SHIRLEY AEBIG V JASON LEE POOLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHIRLEY AEBIG, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of MARVIN E.
AEBIG, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 250278
Oceana Circuit Court
LC No. 02-003105-NI
JASON LEE POOLE and FARM BUREAU
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). This case is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). We affirm.
Plaintiff filed this negligence action seeking damages for the wrongful death of the
decedent and a derivative claim for loss of consortium after a pickup truck driven by defendant
Jason Poole struck and killed the decedent when the decedent suddenly turned his batteryoperated “Rascal” scooter into the path of Poole’s oncoming truck. The submitted evidence
established that Poole was traveling below the posted speed limit and immediately braked and
veered away from the decedent, but the back end of his truck swung around and struck the
decedent. The trial court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Poole’s
“reaction was reasonable given the circumstance and there could be no other interpretation to
that.” Plaintiff now appeals.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s resolution of a motion for summary
disposition. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Kraft v Detroit
Entertainment, LLC, 261 Mich App 534, 539; 683 NW2d 200 (2004). Summary disposition
should be granted if there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4); Kraft, supra at 540.
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"To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must introduce evidence
sufficient to establish that (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant
breached that duty, (3) the defendant's breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries,
and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages." Latham v National Car Rental Systems, Inc, 239 Mich
App 330, 340; 608 NW2d 66 (2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The second
element is at issue here. The question whether a defendant has breached a duty of care is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and not appropriate for summary disposition. Id.
However, when the moving party can show either that an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case is missing, or that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an
element of its claim, summary disposition is properly granted. Id.
In an action seeking recovery of noneconomic damages arising from automobile
negligence, damages may not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than fifty percent at
fault. MCL 500.3135(2)(b). Here, the undisputed evidence showed that the decedent, who was
traveling south in the northbound lane, suddenly crossed the northbound lane of traffic into the
path of Poole’s southbound vehicle. Poole immediately braked and attempted to avoid hitting
the decedent by veering to the right. We agree with the trial court that the submitted evidence
does not permit a determination that Poole responded in a manner that could be considered
negligent.
Plaintiff argues that Poole should have foreseen the decedent’s sudden maneuver and
either slowed down or alerted the decedent, by horn, before the decedent crossed the road,
because the decedent’s only other options were to remain on a collision course with northbound
traffic or turn to the east, where he would have rolled into a ditch. This argument actually
supports defendants’ claim that the decedent was more than fifty percent responsible for the
accident, because it indicates that the decedent was operating the Rascal scooter head-on against
the flow of traffic, under circumstances where he could not safely move to either the left or the
right. Regardless, it is not reasonable to expect Poole to recognize every hazard faced by other
persons on the road and predict how they will respond to those hazards.
Plaintiff also argues that Poole could have avoided the accident if he had simply braked
without turning, or if he had veered to the left instead of the right. These claims are made with
the benefit of hindsight; moreover, the former is based on plaintiff’s expert’s scientific
reconstruction of the accident and the latter on plaintiff’s inference from deposition testimony
that the northbound vehicles were at a safe enough distance for defendant to move to the left. In
any event, as this Court stated in Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 90; 687 NW2d 333
(2004):
Simply alleging that an actor could have done more is insufficient [to
prove negligence] under Michigan law, because, with the benefit of hindsight, a
claim can always be made that extra precautions could have influenced the result.
. . . Even the most exacting standard of conduct, the negligence standard, does
not require one to exhaust every conceivable precaution to be considered not
negligent.
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Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether Poole was negligent, and the
trial court properly granted summary disposition in defendants’ favor.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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