PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS WALKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 259657
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-013836-01
THOMAS WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Zahra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his sentence of forty to sixty months’ imprisonment
for a conviction of aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i, imposed following a determination that
he violated his probation.1 We affirm the trial court’s finding that defendant violated his
probation, but remand for resentencing.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that he violated his probation. We disagree. The prosecution bears the burden of
establishing a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. MCR 6.445(E)(1). There
must be verified facts in the record from which the trial court can find by a preponderance of the
evidence that a probation violation occurred. People v Pillar, 233 Mich App 267, 270; 590
NW2d 622 (1998). Evidence is sufficient to sustain a determination of probation violation if,
“viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would enable a rational trier of fact to
conclude that the essential elements of the charge were proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.” People v Ison, 132 Mich App 61, 66; 346 NW2d 894 (1984).
Here, there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated his probation when he fired a gun at the
two complainants. The complainants both testified that on September 11, 2001, they saw
1
The trial court also sentenced defendant to forty to sixty months’ imprisonment for his
conviction of intentionally aiming a firearm without malice, MCL 750.233, but vacated this
conviction after defendant moved for resentencing.
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defendant, who was the ex-husband of one of the complainants, driving next to them in a van on
Interstate-75. Defendant stuck his hand out the window and fired a gun at the complainants’ car,
hitting the windshield. Two police officers testified that the damage to the windshield was
consistent with a bullet strike. In his defense, defendant presented two witnesses who testified
that defendant was at another location at the time of the shooting.
Defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that he violated
his probation because the testimony of defendant’s two alibi witnesses was more credible than
the testimony of the complainants. However, this Court will not interfere with the factfinder’s
role of determining the weight of the evidence or deciding the credibility of the witnesses.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992);
People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679 NW2d 127 (2004).
Defendant also asks this Court to consider the speed with which the jury found defendant
not guilty of the charges in determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a
probation violation.2 However, the only definite conclusion to draw from defendant’s acquittal
is that the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
offenses. Because the standard of proof required to support a criminal conviction is higher than
the standard required to revoke probation, defendant’s acquittal of the criminal charges did not
preclude revocation of his probation based on the same facts. People v McEntyre, 127 Mich App
731, 732-733; 339 NW2d 538 (1983). Defendant has offered no authority supporting his
argument that the speed with which a defendant is acquitted is relevant to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a finding that the defendant violated his probation.
II. Sentencing
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the legislative
sentencing guidelines do not apply in this case. We agree. “The resolution of whether the
legislative sentencing guidelines apply to sentences imposed after a probation violation is a
matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.” People v Hendrick, 261 Mich App
673, 676; 683 NW2d 218, lv gtd 471 Mich 914 (2004). This Court has held that “the legislative
sentencing guidelines apply to all enumerated felonies committed on or after January 1, 1999,
regardless of whether the sentence is imposed after a probation violation.” Id. at 679-680.
Because defendant committed the crime after January 1, 1999, and aggravated stalking is an
enumerated felony, the trial court erred in failing to apply the legislative guidelines to
defendant’s sentence.
According to defendant’s sentencing information report, the minimum sentence range for
defendant’s aggravated stalking conviction under the legislative guidelines was zero to eleven
months in jail. Where the upper limit of a guidelines range is eighteen months or less, the trial
court is required to impose an intermediate sanction unless it states on the record that a
2
In connection with the shooting, defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit
murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b. The jury deliberated for thirty-two minutes before finding defendant
not guilty of these charges.
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substantial and compelling reason exists to sentence defendant to prison. MCL 769.34(4)(a).
Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to forty to sixty months’ imprisonment. Because the
trial court did not impose an intermediate sanction,3 it was required to state on the record that a
substantial and compelling reason exists to sentence defendant to prison.
