PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES RALSTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 2, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249828
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000882-FC
CHARLES RALSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Markey and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of three counts of assault with intent to
commit murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of forty-five to seventy years for
each of the assault convictions, and a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant’s convictions arise from a shootout with police officers in Isabella County on
November 22, 2002. While defendant was incarcerated in the county jail following the
shootings, he made statements in tape-recorded conversations that linked him to an unsolved
murder in Lapeer County. These recordings were played for the jury at defendant’s trial
involving the assault charges arising from the police shootout.
The earlier incident involved the October 29, 2002, robbery of a gun shop in Lapeer
County, wherein forty handguns and one to four long guns were stolen. The perpetrators shot the
proprietors of the gun shop, one of whom died from his wounds. The perpetrators remained at
large as of November 22, 2002.
On November 22, 2002, law enforcement officers pulled over a van that matched the
description of a vehicle associated with recent break-ins and which bore the wrong license plate.
The officers arrested the driver, Jeremy Powell, and a female passenger on outstanding warrants.
Two officers entered the van to search it, unaware that defendant was hiding behind the rear
bench seat. The officers discussed opening the rear end of the van when defendant suddenly
appeared from behind the seat, pointed a gun at an officer, and shouted, “freeze motherf****r.”
The officers left the van to take defensive positions. Defendant defied police commands and
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started to leave the van with his gun pointed toward one of the officers. An officer fired at
defendant, defendant fired back, and all three officers returned fire. None of the officers were
hit.
Defendant fled in the van, with officers in pursuit, but they lost sight of the van in a
wooded area. Defendant was found later that morning in an abandoned trailer. He was wounded
in the back. The gun he used to fire at the officers was recovered from underneath the sink in the
trailer. The gun had been stolen from the Lapeer County gun shop. Additionally, the police
found two empty handgun boxes in Powell’s van showing serial numbers that corresponded to
guns stolen from the Lapeer County gun shop.
While defendant was incarcerated in the county jail, the police monitored and recorded
his telephone calls and visits, including a visit with his father, two phone calls with his father, a
visit call with his mother, and a phone call with an unidentified female. In these recorded
conversations, defendant acknowledged that he shot at the three officers in the Isabella County
traffic stop. He also made statements that linked him to the Lapeer County gun shop shootings
and robbery. He expressed anxiety about the whereabouts of a Highpoint rifle, which was
believed to be the weapon used in the Lapeer County shootings. He also discussed plans he had
made to acquire a grenade launcher and rob banks, and he made statements describing himself as
evil and without respect for other persons. Defendant mentioned two other persons, “Jeremy”
and “Herman,” who had been involved in the Lapeer County shootings; the former, Jeremy
Powell, was arrested during the Isabella County traffic stop. Nancy Stimson, a detectivesergeant with the Lapeer County Sheriff’s Department, used these statements to charge
defendant with homicide and robbery in Lapeer County. Defendant had not been tried for the
Lapeer County offenses at the time of his trial in this case.
In a pretrial motion under MRE 404(b), the prosecutor in this case sought to use the
recorded conversations as evidence, and also to call Stimson as a witness to explain how
defendant’s statements related to the Lapeer County offenses. The prosecutor maintained that
this evidence was relevant to show that defendant intended to kill the officers during the shootout
to prevent them from arresting him and discovering that his gun was stolen in the Lapeer County
robbery. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the evidence was minimally probative and
unduly prejudicial because the prosecutor’s motive theory was too speculative and attenuated.1
The trial court allowed the evidence and permitted Stimson’s testimony.
Defendant subsequently moved to limit what portions of the recorded conversations
could be introduced. He sought to exclude statements he made about becoming evil, but did not
specify which other portions should be excluded, although he referenced “certain statements
against interest” and “certain irrelevant and other potentially inflammatory materials,” and he
moved to redact statements from the recordings that did not prove motive, intent, plan or scheme,
or his involvement in the Isabella County shootings. The trial court denied the motion.
1
At trial, defendant emphasized that he did not fire until the officers fired at him, to argue that he
did not shoot with an intent to kill.
