PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY LAMONT JONES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247353
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-186780-FC
ANTHONY LAMONT JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Jansen and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and kidnapping, MCL 750.349. He was sentenced as a second
habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery
conviction, twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment for the carjacking conviction, and twenty to
thirty years’ imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction. The carjacking sentence is to be
served consecutive to the armed robbery and kidnapping sentences, which are concurrent.
Defendant appeals only the sentences imposed by the trial court. We affirm.
On the evening of August 13, 2002, Christine Vaghy was leaving her place of business
when defendant, armed with a gun, forced Vaghy into her car, made her open the passenger door
so he could enter the vehicle, and then forced her to drive around for approximately thirty-five
minutes. During the ordeal, Vaghy developed breathing difficulty, and she eventually pulled the
car over to the side of the road, telling defendant that she could not continue and that she needed
to get out of the car. On defendant’s insistence, Vaghy gave defendant all the money she had in
her purse and a credit card. She then stepped out of the car, grasping her purse in the process,
and ran to a nearby gas station. Vaghy left behind her briefcase that contained her checkbook as
well as her mother’s checkbook. Defendant drove off with Vaghy’s car. The day after the
crime, the victim continued having breathing problems, and she went to the hospital where she
was diagnosed with a heart attack.
A few days after the crime, Vaghy’s daughter received a telephone call from someone
claiming to be from a bank and requesting the social security numbers for Vaghy and her mother.
The source of a similar subsequent call was identified through caller ID, reflecting a Detroit
address. Later, defendant was stopped and arrested when police saw him driving the victim’s
vehicle near the identified address. Vaghy identified defendant as the perpetrator in a police
line-up. Defendant gave police various accounts of how he obtained the car, including a claim
-1-
that his brother first had the vehicle. Defendant subsequently stated that Vaghy freely and
willingly gave him a ride and that he drove away with the car when she entered the gas station.
Defendant denied having a gun and asserted that he simply needed a ride to a “safe” place. At
trial, defendant testified that he was at home recovering from a work injury when the crime
occurred. He maintained that his statements to police were coerced through police threats. The
jury rejected the defense presented by defendant, and he was convicted of armed robbery,
carjacking, and kidnapping.
On appeal, defendant challenges only the sentences imposed by the trial court, arguing
that the consecutive terms of imprisonment are disproportionate to the offenses and the offender
and constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion despite the individual sentences being within the
minimum sentencing guideline ranges.
Defendant contends that MCL 769.34(10) is
unconstitutional in that it violates the principle of separation of powers, Const 1963, art 3, § 2,
and divests the judicial power of the courts, Const 1963, art 6, § 1. Defendant further argues
that MCL 769.34(10) violates procedural and substantive due process rights, requiring
fundamental fairness, by prohibiting appellate review of a disproportionate sentence and
precluding claims that a sentence conflicts with constitutional protections against cruel and
unusual punishment. Finally, defendant maintains that MCL 769.34(10) is in derogation of
Const 1963, art 1, § 20, which provides, in general, an appeal as a matter of right for those
accused in criminal proceedings.
Interpretation of the sentencing guidelines and consideration of constitutional arguments
present issues of law that this Court reviews de novo on appeal. People v Babcock, 469 Mich
247, 253; 666 NW2d 231 (2003); McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 23; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).
The legislative sentencing guidelines control in the case at bar because the charged offenses
occurred after January 1, 1999. MCL 769.34(2); People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 254;
611 NW2d 316 (2000).
MCL 769.34(10) provides:
If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range,
the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for
resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate
information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence. A party shall
not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the sentencing guidelines
or challenging the accuracy of information relied upon in determining a sentence
that is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range unless the party has raised
the issue at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion
to remand filed in the court of appeals.1
1
We note that MCR 6.429(C) provides, contrary to MCL 769.34(10), that scoring challenges and
challenges regarding the accuracy of the presentence report must be raised at or before
sentencing unless the defendant demonstrates that the challenge was brought as soon as an
inaccuracy could reasonably have been discovered. This Court in People v McGuffey, 251 Mich
App 155, 165-166; 649 NW2d 801 (2002), held that “the court rule, MCR 6.429(C), must prevail
(continued…)
-2-
As acknowledged by defendant, the sentences imposed by the trial court fell within the
minimum sentencing guideline ranges. According to MCL 769.34(10), we are mandated to
affirm the sentences without further consideration because there is no challenge to the scoring of
the guidelines, nor is there a challenge concerning the accuracy of the presentence investigation
report. Defendant wishes us to engage in an analysis of MCL 769.34(10) in order to determine
its constitutional soundness. On closer inspection of defendant’s argument, it becomes clear that
it is unnecessary to address the constitutional validity of the statute because the essence of
defendant’s claim is not that the individual sentences are inappropriate and constitute an abuse of
discretion but rather that the abuse of discretion lay with the trial court’s ruling making the
carjacking sentence consecutive.2 In Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that “there exists
a general presumption by this Court that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not
necessary to resolve a case.” (Citation omitted.) Only when compelled may an appellate court
render constitutional pronouncements, and then so with great circumspection and trepidation.
