PEOPLE OF MI V ALPHONSO GERALD MILLS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247948
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-186340-FC
ALPHONSO GERALD MILLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Cavanagh and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of six counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), for sexually abusing the twin four-year-old daughters of
his girlfriend, with whom he lived. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL
769.11, to concurrent terms of thirty to sixty years in prison for each conviction. He appeals as
of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion and committed
error requiring reversal by admitting other acts evidence. We disagree.
The charges brought in the instant case stemmed from incidents that occurred between
November 1998 and May 1999, while defendant was living with his girlfriend and her twin
daughters in Oak Park, in Oakland County. Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a motion seeking
admission of evidence that defendant continued to sexually assault the same complainants while
they lived together in Canton, in Wayne County, from May 2000 until June 2002. The
prosecution also sought to admit evidence that defendant sexually assaulted his own biological
daughter during the same time frame he abused the twins, while living in Oak Park. In a separate
jury trial preceding the instant trial, defendant was acquitted of charges that he sexually abused
his biological daughter.
The record indicates that defense counsel did not contest the prosecution’s motion to
admit the other acts evidence concerning defendant’s alleged abuse of the twins while they lived
in Wayne County because, as a matter of strategy, the defense wanted to bring out
inconsistencies in the complainants’ testimony. However, defense counsel objected to the
admission of any allegations of abuse regarding defendant’s biological daughter. The trial court
-1-
nonetheless held that evidence regarding the sexual assaults by defendant against his daughter
was admissible at trial.
At trial, defendant’s daughter testified that she lived with defendant, his girlfriend, and
her twin daughters in Oak Park starting in November 1998. She testified that, during this time
period, when she was fifteen years old, defendant asked her if she was a virgin, pulled down her
pants and stuck his finger in her vagina. Thereafter, defendant had sexual intercourse with her
approximately twenty times over several months. She eventually told a friend what her father
had been doing to her.
Defendant now contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
this other acts evidence concerning defendant’s alleged sexual assault of his daughter.1
Defendant maintains that his daughter’s uncorroborated allegations were highly prejudicial given
the lack of physical or medical evidence of the assaults in the instant case and the serious
questions regarding the complainants’ credibility. Defendant also argues that the alleged assaults
on his daughter had no probative value because they were not similar to the charged acts; his
daughter was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged assaults, whereas the twins were only
four years old. Further, the manner of the alleged assaults differed.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit other acts evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Sabin (On Remand), 463 Mich 43, 60; 614 NW2d 888 (2000); People v Crawford, 458
Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998); People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 634-635; 630
NW2d 633 (2001). An abuse of discretion is found when an unbiased person, reviewing the
same facts on which the trial court acted, would conclude there is no justification or excuse for
the ruling made. People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229, 235; 586 NW2d 906 (1998). Even if
properly preserved, an error in the admission of other acts evidence does not require reversal
unless it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome
determinative. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378-379; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
Use of other acts evidence reflecting on character is limited by MRE 404(b) to avoid the
danger of conviction based on past conduct. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494-495; 577 NW2d
673 (1998). MRE 404(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
1
On appeal, defendant does not contest that portion of the trial court’s evidentiary ruling that
allowed the introduction of evidence that he sexually assaulted the complainants while they lived
in Wayne County. As previously noted, the record indicates that defendant wanted such
evidence to be admitted in order to challenge the complainants’ credibility.
-2-
To be admissible, the evidence (1) must be offered for a proper purpose under MRE
404(b); (2) it must be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b); (3) the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice
under the balancing test of MRE 403; and (4) the trial court may provide a limiting instruction if
requested. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004), citing People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). A
proper purpose is one other than establishing the defendant’s character to show his propensity to
commit the offense. VanderVliet, supra at 74-75.
In the instant case, the prosecution offered the other acts evidence for a purpose deemed
proper under MRE 404(b): to prove a scheme, plan, or system. Defendant argues the evidence
is inadmissible because there were dissimilarities between the other acts (the alleged sexual
abuse of his biological daughter) and the assaults against the complainants in this case. We
disagree.
In Sabin, supra at 63, our Supreme Court, focusing on the exception in MRE 404(b) for
evidence showing a “scheme, plan, or system,” held that “evidence of similar misconduct is
logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the
charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a
common plan, scheme, or system.” The Sabin Court cautioned that “[l]ogical relevance is not
limited to circumstances in which the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single continuing
conception or plot,” and that “[g]eneral similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does
not, however, by itself, establish a plan, scheme, or system used to commit the acts.” Id. at 64.
There must be such a concurrence of common features so that the charged acts and the other acts
are logically seen as part of a general plan, scheme, or design. Id. at 64-65. See also People v
Hine, 467 Mich 242, 251; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). Distinctive and unusual features are not
required to establish the existence of a common design or plan; the evidence of uncharged acts
“needs only to support the inference that the defendant employed the common plan in
committing the charged offense.” Hine, supra at 253, citing Sabin, supra at 65-66.