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II
Defendant raises several challenges to the admissibility of his recorded conversations and
Stimson’s explanatory testimony. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting the
portions of his conversations in which he discussed how he had become evil and in which he
discussed his plan to “wreak havoc” on banks and acquire a grenade launcher. He also
challenges Stimson’s testimony opining that he was responsible for a murder and attempted
murder in the Lapeer County robbery. Defendant preserved his challenge to the statements about
becoming evil by objecting to this evidence below in a motion in limine, but he did not object to
the statements referring to a grenade launcher or object to Stimson’s testimony. Consequently,
these latter matters are unpreserved.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 649; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). “An abuse of discretion
is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted,
would say that there was no excuse for the ruling made.” Id. We review unpreserved issues for
plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 404; 633 NW2d
376 (2001).
To convict defendant of assault with intent to commit murder, the prosecutor was
required to prove: (1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would
make the killing a murder. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999);
MCL 750.83. The intent to kill may be inferred from minimal circumstantial evidence.
McRunels, supra. Assault with intent to commit murder is a specific intent crime. See People v
Rockwell, 188 Mich App 405, 410; 470 NW2d 673 (1991).
The prosecutor argued below that evidence of defendant’s motive to avoid being caught
with evidence of the Lapeer County crime was probative of his intent to kill the officers.
Defendant concedes that certain statements connecting him to the Lapeer County homicide and
the Highpoint rifle were relevant to the issue of his intent, but argues that his recorded
conversations contained other statements that had little probative value, if any, and which were
highly prejudicial.
MRE 404(a) provides that evidence of “a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”
Similarly, MRE 404(b) prohibits “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove a
defendant’s character or propensity to commit the charged crime. MRE 404(b)(1); see also
People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). But other acts evidence may be
admitted “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the
same is material.” MRE 404(b)(1). Other acts evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b) if it is
offered for a proper purpose, is relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and is
sufficiently probative to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice under MRE 403. People v
Starr, 457 Mich 490, 496-497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Regarding defendant’s statements about becoming evil and mean, and losing respect for
people, the trial court agreed with the prosecutor that the statements were relevant to show that
defendant intended to kill the officers because they showed that he intended to use any means
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necessary to avoid getting caught with evidence of the Lapeer County homicide. However, there
is no reference in either conversation to suggest that defendant was referring to his state of mind
at the time of the shooting. It appears, instead, that he was generally discussing how he had
become so immersed in criminal activity. We agree with defendant that the only nexus between
the statements and defendant’s intent at the time of the Isabella County shooting was the
inference that defendant intended to kill the officers because he was an evil person and
indifferent to other persons’ rights. In this context, the statements were improper character
evidence under MRE 404(a), because their purpose was to show that defendant was an evil
person who acted in conformity with his evil character at the time of the Isabella County
shooting. Furthermore, because the statements pertained only to defendant’s character, as
opposed to his prior acts or conduct, the statements were not eligible for admission under MRE
404(b). People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 538; 659 NW2d 688 (2002).
However, an error in the admission of evidence is not a ground for reversal unless it is
more probable than not that the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the weight and
strength of the untainted evidence. MCR 2.613(A); MCL 769.26; McLaughlin, supra at 650.
Here, the evidence of defendant’s assessment of himself as a person who was evil, mean, and
disrespectful of others was effectively cumulative of other properly admitted evidence—
including defendant’s own tacit admissions—establishing that he was involved in two separate
shooting incidents, involving five victims, and that one of the shootings was committed in order
to steal more than forty guns for the purpose of future criminal conduct. Considered in the
context of this other evidence, it is not more probable than not that defendant’s statements
referring to his evil character affected the outcome. Therefore, any error was harmless.
Defendant did not challenge below his statements about acquiring a grenade launcher and
his plan to “wreak havoc.” Therefore, we review these statements for plain error. We conclude
that the statements were relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent, MRE 401, because defendant
explained that he wanted a grenade launcher “so no one can come and get me.” This statement
revealed that defendant had formulated an intent and plan, even before the Isabella County
shooting, to use deadly force to resist arrest. Unlike defendant’s general statements about
becoming evil, which pertained to character instead of conduct, the statement about ordering a
grenade launcher revealed concrete preparation to use deadly force against law enforcement
officers. Also, defendant’s statement about a plan to “wreak havoc” on “banks and stuff” was
relevant to provide context to the statement about the grenade launcher, i.e., it gave context to
defendant’s plan to use a grenade launcher to resist arrest. The statements were therefore
admissible under MRE 404(b) for the nonpropensity purposes of proving intent and motive.
Werner, supra at 538. We disagree with defendant that the evidence was unduly prejudicial
under MRE 403. Defendant’s intent was the primary disputed issue at trial. Consequently, it is
not apparent that the prejudicial effect of the statements substantially outweighed the probative
value. Thus, defendant has not shown that the statements amounted to plain error.