Council of Orgs & Others for Ed About Parochiaid, Inc v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568; 566
NW2d 208 (1997).
Michigan’s carjacking statute, MCL 750.529a(2), provides that “[a] sentence imposed for
a violation of this section may be imposed to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed
for a conviction that arises out of the same transaction.” Concurrent sentencing is the norm in
Michigan, and a court may impose consecutive sentences only if authorized by statute. People v
St John, 230 Mich App 644, 646; 585 NW2d 849 (1998). The use of the term “may” signifies
that a trial court has the discretion to either impose or not impose a consecutive sentence. Id. at
646-647; see also Jordan v Jarvis, 200 Mich App 445, 451; 505 NW2d 279 (1993). Thus, a trial
court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion exists only where an unprejudiced person, considering the facts upon which
the trial court made its decision, would find that there was no justification or excuse for the
ruling made, People v Miller, 198 Mich App 494, 495; 499 NW2d 373 (1993), or where the
result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will
and a defiance of judgment, People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 250; 650 NW2d 659 (2002).
We find nothing in the language of MCL 769.34(10) that precludes appellate review of a
trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences as opposed to concurrent sentences, where
the language of the statute merely requires affirmance of a sentence within the appropriate
guidelines range absent a scoring error or presentence report inaccuracy. Affirming or reversing
the twenty- to thirty-year prison terms is not the issue here. Rather, the imperative question
(…continued)
over the conflicting statutory provision, MCL 769.34(10).” (Citation omitted.)
2
Defendant states on appeal that “the imposition of the two consecutive terms of 20 to 30 years
of imprisonment in the case at bar is an abuse of sentencing discretion as the sentences are
disproportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offenses and the offender.” Defendant
further argues that the trial court “essentially sentenced Mr. Jones to life in prison by giving him
forty year[s] in prison.” It is evident that defendant’s complaint with the trial court’s sentencing
decision rests with and focuses on the fact that he is required to serve a minimum of forty years’
imprisonment, which, according to defendant, is too extreme. The forty-year term necessarily
arises out of the ruling making the carjacking sentence consecutive to the other sentences.
-3-
concerns the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. To the extent that defendant’s
argument can be read as a challenge to the individual sentences, we decline to address the
argument in such a manner because it would unnecessarily compel constitutional
pronouncements and because a mechanism exists to address the heart of defendant’s claims
through review of the court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. Because there exists a
mode of appellate review in relation to the crux of defendant’s grievance with the sentences, it is
unnecessary to determine whether MCL 769.34(10) unconstitutionally hinders defendant from
fully challenging the judgment of sentence.3
Defendant asserts that because he had a limited prior record with no history of assault, the
judgment of sentence constituted an abuse of discretion and cruel and unusual punishment. We
disagree.
“The enhancement of punishment through consecutive sentencing is a legislative action
taken for the ostensible purpose of deterring certain criminal behavior.” People v Morris, 450
Mich 316, 327; 537 NW2d 842 (1995)(citation omitted). If a defendant receives consecutive
sentences and neither sentence exceeds the maximum punishment allowed under the law, the
aggregate of the sentences will not be deemed disproportionate under the rule of proportionality
set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). People v Miles, 454 Mich
90, 95; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). The maximum punishment allowed for both armed robbery and
carjacking is life in prison. MCL 750.529; MCL 750.529a. In determining whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual, one must look to the gravity of the offense and harshness of the
penalty, compare the penalty to those imposed for other crimes, and consider the goal of
rehabilitation. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 363; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). A
sentence that is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender is not cruel and
unusual punishment. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 456; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). We
deem it appropriate to consider proportionality principles in the context of determining whether
the trial court abused its discretion in making the carjacking sentence run consecutive to the
armed robbery and kidnapping sentences.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences. Defendant had a prior felony drug conviction; however, he chose not to appear for
sentencing, and there was an active warrant out for his arrest. This reflects a failure to take
responsibility for his actions and a failure to be accountable. The victim offered defendant the
car keys when he first approached her, which could have ended the matter, yet he refused the
keys and instead forced Vaghy to drive the car. Defendant held Vaghy captive in her car for
about thirty-five minutes at gunpoint, which certainly must have felt like an eternity to the
victim.
The uncertainty of what was going to occur, along with the fact that defendant
attempted to direct Vaghy to drive into a deserted park, terrorized the victim, apparently resulting
3
We do note that our Supreme Court recently held that the Separation of Powers Clause of the
Michigan Constitution, art 3, § 2, does not bar the Legislature from requiring the Court of
Appeals to affirm, under MCL 769.34(10), a minimum sentence that falls within the guidelines
range absent a scoring error or inaccurate presentence report. People v Garza, 469 Mich 431,
434-435; 670 NW2d 662 (2003).
-4-
in a heart attack. The imposition of consecutive sentences, which effectively will require
defendant to serve a minimum of forty years’ imprisonment, although severe, is consistent and
proportionate with the gravity and seriousness of the crime and is not cruel and unusual.
Minimally, there was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
