PEOPLE OF MI V SAMUEL THOMAS LUCERO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231977
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001089-FC
SAMUEL THOMAS LUCERO,
ON REMAND
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
I.
Introduction
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. After our decision affirming
defendant’s convictions,1 the Supreme Court held in abeyance defendant’s delayed application
for leave to appeal pending its decision in People v Boyd, 470 Mich 363; 682 NW2d 459 (2004).
Boyd having been decided, the Court, while retaining jurisdiction, remanded the case for us to
consider the following two issues:
Whether the Macomb Circuit Court abused its discretion in concluding
that defendant’s custodial statements were involuntary, and whether defendant
was required to testify in order to preserve his challenge to the trial court ruling
that his custodial statements, although inadmissible as substantive evidence, could
be used for impeachment purposes. [People v Lucero, 471 Mich 883; __ NW2d
__ (2004).]
II.
Facts
As noted in our prior opinion, on January 1, 2000, defendant was arrested for the murder
of his fiancée. According to the testimony at the Walker2 hearing, when police arrived at the
1
People v Lucero, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals issued June 28, 2002
(Docket No. 231977).
2
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
-1-
scene, they found defendant lying on top of the victim. By all appearances, defendant was upset
and angry. It took several officers to place defendant into handcuffs. Upon taking him into
custody, defendant was read his Miranda3 rights, which he said he understood. Defendant
continued to scream and kick while being transported to the police station, and while doing so
made spontaneous statements about the incident. During the entire drive to the station, the
officers never asked defendant any questions.
After arriving at the station at approximately 2:05 a.m., defendant was taken to the
booking room. Defendant was once again read his Miranda rights, this time line-by-line from a
department issued card, and he again confirmed that he understood them. After the rights were
read, defendant was approached by a lieutenant, who asked defendant if he understood his rights
and if he wanted to talk. Defendant answered affirmatively to both questions and provided an
explanation regarding what occurred. This statement was made at approximately 2:56 a.m. At
approximately 5:40 a.m., defendant asked if he could speak to an officer in order to tell him what
happened. The officer told defendant to stop. The officer then proceeded to perform a gun
residue test on defendant.4 Immediately after, defendant again told the officer he wanted to tell
him what had happened, and the officer told him he need not and could speak with a lawyer.
Defendant proceeded to give several different explanations of what had occurred.5
Each of the police officers that were in contact with defendant testified that he appeared
intoxicated, as they could smell alcohol emanating from him and his eyes were bloodshot.
However, there was no evidence presented that defendant did not understand what was
transpiring at the police station.
After hearing the evidence and considering the arguments of the parties, the trial court
ruled that all of defendant’s statements made after he was arrested were inadmissible as
involuntary statements:
The Court: All right. As far as the Court’s decision concerning the motion to
suppress the defendant’s statements, the Court after going back over the
testimony, as well as reviewing the case law that was submitted by both the
prosecutor and the defense counsel, does find that the statements were not
voluntary based on Mr. Lucero’s intoxication at the time.
There was some claim that the video, or the – yes, the videotape would have
lent some assistance to the Court. I realize now that it didn’t have an audio
portion so I’m not sure it would have been helpful, but it is prosecutor’s
burden to establish to the court by a preponderance that it was a knowing,
intelligent, voluntary waiver, and based on the fact that several of the
witnesses testified that he was intoxicated, the first officer on the scene said he
3
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
4
Defendant consented to the test.
5
Throughout the time defendant was in custody, he never confessed to the crime. Instead, he
gave several conflicting statements with respect to what occurred that night.
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was not responsive to questions – he did have a blood alcohol level about – is
it 6:30 or 5:30?
Mr. Jaffe [Defense counsel]: At 6:30, Your Honor.
The Court: 6:30 in the morning of .19, which leads the Court to conclude that
earlier his blood alcohol was even higher. I can’t say that he – that it was a
voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and
statements given while in custody would be suppressed. [Emphasis added.]
