GERMAINE J MAVIGLIA V W BLOOMFIELD NURSING & CONVALESCENT CENTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GERMAINE J. MAVIGLIA,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
WEST BLOOMFIELD NURSING &
CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC.,
BEAUMONT NURSING HOME SERVICES,
INC., and WEST BLOOMFIELD NURSING &
CONVALESCENT CENTER JOINT VENTURE,
No. 248796
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-041739-NH
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by leave granted the order granting plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery of incident reports at defendants’ nursing home. In the course of this negligence
action, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request for discovery of incident reports related to her
residency at the nursing home. We hold that because the incident reports are data collected for
the purposes of professional review, they should not be subject to discovery in a
negligence/malpractice case. Accordingly, we reverse. This appeal is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute. In re Lieberman, 250 Mich App
381, 386; 646 NW2d 149 (2002). MCL 333.20175(8) provides:
The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or
committees assigned a professional review function in a health facility or agency,
or an institution of higher education in this state that has colleges of osteopathic
and human medicine, are confidential, shall be used only for the purposes
provided in this article, are not public records, and are not subject to court
subpoena.
And MCL 333.21515, which is applicable to hospitals, similarly provides:
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The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or
committees assigned a review function described in this article are confidential
and shall be used only for the purposes provided in this article, shall not be public
records, and shall not be available for court subpoena.
In Lieberman, supra at 387, this Court explained the purpose and intent of §21515 as follows:
The clear language of § 21515 provides: (1) peer review information is
confidential, (2) peer review information is to be used “only for the purposes
provided in this article,” (3) peer review information is not to be a public record,
and (4) peer review information is not subject to subpoena. Section 21515
demonstrates that the Legislature has imposed a comprehensive ban on the
disclosure of any information collected by, or records of the proceedings of,
committees assigned a professional review function in hospitals and health
facilities. If the specific mention of a court subpoena meant that the privilege
existed only as a defense against a subpoena, the statute’s general language
stating that peer review materials are confidential would become nearly
meaningless. Although the statute does not refer to search warrants, it would be
inconsistent with the stated purposes of the privilege to find that peer review
information could be obtained pursuant to an investigatory search warrant. The
protection against discovery through subpoena would effectively evaporate if an
investigator needed only to obtain a search warrant instead.
Underscoring the high level of confidentiality attendant to peer review
documents is the statutory admonishment that such information is to be used only
for the reasons set forth in the legislative article including that privilege.
[Emphasis in original.]
Plaintiff’s reliance on Centennial Healthcare Mgt Corp v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry
Services, 254 Mich App 275, 290; 657 NW2d 746 (2002), is misplaced. In that case, this Court
found that the incident reports, accident reports, and other records prepared in compliance with
the administrative rules, which contained only factual information rather than the assessments of
the peer review committee, were not within the scope of the privilege. The Centennial Court
explained:
Certainly, in the abstract, a peer review committee cannot properly review
performance in a facility without hard facts at its disposal. However, it is not the
facts themselves that are at the heart of the peer review process. Rather, it is what
is done with those facts that is essential to the internal review process, i.e., a
candid assessment of what those facts indicate, and the best way to improve the
situation represented by those facts. Simply put, the logic of the principle of
confidentiality in the peer review context does not require construing the limits of
the privilege to cover any and all factual material that is assembled at the direction
of a peer review committee. [Id. at 290.]
We agree with defendants that this reasoning should be limited to the context of where the state
agency responsible for regulating nursing homes requires the collection of incident and accident
information:
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In the context of the circumstances in the case at bar, it is true that
Westgate’s peer review committee could not effectively do its work without
collecting basic information about the various incidents and accidents that occur
at a nursing home. However, it is not the existence of the facts of an incident or
accident that must be kept confidential in order for the committee to effectuate its
purpose; it is how the committee discusses, deliberates, evaluates, and judges
those facts that the privilege is designed to protect. We conclude that in order to
effectuate other purposes outlined in the Public Health Code--especially those
involving licensing--the statutory peer review privilege outlined in subsection
21075(8) is not undermined by administrative rules requiring a nursing home to
keep and make available for review and copying incident reports and accident
records that contain basic factual material but do not require the reporting of the
internal deliberative process of a peer review committee. [Id. at 291].
The Centennial Court’s decision and reasoning is not applicable where, as here, the party
seeking disclosure of the information is a private litigant. MCL 333.20175(8) clearly bars
release of the “records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or committees
assigned a professional review function in a health facility.” The accompanying regulation, 1979
AACS, R 325.21101, also relied on by plaintiff, provides that accident records and incident
reports shall be kept in the home and shall be available to the director or his or her authorized
representative for review and copying if necessary. But the rule only authorizes copying of the
reports by the director or an authorized representative. It does not indicate that the reports
should be available for copying by anyone else.
Reversed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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