IN RE BACHUS ESTATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CORNELIUS G. BACHUS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of DEBORAH JANE
BACHUS, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 252686
Alcona Circuit Court
LC No. 02-011062-NO
SHIRLEY FOLEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Jansen and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
Plaintiff’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion
for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) because an issue of material fact existed
regarding whether defendant’s inaction constituted gross negligence or wilful and wanton
misconduct. We disagree.
On appeal, a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de
novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). In ruling on a summary
disposition motion, the trial court must determine whether an issue of material fact existed or
whether the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Meyer v City of Center
Line, 242 Mich App 560, 574; 619 NW2d 182 (2000). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests
the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating such a motion, the trial court considers the
entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, including affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties. Where the
proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Corley v Detroit Board of Education, 470 Mich
274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). All reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the
nonmoving party. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
Under the Recreational Land Use Act, MCL 324.73301(1), generally, a cause of action
may not arise for injuries to a person who is on the land of another without paying to the owner,
tenant, or lessee of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping,
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camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use
or trail use, with or without permission against the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land unless the
injuries were caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner,
tenant, or lessee. MCL 324.73301(1); Neal v Wilkes 470 Mich 661, 664, 685 NW2d 648 (2004).
Gross negligence requires that the defendant acted negligently after the plaintiff negligently
contributed to his own peril. Ellsworth v Highland Lakes Development Associates, 198 Mich
App 55, 61; 498 NW2d 5 (1993). Wilful and wanton misconduct exists when the defendant has:
(1) knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury
to another; (2) ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the
means at hand; and (3) the failure to use such care and diligence when to the ordinary mind it is
apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another. Burnett v City of Adrian, 414
Mich 448, 463; 326 NW2d 810 (1982). One who wilfully injures another, or whose conduct is
so wanton or reckless as to be wilful, is guilty of more than negligence or a high degree of
carelessness. Id. at 455. Wilful and wanton misconduct requires an intent to harm or such
indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does. Id.
Mere negligence cannot be cast as “wilfulness” simply for the purposes of bringing a complaint.
Ellsworth, supra at 61. Wilful negligence is quasi-criminal and manifests an intentional
disregard for another's safety. Omissions to act are not usually wilful and wanton misconduct.
Id. at 61-62.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that plaintiff has failed to
present sufficient facts to prove gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of
defendant. First, nothing in the record indicates that defendant was grossly negligent (i.e., acted
negligently after the decedent negligently contributed to her own peril). Ellsworth, supra at 61.
The decedent entered defendant’s property on May 27, 2000, some four years after defendant
initially purchased the property. Before the purchase, Robert Krumbach was the caretaker of the
property. During Krumbach’s time as the caretaker, the cable that caused the decedent’s injury
was strung between two trees on the property. The cable was placed there by loggers hired to
construct a road to the property. The cable was used to prevent vehicular traffic from entering
the property. The loggers used a padlock to affix the cable between the trees and gave
Krumbach the key to the padlock. The loggers also placed “No Trespassing” signs on the two
trees where the cable was attached. The evidence indicates that defendant rarely walked around
the property after the purchase and it was primarily used by her sons to hunt. Krumbach showed
defendant the cable strung between the trees and defendant was given the keys to the padlock at
the time of the purchase Therefore, the cable was strung between the trees at the time defendant
purchased the property. However, the cable was in place some four years before the decedent’s
accident on defendant’s property. The record is void of any evidence that defendant’s negligent
act followed the decedent’s alleged negligent contribution to her own peril (i.e., the decedent
driving the off-road vehicle onto defendant’s property). In other words, defendant’s negligence
would have preceded the decedent's own act of going on the property, and thus, there is no
evidence of gross negligence on defendant’s part.
Second, the decedent’s injury was not caused by defendant's wilful and wanton
misconduct. Defendant’s conduct was not so reckless that it showed a substantial lack of
concern for whether an injury would result. Burnett, supra at 455. Viewing the facts in a light
most favorable to plaintiff, the factual allegations presented support a finding that defendant
knew of the cable strung between the trees and had reason to know of the danger it created.
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Defendant was told of the cable at the time she purchased the property and Krumbach showed
her the cable. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had the ability to avoid the harm by removing the
cable entirely, moving the cable to a more visible position, or clearly marking the cable by
placing flags on it. Therefore, there was sufficient factual allegations to support a finding that
defendant had the ability to avoid the harm. Although defendant had knowledge of the cable
strung between the trees on her property and could have avoided the harm caused by the cable,
the record indicates that she did not possess an intent to harm or such indifference to whether
harm would result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does. Id.
Plaintiff contends that defendant’s lack of action in making the cable more conspicuous
demonstrated wilful and wanton misconduct. However, omissions to act are not usually wilful
and wanton misconduct. Ellsworth, supra at 61-62. Plaintiff presented no evidence that
defendant intended to injure anyone or that defendant’s action, or lack of action, was so reckless
as to show a lack of concern for whether an injury would result. The record reflects that the
reason defendant kept the cable between the trees was to prevent others from driving onto the
property. On review de novo, we find that the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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