Although the trial court ruled that all statements made by defendant once he was in
custody were inadmissible as substantive evidence, it also ruled that the statements could be used
for impeachment purposes.
In our prior opinion, we summarized the trial testimony regarding the general events that
occurred that night:
In the early morning hours of January 1, 2000, Natalie Lester, the victim,
died of a gunshot wound to the face. The victim was defendant’s girlfriend. The
victim rang in this tragic New Year, celebrating with defendant, her brother Adam
Lester, and Amanda Mitchell. On the evening of December 31, 1999, the two
couples went out to dinner and returned to defendant’s house to watch videos and
start drinking alcohol. Defendant was observed drinking tequila and beer. After
toasting the New Year at midnight, the couples went to bed. The victim and
defendant went upstairs to defendant’s room and Adam and Amanda went to a
bedroom downstairs. Approximately one hour later, defendant came running into
the downstairs bedroom covered in blood, screaming that he had killed the victim.
Adam and Amanda ran upstairs, with Adam calling 911. The victim was found
lying on the bed in the upstairs bedroom with a gunshot wound to her face. A
shotgun was on the floor next to the bed. The police arrived almost immediately
and took defendant into custody. [Lucero, supra, slip op at 1.]
After the prosecution completed its proofs during the trial, defendant and his counsel
indicated that defendant would not be testifying. Defendant’s counsel indicated that he had
recommended to defendant “from the onset” that he not testify, and had more recently given that
same advice because of his concern with defendant being impeached through use of the
inconsistent statements he made while in custody:
Mr. Jaffe: Your Honor, may the record reflect that I have consulted with Mr.
Lucero on this issue numerous times and that my recommendation to Mr.
Lucero at all times was very succinct, that was it’s his decision to make. My
recommendation to my client has been from the onset that he should not take
the stand and testify on his behalf.
I further advised him that even though you have suppressed the use of his
statements -- his numerous statements, that that applied only to the ability of
the prosecutor to use or not use those statements in this case in chief.
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I further explained to my client that if he decides to take the stand and
testify, it’s fair game and that every statement that he made had the potential
to be used against him.
The Court: For impeachment purposes?
Mr. Jaffe: For impeachment purposes, and I thought the matter had been resolved
prior to today, but nevertheless, from conferring with him at this moment and
again strongly recommending that he does not – that he doesn’t take the
witness stand, I believe it is his decision to follow my recommendation and
not take the witness stand. Is that true, Mr. Lucero?
The Defendant: Yes, it is. [Emphasis added.]
No offer of proof was provided regarding what defendant’s testimony would have been
had he testified at trial. Defendant was thereafter convicted of second-degree murder, and
sentenced to twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment.
III.
Analysis
As noted, the Supreme Court ordered us to decide two issues. First, we must determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in holding that defendant’s custodial statements were
involuntary. Second, we are to decide whether defendant had to testify at trial in order to
preserve a challenge to the trial court’s ruling that his custodial statements were admissible only
for purposes of impeachment.
A.
Voluntariness of Statement
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion6 by
determining that defendant’s custodial statements were involuntary. First, we hold that the trial
court erroneously relied upon defendant’s intoxication as the sole justification for finding the
statements to be involuntary. Second, we hold that defendant’s statements cannot be involuntary
without some finding of police misconduct or coercion, and the trial court made no such finding.
As such, we conclude that the trial court’s decision that the statements were involuntary was in
error, and must be reversed.
6
The Supreme Court order remanding this case requires us to determine whether the trial court
“abused its discretion” in finding the statements to be involuntary. Because we are bound to
follow the orders of our highest court, we will review the issue under that standard of review.