Our Supreme Court has defined a substantial and compelling reason for
departure from the guidelines as requiring “an ‘objective and verifiable’ reason
that ‘ “keenly” or “irresistibly” grabs our attention’; is ‘of “considerable worth” in
deciding the length of a sentence’; and ‘exists only in exceptional cases.’ ”
[People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 258; 666 NW2d 231 (2003)], quoting People v
Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62, 67-68; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). MCL 769.34(3) requires
a court to “state[] on the record the reasons for departure” and the “ ‘substantial
and compelling’ circumstances articulated by the court must justify the particular
departure in a case . . . .” Babcock, supra at 259, quoting [People v Hegwood,
465 Mich 432, 437 n 10; 636 NW2d 127 (2001) (emphasis omitted)]. [Hendrick,
supra at 682.]
A probation violation may constitute a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the
guidelines:
When a probationer violates his probation, it is a violation of public trust
and can, in exceptional cases, amount to a substantial and compelling reason to
depart from the guidelines range. Therefore, when resentencing a defendant after
revoking his probation, the trial court may consider the seriousness and severity
of the circumstances surrounding the probation violation in determining whether
there is a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the guidelines. [Id. at
683.]
MCL 769.34(3)(b) provides that
the court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender
characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence
range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record, including
the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been given
inadequate or disproportionate weight.
Here, the trial court articulated the following reasons for the sentence it imposed on
defendant:
Okay. Well I’d just like to go over this record here. April 4th, 2000,
Aggravated Stalking, March 11, 2001, Aggravated Stalking, 10-23-2001 [sic],
3
“An intermediate sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit of the
recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less.” MCL 769.34(4)(a).
An intermediate sanction does not include a prison term. MCL 769.31(b); People v Stauffer, 465
Mich 633, 635; 640 NW2d 869 (2002).
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that’s the Assault with Intent to Commit Murder[. R]egardless of what the jury
[decided], I heard the case. And what I heard was enough to convince me that
eventually you are going to kill her or she is going to kill you, plus we have
another case of the same thing that’s pending. Enough is enough. Lives are at
stake here. Guns are being fired. I cannot take any[ ]more risks.
Our Supreme Court set forth the standard of review of sentences outside the guidelines:
“ ‘[T]he existence or nonexistence of a particular factor is a factual
determination for the sentencing court to determine, and should therefore be
reviewed by an appellate court for clear error. The determination that a particular
factor is objective and verifiable should be reviewed by the appellate court as a
matter of law. A trial court’s determination that the objective and verifiable
factors present in a particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons
to depart from the statutory minimum sentence shall be reviewed for abuse of
discretion.’ ” [People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264-265; 666 NW2d 231
(2003), quoting People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 75-76; 624 NW2d 479
(2000), quoting People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 77-78; 528 NW2d 176 (1995).]
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the
permissible principled range of outcomes. Babcock, supra at 269.
We conclude that the trial court’s reasons for the sentence imposed are not substantial
and compelling reasons to depart from the legislative sentencing guidelines. First, references to
the defendant’s prior criminal history and recidivism are not sufficient and compelling reasons
for departure because they are factors already considered in scoring the prior record variables
when determining the guidelines range. Hendrick, supra at 684. The court did not indicate that
these factors were given inadequate weight. MCL 769.34(3)(b); Hendrick, supra at 684.
Second, the court’s conclusion that defendant presents a future danger is not an objective and
verifiable factor. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 670; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). Finally,
the court did not state a substantial and compelling reason for giving defendant a prison sentence
rather than an intermediate sanction. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence for his
conviction of aggravated stalking and remand this case for resentencing. MCL 769.34(11). If
the trial court concludes on resentencing that substantial and compelling reasons exist to deviate
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from the statutory sentencing guidelines, the trial court must comply with the requirements of
MCL 769.34(3) and Babcock, supra.4
Affirmed, but remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
4
Defendant also argues that his sentence was disproportionate to his offense. On remand, the
trial court should keep in mind that “in considering whether to depart from the guidelines, the
trial court must ascertain whether taking into account an allegedly substantial and compelling
reason would contribute to a more proportionate criminal sentence than is available within the
guidelines range.” Babcock, supra at 264. “[I]n departing from the guidelines range, the trial
court must consider whether its sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s
conduct and his criminal history because, if it is not, the trial court’s departure is necessarily not
justified by a substantial and compelling reason.” Id.
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