SCOTT E COMBS V SARA M WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SCOTT E. COMBS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 4, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 247797
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-034327-NI
SARA M. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict. We affirm.
In June 2000, plaintiff was walking through a parking lot in Southfield when defendant
reversed her car out of a parking space and struck plaintiff. On August 29, 2001, plaintiff
initiated this case. On March 11, 2003, after a jury was impaneled in this case, plaintiff gave
notice to defendant of his intent to take the de bene esse deposition of his treating physician on
the following afternoon. Defendant immediately filed an emergency motion to quash this
deposition, arguing that it was being taken in violation of MCR 2.302(B)(4)(d). The court heard
arguments on this motion the following morning and subsequently granted defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff then moved to admit his medical records into evidence through the testimony of
his expert witness. Defendant objected, arguing that plaintiff had failed to meet the foundational
requirements necessary to permit the medical records to be introduced into evidence. After
hearing arguments and taking testimony from plaintiff’s expert witness, the court ruled that
plaintiff’s medical records were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule.
Moreover, as a result of the arguments made in connection with plaintiff’s motion to admit the
medical records, the court found that plaintiff had violated MCR 2.302(E) by failing to
seasonably supplement his answers to defendant’s interrogatories. Accordingly, the court barred
plaintiff’s expert witness from testifying. MCR 2.313(B)(2)(b).
Subsequently, plaintiff sought leave from the court to conduct the de bene esse
depositions of two of his treating physicians. Defendant again objected on the ground that such
depositions violated MCR 2.302(B)(4)(d). The trial court agreed and barred plaintiff from taking
either of these depositions. Without his medical records or the testimony of his treating
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physicians, plaintiff was unable to offer evidence of his injury, and the trial court granted
defendant’s motion for directed verdict.
Plaintiff first argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it barred plaintiff from
taking the de bene esse depositions of three of his treating physicians. We review a trial court’s
general conduct of a trial for an abuse of discretion. In re King, 186 Mich App 458, 466; 465
NW2d 1 (1990). An abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the
facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for the
ruling made, or the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a
perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias. Dep’t of
Transportation v Randolph, 461 Mich 757, 768; 610 NW2d 893 (2000).
Three court rules govern a party’s taking of a deposition of its own witness or potential
witness. MCR 2.301(C) provides that “[a]fter the time for completion of discovery, a deposition
of a witness taken solely for the purpose of preservation of testimony may be taken at any time
before commencement of trial without leave of court.” MCR 2.302(B)(4)(d) provides, in
pertinent part, that “[a] party may depose a witness that he or she expects to call as an expert at
trial. The deposition may be taken at any time before trial on reasonable notice to the opposite
party[.]” (Emphasis added.) MCR 2.302(F)(1) provides that, unless the court orders otherwise,
by written stipulation the parties may “provide that depositions may be taken before any person,
at any time or place, on any notice, and in any manner, and when so taken may be used like other
depositions[.]” The parties did not enter into a written stipulation regarding discovery or, more
specifically, the taking of depositions. Accordingly, the parties were required to comply with the
requirements of MCR 2.301(C) and 2.302(B)(4)(d) in taking the deposition of any of their own
witnesses.
Plaintiff did not give notice of his intent to take the deposition of the witnesses at issue
until after trial had begun. Additionally, plaintiff provided opposing counsel with only twentyfour hours’ notice of one of the depositions and failed to seek leave of court to take this
deposition. With respect to the other two depositions, plaintiff provided only a couple of hours’
notice. Thus, plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of either MCR 2.301(C) or MCR
2.302(B)(4)(d) in connection with any of these depositions. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it barred plaintiff from taking these depositions.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it barred plaintiff from introducing his
medical records into evidence. The decision whether to admit evidence is within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Craig ex
rel Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 76; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). MRE 801(C) defines
hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 802 provides that
hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Michigan Rules of Evidence. MRE 803(6)
provides an exception to the general prohibition against hearsay. This rule provides, in pertinent
part, that the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
transactions, occurrences, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
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kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with a rule promulgated by the
supreme court or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. [MRE 803(6).]
Under the plain language of MRE 803(6), a qualified witness must testify that the record
sought to be entered: (1) was made at or near the time in question; (2) by or from information
transmitted by a person with knowledge; and (3) in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity. Alternatively, the parties may stipulate to the admission of such records. Werthman v
General Motors Corp, 187 Mich App 238, 242; 466 NW2d 305 (1990).
In the instant case, plaintiff did not produce any qualified person to testify with regard to
the foundational requirements necessary for the admission of his medical records under MRE
803(6). For purposes of setting the foundation for the admission of medical records pursuant to
MRE 803(6), a qualified person is an agent or “any person connected with a hospital and who is
familiar with its procedures of hospital record-keeping[.]” People v Kirtdoll, 391 Mich 370, 390
n 11; 217 NW2d 37 (1974); Sponenburgh v Wayne County, 106 Mich App 628, 652; 308 NW2d
589 (1981). Plaintiff presented neither the doctors who actually created the records, nor a
custodian of such doctors’ records as a witness at trial. The witness through whose testimony
plaintiff attempted to introduce the medical records was merely an expert witness, and plaintiff
did not attempt to show any connection between this witness and the sources of the medical
records. Indeed, the expert himself testified that his sole connection with the records was that he
had reviewed them in expectation of testifying as an expert on plaintiff’s behalf. Moreover,
contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, defendant did not stipulate that the records were admissible.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiff’s medical
records were not admissible.