Werkhoven v Grandville, 65 Mich App 741; 238 NW2d 392 (1975). However, case law
indicates that we are to review de novo the ultimate decision on a motion to suppress, while
leaving intact the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. People v
Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614 NW2d 152 (2000); People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 563;
675 NW2d 863 (2004).
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As recently stated by the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v Seibert, __ US __,
__; 124 S Ct 2601; 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), ““In criminal trials . . . wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion
of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”” Id. at ___, quoting Bram v United States, 168 US 532, 542; 18
S Ct 183; 42 L Ed 568 (1897). One of the “prophylactic rules”7 created by the Supreme Court to
protect certain Fifth Amendment rights was Miranda, which “created a presumption of coercion,
in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrefutable for purposes of the prosecution’s
case in chief.” Patane, supra at ___. As summarized by the Missouri Court:
Accordingly, “to reduce the risk of a coerced confession and to implement
the Self-Incrimination Clause,” Chavez v Martinez, 538 US 760, 790; 155 L Ed
2d 984; 123 S Ct 1994 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), this Court in Miranda concluded that “the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully
honored,” 384 US, at 467; 16 L Ed 2d 694; 86 S Ct 1602. Miranda conditioned
the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of his
rights: failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before
custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.
Conversely, giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a
virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even
though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual
stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid
waiver. See Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 433, n 20; 82 L Ed 2d 317; 104 S
Ct 3138 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument
that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare”). To point
out the obvious, this common consequence would not be common at all were it
not that Miranda warnings are customarily given under circumstances allowing
for a real choice between talking and remaining silent. [Id. at __.]
To effectuate a valid waiver of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver is
made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 633; 614
NW2d 152 (2000). As detailed in Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed
2d 410 (1986), courts must perform a two-part inquiry to determine whether a valid waiver has
occurred:
First, the relinquishment of the right “must have been voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
7
United States v Patane, __ US __, __; 124 S Ct 2620; 159 L Ed 2d 667 (2004) (plurality
opinion of Thomas, J.).
-5-
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice
and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
The “totality of the circumstances” test sets forth an objective standard, Daoud, supra at 634,
with courts evaluating such circumstances as the suspect’s age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given
him, the nature of his rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Id. Importantly, no
single factor is determinative. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
Because no single factor is determinative, the fact that a person is under the influence of
intoxicants does not per se render a statement involuntary. People v Lumley, 154 Mich App 618,
624; 398 NW2d 474 (1986); People v Crawford, 89 Mich App 30, 33-34; 279 NW2d 560
(1979); People v Dunlap, 82 Mich App 171, 176; 266 NW2d 637 (1978). The federal courts
have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v Muniz, 1 F3d 1018, 1022 (CA 10,
1993) (“The state of intoxication does not automatically render a statement involuntary.”);
United States v Casal, 915 F2d 1225, 1229 (CA 8, 1990); United States v Hogan, 933 F Supp
1008, 1017 (D Kan, 1996). Of course a suspect’s level of intoxication is a factor to consider in
reviewing the objective circumstances of a suspect’s waiver, but it cannot be the sole factor in
rendering a waiver involuntary. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 43; 551 NW2d 355 (1996).
Indeed, a crucial element of finding a waiver involuntary is the need for a determination
that police coercion was utilized against the suspect to obtain the waiver. As we concluded in
Fike, supra at 182, “a deficiency in the defendant that is not exploited by the police cannot annul
the voluntariness of a confession unless there is evidence of police coercion.” See also United
States v Chrismon, 965 F2d 1465 (CA 7, 1992); LaRette v Delo, 44 F3d 681, 688-689 (CA 8,
1995).
