PEOPLE OF MI V GORDON ROBERT LOGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 23, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249340
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-007847-01
GORDON ROBERT LOGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction for aggravated stalking, MCL
750.411i, for which he was sentenced to five years’ probation. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
and also claims that he received the ineffective assistance of both his trial counsel and his first
appellate counsel for their failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him.
Specifically, defendant contends that the prosecution failed to establish that defendant had
“actual notice” of the personal protection order against him, and therefore, defendant could not
be guilty of violating the PPO or of aggravated stalking.
I
Claims of insufficient evidence are reviewed de novo, and viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999); People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457;
628 NW2d 105 (2001).
“Aggravated stalking consists of the crime of ‘stalking,’ MCL 750.411h(1)(d), and the
presence of an aggravating circumstance specified in MCL 750.411i(2).” People v Threatt, 254
Mich App 504, 505; 657 NW2d 819 (2002). “Stalking” is defined as “a willful course of
conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a
reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested
and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested.” MCL 750.411h(1)(d). The aggravating circumstance that the trial court
found to be present was “[a]t least 1 of the actions constituting the offense is in violation of a
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restraining order and the defendant has received actual notice of that restraining order or at least
1 of the actions is in violation of an injunction or preliminary injunction.” MCL 750.411i(2)(a).
II
Here, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that his actions constituted
stalking under MCL 750.411h(1)(d), but rather, defendant argues that he never received “actual
notice” of the PPO against him, as required by MCL 750.411i(2)(a). Although defendant was
told over the telephone by a police investigator that there was a PPO taken out against him and
that he was not to contact complainant again, defendant argues that his conversations with the
investigator do not constitute “actual notice” under the statute.
Although MCL 750.411i(2)(a) does not define “actual notice,” this Court has addressed
the issue and determined that “actual notice” does not require “service,” but rather, that a
defendant’s knowledge of the PPO may be reasonably inferred. Threatt, supra at 506-507. This
Court looked to the PPO issuance provisions of MCL 600.2950a for guidance. In support of its
ruling, this Court stated:
[W]ere we to examine MCL 600.2950a to determine what is required to
demonstrate “actual notice” under the aggravated stalking statute, we would find
that it does not support defendant's claim that “actual notice” must be equated
with service. MCL 600.2950a(8)(g), and (10) refer to “receiv[ing] actual notice”
and “be[ing] served” in the alternative. These references indicate that, under
MCL 600.2950a, “actual notice” is not the equivalent of service. [Id.]
Defendant counters by arguing that Threatt does not apply to the circumstances of this
case because Threatt merely addressed the distinction between “actual notice” and “service” but
did not address the difference between “actual notice” and “constructive notice.” Defendant also
argues that MCL 600.2950a(19) requires an officer giving oral notice to also give a defendant an
opportunity to comply with the order before effecting an arrest. Defendant argues that, because
the investigator did not inform him of the specific conduct enjoined or of the penalties for
violating the PPO as required by MCL 600.2950a(19), he merely had “constructive notice” of the
PPO, and thus, had no opportunity to comply with it. Defendant’s argument fails for three
reasons.
First, MCL 600.2950a(19) only requires an officer to inform a defendant of the specific
conduct enjoined and the penalties for violating the order when the officer is responding to a call
alleging a violation of the PPO and the defendant has not been served. MCL 600.2950a(19)
provides in part that:
If the individual restrained or enjoined has not been served, the law enforcement
agency or officer responding to a call alleging a violation of a personal
protection order shall serve the individual restrained or enjoined with a true copy
of the order or advise the individual restrained or enjoined about the existence of
the personal protection order, the specific conduct enjoined, the penalties for
violating the order, and where the individual restrained or enjoined may obtain a
copy of the order. The law enforcement officer shall enforce the personal
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protection order and immediately enter or cause to be entered into the L.E.I.N.
that the individual restrained or enjoined has actual notice of the personal
protection order. The law enforcement officer also shall file a proof of service or
proof of oral notice with the clerk of the court issuing the personal protection
order. [Emphasis added.]