We also reject plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred when it barred, as a sanction
for discovery violations, his expert witness from testifying at trial. A trial court’s decision
whether to impose discovery sanctions rests in the trial court’s discretion. Local Area Watch v
Grand Rapids, 262 Mich 136, 147; 683 NW2d 745 (2004). Where the sanction imposed is the
barring of an expert witness that results in the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the sanction
should be exercised cautiously. Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27, 32; 451 NW2d 571 (1990).
Accordingly, the trial court’s record should indicate that the court “gave careful consideration to
the factors involved and considered all of its options in determining what sanction was just and
proper in the context of the case before it.” Id.
MCR 2.302(E)(1)(a)(ii) provides:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that
was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response to include
information acquired later, except . . . [a] party is under a duty seasonably to
supplement the response with respect to a question directly addressed to . . . the
identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
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subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and the substance of the
expert’s testimony.
MCR 2.302(E)(2) provides:
If the court finds, by way of motion or otherwise, that a party has not
seasonably supplemented responses as required by this subrule the court may
enter an order as is just, including an order providing the sanctions stated in MCR
2.313(B), and, in particular, MCR 2.313(B)(2)(b).
MCR 2.313(B)(2)(b) provides that, as a sanction for discovery violations, a court may enter “an
order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses,
or prohibiting the party from introducing designated matters into evidence[.]”
The factors we consider in determining an appropriate discovery sanction include: “(1)
whether the violation was wilful or accidental, (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with
discovery requests (or refusal to disclose witnesses), (3) the prejudice to the defendant, (4) actual
notice to the defendant of the witness and the length of time prior to trial that the defendant
received such actual notice, (5) whether there exists a history of plaintiff engaging in deliberate
delay, (6) the degree of compliance by the plaintiff with other provisions of the court’s order, (7)
an attempt by the plaintiff to timely cure the defect, and (8) whether a lesser sanction would
better serve the interests of justice.” Dean, supra at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, plaintiff included the expert witness at issue as a potential expert
witness on his witness list dated February 13, 2002. However, this witness was only one of three
experts, and one of ten doctors or other members of the medical field, that plaintiff included in
this list. At his February 18, 2002, deposition, while indicating that this witness was listed as an
expert on his witness list for the purpose of testifying at trial, plaintiff also indicated that as of
that time he had not yet sent this witness any materials in connection with this case, nor had he
paid him a retainer fee. In his answers to defendant’s interrogatories, served on March 11, 2002,
plaintiff responded to a question regarding the names of the doctors who had provided medical
treatment to him or had examined him in connection with the accident by merely referring
defendant back to plaintiff’s medical records, as previously provided to defendant and
defendant’s insurance carrier. In his April 9, 2002, supplemental answers to defendant’s
interrogatories, plaintiff explicitly stated that not all of the experts there listed, including the
witness at issue, had been “contracted for final opinions” as of that time. Some three months
after these supplemental answers were served on defendant, this witness finally examined
plaintiff for purposes of testifying on his behalf. However, plaintiff never supplemented his
April 9, 2002, answers to indicate that this witness had actually been retained in connection with
this case.
Under MCR 2.302(E)(1)(a)(ii), plaintiff had a duty to seasonably supplement his
responses to defendant’s requests for discovery to divulge the identity of any expert witnesses
retained after his response to defendant’s requests was submitted, and to provide the subject
matter of which any such expert witnesses were expected to testify. Accordingly, plaintiff had a
duty to supplement his answers once he retained this witness as an expert in July 2002. Because
plaintiff did not properly supplement his answers, the court had the discretion to sanction
plaintiff for his violation of MCR 2.302(E)(1)(a)(ii). MCR 2.302(E)(2).
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We conclude that the sanction imposed by the court was appropriate. In the past both this
Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have found that a trial court abused its discretion when it
barred a party from introducing testimony or calling witnesses as a sanction for discovery
violations. See, e.g., Dean, supra at 33-35. Moreover, this Court has also concluded that it was
an abuse of discretion to dismiss an action where the party aggrieved by a discovery violation
has delayed in taking any action to try to remedy the violation, or when the aggrieved party has
himself contributed in some way to the discovery violation. Thorne v Bell, 206 Mich App 625,
634-635; 522 NW2d 711 (1994); Middleton v Margulis, 162 Mich App 218, 223-224; 412
NW2d 268 (1987).
In the present case, however, plaintiff’s violation was extremely egregious. Plaintiff was
aware of his duty to supplement his answers to defendant’s interrogatories. Moreover, plaintiff
had nearly eight months within which to supplement those answers between the time he actually
retained his expert and the time of trial. Nonetheless, plaintiff failed to supplement his answers.
Further, there is no indication that defendant in any way contributed to the discovery violation,
and defendant did not delay in seeking to remedy the violation.
Moreover, we do not believe the less severe sanction of postponing trial to permit proper
discovery to occur was a reasonable option under the circumstances. The expert himself
admitted that he had no records of his evaluations of plaintiff and that he had not prepared any
documents indicating his opinions. Further, a jury had already been impaneled in this case when
the discovery violation became apparent. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s sanction
barring plaintiff’s expert from testifying was appropriate. Kalamazoo Oil Co v Boerman, 242
Mich App 75, 88-89; 618 NW2d 66 (2000). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it barred this witness from testifying.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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