In this case, the trial court erroneously concluded that defendant’s level of intoxication
rendered both of his Miranda waivers involuntary. First, the fact that defendant was intoxicated
does not per se render his waivers involuntary and subsequent statements inadmissible. Lumley,
supra. The trial court made no further evaluation of the objective circumstances in existence at
the time defendant waived his rights and made his statements. Daoud, supra. Second, the trial
court made no findings regarding police coercion, or that the police took advantage of
defendant’s intoxication in order to obtain defendant’s statements. Fike, supra. Absent those
critical findings, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s statements made while
in custody.8 See, also, Boggs v Bair, 892 F2d 1193, 1198-119 (CA 4, 1989) (concluding
8
We also note that except for the statement made at approximately 2:56 a.m., at no time did the
police approach defendant and ask for a statement. Each time defendant spoke to the police
(except at 2:56 a.m.) it was because defendant either requested to do so or spontaneously made
statements in front of the police. Volunteered statements made in the absence of police
interrogation are not subject to Miranda. Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300; 100 S Ct 1682;
64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980); United States v Cole, 315 F3d 633, 636 (CA 6, 2003).
-6-
defendant’s statement was not involuntary even though testimony revealed he smelled of alcohol
and had bloodshot, glazed eyes and blood test revealed a blood alcohol level of .22 and .145).
B.
Preservation
The second issue on remand is whether defendant was required, consistent with Boyd, to
testify in order to preserve his objection to the trial court’s in limine ruling that his involuntary
statements could be used against him for purposes of impeachment. In the ordinary course, we
would not reach that issue because of our conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding
defendant’s statements. This is so because, as defendant’s voluntary statements were admissible
as substantive evidence, his objection to the more limited in limine ruling based upon an
involuntary statement is irrelevant. Since defendant’s statements were fully admissible,
defendant was faced with the same choice regarding whether to testify as are all other
defendants. Nonetheless, because our Supreme Court ordered us to consider both issues, and
because the Court could disagree with our conclusion on the voluntariness of defendant’s
statements, we will now address the preservation issue.9
In Boyd, the Supreme Court undertook the task of deciding “whether a defendant must
testify in order to preserve for appellate review a challenge to a trial court’s ruling in limine
allowing evidence that the defendant exercised his Miranda right to remain silent.” Boyd, supra
at 365 (citation omitted). The Court held that a defendant was required to testify at trial in order
to preserve his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling, for in the absence of the defendant’s
trial testimony, the Court could not “determine whether the trial court’s ruling was erroneous
and, if so, whether the error requires reversal.” Id. The Boyd Court’s holding was the natural
extension of the holdings in Luce v United States, 469 US 38; 105 S Ct 460; 83 L Ed 2d 443
(1984) and People v Finley, 431 Mich 506; 431 NW2d 19 (1988). Boyd, supra at 370-371, 377
378.
In Boyd, the trial court ruled that the defendant’s invocation of his Miranda right to
remain silent was admissible at trial. However, the defendant never testified at trial (and gave no
reason for not testifying), and the prosecutor never sought to admit the statement into evidence
and never otherwise made reference to the statement. Id. at 367. On appeal to this Court, the
defendant argued that he did not testify at trial because of the trial court’s erroneous ruling. This
Court affirmed the convictions.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant’s failure to
testify precluded appellate review. Citing to both Luce and Finley, the Court recognized three
concrete reasons for requiring a defendant to testify at trial in order to preserve an objection to
the in limine ruling. First, the Court noted that in Luce and Finley, both involving the decision to
admit prior convictions for impeachment purposes, the trial courts had the discretion to
subsequently modify an in limine ruling if a defendant’s actual testimony varied at trial. Boyd,
supra at 369. Second, the Court concluded that without a defendant’s actual testimony (and the
9
We recognize that our discussion on this issue is dictum, as it is unnecessary to our resolution
of this appeal. Dessart v Burak, 252 Mich App 490, 496 n 5; 652 NW2d 669 (2002).
-7-
admission of the impeachment evidence) it would be entirely speculative for a reviewing court to
conclude that any harm may have occurred from the in limine ruling. Id. Additionally, courts
cannot assume that an adverse ruling motivated a defendant’s decision not to testify, particularly
when numerous factors are involved in such a decision. Id. Third, the Court noted that, as in
Luce and Finley, the defendant’s statement in Boyd invoking his Miranda rights was admissible
for the limited purpose of impeachment, id. at 375, and thus the Court was not dealing with a
situation where the defendant’s statement was inadmissible under all circumstances. Id. at n 9.