Here, defendant had a father-daughter relationship with the MRE 404(b) witness and the
complainants. See Sabin, supra at 66. Defendant was the biological father of the proffered other
acts witness, and she lived with him at the time of the assaults. Although defendant was not the
biological father of the complainants, he lived with them, and they called him “daddy” or “dad.”
Defendant committed the assaults on the complainants and his daughter during the same time
frame, while all were living together in the same house. Moreover, defendant committed the
assaults while his girlfriend, the mother of the complainants, was at work. He held a position of
authority over the complainants and his teenage daughter. Although his biological daughter was
approximately ten years older than the complainants, she did not live with defendant when she
was younger, and only started living with him when she was fourteen. Consequently, defendant
did not have the opportunity to commit the abuse on his daughter when she was younger. The
sexual assaults defendant perpetrated on the complainants and his daughter, which included
vaginal penetration, occurred on several occasions. They were not isolated incidents. One could
infer from these common features that defendant had a system that involved taking advantage of
the parent-child relationship, particularly his control over his daughters, to perpetrate the abuse.
The common features of the charged acts and the other acts support the prosecution’s theory that
-3-
defendant devised a plan or scheme and used it to sexually assault young female relatives in his
household.
While we agree with defendant that there were dissimilarities between the acts, i.e., the
nature of the sexual acts differed, at most, reasonable persons could disagree on whether the
charged and uncharged acts contained sufficient common features to infer the existence of a
common system used by defendant in committing the acts. See Sabin, supra at 67. A mere
difference of opinion on a close evidentiary question will not qualify as an abuse of discretion.
Sabin, supra at 67; People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). As in Sabin,
supra, this Court cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the evidence
admissible under a theory of logical relevance. Id. at 68.2
We further conclude that the probative value of the other acts evidence was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. VanderVliet, supra. Where the complainants’
credibility was at issue and under attack, the evidence served to rebut defendant’s claims of
fabrication and explained the complainants’ delay in reporting the sexual assaults. See Starr,
supra at 503. Moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury, cautioning that the
other acts evidence could only be considered for a limited purpose, not to show that defendant
was a bad person, thereby lessening any prejudicial effect of the evidence. It is well established
that jurors are presumed to follow their jury instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486;
581 NW2d 229 (1998). Based on the evidence of record, we cannot conclude that the trial
court’s decision to admit the other acts evidence was an abuse of discretion. Crawford, supra.
II
Defendant next contends that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to sustain
his convictions on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant argues that the
testimony of the two complainants was weak and incredible; one of the twins was found by the
trial court to be incompetent to testify, and she contradicted her prior preliminary examination
testimony in numerous particulars. Defendant alleges that the other victim’s testimony was
likewise questionable, and notes that there were neither eyewitnesses to any of the alleged sexual
assaults nor medical or physical trace evidence to support the allegations that defendant had
penetrated the two complainants anally, orally, and vaginally.
This Court reviews claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v
Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found all the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that arise from
the evidence can constitute sufficient proof of the elements of the crime. Id. “The standard of
review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make
2
The fact that defendant was acquitted of sexually abusing his daughter does not destroy the
relevance of the evidence. A bad act need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be
admitted under MRE 404(b). See People v Cooper (After Remand), 220 Mich App 368, 375;
559 NW2d 90 (1996).
-4-
credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” Id. at 400. The prosecution need not negate
every reasonable theory consistent with innocence; instead, “it need only convince the jury ‘in
the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide.’” Id., quoting People v
Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 273 n 6; 536 NW2d 517 (1995). This Court will not interfere with the
jury’s role in determining the weight of evidence or credibility of the witnesses. People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People v
Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
The elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct are that a defendant engaged in
sexual penetration with another, and that the other was under thirteen years of age. MCL
750.20b(1)(a); People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 57; 534 NW2d 183 (1995).
In this case, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient, particularly in light of
the fact that the trial court found one of the twins to be incompetent to testify. However, due to
tactical decisions by defense counsel, this victim’s testimony was not stricken.3 Defense counsel
was thus able to impeach her trial testimony with her former testimony at the preliminary
examination and at the district court proceedings in Wayne County. Although there were some
inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, the main focus of her testimony was clear – defendant
sexually abused her on several occasions while his girlfriend was at work. The victim testified in
detail that went well beyond her years that defendant put his private part in her bottom, mouth,
and vagina.
The second victim testified that, under similar circumstances and during the pertinent
time period, defendant put his private part in the area where she urinates, more than ten times.
She further testified in graphic detail that defendant also put his penis in her mouth and in her
bottom. While the twins were living in Oak Park, they both complained to their mother that their
bottoms hurt. Although there was no physical evidence of abuse, the examining physician
testified that this was not unusual. Both victims told the emergency room nurse about the abuse.