Defendant also argues that Stimson improperly expressed her opinion that he committed
a murder and attempted murder in the Lapeer County robbery. Because defendant failed to
object to Stimson’s testimony, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Herndon, supra.
Although Stimson twice used the term “attempted murder” in relation to the Lapeer
County shootings, she did so primarily in a lay context, not for the purpose of expressing an
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opinion about whether a legal mens rea requirement for murder was satisfied. Stimson did not
express any opinion about defendant’s guilt with respect to the charged offenses. Further,
although Stimson opined that defendant was involved in the Lapeer County gun shop robbery
and shooting, she did not state that he was the shooter. Also, Stimson’s opinion that defendant
was involved in the Lapeer County robbery was cumulative to defendant’s own statements
tacitly admitting his involvement. For these reasons, defendant has failed to establish that
Stimson’s testimony resulted in a plain error that affected his substantial rights.
III
Defendant raises a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, based on the prosecutor’s argument
that defendant’s intent to kill the officers could be inferred from his evil character. In closing
argument, the prosecutor attempted to discount the defense claim that there was no evidence of
an intent to kill. The prosecutor remarked:
You listen to the tape, the tape where he’s talking to this unknown female.
You listen to the tape where he’s talking, I believe, to his mother; and what does
he tell us about himself? He tells us that just before this he could feel himself
becoming evil, that he had no regard for human life. Is there any evidence before
you that would seem to suggest that that had changed? That I’m going to reek
[sic] havoc. I don’t care about me; I don’t care about anyone else; nobody is
going to take me; I’ve got grenade launchers coming; the only way you kill a cop
is to put a bullet in him. But for this one little instance [at the scene of the
Isabella shooting] I become concerned about people. I worry about he [sic]
welfare of my fellow man. All I want to do is get out of there, but I would never
think of harming them. Is that reasonable? Is that reasonable, ladies and
gentlemen? No. No, that is not. The element of intent, ladies and gentlemen, is
one that can be formed at any time. One that can be formed at any time.
The prosecutor then argued that even if defendant had not intended to kill the officers when the
incident began, he subsequently formed that intent immediately before he began shooting.
Generally, a prosecutor’s remarks are examined on a case by case basis, in context, to
determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Grayer, 252
Mich App 349, 357; 651 NW2d 818 (2002). But because defendant failed to object to the
prosecutor’s remarks at trial, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
We agree that the prosecutor’s statement asked the jury to make the improper inference
that defendant acted with an intent to kill because that was consistent with his evil character.
However, we cannot conclude that this remark denied defendant a fair trial. The prosecutor did
not focus solely on a character argument in arguing the issue of defendant’s intent. Rather, he
also properly referred to other evidence and the circumstances as demonstrating that it was
simply implausible that defendant acted with other than a deadly intent. Defendant does not
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claim that the prosecutor made any other improper remarks in the argument.2
defendant has failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected.
Therefore,
IV
Defendant lastly argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
admission of improper evidence. Defendant does not specify what objections counsel should
have made, but he seems to argue that counsel should have raised specific objections in addition
to generally opposing Stimson’s testimony and his recorded conversations. Because defendant
did not move for a new trial or a Ginther3 hearing, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes
apparent on the record. People v Westman, 262 Mich App 184, 192; 685 NW2d 423 (2004).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his
attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms
and (2) that, but for the attorney's error or errors, a different outcome reasonably would have
resulted. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Defendant has not
established either prong of this test. As discussed above, defendant’s statement about acquiring a
grenade launcher was admissible because it was relevant to the prosecutor’s theory that
defendant planned to use deadly force to resist arrest. Consequently, defense counsel did not err
in failing to specifically object to this evidence. Stimson’s uses of the terms “murder” and
“attempted murder” in reference to the Lapeer County shooting, considered in context, were not
intended as a comment on defendant’s specific state of mind during that incident. Under the
circumstances, counsel’s failure to object may have been trial strategy and defendant has not
overcome the presumption of sound strategy. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649
NW2d 94 (2002). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
2
Defendant’s reliance on Washington v Hofbauer, 228 F3d 689, 696-697 (CA 6, 2000), is
misplaced because in that case there was extensive inappropriate conduct, unlike the brief
digression from otherwise proper argument that occurred in the present case.
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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