The analysis and holding of Luce, Finley, and Boyd are logical and practical. After all, in
each of those cases the trial court made an initial discretionary evidentiary ruling before trial, yet
the actual effect of the ruling was subject to future events. For example, even if the defendant
actually testified, the evidence still might not be submitted because the prosecutor may
ultimately elect not to utilize the evidence. See Boyd, supra at 369; Finley, supra at 519.
Additionally, if the defendant testifies, the trial court has an opportunity to modify the in limine
ruling if the actual testimony differs from what was anticipated at the time the in limine motion
was decided. Luce, supra at 41-41. Finally, without the defendant’s testimony and the
admission of the impeachment evidence, a reviewing court is significantly hampered in
determining what harm, if any, the erroneous admission caused. Boyd, supra at 377; Finley,
supra at 519.
As the remand order in this case implicitly suggested, this case contains a different twist.
Specifically, rather than involving a discretionary decision that is subject to change during trial,
in this case, the use of defendant’s “involuntary” statement would be inadmissible for any
purpose. As we noted in our prior opinion, it “is well-established that a defendant’s involuntary
statements ‘may not be used for any purposes at trial, either for substantive evidence or for
impeachment purposes.’” Lucero, supra, slip op at 2, quoting People v Tyson, 423 Mich 357,
377; 377 NW2d 738 (1985), citing People v Reed, 393 Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975). Thus,
in this case, we are dealing with the precise issue raised in footnote 9 in Boyd, i.e., whether a
defendant must testify to preserve the trial court’s ruling when the evidence is not admissible for
any purpose.
We do not believe that this difference is significant enough to remove it from the
principles set forth in Boyd and Luce. Our conclusion is supported by the Court’s decision in
Finley. In that case, the trial court ruled prior to trial that the defendant’s prior convictions could
be used to impeach the defendant if he testified at trial. Finley, supra at 511. The defendant
chose not to testify, and he did not inform the court of the expected nature of his testimony had
he testified. Id. The defendant’s convictions were affirmed by this Court.
Affirming this Court’s decision, the Supreme Court adopted the Luce holding. Id. at 521.
One of the defendant’s arguments was that there were certain “bright line” categories that only
required a legal analysis to decide on appeal, as opposed to needing a factual predicate for a
decision as in Luce. Id. at 518. The defendant therefore argued that the preservation-by
testimony rationale in Luce did not apply to “bright line” legal issues. Id. The Court rejected
that view, holding that most of the Luce preservation principles still applied to in limine
decisions that needed little, if any, factual basis to rule upon:
It is true that the question whether a conviction falls within a “bright line”
category does not require a defendant’s testimony in order to be properly
-8-
reviewed. However, for the most part, the rationales underlying the Luce rule are
applicable even where the prior conviction falls within one of the “bright line”
categories. Any hardship to the defendant arising out of an incorrect decision is
purely speculative in the absence of his testimony. As noted by the Luce Court, a
defendant’s decision not to testify is rarely premised solely on whether prior
convictions will be used for impeachment. Luce, supra at 42. Further, the
prosecutor may have decided to use other means to impeach the defendant. Id.
Finally, without defendant’s testimony, a reviewing court is limited in
determining the harmless error question.
It should also be noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence, under which
Luce was decided, contain a “bright line” component similar to one category of
the revised Michigan rule. Under FRE 609(a), any conviction, be it felony or
misdemeanor, shall be admitted if the crime involved dishonesty or false
statement. However, despite this “bright line” component of the federal rule, the
Supreme Court determined that defendant’s testimony is necessary to facilitate
review. Further, a number of states with limited judicial discretion on the issue of
admission of prior convictions have adopted the Luce rule. Accordingly, we
disagree with defendant that the “bright line” aspects of the new Michigan rule
render the Luce rule necessary. [Finley, supra at 519-520.]
