PYTHAGOREAN INC V GRAND RAPIDS TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PYTHAGOREAN, INC,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 254369
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 98-05394-AW
GRAND RAPIDS TOWNSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Murphy and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a lower court order granting defendant’s motion for
dismissal/directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case at a bench trial. We affirm.
This is not the first time this matter has come before us. We explained the underlying
facts in an earlier appeal as follows:
In 1995, plaintiff filed an application with defendant to rezone plaintiff’s
property from an R-1 (single-family residential) to a C-1 (suburban neighborhood
commercial) zoning classification. Plaintiff sought the rezoning so that it could
construct a combination of offices and retail space on the property. Following a
public hearing, defendant's planning commission voted to recommend that
defendant's board deny the application, which the board did on October 24, 1995.
In 1996, plaintiff filed another application requesting that the property be
rezoned to a planned unit development classification that would allow
neighborhood commercial uses. [Randall Kraker] [c]ounsel for defendant advised
that office use had been designated for the property by the master plan since 1990
and that, therefore, defending continued zoning restrictions allowing only singlefamily residential use would be difficult. On its own initiative, the planning
commission scheduled a hearing on a proposal to rezone the property to a C-2
(suburban office use) classification and, on May 27, 1997, the commission
adopted that proposal. On July 1, 1997, defendant's board adopted the planning
commission's recommendation to rezone plaintiff's property from R-1 to C-2.
Plaintiff thereafter brought suit against defendant, alleging that the board
had “arbitrarily, capriciously, and without substantial or material basis” denied
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plaintiff's application to use the property for commercial purposes. Plaintiff also
sought compensation for inverse condemnation. Pythagorean, Inc v Grand
Rapids Twp, 253 Mich App 525, 526-527; 656 NW2d 212 (2002).
The prior appeal pertained to a discovery dispute. On remand and at trial, plaintiff
argued that defendant’s 1997 rezoning of the property from R-1 to C-2 was done in bad faith to
manufacture a defense to the litigation, so defendant should be estopped from asserting that the
property is zoned C-2 for the purposes of plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. However, the
trial court found that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant had rezoned the property C-2 for
the sole purpose of manufacturing a defense to this action, so the C-2 classification was
applicable. The trial court concluded that the evidence tending to show bad faith also established
a valid reason for the rezoning: to bring the zoning of plaintiff’s property into conformity with
the 1990 Master Plan. The trial court noted that the property would be more valuable zoned C-1,
but because it nevertheless had substantial value zoned C-2, the classification did not deprive
plaintiff of all economically beneficial use of the property.
Plaintiff argues only that the trial court erred in applying the C-2 zoning classification
instead of the R-1 zoning classification to its inverse condemnation claim. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of a zoning ordinance amendment
for an abuse of discretion. Landon Holdings, Inc v Grattan Twp, 257 Mich App 154, 161; 677
NW2d 93 (2003). The trial court should apply the version of the ordinance effective at the time
it renders its decision, with two exceptions: where doing so would destroy a property interest
that vested before the amendment or where “‘the amendment was enacted for the purpose of
manufacturing a defense to plaintiff’s suit.’” Id., quoting Rodney Lockwood & Co v City of
Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211; 286 NW2d 87 (1979) (citing Keating Int’l Corp v Orion Co,
395 Mich 539, 548-549; 236 NW2d 409 (1975)).
Plaintiff argues that the Kraker letter and the discussion at the May 27, 1997 planning
commission establish that defendant rezoned the property to C-2 to improve its position during
litigation, and bringing the property into conformance with the Master Plan was merely pretext.
However, the trial court correctly noted that although Kraker’s letter acknowledged the threat of
litigation, it strongly recommended that the property be rezoned C-2 on the basis of the Master
Plan’s recommendation that the property be zoned for office use.
Thus, Kraker’s
recommendation was in part to allow defendant the opportunity to implement its Master Plan.
Certain planning commission members mentioned the litigation in discussing the rezoning of the
property. However, the planning commission considered other good faith reasons for rezoning
the property to C-2, including the desire of the public not to have commercial uses on the
property, the recommendation of the Master Plan that the property be zoned for office use, traffic
issues, the impact of office versus commercial use, and the lack of a need for additional
commercial uses in the area. The planning commission considered the merits of the proposal for
rezoning the property to C-2 as compared with the merits of plaintiff’s request for rezoning to
NC-PUD, and ultimately four commissioners preferred the C-2 classification, while three
commissioners preferred the NC-PUD.
To establish bad faith, plaintiff was required to show that the rezoning was undertaken
for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to the lawsuit. However, the trial court correctly
found that improving defendant’s position in this action was merely a reason for the rezoning.
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The same evidence also establishes additional, legitimate reasons for rezoning the property to C2.
Because the “bad faith exception” does not apply, and there is no argument that plaintiff
had a pre-existing vested property interest that was destroyed by the amendment, the trial court
properly applied the C-2 zoning classification to plaintiff’s claims.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael S. Smolenski
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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