BRUCE BEAGLE V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BRUCE BEAGLE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 4, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245519
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 98-087845-CZ
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and
CINDY KAYANEK,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BILLY BURNS and KEN HORTON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant General Motors Corporation (GM) appeals by leave granted an order
sanctioning GM for filing a motion for summary disposition approximately nine months after the
deadline in the court’s stipulated scheduling order. The court awarded sanctions to plaintiff for
the attorney fees and costs plaintiff incurred between the motion deadline and the date GM’s
motion was granted. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
GM challenges the sanctions because they were ordered under the court’s inherent
authority rather than under a court rule or statute. A trial court’s authority to impose attorney fee
“awards as a sanction is a question of law, subject to review de novo.” Persichini v Beaumont
Hospital, 238 Mich App 626, 637; 607 NW2d 100 (1999). “An exercise of the court’s inherent
power may be disturbed only upon a finding that there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.
at 642. “This Court has repeatedly recognized that a trial court has inherent authority to impose
sanctions on the basis of the misconduct of a party or an attorney.” Id. at 639 (citations and
footnote omitted).
[O]ur Supreme Court has “recognized the inherent power of a court to control the
movement of cases on its docket by a variety of sanctions.” Banta v Serban, 370
Mich 367, 368; 121 NW2d 854 (1963). Furthermore, MCL 600.611; MSA
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27A.611 provides, “Circuit courts have jurisdiction and power to make any order
proper to fully effectuate the circuit courts’ jurisdiction and judgments.”
In Cummings [v Wayne Co, 210 Mich App 249, 252-253; 533 NW2d 13 (1995)],
this Court held that a court has the inherent authority to dismiss a lawsuit as a
sanction for litigation misconduct. It therefore follows that the less severe
sanction of an assessment of attorney fees is within a court’s inherent power as
well. [Id. at 640.]
The trial court appointed a special master to hear argument and make recommendations
to the court regarding the case evaluation sanctions against plaintiff and the sanctions against
GM. In its order, the trial court stated that it would adopt the report of the special master “unless
any party objects to same, in which case a hearing shall be conducted before this court, as to said
objection(s).” [emphasis added.] The special master submitted his report and recommendations
to the court on July 3, 2002. GM filed objections and amended objections to the special master’s
recommendations; however, the trial court did not allow GM a hearing on its objections.
Although GM conceded the court’s inherent authority to sanction a party for misconduct
at a sanctions hearing conducted by a special master appointed by the court, it asserted below
and on appeal that its conduct did not qualify as misconduct.
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that GM’s actions merited
sanction. Id. at 642. Without offering any justification for its late action, and on the eve of a
lengthy civil trial, GM filed a dispositive motion that very likely would have obviated entirely a
trial had GM’s motion been timely. A court is not powerless to sanction flagrant violations of its
orders, despite the lack of a specific court rule on point, especially when those violations
consume and waste the court’s time and the opponent’s resources. Id. at 639-640.
GM also challenges the court’s decision to adopt the special master’s method of
estimating the amount of the sanction. “We review a trial court’s determination of the amount of
sanctions imposed for an abuse of discretion.” Maryland Casualty Co v Allen, 221 Mich App
26, 32; 561 NW2d 103 (1997).
In the report to the court, the special master noted that “designating certain hours as work
performed solely for the purpose of achieving a favorable result against General Motors would
be an exercise in speculation, if not pure guesswork,” in part because plaintiff failed to present “a
clear and concise evidentiary offer with regard to what was done, or not done, by plaintiff’s
counsel [that] would not have been necessary had General Motors been out of the case by the
deadline for summary disposition motions.” The special master decided, therefore, to base the
recommended sanction on the potential recovery from each defendant, applying a percentage to
each one. The special master estimated that two-thirds of the work plaintiff’s counsel performed
during the sanctions period would not have been necessary had GM been timely with its motion
for summary disposition.
Although the trial court indeed had the inherent authority to sanction GM for its late
motion, we conclude that it abused its discretion by simply adopting the special master’s
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findings and conclusions after GM invoked its right to object and require a hearing. The special
master arbitrarily allocated costs based on the amounts plaintiff hoped to recover from the
various defendants. But it is plaintiff’s burden to prove, not speculate, as to the difference in
fees plaintiff’s counsel would have charged had GM’s motion for summary disposition been
filed and granted sooner. Consequently, the court abused its discretion by adopting the special
master’s report because the court’s order provided for a hearing if any party objected to the
special master’s report. GM, in fact, objected. We therefore remand so that GM may have a
hearing on the objections it raised to the special master’s method of calculating the appropriate
sanction against it.
We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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