As in Finley, although review of the trial court’s decision to allow impeachment with an
involuntary statement required only a legal “bright line” determination,10 several of the
Luce/Boyd factors are still in play. For, without defendant testifying, we are left to speculate on
whether the prosecutor would have utilized the evidence for impeachment purposes, and whether
the trial court would have altered its ruling during trial. Additionally, because defendant never
testified and the statements were never offered into evidence, we have no way of knowing the
substance of defendant’s testimony and how the impeaching evidence would have impacted
defendant’s case.11 It is impossible to determine whether admission of the involuntary statement
was harmless error, see Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 310-311; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed
2d 302 (1991) and People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 184; 603 NW2d 95 (1999), when the
statement was never introduced at trial. As a result, we conclude that, under Boyd, defendant
failed to preserve his objections to the trial court’s ruling that his involuntary statements were
available for impeachment purpose.12
10
In other words, no facts are necessary to resolve the legal issue provided.
11
Defendant also provided no offer of proof outlining what his testimony would have been had
he taken the stand.
12
Another slight difference between Boyd, Luce, and this case is that here, defendant agreed on
the record with his counsel’s statement that defendant refused to testify based on his counsel’s
advice not to do so “from the onset” and based on the trial court’s in limine decision. So, unlike
Luce and Boyd, where there was no record explanation about why those defendants did not
testify, here defendant relied on his attorney’s two-fold advice. This factor, however, does not
assist this Court in determining the potential prejudice or harm from the trial court’s ruling. It
(continued…)
-9-
State and federal courts have split on whether a defendant must testify to preserve an
objection to an evidentiary ruling that affects a defendant’s constitutional rights. Most of the
federal decisions have held that a defendant need not testify in order to preserve the issue,
distinguishing Luce on the ground that Luce did not involve a constitutional issue. See, e.g.,
United States v Chischilly, 30 F3d 1144, 1151 (CA 9, 1994) (“Because use of an involuntary
confession would violate the Constitution, Luce does not apply.”); United States v Greer, 791
F2d 590, 594 (CA 7, 1986) (distinguishing Luce on grounds that it did not involve a
constitutional issue and whether use of a confession obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment
raised legal, not factual, issue.).13 See, also, People v Brown, 42 Cap App 4th 461, 469-471 and
n 4; 49 Cal Rptr 2d 652 (1996) for a good discussion of the relevant case law on this issue.
As noted in Brown, several state courts have ruled that a defendant still must testify to
preserve a challenge to an in limine ruling, even though it impacts a defendant’s constitutional
right. In Jordan v State, 323 Md 151; 591 A2d 875 (1991), the trial court ruled that the
defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights, and had made voluntary statements. The trial
court also ruled, however, that the defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel. Jordan, supra at 154. The defendant was convicted of several felonies, and the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Id. at 154-155.
On further appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals14 considered whether the defendant
preserved for appeal the trial court’s ruling that his statement was voluntary when he did not
testify, but stated that he would have had the court ruled the statement involuntary. Id. at 155.
After noting the constitutional magnitude of the defendant’s right to testify in support of his own
defense, the court noted that traditionally courts will not review evidentiary issues unless the
evidence was actually used at trial:
It is axiomatic that courts have traditionally reviewed decisions that permit
the admission of evidence in criminal trials only where the evidence is used to
convict. We are not inclined to review a trial court’s decision authorizing the
State to use particular evidence when, as a result of a tactical decision by the
defendant, the State ultimately was precluded from utilizing that same evidence.
[Id. at 156 (emphasis in original).]
The court then concluded, similar to the Luce and Boyd Courts, that absent the defendant’s
testimony and the introduction of his statement into evidence, the defendant’s injury was remote
and speculative and review for harmless error was difficult:
(…continued)
therefore is not a major factor in deciding this issue.