In June 2002, the victims disclosed to their grandmother that defendant had sexually assaulted
them and had threatened them in order to maintain their silence.
The testimony of a victim is sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact can infer that a
sexual penetration occurred. MCL 750.520h; People v Robideau, 94 Mich App 663, 674; 289
NW2d 846 (1980), aff’d on other grounds, 419 Mich 458 (1984). Moreover, as previously
noted, the issue of the credibility of the complainant’s testimony is for the trier of fact, and we
will not resolve credibility issues anew on appeal. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 404;
648 NW2d 648 (2002). Here, viewing the above evidence in a light most favorable to the
3
During the cross-examination of one of the twins, the trial court declared her to be incompetent
to testify because she was unresponsive and unable to adequately understand or communicate.
However, defense counsel indicated that he was not going to ask to strike her trial testimony
because defendant wanted the jury to assess her credibility. Defendant also asked to use her
preliminary examination testimony to impeach her trial testimony. Consequently, the victim’s
trial testimony was supplemented by reading her testimony from the preliminary examination to
the jury. A portion of the victim’s testimony from the Wayne County proceedings was also read
into the record.
-5-
prosecution, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant engaged in multiple acts of oral, anal, and vaginal
sexual penetration with his four-year-old twin daughters, so as to sustain his convictions on six
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
III
Finally, defendant argues that, in light of his relatively young age (thirty-eight) at the
time of sentencing and the purportedly questionable reliability of the evidence on which he was
convicted, his sentence of thirty to sixty years on each count constitutes cruel and/or unusual
punishment in violation of both the state and federal constitutions. The United States
Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual” punishment, but the Michigan
Constitution provides greater protection, prohibiting “cruel or unusual” punishment. See Const
1963, art I, § 16; US Const, Am VIII; People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30; 485 NW2d 866
(1992); People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 363; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). Consequently, if
a punishment is not “cruel or unusual” under the Michigan Constitution, “then it necessarily
passes muster under the federal constitution.” People v Nunez, 242 Mich App 610, 618 n 2; 619
NW2d 550 (2000).
Because defendant did not challenge his sentence on this basis in the trial court, this issue
has not been properly preserved. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 669-670; 672 NW2d
860 (2003). However, defendant’s failure to assert this argument below does not preclude
appellate review under the plain error doctrine set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Id. at 670; People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269; 275-276; 651
NW2d 798 (2002).
In McLaughlin, this Court rejected the defendant’s argument that his sentence was
disproportionate and constituted cruel and unusual punishment where the defendant’s minimum
sentence fell within the statutory guidelines:
When the minimum sentence is within the range provided by the statutory
sentencing guidelines, this Court must affirm unless the trial court erred in scoring
the guidelines or relied on inaccurate information. MCL 769.349(10); People v
Leversee, 243 Mich App 337, 348; 622 NW2d 325 (2000). Except as otherwise
provided in the statute, MCL 769.34 requires that the trial court impose a sentence
within the guidelines range, but permits departures from the guidelines for
substantial and compelling reasons. MCL 769.34(2)-(3); People v Hegwood, 465
Mich 432, 438; 636 NW2d 127 (2001).
As defendant recognizes, his minimum sentence of nine years was at the
low end of the sentencing guidelines range for his offense. MCL 777.62.
Accordingly, defendant’s argument is without merit because of the statutory
limitation on appellate review of sentences. MCL 769.34(10). People v Babcock,
469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). [Id. at 670-671, footnote omitted.]
In the instant case, defendant acknowledges that his sentences fall within the statutory
guidelines range. Defendant neither alleges error in the scoring of the guidelines nor does he
argue that the trial court relied on inaccurate information in determining his sentence.
-6-
Defendant’s sentences are therefore presumptively proportionate and must be affirmed. Id.;
Babcock, supra at 261 (a sentence within the guidelines range is not subject to review for
proportionality); MCL 769.34(10). Defendant’s argument that his sentences are cruel and/or
unusual is thus outside the limited scope of review as provided by statute. McLaughlin, supra.
In any event, we note that defendant is a third habitual offender, with a criminal record
consisting of six felony convictions. He previously pleaded guilty in Wayne circuit court to
sexually assaulting the victims in the instant case. Defendant sexually molested twin four-yearold sisters, the daughters of his girlfriend. As previously noted, the molestation included oral,
vaginal, and rectal sex. Given the egregious nature of the sexual assaults and defendant’s
extensive criminal history, defendant’s sentence of thirty to sixty years on each of the six counts
of CSC I, a crime for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment may be imposed, is clearly
proportionate in this case. It is well established that a proportionate sentence is not cruel and
unusual punishment. People v Colon, 250 Mich App 59, 66; 644 NW2d 790 (2002); People v
Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 456; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). Thus, defendant’s sentence did not
constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment under either constitutional provision.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.