A waiver is “‘the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Carter, supra
at 215 (citations omitted). We fail to understand how telling defendant that it is to his advantage
to stipulate to automatic guilt ensures that his constitutional right to a jury trial was waived
knowingly and voluntarily, especially in light of the fact that our Supreme Court has ruled that
juries are not required to return consistent verdicts. People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443, 448; 330
NW2d 16 (1982); People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463, 464; 295 NW2d 354 (1980). Accordingly,
we vacate defendant’s “convictions” and sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm
and the corresponding felony-firearm violation, and we remand for a new trial on those counts.
2
See Johnson v US, 520 US 461, 468-469; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 (1997), citing
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) (a total deprivation of the
right to counsel); Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275; 113 S Ct 2078; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993)
(erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to jury); Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254; 106 S Ct 617;
88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986) (unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant’s race); Waller v
Georgia, 467 US 39; 104 S Ct 2210; 81 L Ed 2d 31 (1984) (the right to a public trial); McKaskle
v Wiggins, 465 US 168; 104 S Ct 944; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984) (the right to self-representation at
trial); Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437; 71 L Ed 749 (1927) (lack of an impartial trial
judge).
-6-
Defendant also notes in his brief on appeal that vacating these counts would affect the
calculation of the sentencing guidelines and the sentences imposed for the other convictions.
Defendant argues that this Court should, therefore, remand for resentencing on the counts of
armed robbery and AWIRWA. Defendant, however, failed to formally brief this issue or state
which sentencing variables were affected or by how many points. “Failure to brief a question on
appeal is tantamount to abandoning it.” People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639
NW2d 291 (2001). “‘An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claim nor may he give only cursory treatment
[of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.’” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich
App 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004), quoting People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629
NW2d 411 (2001) (alteration by Matuszak). We, therefore, decline to address this issue.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences with regard to armed robbery,
AWIRWA, and the two corresponding counts of felony-firearm. We vacate defendant’s
“convictions” and sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm and the corresponding
felony-firearm, and we remand for a new trial on those counts. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.