13
Greer was a habeas corpus case, and thus the federal court distinguished Luce, but relied upon
New Jersey v Portash, 440 US 450; 99 S Ct 1292; 59 L Ed 2d 501 (1979), in which the Court
held that federal law does not prohibit state courts from considering such evidentiary issues
without the defendant first testifying. Greer, supra at 593-594.
14
In Maryland, the highest appellate court is the Court of Appeals.
-10-
Jordan’s alleged injury is rather remote and speculative. If Jordan had
testified, it is possible, depending on how he testified, that the State might have
elected not to use his statement to impeach him and thus not open the door to the
issue of voluntariness. It is also possible that Jordan might have taken the stand
and given testimony consistent with his statement to the police, thus precluding
use of the statement since it would have no “impeachment” value; or Jordan
might have taken the stand and given testimony so similar to his statement to the
police that use of the statement to impeach, even if improper, would be harmless
error. [Id.]
Finally, the Jordan Court concluded that the defendant’s constitutional right to testify, and his
right against self-incrimination, would be protected by requiring him to testify in order to
preserve the issue for appeal:
Just as Jordan’s potential injury is speculative, the right he is asserting is
also speculative. If we assume Jordan is correct and the trial judge erroneously
ruled that the confession was voluntary, then it is not clear how Jordan’s
constitutional rights were violated. His right against self-incrimination was not
infringed upon, as he elected not to testify. His right to take the witness stand
could ultimately be preserved since, if he testified and was improperly impeached
with an involuntary statement, any conviction would be reversed on appeal. What
Jordan really seems to be asking for is that, when a trial judge improperly rules
that an involuntary confession can be used to impeach, the defendant ought to be
able to avoid the effect of the ruling by not taking the stand, but still have his
conviction reversed because evidence that ultimately was never introduced should
not even have been available for introduction. [Id. at 156-157 (emphasis in
original).]
The Arizona Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in State v Conde, 174 Ariz 30; 846
P2d 843 (1992). In that murder case, the trial court held that the defendant’s second statement to
police was involuntary but could still be used for impeachment. Conde, supra at 32. The
defendant did not testify at trial, and was convicted. The defendant challenged the trial court’s
ruling that his statement could be used for impeachment, and the state challenged that on the
basis that it was unpreserved. In considering this issue, the court noted that some Sister State
courts had distinguished Luce because it did not deal with constitutional issues, yet recognized
that an earlier Arizona Supreme Court decision applied Luce in deciding a constitutional issue.15
Id. at 35. It then held that the policies underlying Luce and Conner applied to Conde because of
his failure to testify:
While the issue in Conner was a constitutional one, Arizona adopted the
Luce rule: Although a defendant’s statements were obtained in violation of
Miranda, his election to forego testifying obviates any challenge to the ruling on
use of the impeachment evidence. Conde’s claim that his second statement was
15
State v Conner, 163 Ariz 97; 786 P2d 948 (1990).
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the product of the allegedly coercive first interrogation involves the same analysis
and result. All of the policy reasons for declining to consider his claim in the
absence of his testimony apply whether the statement was coerced or, as in
Conner, obtained in violation of Miranda. In either situation, Conde’s alleged
prejudice is hypothetical because his testimony could not be impeached because it
did not occur. [Id.]
We agree with the rationale of both the Jordan and Conde courts, as they reflect a sound and
principled application of Luce. Additionally, we conclude that these holdings are more
consistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in Boyd. After all, the Boyd Court considered the
issue before it to be of constitutional magnitude, see Boyd, supra at 373-374, and still opined that
the rationale underlying Luce applied. Id. at 376. By requiring defendant to testify, his right to
testify and to not incriminate himself are preserved, as are traditional appellate preservation
principles. After all, “‘error does not occur until error occurs; that is, until the evidence is
admitted.’” Boyd, supra at 370, quoting Finley, supra at 512 (opinion of Riley, C.J.).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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