This section of the statute constitutes one way, but not the only way, to comply with the actual
notice requirement. Under this Court’s holding in Threatt, defendant’s “actual notice” of the
PPO in the present case clearly “could reasonably be inferred” given the fact that the investigator
actually informed him of its existence and that it required him to cease contact with complainant.
Threatt, supra at 507.
Second, the requirement that an officer give a defendant the opportunity to comply before
effecting an arrest only applies where the defendant has received no notice of the PPO. MCL
600.2950a(19) continues:
If the individual restrained or enjoined has not received notice of the personal
protection order, the individual restrained or enjoined shall be given an
opportunity to comply with the personal protection order before the law
enforcement officer makes a custodial arrest for violation of the personal
protection order. Failure to immediately comply with the personal protection
order is grounds for an immediate custodial arrest.
Significantly, the opportunity to comply only applies where an individual had not received
“notice” of the PPO, not “actual notice.” In any event, the trial court found, and the evidence
supports the conclusion, that defendant had actual notice before he committed the acts which
violated the order.
Third, defendant did have an opportunity to comply with the order. The investigator
informed defendant of the existence of the PPO and that he was to cease all contact with
complainant the day before defendant was seen in his car outside complainant’s residence. Still,
defendant continued to call complainant’s cell phone and then went to complainant’s residence at
her mother-in-law’s house. MCL 600.2950a(19) requires defendant’s immediate compliance
upon receiving notice of the PPO from an officer, not waiting until actually being served before
coming into compliance.
We are not persuaded by defendant’s attempts to distinguish Threatt. Defendant clearly
knew of the PPO against him, but he continued to contact complainant. This Court’s holding in
Threatt is, therefore, controlling. Defendant’s knowledge of the restraining order against him is
sufficient to establish his “actual notice” of the PPO under MCL 750.411i(2)(a). Threatt, supra.
III
Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel and first appellate counsel were ineffective
because they failed to clearly raise the issue of a lack of “actual notice,” as opposed to mere
“constructive notice.” We disagree.
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To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58; 523
NW2d 830 (1994). Defendant must further demonstrate a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different, and the attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.
People v Poole, 218 Mich App 702, 718; 555 NW2d 485 (1996) (emphasis in
original). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a
heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601
NW2d 887 (1999). [People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294
(2001).]
Here, defendant has not shown that his trial counsel’s or first appellate counsel’s
performance was deficient for failing to raise defendant’s alleged lack of actual notice because
the record does not support that argument. The trial court held that the investigator’s
conversation with defendant informing him that there was a PPO against him was sufficient to
constitute “actual notice” of the PPO, and any argument to the contrary is without merit.
“Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or
meritless motion.” People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
Nonetheless, even if defense counsel’s failure to advance the argument that defendant
only received “constructive notice” was deficient, such failure does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel unless it deprives defendant of a substantial defense. People v Dixon, 263
Mich App 393, 398; ___ NW2d ___ (2004). “A defense is substantial if it might have made a
difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d
465 (1995), vac’d in part on other grds 453 Mich 902 (1996). The trial court concluded that
defendant “did, in fact, have actual knowledge of the Personal Protection Order on [May] 28th,
as well as on the 29th [2001].” Therefore, even if this argument had been raised at trial, the
outcome would have been the same because the trial court found actual notice. Additionally,
defendant has not been prejudiced by his trial counsel’s or first appellate counsel’s alleged
deficiencies in their failure to raise the issue of a lack actual notice because defendant was
permitted to raise the issue before this Court.
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant’s knowledge of the PPO against him
was sufficient to establish defendant’s “actual notice” of the PPO. Defendant has failed to show
that counsels’ performance was deficient in failing to argue that defendant lacked “actual
notice,” and defendant was not prejudiced by counsels’ performance.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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